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INTRODUCTION 
“War is in no way a relationship of man with man but a 
relationship between States, in which individuals are only enemies 
by accident, not as men, but as soldiers” 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract, 1762 
 
 
A. Introduction to the problem 
International humanitarian law (IHL) is designed to protect these “enemies by 
accident”, to differentiate between men and soldiers. It is a branch of public 
international law that aims to limit the effects of armed conflict; it protects 
persons who are not or are no longer participating in the hostilities and restricts 
the means and methods of warfare. Most of the written rules of IHL are found in 
the 1949 Geneva Conventions (Conventions) and their 1977 Additional Protocols 
(Protocols/AP). 
Modern development of IHL has been a notable success. Its rules are among 
the most detailed in international law and its principal treaties enjoy almost uni-
versal acceptance. Nevertheless, serious violations of IHL occur in armed con-
flicts all over the world. There is a striking contrast between the richness of the 
normative order and the behavior of men.1 This leads to the conclusion that 
compliance is the major challenge facing humanitarian law today, rather than its 
very existence or the adequacy of its provisions.2 Compliance to IHL, in turn, is 
a multifaceted phenomenon, in that it includes compliance by the States that 
signed the treaties vis-à-vis their own people and the enemy fighters, compliance 
by armed groups involved in a conflict, and even compliance by the international 
community as a whole.  
The weakest part of international law has always been the methods for 
ensuring compliance, and “nowhere is this weakness more apparent than in IHL”, 
Greenwood holds.3 Despite well developed and articulated norms and rules for 
the regulation of armed conflicts, the implementation and enforcement of these 
rules lacks sufficient development and is carried out selectively.4 
                                                                                                 
1  William Bradford, “A behavioralist Theory of Compliance with the Laws of War”, 11 
International Legal Theory (2005) 1–33, p 6. 
2  Maria Teresa Dutli, “National Implementation measures of international humanitarian law: 
some practical aspects”, 1 Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law (1998) 245–261, p 245. 
3  Christopher Greenwood,”Ensuring Compliance with the law of armed conflict” – William 
E. Butler (ed), Control over compliance with International Law (Dordrecht/Boston: Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, 1991) 195–204, p 195. 
4  Umesh Kadam, “Implementation of international humanitarian law: problems and pro-
spects” – Naorem Sanajaoba (ed), Manual of International Humanitarian Laws (Regency: 
New Delhi, 2004) 379–396, p 379. 
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Implementation is a manifestation of the pacta sunt servanda principle, 
meaning to turn rules into action, i.e. applying international rules applicable in 
armed conflict or in preparation for such conflict. Implementation measures range 
from disseminating and teaching the text of the Conventions to adopting national 
criminal legislation to punish those that violate the law. Every State party to the 
Conventions is obligated to take such measures. However, a comparison of what 
is required and what has been done reveals that although valuable work has been 
accomplished, many of the agreed measures for implementation remain to be taken. 
This is a serious problem, and undoubtedly one of the main reasons why human-
itarian law is often disregarded in many armed conflicts.5 
Enforcement, as compared to implementation, is a retrospective response to 
the violation of norms, which presupposes failure in the primary endeavor of legal 
prescription to establish and maintain whatever normative standards may be in 
question. It involves at least some degree of sanctioning for violations and is truly 
the “soft underbelly” of this field of law. So much so, that the selective enforce-
ment of international law and the limited range of available enforcement mecha-
nisms has been said to detract from the legitimacy of international law as a legal 
regime.6 
One of the reasons why this problem persist is the ambiguity of the law. It is 
well established that the Conventions and Protocols need to be implemented and 
enforced, but what exactly does that mean; which of the more than 800 Articles 
need additional action by States in order to become effective in armed conflict? 
There has been some academic dispute over Common Article 1 (CA 1) to the 
Conventions, which states that States should respect and ensure respect for the 
Conventions in all circumstances. Some authors think that CA 1 incorporates 
every conceivable implementation and enforcement measure, which in turn has 
considerably distorted the scope of the CA 1 itself as well as the understanding 
of the concrete measures in other Articles. In addition, the Conventions are silent 
on the separation of implementation and enforcement measures, a distinction that 
I believe is important. It will be demonstrated in the next chapters that these two 
sets of measures have a different temporal and material scope and understanding 
which measures bring results in which circumstances, can help guarantee the aims 
of IHL. 
Given the evident persistence of both international and non-international 
armed conflicts throughout the world, the continued relevance of IHL cannot be 
denied. Both the number of armed conflicts and the number of parties fighting 
                                                                                                 
5  Dieter Fleck, “Implementing International Humanitarian Law: Problems and Priorities” – 
Naorem Sanajaoba (ed), Manual of International Humanitarian Laws (Regency: New Delhi, 
2004) 348–362, p 355. 
6  Hilaire McCoubrey, International Humanitarian Law, Modern Developments in the 
limitation of Warfare (Ashgate, Dartmouth, 1998), pp 57–58; Hilary Charlesworth, et al, 
„International law and national law: fluid states“ – Hilary Charlesworth (ed), The fluid state: 
international law and national legal systems (Federation Press, 2005) 1–17, p 10. 
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have grown exponentially, however the inability to explain and predict com-
pliance with IHL remains.7 
In the 1980s, the topic of national implementation was often discussed at inter-
national conferences and in scholarly articles. This was due to the major break-
through of adopting the two additional Protocols to the Conventions. After this 
period, however, the importance of implementation gradually diminished in 
academic literature. Focus shifted to enforcement measures, international crimi-
nal adjudication and the opportunities offered by counter terrorism laws. 
I argue that after 70 years of adopting the Geneva Conventions time has come 
to revisit the “roots” of modern IHL; the text of the Conventions and Protocols, 
the myriad of implementation measures available but not fully used and the fun-
damental preventative ideas the drafters had in mind. IHL gives us a vast array of 
measures to take before resorting to international criminal adjudication. Roberts 
has cleverly pointed out that “The near-exclusive preoccupation of lawyers with 
major international trials reduces the numerous strands in the rope of imple-
mentation to one single strand, which is liable to break under the strain.”8 This 
thesis explores what are the other strands that make up the rope of compliance 
with IHL. 
Other authors have suggested that international criminal justice provides 
minimal general deterrence of future violations of IHL.9 Or that “enforcement 
actions have been so fragmentary, decentralized and sporadic that it remains 
impossible, rebus sic stantibus, to speak of an effective system of coercive 
enforcement of international rules.”10 If respect for the rules cannot, in general, 
be acheived through punishment, one has to ask what are the options left for 
States to ensure the effectiveness of IHL. This too illustrates the need to 
differentiate between measures of implementation and enforcement. 
There is some hope that implementation issues will be given more thought in 
the coming years. In 2016, and 2018 respectively, the International Committee of 
the Red Cross (ICRC) released new commentaries on the First and Second 
Geneva Conventions, after more than a 60-years wait. This should spark some 
academic debate on the importance and durability of the Conventions. So far 
hardly any commentators have picked up on these developments, which is why 
this thesis is timely and adds to the discussion. The few articles published and 
                                                                                                 
7  George H. Aldrich, “Compliance with the law, problems and prospects” – H. Fox & M.A. 
Meyer (eds), Armed Conflict and the new Law: Ensuring Compliance (London: British Institute 
of International and Comparative Law, 1993) 3–13, p 3.  
8  Adam Roberts, “Implementation of the laws of war in the late 20th century conflicts”, 29 
Security Dialogue (1998) 137–150, p 382. 
9  Chris Jenks, “Moral Touchstone, Not General Deterrence: The Role of International 
Criminal Justice in Fostering Compliance with International Humanitarian Law”, 96 Inter-
national Review of the Red Cross (2005) 776–784, p 776. 
10  Benedetto Conforti, International Law and the Role of Domestic Legal Systems (Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, 1993), p 7.  
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seminars held are addressed in this thesis. For example, right after the com-
mentary to the First Convention was published, the ICRC hosted a high-level 
panel, which asked whether the “erosion of respect for IHL” was real or perceived 
and how could the gap between the development of IHL and the situation on the 
ground be bridged.11 
This thesis thus serves a purpose of drawing attention to prevention and 
implementation in the field of IHL, as well as illustrating where this branch of 
law is currently positioned against other intertwined areas of public international 
law. The approach taken is uncommon in this day and age in concentrating mostly 
on preventive activities rather than enforcement, which has been in the centre of 
academic literature for the past decades. I ask whether the improper implemen-
tation of national measures, which are mostly preventive in nature, could lead to 
serious infringements on international level. 
In addition, all three groups of measures – preventive, monitoring and repres-
sive – are brought together here while the majority of previous authors choose to 
focus on one group only. This is complemented by a thorough analysis of the 
scope of CA 1. The latter is seen as a basis of States’ obligation to ensure respect 
for the Conventions, therefore analysing these elements together gives the thesis 
additional value.  
The novelty also lies in the fact that the thesis addresses the difference between 
implementation and enforcement measures foreseen under IHL, and outlines that 
their temporal scope, relevant actors covered, and desired results are divergent. 
Enforcement is a retroactive response that presupposes some level of failure in 
implementation. This element has not been studied in detail previously. The 
thesis also emphasises the importance of national implementation measures, i.e. 
those domestic legislative and administrative measures necessary to facilitate 
compliance with the law, as opposed to measures taken on the international level. 
National implementation is something that has not received enough attention in 
past decades. Focus should be on raising awareness on IHL and its full incorpo-
ration in national doctrines and handbooks, in reality it is on dealing with the 
consequences.  
 
 
B. Research aim and questions 
The purpose of this thesis is to assess what are the reasons leading to continuous 
violations of IHL and how to enchance compliance with this body of law. 
The research aims to establish whether (and to which extent) the implemen-
tation and enforcement measures available under IHL have been used by States 
to prevent violations and foster deterrence. Both prevention and deterrence are 
                                                                                                 
11  ICRC, “Is the law of armed conflict in crisis and how to recommit to its respect?”, 3.06.2016, 
<www.icrc.org/en/document/law-armed-conflict-crisis-and-how-recommit-its-respect> 
(1.11.2019). 
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important aims, however, more needs to be done to bring focus back on preven-
tion to ensure that we do not need to eventually resort to adjudication. In con-
nection to this, it could be asked whether the evidenced underuse of national 
implementation measures could have led to major violations on international 
level. The Conventions offer a variety of specific measures to be taken and also 
call for their respect in all circumstances. However, the scope of the duty to 
respect and ensure respect for the Conventions as enshrined in CA 1 is unclear 
and debatable as it leaves open what kind of legal or moral obligations States 
actually have. 
Therefore, it is necessary to establish what the correct interpretation of CA 1 
is, i.e. is it to be understood restrictively or extensively. As a natural sequel, the 
existing implementation measures in the Conventions and Protocols as well as 
those stemming from customary law and other fields of law, have to be outlined 
and systemized. This analysis is followed by enquiring whether the dissemination 
and teaching obligations that parties to a conflict have could prove decisive in 
fostering wider respect for the Conventions. 
Furthermore, it is necessary to ask if, and which of, the reporting, monitoring 
and repressive measures enshrined in the legal texts have been used in practice, 
or should be used with more frequency in the future. Finally, the reasons why 
relevant actors choose to comply with IHL are analysed. This is a complex issue 
that has not received enough attention in academic dispute and calls for some 
multidisciplinary insight. 
 
To achieve these research aims, the following research questions are posed: 
1) What are the current and inherent challenges in applying IHL that lead to its 
continuous violations? 
2) What is the scope of CA 1? What legal and/or moral obligations does it bring 
to States regarding their own subjects and regarding other States and non-state 
actors? 
3) What is the difference between implementation and enforcement and how can 
understanding this help foster compliance? 
4) To what extent can teaching and disseminating influence the behaviour of 
warring parties and help ensure respect for the Conventions? 
5) Which are the monitoring and reporting mechanisms available in the Conven-
tions that are not properly implemented and could be used more effectively? 
6) Can it be demonstrated that the fear of international adjudication has provided 
a general deterrent effect and lead to less violations of the law? 
7) Are the Conventions capable of accommodating the modern-day conflict and 
actors, or is a revision urgently needed? 
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C. Structure of the dissertation 
The thesis is structured to allow for an in-depth discussion on the way the imple-
mentation measures could foster greater compliance, and why repressive measures 
are usually not the most effective ones. The work is divided into five chapters 
that form a logical cycle from the prevention to the repression activities. The first 
chapter is meant for setting the scene, by briefly reminding the reader of the 
sources of IHL and the conditions of its applicability. To emphasise understanding 
why national implementation measures are so important and why IHL deserves 
such attention, this chapter also asks how international law interacts with national 
law, and explains the special character and weaknesses of IHL. This latter part 
answers the question why IHL has been continuously violated in practice.  
The second chapter concerns with analysing the scope of CA 1. It asks what 
the historical background of this Article is, how different authors see the legal or 
moral obligations it entails and whether it has been used in State practice and case 
law. This is vital for understanding what, why and how needs to be implemented 
and setting the foundation for further discussions.  
The last three chapters are themed prevention, supervision and repression. 
This is a logical method to organise IHL implementation and enforcement 
measures, which are roughly divided into those that can be taken before, during, 
and after a conflict. The chapter on prevention will focus on the difference 
between implementation and enforcement measures as well as on what imple-
mentation actually covers; specifically, the dissemination and instruction obli-
gations. Here I find answers to how understanding the difference between imple-
mentation and enforcement can lead to better compliance and how teaching and 
disseminating influence the behaviour of the belligerents. 
The supervision chapter will address reporting and monitoring, Protecting 
Powers, fact-finding, and enquiry. I ask which are the monitoring and reporting 
mechanisms available in the Conventions, have they been used in practice and 
what could be the reasons for their misuse. The role of the EU in implementing 
IHL will also be addressed in this chapter, since it is of continuous importance on 
the international arena. 
In the last chapter, I will demonstrate the importance of enforcement of IHL. 
I ask what are the factors influencing the behaviour of armed groups and what 
kind of deterrent effect international adjudication may have. The role of the UN 
in enforcing the law is discussed here. 
Ways of fostering better compliance are analysed and proposed throughout 
the thesis under various headings. When considering different implementation 
measures, I explained what improvements commentators offer and some positive 
examples they give. Similarly, the continuous adequacy of the Conventions was 
outlined in different chapters and more thoroughly in the Conclusions. 
Where relevant I also included Estonian specific examples of national imple-
mentation measures taken. I dedicated my master’s thesis to this topic and care-
fully analysed a full set on measures obligatory for States parties. In this PhD 
thesis I took a more theoretical approach and focused less on concrete country 
14 
specific examples. However, I briefly analysed how teaching and training are 
carried out in the armed forces and to the civil society in Estonia. In addition, 
I looked at the national regulation of grave breaches, as well as protection of the 
emblem and personnel on the Red Cross. 
 
 
D. Theses set forth for the defence 
The main hypothesis set forth in this thesis is that the Conventions and Protocols 
are fit for modern day purposes and no revision should be foreseen at this point. 
To support this hypothesis, I also test the following ones: 
Existing law is unclear on what needs to be implemented and what measures 
are available for States to enforce the law. CA 1 holds that States should respect 
and ensure respect for the Conventions in all circumstances. However, since it is 
not clear what the scope of this Article is, the extent of the obligation as well as 
concrete measures in other Articles remain ambiguous. 
The Conventions offer a vast array of implementation measures that can and 
should be used before resorting to international criminal adjudication. The latter 
does not have a sufficient deterrent effect to outweigh the fundamental preven-
tative ideas proposed by the drafters of the Conventions.  
Lack of proper teaching and disseminating of IHL among armed forces and 
civilian population influences behaviour and may lead to violations on and off 
the battlefield. 
The treaty-based monitoring and reporting mechanisms are not properly 
implemented at this stage, but there are no legal obstacles for doing so in the future. 
 
 
E. Description of the applied methodology 
Although this study is rooted in the field of IHL, it also touches upon national 
law, human rights law (HRL) and international criminal law. Links are also fre-
quently made to sociology, international relations and military theories. These 
disciplines help to understand why combatants choose to comply with the law 
and what are the different factors influencing their behaviour. They also clarify 
why States are reluctant to implement some of the measures foreseen in the Con-
ventions, for example the monitoring and reporting obligations that have a peer-
review character. The research methods used in this work are mainly doctrinal 
and historical. Doctrinal research is based on the study of current positive law or 
the “black letter law” as laid down in rules, principles, concepts, doctrines, case 
law, and annotations in literature.12 This method was mostly used in the beginning 
of this work, where it is important to set the scene and find out exactly what the 
main rules of IHL mean. As the work progresses the epistemological nature of 
                                                                                                 
12  Paul Chynoweth, “Legal research”– Andrew Knight & Les Ruddock (eds), Advanced 
research methods in the built environment (Wiley-Blackwell, 2008) 28–38, p 29.  
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the research changes from the internal enquiry of the meaning of the law, to that 
of external enquiry into the law as social entity.13 This means interdisciplinary 
research that aims to evaluate the effectiveness of legislation in achieving par-
ticular social goals and an examination of the extent to which it is being complied 
with. In analysing the characteristics of armed groups and the reasons for their 
behaviour, organizational and behavioural theory literature was used. The two 
major studies by the ICRC discussed in this work, as well as works by military 
lawyers and officers, enabled to answer the question on what works in training 
and how the characteristics of armed groups might contribute to violations. 
Historical method was used to find out how a certain article or institute has 
developed over time. This is not only important to interpret CA 1, but also the 
interplay between historical events and the development of specific imple-
mentation measures. To achieve these goals, I used literature dating back to the 
beginning of the 20th century and the travaux préparatoires of the Conventions. 
When addressing a concrete implementation or enforcement obligation, I 
found out where its roots are in both customary international law and in the text 
of the Conventions. This revealed how an obligation came to be and what were 
the difficulties in codifying it in the 1949 Conventions or 1977 Protocols. That 
background information proved quite indicative of the chances of an obligation 
being complied with. If an obligation was the result of harduous negotiations and 
significantly watered down compared to the original wording offered, it was less 
likely to be applied in practice. I then looked at case law and state practise to find 
out how the scope of an obligation has been understood and applied in practise. 
Academic articles on the topic were a major source of analysis and comparison. 
I compared how the discourse has changed over the past decades, and how 
various authors saw the same problem. For example, there are tens of different 
interpretations of what implementation is and which measures it encompasses. In 
some instances, I drew comparisons with instruments from other fields of law, 
notably the HRL.  
Other elements of the traditional legal method and interpretation catalogue 
were used whenever appropriate. The grammatical interpretation was used to 
clarify the meaning of the text of CA 1, supplemented by systematic and teleo-
logical interpretation techniques. Throughout the thesis the catalogue served as a 
valuable tool for a comprehensive understanding of any given article in the Con-
ventions. 
As this work is doctrinal in nature, empirical research was mainly left out of 
the scope. It was used indirectly by summarizing studies where empirical research 
was used, such as the ICRC studies on the roots of restraints in war. Some 
Estonian specific examples on concrete implementation measures were also 
given throughout the thesis. 
The sources used in this thesis are wide-ranging. Scholarly books and articles, 
mainly written in English or French, form the bulk of the literature. In addition, 
the decisions of national and international courts, UN resolutions, EU documents, 
                                                                                                 
13  Ibid, p 30. 
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interviews, and online resources were all used to answer the research questions 
posed. It is not uncommon in IHL that a few prominent authors are cited more 
than others. Thus, the works of professors Kalshoven, Sassoli, Greenwood and 
Fleck stand out in this rather confined group of authors. 
Among others, I have benefitted from using the Peace Palace Library re-
sources in The Hague, the Georgetown University Law Centre in Washington, 
the Helsinki University Law School and the ICRC Brussels headquarters library. 
During the many years of writing this thesis, I have attended numerous summer 
schools and moot courts, as well as conferences on IHL which have also provided 
valuable insights and additional sources. All online resources used were last 
accessed on 1 November 2019. 
 
 
F. Overview of the existing legal research on 
the topic of the dissertation 
Analysis of the literature available revealed that academic dispute on this topic 
has mostly focused on enforcement measures, the role of international criminal 
courts and individual criminal responsibility, and counterterrorism responses for 
the past decades. The creation of the International Criminal Court set the stage 
for shifting the focus from implementation to enforcement, and the prevalence of 
international criminal law over IHL. There is a handful of authors, and most 
notably the ICRC, who have emphasised the importance of implementation 
measures available in the Conventions. For example, Drzewicki in 1989, Dutli in 
1998 and Kadam in 2004 wrote about national implementation measures, 
analysing the existing measures and their effectiveness much like it is done in this 
thesis.14 They listed the various implementation measures available in the Con-
ventions and asked whether measures from other fields of law could be used. 
After that period, however, implementation as a whole has not been in the centre 
of discussions.  
There has also been some periodic debate on the scope of CA 1. Kalshoven 
started this discussion in 1999 and was answered by Chazournes and Condorelli 
in 2000. Ten years later, Zych and Focarelli revived this discussion by offering 
some new insights and warning against too extensive interpretation.15 These 
                                                                                                 
14  Dutli, “National Implementation measures”, supra nota 2; Kadam, “Implementation of 
international humanitarian law”, supra nota 4; Krzysztof Drzewicki, „National Legislation as 
a measure for implementation of international humanitarian law“ – Fritz Kalshoven & Yves 
Sandoz (eds), Implementation of International Humanitarian Law. Research Papers by 
participants in the 1986 Session of the Centre for Studies and Research in International Law 
and International Relations of the Hague Academy of International Law (1989) 109–131. 
15  Frits Kalshoven, “The Undertaking to Respect and Ensure Respect in All Circumstances: 
From Tiny Seed to Ripening Fruit”, 2 Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law (1999) 
3–61; Tomasz Zych, “The Scope of the Obligation to Respect and to Ensure Respect for 
International Humanitarian Law”, 27 Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice (2009) 251–270; 
Laurence Boisson de Chazournes & Luigi Condorelli, “Common Article 1 of the Geneva 
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examples nevertheless remain modest in the vast pool of literature on inter-
national law. 
More recently there are somewhat more references to the prevention and 
implementation elements of IHL. The December 2015 issue of the International 
Review of the Red Cross was themed Generating respect for law and was aimed 
at “taking stock of the lessons learnt in the field of influencing behaviour and 
developing strategies for enhanced respect for the law and, more generally, to 
recall the importance of taking preventive measures.”16 As such, this was quite a 
unique issue of the Review. In 2018, the Roots of Restraint in War study was 
published. This is an update of the 2004 study, which investigates how formal 
and informal norms condition the behaviour of soldiers and fighters depending 
on the kind of armed organization to which they belong.17 Finally, the 2019 
December International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent will dis-
cuss a resolution titled “A road map for better national implementation of inter-
national humanitarian law.” This is a part of long ang ongoing efforts of the ICRC 
and many likeminded governments to remind the international community of 
their obligations and try to advocate for a voluntary reporting system, as will be 
seen below. It is also worth noting the encouraging words of the President of the 
ICRC delivered recently: “International humanitarian law does not ask the 
impossible. States were not carried away by lofty ideals when they negotiated the 
treaties. They knew the realities of war and they set out inherently pragmatic rules 
to protect and respect human life and dignity.”18 
All in all, a shift towards taking prevention seriously can be noticed in the 
literature of the past five years. This thesis is thus timely and adds to the debate 
in offering a comprehensive approach on implementation measures. The ideas 
and suggestions put forward here are more far-reaching than the ones of ICRC in 
their latest resolutions. There seems to be quite a discord between what is legally 
possible and what is feasible in current political circumstances.  
  
                                                                                                 
Conventions Revisited: Protecting Collective Interests”, 837 International Review of the Red 
Cross (2000). <www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/article/other/57jqcp.htm>; Carlo 
Focarelli, “Common Article 1 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions: A Soap Bubble?”, 21 
European Journal of International Law (2010) 125–171. 
16  Vincent Bernard, “Time to take prevention seriously: editorial”, 96 The International Review 
of the Red Cross (2014) 689–696.  
17  The Roots of Restraint in War (ICRC, 2018),   
<www.icrc.org/en/publication/roots-restraint-war> (1.11.2019). 
18  Peter Maurer, „Briefing by ICRC President to UN Security Council on The promotion and 
strengthening of the rule of law in the maintenance of international peace and security“, 
<www.icrc.org/en/document/geneva-conventions-are-all-us> (1.11.2019); ICRC, Bringing 
IHL Home: A road map for better national implementation of international humanitarian law, 
33rd International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, Geneva, 9–12 December 
2019, Background document, <rcrcconference.org/app/uploads/2019/06/Background-
document-33IC-report-vFinal_en.pdf> (1.11.2019). 
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1. SETTING THE SCENE 
Humanitarian law tries to humanize an area which is per se inhumane. Imple-
menting and enforcing law in such circumstances is one of the greatest tasks a 
legal order has to cope with.19 Violations of IHL have been committed by parties 
to nearly every armed conflict, however, both published reports and internal 
findings show that the protective provisions of IHL have prevented or reduced 
great suffering in many cases.20  
IHL is a compromise between military and humanitarian requirements, as 
Greenwood notes. “Its rules comply with both military necessity and the dictates 
of humanity. Considerations of military necessity cannot, therefore, justify 
departing from the rules of humanitarian law in armed conflicts to seek a military 
advantage using forbidden means.”21 On the other hand, it should not be assumed 
that humanitarian law and military requirements will necessarily be opposed to 
one another. “On the contrary, most rules of humanitarian law reflect good military 
practice, and adherence by armed forces to those rules is likely to reinforce 
discipline and good order within the forces concerned.”22 
In other words, IHL is a very specific field of public international law. To under-
stand why its implementation and enforcement is so difficult, some historical 
context will be provided in this introductory chapter, followed by analysis of 
IHLs current and inherent challenges. This will answer the first set of research 
questions I posed, namely why is the law still constantly violated. 
 
 
1.1. A brief history and definition of International 
Humanitarian Law 
The origins of humanitarian law date back to ancient history. The concept of rules 
regulating war is recognizable in every culture, religion, and tradition. In all 
historical periods, leaders set up rules and taboos that determine what is allowed 
and what is forbidden in military activities.23 Some rules, which imposed 
restrictions on the conduct of war, the means of warfare, and their application, 
                                                                                                 
19  Silja Vöneky, “Implementation and Enforcement of International Humanitarian Law” – 
Dieter Fleck (ed), The Handbook of International Humanitarian Law (3rd edn, Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2013) 648–660, p 648. 
20  Ibid, 649. 
21  Christopher Greenwood, “Historical development and legal basis” – Dieter Fleck (ed), The 
Handbook of International Humanitarian Law (2nd edn, Oxford University Press, 2008) 1–44, 
p 38. 
22  Ibid, p 38. 
23  Francoise Bouchet-Saulnier, The practical guide to humanitarian law (3rd edn, Rowman 
& Littlefield Publishers, 2014), p 310. 
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can be traced back to the Sumerians, the Code of Hammurabi, ancient India, 
Islam, Bushi-Do, etc.24 
The development of rules of war resulted from the slow accretion of practical, 
and ad hoc, agreements made between the participants in particular wars. Dating 
roughly from the discovery of the New World, attention began to focus gradually 
on the regulation of war rather than on the reasons for its occurrence, or its “just-
ness.” In time, this was reflected in a contractual approach to the codification of 
certain rules, particularly applicable to weapons, and military practices.25 
The origins of contemporary humanitarian law go back to the efforts codifying 
the laws and customs of war, which started in the second half of the 19th century. 
Soviet professor Trainin notes that between 1815 and 1910 there were 148 dif-
ferent international meetings to codify the laws and customs of war.26 IHL thus 
developed in the bosom of classical public international law and was cast in its 
mold. In consequence, IHL was formulated as a purely inter-state and contractual 
(or reciprocal) set of legal rules.27 Early developments in the laws of war reflect 
an objective acknowledgement that “civilized” States needed to observe practical 
restraints on a reciprocal basis in order to guarantee their mutual survival.28 
Of the rich history of the development, two events (or rather persons) deserve 
particular attention. Namely, Francis Lieber and Henry Dunant. On behalf of US 
President Lincoln, Lieber prepared a manual of the battlefield in 1861 which was 
first put into effect in 1863 in the American Civil War. The Lieber Code is the 
origin of what has come to be known as the “Hague Law”. Dunant, on the other 
hand, after witnessing the horrors on the battlefield of Solferino (1859), launched 
the establishment of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).29 
After the events of the Second World War, it became unthinkable to ignore 
the caps in humanitarian law concerning the protection of civilians as witnessed 
                                                                                                 
24  Greenwood, “Historical development and legal basis”, supra nota 21, p 16. 
25  Elizabeth Chadwick, “It’s War, Jim, but not as we know it: A ‘reality-check’ for inter-
national laws of war?”, 39 Crime, law & social change (2003) 233–262, p 237. 
26  I.P. Trainin, “Questions of Guerrilla Warfare in the Law of War”, 40 American Journal of 
International Law (1946) 534–562, pp 534, 536. 
27  Georges Abi-Saab, „The specificities of humanitarian law“ – Christophe Swiniarski (ed), 
Studies and essays on International humanitarian law and Red Cross Principles in honour of 
Jean Pictet (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1984) 265–280, p 265. See for example: Geneva 
Convention for the amelioration of the condition of the wounded in armies in the Field, 
22.12.1864, in force 22.06.1965, 22 Stat. 940, T.S. No. 377; Declaration of St. Petersburg 
Renouncing the use in time of war of explosive projectiles under 400 grammes, 29.11.1986, 
in force 11.12.1868, 138 Parry’d T.S. 297; Hague Convention No II with Respect to the laws 
and customs of war on land, 29.07.1899, in force 4.09.1900, 32 Stat. 1803, T.S. No. 403 
28  Chadwick, “It’s war Jim”, supra nota 25, p 239. 
29  Greenwood, “Historical development and legal basis”, supra nota 21, pp 21–22. (Henry 
Dunant was a Genevese merchant, who published a book “A memory of Solferino” after 
witnessing the plight of 40000 Austrian, French, and Italian soldiers wounded on the battle-
field of Solferino. In 1863 the ICRC was founded in Geneva on his initiative, which has played 
a central role in the development and implementation of the rules of humanitarian law). 
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in practice. Consequently, a more ambitious phase of codification of humani-
tarian law got underway. The four Conventions adopted in Geneva on 12 August 
1949 were the fruit of this recodification. The 1977 Protocols unified protection 
with reference to notion of civilian victims of conflict, without mention of enemy 
nationality.30 Of the four conventions that resulted from the 1949 Conference, 
three substituted those already in force whereas the fourth was an entirely new 
Convention on the protection of civilians in time of war.31 
What is IHL as we know it today? In the broadest terms, IHL frames the coex-
istence of armed actors and humanitarian ones in situations of conflict. It refers 
to international rules that attempt to “mitigate the human suffering caused by 
war”.32 It is of relatively recent origin and the term itself does not appear in the 
Conventions of 1949. Therefore, one has to look at academic sources to define 
exactly what IHL means and encompasses. 
According to Gasser, IHL – also called the “law of armed conflict” and previ-
ously known as the “law of war” – is a special branch of law governing situations 
of armed conflict. IHL seeks to mitigate the effects of war, first in that it limits 
the choice of means and methods of conducting military operations, and secondly 
in that it obliges the belligerents to spare persons who do not or no longer 
participate in hostilities.33 The purpose of IHL in not to prevent war. Girod holds 
that, “quite prosaically, IHL seeks to preserve an oasis of humanity in battle until 
resort to armed force is no longer a means of settling differences between 
States.”34 
Schindler points out that the previously unknown term “international humani-
tarian law” was introduced by the ICRC in the early 1950s. This largely replaced 
the terms “law of war” and “law of armed conflicts” while blurring the distinction 
                                                                                                 
30  Bouchet-Saulnier, The practical guide, supra nota 23, p 312. Protocol (I) Additional to the 
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Inter-
national Armed Conflicts, 12.08.1949, in force 7.12.1978, 1125 UNTS 3; Protocol (II) 
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of 
Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, 12.08.1949, in force 7.12.1978, 1125 UNTS 
609. 
31  ICRC, What treaties make up IHL? What is customary IHL?  
<www.icrc.org/en/document/what-treaties-make-ihl-what-customary-ihl> (1.11.2019). Con-
vention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces 
in the Field, 12.08.1949, in force 21.10.1950, 75 UNTS 31; Convention (II) for the Ameli-
oration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at 
Sea, 12.08.1949, in force 21.10.1950, 75 UNTS 85; Convention (III) relative to the Treatment 
of Prisoners of War, 12.08.1949, in force 21.10.1950, 75 UNTS 135; Convention (IV) Relative 
to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 12.08.1949, in force 21.10.1950, 
75 UNTS 287. 
32  Frits Kalshoven & Liesbeth Zegveld, Constraints on the Waging of War (Geneva: ICRC, 
2001), p 12. 
33  Hans-Peter Gasser, “International Humanitarian Law” – Naorem Sanajaoba (ed), Manual 
of International Humanitarian Laws (Regency: New Delhi, 2004) 204–311, p 204. 
34  Christophe Girod, Storm in the desert: the International committee of the Red Cross and 
the Gulf War 1990–1991 (Geneva: ICRC, 2003), pp 26–27. 
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between the law applicable in armed conflicts and the law of human rights and 
giving rise to occasional confusion between these two branches of international 
law.35 
Greenwood holds that “IHL comprises all those rules of international law, 
which are designed to regulate the treatment of the individual – civilian or 
military, wounded or active – in international armed conflicts.” While the term is 
generally used in connection with the Conventions and the APs, it also applies to 
the rules governing methods and means of warfare and the government of occupied 
territory, for example, which are contained in earlier agreements such as the 
Hague Conventions of 1907. It also includes a number of rules of customary inter-
national law. IHL thus includes most of what used to be known as the laws of 
war.36 
Bouchet similarly states that the term IHL refers to a special branch of public 
international law concerning the “law of armed conflict” or the “law of war.” It 
is an ancient law, established progressively through the practice of States and 
codified through treaties they adopted.37 He thinks that the term IHL should be 
preferred as it places more emphasis on the humanitarian goals of the law or 
armed conflict. Solis further holds that the conflation of LOAC/IHL terminology 
reflects a desire of humanitarian-oriented groups and NGOs to avoid phrases like 
“law of war” in favour of more pacific terms, perhaps in the hope that battlefield 
actions may someday follow that description.38 
Darcy thinks that “the contemporary use of different nomenclature reveals 
slightly diverging emphases as to the law’s purpose, although there is common 
agreement that the principal aim of these laws is to minimize suffering occurring 
during wartime”.39 
For military purposes, Colonel F. de Mulinen has suggested that the military 
should stay with the term “law of war”, the whole concept of war being the basis 
of the existence of the military. Members of the armed forces relate very well to 
“war” and they know “law”. Therefore, the concept of “law of war” is easier to 
refer to than “humanitarian law” which may seem alien to the military mind.40 
                                                                                                 
35  Dietrich Schindler, “Significance of the Geneva Conventions for the Contemporary 
World” – Naorem Sanajaoba (ed), Manual of International Humanitarian Laws (Regency: 
New Delhi, 2004) 42–55, p 44. (The annual report of 1953 of the ICRC was the first one to 
use the term IHL). 
36  Greenwood, “Historical development and legal basis”, supra nota 21, p 11; Michael H. 
Hoffman, “Emerging combatants, war crimes and the future of international humanitarian 
law”, 34 Crime, Law and Social Change (2000) 99–110, p 100. 
37  Bouchet-Saulnier, The practical guide, supra nota 23, p 307. 
38  Gary D. Solis, The Law of armed Conflict (Cambridge University Press, 2010) p 23. 
39  Shane Darcy, Judges, Law and War: The Judicial Development of IHL (Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 2014), p 5. Prosecutor v. Duško Tadic, Case No IT-94-1-T, ICTY, Judgement 
of the Appeals Chamber, 15.07.1999, para 96. 
40  Diane Guillemette, “Legal advisers in armed forces” – Fritz Kalshoven & Yves Sandoz 
(eds), Implementation of International Humanitarian Law. Research Papers by participants 
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As can be seen, some lack of clarity remains on the different terms used. In 
the context of this thesis the more narrow meaning of IHL is used. When speaking 
about implementation or enforcement of IHL, only the Conventions and Proto-
cols are focused on, as a general rule. If other legal instruments are analyzed, a 
reference is made to them separately. The terms “law of war” and “law of armed 
conflict” are used as synonyms for IHL to allow for more variety in the text. 
The fact that IHL deals with war does not mean that it lays open to doubt the 
general prohibition of war.41 Again, IHL is meant to alleviate suffering during 
armed conflicts, not to solve them; this is the role of the UN and the international 
community.42 
This is confirmed in the Preamble of AP I: “The High Contracting Parties … 
expressing their conviction that nothing in this Protocol or in the Geneva Con-
ventions of 12 August 1949 can be construed as legitimizing or authorizing any 
act of aggression or any other use of force inconsistent with the Charter of the 
United Nations”. It is interesting to note from a teleological point of view that in 
1949 the International Law Commission (ILC) refused to engage in codification 
of the laws of war because “public opinion might interpret its action as showing 
lack of confidence in the efficiency of the means at the disposal of the United 
Nations (UN) for maintaining peace”.43 
Use of force is prohibited under Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. UN member 
States may resort to force only in the exercise of their inherent right of individual 
or collective self-defence (Article 51) or as part of military sanctions authorized 
by the UNSC (Articles 42–48). IHL applies with equal force to all the parties in 
an armed conflict irrespective of which party was responsible for starting that 
conflict.44 Under ius ad bellum, the parties to an international armed conflict are 
never equal because one side has necessarily violated that law, although it is often 
controversial which side has done so. Conversely, under ius in bello, both sides 
have to always comply with exactly the same rules.45 
 
                                                                                                 
in the 1986 Session of the Centre for Studies and Research in International Law and Inter-
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41  Gasser, “International Humanitarian Law”, supra nota 33, p 205. 
42  Yves Sandoz, “Discours d’ouverture: la pertinence de la catégorisation des conflits armés: 
une réelle différence dans la protection des personnes touchées?” – Armed conflicts and 
Parties to Armed Conflicts under IHL: Confronting Legal Categories to Contemporary 
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43  Yearbook of the International Law Commission (A/CN.4/SER.A/1949), p 281. 
44  Greenwood, “Historical development and legal basis”, supra nota 21, p 1. 
45  Marco Sassoli, „Ius ad bellum and Ius in bello: the separation between the legality of the 
use of force and humanitarian rules to be respected in warfare: crucial or outdated?“ – Michael 
Schmitt & Jelena Pejic (eds), International law and armed conflict: exploring the faultlines: 
essays in honour of Yoram Dinstein (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2007) 241–264, p 246 
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1.2. Sources of International Humanitarian Law 
The Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), Article 38 identifies four 
sources of international law: 
(a)  Treaties between States; 
(b)  Customary international law derived from the practice of States; 
(c)  General principles of law recognized by civilised nations; and, 
(d)  Judicial decisions and the writings of “the most highly qualified publicists” 
(as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of international law).46 
 
The treaty law relevant to IHL consists primarily of the law of Geneva, aimed at 
the protection of victims of armed conflict, and the law of Hague, aimed at the 
actual conduct of hostilities. The 1864 Geneva Conventions for the Amelioration 
of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the Field defined the legal status 
on medical personnel. This marks the beginning of the development of what has 
become known as Geneva law. The Hague law consists of various declarations 
and conventions signed in the Hague, Netherlands in 1899, 1907, 1954, 1957, 
1970, 1973.47 The distinction between these two branches of law has become 
rather theoretical, however focus is on the Geneva law in this thesis. 
The most important written rules of IHL can be found in the following treaties: 
The 1949 Four Geneva Conventions on Amelioration of the Condition of the 
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (I); Amelioration of the Condi-
tion of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea (II); 
Treatment of Prisoners of War (III); Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of 
War (IV). The 1977 Two Protocols additional to the four 1949 Geneva Conven-
tions, strengthening protection for victims of international (Additional Protocol I) 
and non-international (Additional Protocol II) armed conflicts. The 2005 Protocol 
additional to the Geneva Conventions, and relating to the Adoption of an 
Additional Distinctive Emblem (Additional Protocol III). The 1956 Hague Con-
vention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict.48 
Unless the treaty or its provisions have become custom, however, conven-
tional law binds only its signatories.49 For the Hague and Geneva Conventions of 
the last 100 years or so, it has been said in connection to international customary 
law that the drafters of these instruments were keenly aware that they did not start 
from scratch, but were handling an already existing body of law.50 
                                                                                                 
46  Statute of the International Court of Justice, 26.7.1945, in force 24.10.1945, 1 UNTS xvi. 
47  Oonagh E. Fitzgerald, “Implementation of international humanitarian and related inter-
national law in Canada” – Oonagh E. Fitzgerald (ed), The Globalized Rule of Law: Relation-
ships between International and Domestic Law (Irwin Law: 2006) 625–639, p 627. 
48  References to these acts are provided elsewhere in this thesis. 
49  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Articles 26 and 38. 
50  Abi-Saab, „The specificities of humanitarian law“, supra nota 27, p 274. 
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Therefore, the gradual development of IHL means that customary law plays 
an equally important role here.51 Customary international law reflects certain 
practices that States follow in a repeated and consistent manner (State practice) 
and that they accept as law (opinio juris). Defined by the ICJ as “evidence of a 
general practice accepted as law”, customary law is one of the oldest sources of 
international law. Failure to respect such custom is therefore a violation of law. 
Customary law plays a very important role in the law of armed conflict because, 
among other things, it regulates interactions and confrontations between States 
on the one hand and non-state actors on the other, even where written rules are 
not applicable.52 
There is, however, another side to this phenomenon. As customary law origi-
nates from standards of behavior recognized and accepted as legitimate and 
beneficial, so called precedents, it can also develop “negative” precedents. This 
means that repeated acts violating the law may result in the progressive erosion 
of international law if they are not denounced openly. “The conduct of both State 
and non-state actors may therefore result in either the strengthening or weakening 
of IHL and principles. It is the duty of humanitarian actors to defend humanitarian 
customs through their actions and to denounce any failure to respect them.”53 
The 1949 Conventions reiterate the fact that persons and situations not covered 
by the Conventions remain covered by international customary law. This prin-
ciple is found in all four Conventions and AP I. Commonly known as the “Martens 
Clause”, developed by the Baltic-Russian professor Friedrich von Martens (1845–
1909), it states that 
 
[I]n cases not covered by the Conventions and AP I or by other international 
agreements, civilians and combatants remain under the protection and authority 
of the principles of international law derived from established custom, from 
the principles of humanity and from the dictates of public conscience.54 
 
It is thus established that international customary law is as binding on States as 
the international conventions to which they are parties. Many authors believe that 
the four 1949 Conventions – as well as most provisions of the 1977 Protocols – 
have gained the status of customary international law. This means that even States 
                                                                                                 
51  Hoffman, “Emerging combatants”, supra nota 36, p 100–101. 
52  Bouchet-Saulnier, The practical guide, supra nota 23, p 91; Christopher Greenwood, 
Sources of International Law: An Introduction,  
<legal.un.org/avl/pdf/ls/greenwood_outline.pdf> (1.11.2019) 
53  Bouchet-Saulnier, The practical guide, supra nota 23, p 91. 
54  GC I 63, GC II 62, GC III 142, GC IV 158 and AP I 1.2 Greenwood, “Historical development 
and legal basis”, supra nota 21, p 34; “What is not clear is whether the Martens Clause goes 
further and introduces into humanitarian law a rule that all weapons and means of warfare are 
to be judged against the standard of the “public conscience” even if their use does not contra-
vene the specific rules of customary international law such as the unnecessary suffering 
principle.” 
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that have not ratified them must abide by their rules.55 Note, however, that some 
authors are not entirely convinced that all provisions of the Conventions and 
Protocols now enjoy the status of customary law. This goes especially for the 
massive study and compendium recently completed and published by the ICRC 
of customary IHL that gives customary law status to almost all the norms of 
IHL.56 
Fleck is one of the authors to take issue with this. He stated recently that there 
is “a very strong development to apply all the rules to non-international armed 
conflicts by way of customary law. The ICRCs’ customary law study is a book of 
‘7 kilos’. But governments do not actually think so. Just think of how many objec-
tions States had when drafting AP II. Moreover customary law comprises State 
practice and opinio iuris. Actual State practice”, he adds, “not legal literature.”57 
Why is it important to ask whether the provisions of the universally applicable 
Conventions have attained the status of customary international law? Firstly, 
because an international tribunal may sometimes be able to apply rules of cus-
tomary international law even though it lacks the competence to apply the provi-
sions of a multilateral treaty (as evidenced in the Military and Paramilitary 
activities in and against Nicaragua Case). Secondly, in many States treaties do 
not form part of national legislation and cannot be applied by national courts, 
whereas national courts can and do apply rules of customary international law.58 
This could prove a difficult task in domestic implementation of IHL as most of 
the cases on IHL are indeed tried by domestic courts.  
 
 
1.3. When does International Humanitarian Law apply? 
The answer to this question can be found in Common Article 2 to the Conven-
tions: 
 
[t]he present Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any 
other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Con-
tracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them. 
The Convention shall also apply to all cases of partial or total occupation of 
the territory of a High Contracting Party… 
                                                                                                 
55  Bouchet-Saulnier, The practical guide, supra nota 23, p 92. Some cases where this has 
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26 
However, the 1949 Conventions famously do not define armed conflict – despite 
the fact the Conventions are limited to application in war and armed conflict. 
Pictet’s Commentary says, with respect to this omission, that in reality the Con-
vention becomes applicable as from the actual opening of hostilities, and a formal 
declaration of war is no longer needed.59 
O’Connell takes issue with this interpretation and claims that since 1949, 
States have not treated minor engagements of their armed forces as armed con-
flicts to which IHL applies. Partsch holds that certain situations mentioned in 
Article 1 of AP II involving international violence similar to internal disturbances 
and tensions “should also be excluded from the concept of armed conflict as this 
term is used in Art. 1 of the first Protocol”. Greenwood has also observed that 
“many isolated incidents, such as border clashes and naval incidents, are not 
treated as armed conflicts” and that it “may well be, therefore, that only when 
fighting reaches a level of intensity which exceeds that of such isolated clashes 
will it be treated as an armed conflict to which the rules of international humani-
tarian law apply”.60 
The 2016 updated Commentary affirms that an armed conflict can arise when 
one State unilaterally uses armed force against another State, even if the latter 
does not or cannot respond by military means. The simple fact that a State resorts 
to the use of armed force against another suffices to qualify the situation as an 
armed conflict within the meaning of the Conventions.61 
More noteworthy is that, while continuing to be applicable to international 
armed conflicts, the four Conventions have a Common Article 3 that renders them 
also applicable “in the case of armed conflict not of an international character, 
occurring in the territory of one of the contracting parties”.62 
Under international law, only lawful combatants engaged in situations of 
armed conflict may claim the right to kill. This makes the definition of armed 
conflict one of the most critical definitions in all of international law. Certain 
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international legal rules also depend on whether an armed conflict is an inter-
national armed conflict (IAC) or a non-international conflict (NIAC).63 
In 1995, the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY) clarified 
the definition of armed conflict for both IAC and NIAC. The test for determining 
the existence of an armed conflict was set out by the Appeals Chamber in the 
Tadic Jurisdiction Decision: 
 
[A]n armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed force between 
States or protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and 
organized armed groups or between such groups within a State. International 
humanitarian law applies from the initiation of such armed conflicts and extends 
beyond the cessation of hostilities until a general conclusion of peace is reached; 
or, in the case of internal conflicts, a peaceful settlement is achieved. Until that 
moment, international humanitarian law continues to apply in the whole territory 
of the warring States or, in the case of internal conflicts, the whole territory 
under the control of a party, whether or not actual combat takes place there.64 
 
Thus, it is now accepted that armed conflict, as a factual condition of hostilities, 
is a sufficient trigger for the application of the humanitarian laws of armed con-
flict. Therefore, Article 2 of the GCs should really read as if it said “even if the 
state of war is not recognized by one or both of them”. In practice in most con-
flicts since 1949, neither side has admitted that it was in a state of war, yet they 
have treated the Conventions as applicable.65 
 
 
1.4. International Humanitarian Law as 
part of national law 
No country can be compelled to conclude a treaty. This principle has been clearly 
stated in Articles 51 and 52 of the Vienna Convention of 1969. When concluding 
a treaty, the State expresses its free will and implies that its internal law either is 
already in compliance with that treaty, or is soon to be revised in a way which 
would bring it into compliance with it. Tertium non datur.66 
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States do enjoy considerable discretion to determine how to internally 
organize their institutions so as to ensure compliance. International law does not 
generally require, for example, that domestic courts must have jurisdiction to 
enforce international law. However, if a provision of international law prescribes 
a certain behaviour, “no feature of the domestic legal system can be invoked as a 
justification for non-compliance”. More pressing domestic priorities are not valid 
justifications for non-compliance under international law.67 
In general, the constitutions of States contain a list of treaties, which need 
approval by parliament or any other form of legal acceptance.68 Two elements 
appear in nearly all of these lists. First, whether a treaty imposes financial burdens, 
and second, whether it defines in any way the rights and duties of individuals. 
The Conventions fulfill both of these criteria.69 However, this does not give an 
answer to how the Conventions become applicable on national level. 
Partsch has analyzed the EU member States, and came to the conclusion that 
not even two States have identical provisions regarding the implementation of 
international law on the national level.70 However, there are generally two ways 
the States choose to do this. The essence of the monist approach is that a treaty 
may, without legislation, become part of domestic law once it has been concluded 
in accordance with the constitution and has entered into force for the State. When 
legislation is not needed such treaties are commonly described as “self-exe-
cuting”.71 Under the dualist approach, the constitution of the State accords no 
special status to treaties; the rights and obligations created by them have no effect 
in domestic law unless legislation is in force to give effect to them. When the 
legislation is specifically made for this purpose, the rights and obligations are 
then said to be “incorporated” into domestic law.72  
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The distinction between self-executing and non-self-executing international 
rules gives rise to serious flaws in the implementation of international law by 
domestic legal operators and national courts. Two issues need to be differentiated 
according to Conforti. First, the formal validity of the agreement under municipal 
law. Once that has been resolved and the agreement is interpreted and applied to 
a concrete situation, the content of the agreement must be addressed. This involves 
asking if, and when, the agreement or some of its provisions may be relied upon 
by any interested person and directly applied by domestic legal operator, or if an 
intervening act of integration by a public authority is required before the agree-
ment is applied.73 In this sense, one cannot really claim that a whole treaty is self-
executing (say the Conventions in a monist country). We have to look at the indi-
vidual provision and ask if it requires additional action by the State. This will be 
dealt with in later chapters of this thesis. 
Many provisions of IHL do require legislative measures for implementation 
(one list available enumerates at least 108 provisions of the Conventions); insofar 
as those measures have not yet been taken, they should be drawn up when ratifi-
cation is decided on or as soon as possible thereafter. This is especially true for 
the obligation to prosecute grave breaches.74 Yet again, some standards in inter-
national law (jus cogens) are regarded as sufficiently important to make it proper 
to enforce them without the need for national agreement, and notwithstanding 
any agreement to the contrary.75 
This introduction serves to draw attention to differences in application to better 
understand the scope of States’ obligations under IHL. It is not unequivocally 
understandable how the Conventions become a part of national law and what 
needs to be done by a State to truly incorporate the spirit of the Conventions. This 
is especially true for the issue of punishing the perpetrators of grave breaches of 
the Conventions. Every State Party has a slightly different system for regulating 
this, yet for the purposes of deterrent effect, consistency is of the utmost 
importance. Bothe provides an additional word of caution, in saying that the 
transplantation of legal regulations from one legal system to another is like an 
organ transplantation: the transplanted element may be rejected by the new 
environment and not work well.76 This is why this thesis focuses on which 
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measures need to be implemented and exactly how this has to be carried out on 
national lavel. 
 
 
1.5. Current and inherent challenges in 
the application of IHL 
The previous discussion is but one aspect that illustrates the different nature of 
IHL. Indeed, much of these questions would not arise in domestic legal setting or 
other fields of international law. Why then, and how, is IHL different and what 
implications does this difference have on its applicability? Literature on this topic 
usually multiplies just before and after the adoption of new international treaties, 
or when there is a shift towards a “new” type of conflict that seems to be unresolv-
able by “old” laws. Let us now try to list the things that are “incorrect” in IHL, 
that make it less applicable in practice. 
Many authors admit that the first obstacle to the adoption of all the measures 
just described may be a lack of awareness. The dependence of IHL on national 
measures of implementation is a fact which so far has only been partly recognized. 
Bothe says that he knows from his own experience that negotiators at Geneva 
were not fully aware of the whole complexity of the process of national imple-
mentation required by the Conventions and the Protocols. Thus, there are reasons 
for doubt that State administrations, who have to draft the necessary laws or to 
adopt the relevant administrative rules, are in all cases aware of the problems they 
are facing.77 
 
 
1.5.1. Inherent challenges and 
the special character of humanitarian treaties 
Humanitarian law has certain characteristics which differentiate it from the other 
branches of international law. One of the unusual features of humanitarian law is 
that, unlike most rules of international law, it binds not only the State and its 
organs, but also the individual. Abi-Saab explains why this body of law is different: 
 
The exacting and absolute character of the rules, their tendency towards uni-
versal application and their reach for the individual level make for their jus 
cogens character and for their extensive teleological interpretation. These sub-
stantive characteristics translate in legal terms the will of the drafters of the 
Geneva Conventions to attach to these rules, albeit through conventional means, 
the attributes of a higher legislation. The predominance of the object and 
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purposes of humanitarian law /…/ greatly stretches expectations and largely 
explains the constant strains and frustrations at the level of implementation.78 
 
So, if the special legal characteristic of the Conventions and Protocols ultimately 
derives from their object and purposes, they in turn command the teleological 
interpretation of those instruments in the light of their object and purposes; an 
interpretation which “provides continuous drive towards perfecting the content 
and expanding the ambit of humanitarian protection.”79 
In some instances, it is accepted that the non-execution of a treaty by one party 
may ultimately release the other party from its obligations, or justify the annul-
ment of the treaty, much like a contract under municipal law. This, however, does 
not apply to the Conventions, because whatever the circumstances may be, they 
remain valid and are not subject to reciprocity. As Pictet says “the mind absolutely 
rejects the idea that a belligerent should, for instance, deliberately ill-treat or kill 
prisoners because the adversary has been guilty of such crimes.”80 
When the predecessors of the current Conventions where adopted, they con-
tained the so called si omnes clause (or a general participation clause) as a result 
of their reciprocal character. The Sick and Wounded Convention of 1906 pro-
vides that its “provisions shall cease to be obligatory if one of the belligerent 
Powers should not be a signatory to the Convention”. That meant that if even one 
party to a conflict was not party to the instrument, the instrument did not apply to 
relations between all parties to the conflict, i.e. even between those who were 
parties to the instrument.81 
A radical departure from this classical model was taken by the 1949 Conven-
tions, which brought them much closer both to the level of universal international 
legislation on the one hand, and to that of the protected individual on the other. 
The Conventions reflect a constant endeavour to extend their application to the 
widest possible circle of States and conflictual situations, and to reduce to a 
minimum the legal grounds for avoiding such an application. The si omnes clause 
was thus refuted by Common Article 2, which is to apply in all circumstances 
regardless of considerations of reciprocity. 
In fact, the obligations have an erga omnes character, and there should be 
common interest in their application. This means that each State party to the Con-
ventions has a locus standi to protest against violations of the Conventions and 
to demand their immediate cessation, even if it is not directly concerned, i.e. even 
if these violations are not committed against it or against its citizens or their 
interests. The legal explanation of this has been clearly formulated by the ICJ in 
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its judgment in the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited case, 
where it states that: “…an essential distinction should be drawn between the 
obligations of a State towards the international community as a whole, and those 
arising vis-à-vis another State in the field of diplomatic protection. By their nature 
the former are the concern of all States. In view of the importance of the rights 
involved, all States can be held to have a legal interest in their protection; they 
are obligations erga omnes.”82 
Finally, one of the peculiarities of international law is that its legal rules are 
not implemented and enforced through a central body or hierarchical institutions. 
In this respect, it differs fundamentally from domestic law. This will be discussed 
in more detail in the following chapters. The special character of the treaties leads 
to many challenges in their application. Some of the challenges are inherent to 
the difficulty in trying to regulate war with rules, and some are more recent, 
stemming from problems only found in modern day conflicts. 
Although there are both old and new controversies on the substantive rules, 
including some claims that IHL is no longer adequate for the reality of con-
temporary armed conflicts, there is near unanimity among States and scholars that 
the main challenge is effective implementation on the ground, during armed 
conflicts.83 
Aldrich agrees that by the end of the twentieth century inadequate compliance 
had become the most evident defect of IHL. After the expansion of the sub-
stantive law by means of the two Protocols of 1977, non-compliance with the law 
became a far more significant problem than the limitations of the substantive law 
itself.84 Nevertheless, the law still remains imperfect in the promotion of com-
pliance; and one must look towards interpretation, analogy, other fields of law, 
and State practice to find measures for this aim. 
It is difficult to draw up a complete list of problems encountered in the imple-
mentation of IHL, but for Sandoz it seems possible to identify three broad cate-
gories. These are: ignorance of the law, rejection of the law on political grounds, 
and rejection of the law on military grounds.85 Ignorance of the law is apparently 
the least difficult problem to solve, in that it does not result from a desire not to 
implement the law.86 
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Kalshoven offers three difficulties in ensuring respect. Firstly, there is an 
inherent violence in conflicts – a factor not conductive to an attitude of respect 
for obligations of international law. Secondly, there is a great mass of people who 
may find themselves directly involved in situations requiring application of rules 
of humanitarian law (not only the army, but police officers, doctors and civilians 
alike). Thirdly, the set of humanitarian rules applicable in internal armed conflicts 
has remained far below the level of development of the law applicable in inter-
national armed conflicts.87 
Fleck also lists three problems inherent to humanitarian law. Firstly, in time 
of peace no one wants to think about the kind of situation where this body of law 
is put into practice. The second problem is actual documented practice: the appli-
cable rules have largely been violated during armed conflicts, thus creating a 
general consensus that such violations cannot be successfully sanctioned, and that 
humanitarian protection cannot stand the test of reality. Finally, he thinks that 
there is a consensus on humanitarian law evolving only armed conflicts have 
ended, i.e. when the need for measures of implementation seems most remote.88 
Bothe adds that the Conventions are drafted in the legal language of diplomats 
and lawyers but meant to be applied by soldiers on the ground.89 
Thus, there are problems that arise out of the environment where IHL has to 
be applied; out of the perception of the general public and out of the content of 
the law itself. These are indeed inherent to the very idea of IHL. We cannot change 
the environment where IHL is applied, i.e. an armed conflict. However, we could 
do something about IHL’s perception by the public. This is something the ICRC 
is working on a daily basis. The inter arma silent leges adage has to be rooted out 
if IHL is to be better respected in the future. Despite the complexity and incomp-
leteness of the law, there are many measures to overcome these issues. Think 
about the numerous educational programs mentioned throughout this work. The 
ICRC’s database of national implementation measures, the vast commentaries to 
the Conventions, the military manuals of States and non-state groups, the statute 
of the ICC etc. 
 
 
1.5.2. Current challenges 
It is clear that we are currently going through times in which IHL is called to 
prove the purpose of its existence. The World has considerably changed in the 
last 40–70 years, and this does not make the application of IHL easier in any 
sense. The period between the end of the Cold War and present day has caused a 
very intense, almost revolutionary development of Humanitarian Law. The 
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establishment of the ad hoc Tribunals, together with the establishment of the ICC, 
are only a few of the efforts to enforce humanitarian law since Nuremberg and 
Tokyo, with the added characteristic of being continuously tried in practice.90 
There are some considerations that help to explain why, arising from the con-
flicts of the 1980s and 1990s, the subject of implementation and enforcement of 
the laws of war has been so central and such a difficult an issue. For example, the 
scale and frequency of serious infractions of existing rules has been greater than 
in earlier decades.91 Most of the conflicts have also been non-international armed 
conflicts, where training may be limited and the difference between a soldier and 
a civilian not always an easy distinction to make. The diversity of such conflicts, 
and those party to them, makes it very difficult to formulate standard approaches 
or plans of action for increasing respect for humanitarian law.92 Another charac-
teristic is the protracted nature of contemporary armed conflicts. As such, they 
have long-term consequences on civilians who are unable to live their lives 
normally, often for decades. It also reduces the possibilities to build a secure 
future in the aftermath of a conflict.93 
In many of the atrocities of recent years, it has not been a serious problem to 
establish what the law is, or even what the facts of the particular case are. The 
most critical issue has been that States and non-state bodies persistently violate 
those laws, and then refuse to investigate and punish those responsible.94 Sassoli 
points out that there are particular difficulties in obtaining respect for IHL in 
asymmetric warfare. The equality of belligerents before IHL is challenged in dis-
course and reality and it is very difficult to engage non-state armed groups.95 The 
abovementioned challenge of perception by the public is also mentioned in 
Sassoli’s works. IHL seems to overpromise and underdeliver and the credibility 
gap between the law and reality is growing. A very important observation in my 
opinion. 
Not infrequently, a party to a non-international armed conflict will deny the 
applicability of humanitarian law, making it difficult to engage in a discussion on 
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respect for the law. Most internal armed conflicts are fought by private groups 
which lack a clear command structure, are not trained in the conduct of hostilities, 
and not familiar with the principles and rules of IHL. No fundamental change can 
be expected in this respect.96 
A recent challenge for IHL has been the tendency of States to label all acts of 
warfare committed by organized armed groups in the course of armed conflict as 
“terrorist”. “Although it is generally agreed that parties to an international armed 
conflict may, under IHL, lawfully attack each other’s military objectives, States 
have been much more reluctant to recognize that the same principle applies in 
non-international armed conflicts”, states Spoerri. “What is being overlooked 
here is that a crucial difference between IHL and the legal regime governing 
terrorism is the fact that IHL is based on the premise that certain acts of violence – 
against military objectives – are not prohibited. Any act of “terrorism” is, how-
ever, by definition, prohibited and criminal.”97 
In the last decades many authors are also concerned about emerging threats 
and how IHL can cope with these. For example, the ICRC holds regular expert 
seminars on emerging threats and new forms of warfare, such as chemical 
weapons, drones, cyber warfare etc. On the occasion of the seventieth anniversary 
of the Conventions, the president of the ICRC noted that in today’s battlefields, 
some particularly challenging developments have emerged. Namely, the armed 
actors and civilians are intermingling, and individuals are changing from fighters 
at night to civilians by day. Asymmetric warfare is becoming a predominant con-
flict environment, and distinctions between weapons, dual use goods, as well as 
military and civilian activities is blurring. More importantly, humanitarian action 
is increasingly criminalized as strategic support for the enemy.98 
This puts a heavy burden on the application of the IHL. However, as explained 
in the subsequent paragraphs, there are many ways to overcome this burden. If 
one understands the inherent deficiencies of IHL, it is easier to design proper 
implementation measures. It might make sense not to look at IHL in isolation and 
consider other measures, national and regional legal frameworks, soft law and 
policy guidance, to give a few examples. 
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1.5.3. Legitimacy of international law 
In this introductory chapter, I want to touch briefly on the subject of legitimacy 
in international law. Legitimacy could be described as the quality of a rule, which 
derives from a perception on the part of those to whom it is addressed that it has 
come into being in accordance with right process.99 This will provide a back-
ground to the debate of the scope of CA 1, as well as shed light on reasons why 
armed groups should, and choose to, comply with humanitarian law.  
Why should some rules, unsupported by an effective structure of coercion 
comparable to a national police force, elicit compliance – even against self-interest 
of States or armed groups? Perhaps finding an answer to this question can help 
us find a key to better compliance with IHL. While legitimacy is certainly not the 
only reason for compliance, as will be seen further in this work, it provides an 
interesting nuance to the discussion and helps untangle the issue of non-com-
pliance. 
What is clear is that some rules seem to exert more pull to compliance than 
others. Each rule has an inherent pull power that could be called its index of 
legitimacy. For example, the rule that makes it illegal for one State to infiltrate 
spies into another State in the guise of diplomats is formally acknowledged by 
almost every State, yet it enjoys such a low degree of legitimacy as to exert 
virtually no pull towards compliance. As Schachter observes, “some ‘laws’, 
though enacted properly, have so low a degree of probable compliance that they 
are treated as ‘dead letters’ and some treaties, while properly concluded, are con-
sidered ‘scraps of paper’.”100 What I want to show here is that although some 
provisions of the Conventions and Protocols have never been used in practice, 
they are not a “dead letter” and can still be used in modern day conflicts. 
The famous sociologist Weber’s works stressed process legitimacy. He hypo-
thesized that rules tend to achieve compliance when they, themselves, comply 
with secondary rules about how and by whom rules are to be made and inter-
preted. In his view, a sovereign’s command is more likely to be obeyed if the 
subject perceives both the rule and the ruler as legitimate.101 How could this fit in 
the context of non-state actors and their views on the 1949 Conventions? Do they 
feel any push to comply because they perceive IHL legitimate? The People of 
War project analysed these questions to a certain extent and could provide some 
answers.102 Maybe if legitimacy can be studied, it can also be deliberately 
nourished. This will be dealt with in later chapters of this thesis. 
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The other side of the coin, textual determination, is the ability of the text to 
convey a clear message, to appear transparent in the sense that one can see through 
the language to the meaning. Obviously, rules with a clearly detectable meaning 
have a better chance to exert compliance, as those addressed will know precisely 
what is expected of them, which is a necessary first step towards compliance.103 
Again, narrowing this down to an individual actor on the battlefield is important.  
It follows that indeterminacy has costs. Indeterminate normative standards not 
only make it harder to know what conformity is expected, but also make it easier 
to justify noncompliance. To be legitimate, a rule must communicate what conduct 
is permitted and what conduct is out of bounds.104 Do the rules of IHL, especially 
CA 1, communicate this, or are they indeterminate, thus making non-compliance 
relatively easy? In the next chapter I will analyse whether CA 1 goes further than 
pacta sunt servanda, i.e. is the meaning stretched so far that compliance becomes 
difficult. 
Franck is convinced that greater clarity conduces to compliance. Nevertheless, 
“clarity” is far from identical with simplicity. For example, a rule can appear un-
ambiguous at first glance, but it does not send a simple message as to its meaning 
in such a way as to promote compliance. This is because a literal reading of the 
law will produce absurd obligations at the margins of its application.105 
Rogers warns that for a military lawyer, such clarity is of utmost importance. 
A military lawyer should see that the “rules being negotiated are capable of being 
understood, accepted by those to whom they apply, and implemented in practice.” 
Treaty texts sometimes contain emotive and politicized language, loose drafting, 
or provisions which may not be understood if they are not considered in the 
context of other provisions, or provisions which are inconsistent with those of 
previous treaties, or which lead to uncertainty or whose meaning is downright 
obscure.106 I argue that CA 1 is an example of such provision. It has to be read with 
other provisions and previous treaties. Standing alone it is indeterminate and 
doesn’t communicate clearly what kind of action is expected. 
 
 
1.5.4. Interplay with human rights law 
There is a strong and sometimes confusing link between another field of law and 
IHL, namely the human rights law. This is something that will only be briefly 
touched upon, since the matter is quite complicated, and one could open a 
Pandora’s Box by discussing the overlaps and differences of these two bodies of 
laws. 
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Meron writes that it has become common in some quarters to conflate human 
rights and the law of war. Nevertheless, significant differences remain. Unlike 
HRL, the law of war theoretically allows the killing and wounding of innocent 
people not participating in armed conflict. As long as the rules of the game are 
observed, it is permissible to cause suffering and even death.107 
Greenwood adds that HRL is designed to operate primarily in normal peace-
time conditions, and within the framework of the legal relationship between a 
State and its citizens. IHL, by contrast, is chiefly concerned with the abnormal 
conditions of armed conflict and the relationship between a State and the citizens 
of its adversary. However, it is now clear that human rights treaties are, in prin-
ciple, capable of application in armed conflicts.108 
HRL treaties catalogue a number of rights that can be claimed by individuals 
against their own governmental authorities, while IHL treaties mainly list duties 
incumbent upon parties to a conflict in relation to the conduct of hostilities and 
in relation to the treatment of specific categories of protected persons.109 
HRL was designed from its inception to protect those who lack protection in 
their own countries, irregardless to if it is a time of war or not. The apparatus that 
has developed to protect the individual when violations of these basic rights occur 
or to improve the existing system was constructed for peacetime. Nevertheless, 
situations can exist in which a group of individuals needs the protection afforded 
by both systems simultaneously.110 
For example, in the conflict in Nicaragua the Inter-American Commission of 
Human Rights found that the participation of both the UNHCR and ICRC was 
necessary because questions of human rights, IHL, and the international law of 
refugees were involved. This demonstrates the intimate link between the three 
systems and the institutions charged with the implementation of these rights.111 
Solis agrees that with HRL and IHL the overlaps are still very blurry. Tradi-
tionally, HRL and law of war were viewed as separate systems of protection. The 
two have different subject matters and different roots. HRL is premised on the 
principle that citizens hold individual rights that their State is bound to respect; 
IHL imposes obligations on the individual. HRL largely consists of general prin-
ciples; IHL is a series of specific provisions. HRL enunciates State responsib-
ilities; IHL specifies individual responsibilities as well as State responsibilities. 
In HRL, rights are given to all; IHL links many of its protections to nationality or 
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specific statuses, such as combatants. HRL allows for State derogation, IHL does 
not.112 
This comparison is important, since many authors hold that human rights 
mechanisms may be successfully used as tools for better implementation of 
humanitarian law and that no convincing argument would exclude that com-
pliance with a specific branch of international law might be ensured by resort to 
lawful measures developed within other branches of law.113  
The human rights treaty monitoring bodies favour a strict interpretation of 
their mandates and confine themselves to applying the conventions they were set 
up to monitor. They generally do not incorporate IHL in their work.114 Despite 
these issues, judicial human rights mechanisms, and in particular the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights and the European Court of Human Rights, have 
provided a considerable boost to the implementation of IHL even though they do 
not formally apply it.115  
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2. COMMON ARTICLE 1:  
EXTENDING THE SCOPE OF IMPLEMENTATION 
BEYOND PACTA SUNT SERVANDA? 
It is a general principle of IHL that States are obliged to respect and to ensure 
respect for IHL. According to one interpretation, which by force of repetition 
appears to have become dominant, States are required to ensure that IHL is 
respected not only by their own armed forces and within their respective juris-
dictions, but universally by all around the world. Some writers have sought in this 
interpretation an overarching obligation that conveniently fills any gaps in 
existing rules of IHL.116 
However, other authors have deemed the undertaking to ensure respect by 
others to be a norm surrounded by uncertainty. A study of both the origin and 
practice of this obligation in therefore necessary. 
Academic dispute over the scope and exact meaning of CA 1 has been an 
interesting one. Kalshoven started this complex work with a comprehensive 
article published in 1999.117 Since then, every other peace written is either in sharp 
contrast or agrees with the professors’ findings. Kalshoven is one of the keenest 
adversaries to the broad interpretation theory discussed below. In fact, in approx-
imately ten years after his article, he remained the only author defending the 
narrow scope of CA 1. More recently however, commentators have shifted back 
to this narrow interpretation, and begun to ask whether the scope of the article 
has been stretched unreasonably far. A lot was hoped for from the fresh com-
mentaries to the Conventions published in March 2016, but they did not fulfil the 
expectations placed upon them, as will be discussed later.118 
The New commentary to the First Convention states: “Acts or omissions 
which amount to breaches of the Conventions entail the international 
responsibility of a High Contracting Party, provided those acts or omissions are 
attributable to that Party according to the rules on State responsibility.” /…/ “As 
far as this principle is concerned, CA 1 does not add anything new to what is 
already provided for by general international law.”119 This could be the end of the 
story, but is far from it.  
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On the contrary, a variety of questions, especially concerning the terms 
“ensure respect” and “in all circumstances”, remain unresolved. Focarelli points 
out that it is unclear whether CA 1 provides for an obligation or rather a 
discretionary power to take measures against transgressor States, and – assuming 
that an extensive approach should be taken – what specific measures contracting 
States are bound to take.120  
 
 
Where does the difficulty in understanding the scope of CA 1 and with this the 
broader question of implementation and enforcement of IHL lie then? It has been 
established that parties to armed conflict bear the primary responsibility for 
respecting international obligations. But, as the wording of CA 1 seems to sug-
gest, do others, not directly involved in a given conflict, also have a role to play? 
Is there anything third parties can undertake to bring about compliance with 
humanitarian law by belligerents? Do they even bear (co-)responsibility for the 
observance of humanitarian law by parties to an armed conflict?122 
There is no easy answer to these questions and the analysis to reach a con-
clusion must be a thorough one. First, some historical background is provided to 
understand how and why this Article made it to the Conventions. Then some con-
text is given by touching upon rules of treaty interpretation and the role of the 
travaux préparatoires. Finally, the Article is broken down in three elements each 
of which will be analysed through the said interpretation rules and subsequent 
State practice. This will answer the research question on the correct interpretation 
of CA 1 and its connection to other articles that bring about obligations to dif-
ferent parties. The whole thesis is concerned with better compliance with the rules 
of IHL, therefore it important to see what opportunities the CA 1 presents, or is 
it, in fact, a “soap bubble”. 
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2.1. A brief history of Common Article 1 
The Conventions of 1864 and 1906 had no similar provision. The 1864 Con-
vention (Article 8) merely said: “The implementing of the present Convention 
shall be ensured by the Commanders-in-Chief of the belligerent armies, following 
the instructions of their respective Governments, and in accordance with the 
general principles set forth in this Convention”. The 1906 Convention (Article 
25) reproduced this provision in approximately the same terms.123 
At the 1929 Diplomatic Conference, two conventions were adopted. The 
Amelioration of the Condition of the Sick and Wounded in Armies in the Field 
replaced the earlier conventions of 1864 and 1906. The second one, the con-
vention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War was the first convention 
devoted exclusively to that subject. Both of these conventions contained the 
following article: 
 
The provisions of the present Convention shall be respected by the High Con-
tracting Parties in all circumstances. 
If, in time of war, a belligerent is not a party to the Convention, its provisions 
shall, nevertheless, be binding as between all the belligerents who are parties 
thereto.124 
 
Therefore, it was in 1929 that the need for making the provision more explicit 
was first felt. The idea, according to the Commentators of the 1949 texts, was to 
give a more formal character to the mutual undertaking by insisting on its 
character as a general obligation. It was desired to avoid the possibility of a 
belligerent State finding some pretext for evading its obligation to apply the 
whole or part of the Convention.125 
The diplomatic conference of 1949 for adopting the four Conventions took 
place under extremely difficult political circumstances. Many countries had just 
overcome the horrors of the Second World War, and getting them to one table to 
discuss a binding set of rules was not an easy task. In fact, in some cases it proved 
impossible.126 This aspect has to be kept in mind throughout the rest of the 
analysis. 
The course of the 1949 conference was chiefly determined by three factors, as 
Best explains: the texts of the agenda before it, the relative strengths of the States’ 
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delegations attending it (59 in total), and the instructions given to them by their 
respective governments. What went on at the conference was by no means 
coextensive with what came out of it, a fact that is reiterated by the proponents 
of the narrow interpretation of the scope of CA 1.127 
The famous words to “ensure respect” were added to the texts in 1949. The 
provision has been called unusual, since it reaffirms that contracting States are 
bound to respect their treaty obligations (pacta sunt servanda) and adds a 
corollary of ensuring respect for the Conventions. 
Draft CA 1 fell within the purview of the Joint Committee of the Conference 
and should have been the first provision to be considered but was postponed since 
the delegates wanted to discuss this in connection with the Preamble that had 
proven somewhat complicated.128 Later, the Preambles of the Conventions were 
referred to separate committees and the CA to the Special Committee without 
discussion. In the Special Committee only a few delegates spoke on the issue. Mr 
Maresca of Italy famously stated that the terms “undertake to ensure respect” 
lacked clarity and that “[a]ccording to the manner in which they were construed, 
they were either redundant, or introduced a new concept into international law.” 
Mr Castberg of Norway and Mr Yingling of US explained that “the object of this 
Article was to ensure respect of the Conventions by the population as a whole”.129 
Mr Pillout of the ICRC thereupon said that the draft article submitted to the Stock-
holm Conference had “emphasized that the Contracting parties should not con-
fine themselves to applying the Convention themselves, but should do all in their 
power to see that the basic humanitarian principles of the Conventions were uni-
versally applied.”130 The article was adopted without further discussion or modi-
fication. 
The difference between the 1929 and the 1949 Conventions lies in three 
aspects: 1) the obligation to “ensure respect” was first introduced in 1949; 2) the 
obligation to “respect in all circumstances” was moved to the first article (as 
compared to Articles 25 and 82 of the 1929 Conventions); 3) the 1949 Conven-
tions use an active voice (the High Contracting Parties undertake to respect and 
to ensure respect) while 1929 Conventions use a passive voice (shall be respected 
by the High Contracting Parties). These differences have given some com-
mentators grounds to support their broad interpretation of CA 1. 
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2.2. Treaty interpretation, legal meaning of 
the travaux préparatoires 
We come now to one of the most decisive questions of understanding CA 1. What 
did the delegates of the 1949 Geneva Conference actually mean when adding “to 
respect and ensure respect” to the text of the Conventions? What significance did 
this clause have then, and how has it developed to this day? There is a plethora 
of questions concerning the historical interpretation, scope, evolution and other 
aspects of this clause as illustrated below. Let us first turn to the significance and 
forms of treaty interpretation as a way of introduction. 
“There are few aspects of international law more important than the inter-
pretation of treaties. A very large proportion indeed of practical problems and 
disputes have this question at the core of the matter,”131 Sir Jennings stated in 
1967. Similarly, Linderfalk holds that in the practice of modern international law, 
disputes as to the meaning of specific treaty provisions are a quite frequent 
occurrence.132 Aust, the most renowned author in this field also points out that 
“Most disputes submitted to international adjudication involve some problem of 
treaty interpretation. Just as the interpretation of legislation is the constant con-
cern of any government lawyer, treaty interpretation forms a significant part of 
the day-to-day work of a foreign ministry legal adviser.”133 
It is true that applying the legal method is mostly about interpretation. We 
need to understand what the lawmakers mean by specific provisions before we 
can apply any of them. CA 1 is certainly in the heart of such endeavours of inter-
pretation since a lot is depending on the result. 
 
 
2.2.1. Means of interpretation relevant to the Geneva Conventions 
Interpretation is by no means an easy job, as it is “to some extent an art, not an 
exact science”.134 Nevertheless, in a process of interpretation there is a funda-
mental distinction to be made between the legally correct and incorrect inter-
pretation result. The correctness of the result is determined by reference to the 
rules of interpretation laid down in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties (VCLT), Articles 31–33.135 The result is correct when it can be success-
fully defended as being in accordance with these provisions, and incorrect when 
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it cannot be so defended.136 To remain correct and objective in art is a real 
challenge.  
On the other hand, it is the method of interpretation which dictates which 
results a rule will have. “Many instances of alleged breaches of treaties may be 
recast as differences of interpretation, and this means that interpretation is not a 
mere technical device, but a political matter of the utmost importance”, even con-
tinuing the politics of negotiation after treaty’s entry into force. “It may even-
tually depend on which interpretative method is applied; whether a State (or any 
other actor) can be accused of an internationally wrongful act, or whether it will 
be regarded as having stayed faithful to its commitments.”137 This statement is 
extremely important in the context of CA 1 since it literally depends on its inter-
pretation whether or not States can be held responsible for violating their obli-
gation to “ensure respect” for the Conventions. 
Moving on to the “official” rules on interpretation of treaties, it is interesting 
to note that they are themselves laid down in a treaty.138 The 1969 Vienna Con-
vention of the Law of Treaties (VCLT) provides a general rule of interpretation 
in the section Interpretation of Treaties, Article 31: 
 
1.  A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary 
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the 
light of its object and purpose. 
2.  The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, 
in addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes: 
(a)  Any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the 
parties in connexion with the conclusion of the treaty; 
(b)  Any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connexion 
with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as 
an instrument related to the treaty. 
3.  There shall be taken into account, together with the context: 
(a)  Any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the inter-
pretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions; 
(b)  Any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which estab-
lishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation; 
(c)  Any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations 
between the parties. 
4.  A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties 
so intended.139 
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For our purposes the next article is equally important. Article 32 enlists the sup-
plementary means of interpretation:  
 
Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the 
preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order 
to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of article 31, or to 
determine the meaning when the interpretation according to article 31: 
(a)  Leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or 
(b)  Leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable. 
 
Both points (a) and (b) can be used in the context of establishing the correct 
meaning on CA 1. As will be seen below, many commentators point out that the 
meaning of the article is in fact ambiguous and could lead to an unreasonable 
result.140 Note that subsequent practice, which will also be analysed, falls within 
Article 31 and thus bears considerable weight. 
In the Celebici case, the ICTY’s Appeals Chamber recalled that the judges 
could depart from the letter of the law in order to respect the spirit of the Con-
ventions. The judges drew on the VCLT in affirming that a treaty should be 
interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to 
the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.141 
Therefore, a text must first be so construed as to give effect to its “normal”, 
“natural”, “ordinary” or “usual” meaning. But this position is not really a rule of 
interpretation at all, Aust believes. It assumes what was to be proved: that the 
expression has a certain meaning instead of another one. However, already the 
ascertainment of “normal” requires interpretation and the very emergence of a 
dispute proves this.142 
Gardiner also hesitates and states that while the object of treaty interpretation 
is to give “ordinary” meaning to the terms of the treaty almost any word has more 
than one meaning. The word “meaning” itself, has at least sixteen different 
meanings.143 
Villiger holds that a term may have a number of ordinary meanings, which 
may even change over time. In other words, that particular ordinary meaning will 
be established which is the common intention of the parties.144 Furthermore, the 
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ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty depends of its context. 
Treaty terms are not drafted in isolation, and their meaning is to be determined 
by considering the entire treaty text. 
It appears that academic views on the use of supplementary means of inter-
pretation are biased. Some believe that they are of great value, others that they 
can only be used in extreme cases. For example, Aust believes that Article 31 is 
limited to the primary purpose for interpreting a treaty: “an elucidation of the 
meaning of the text, not a fresh investigation as to the supposed intentions of the 
parties.” He even goes on to say that the travaux are by their nature less authentic 
than the other elements, being often incomplete and misleading. However, Aust 
admits that in certain circumstances, recourse may be had to supplementary 
elements to “confirm” the meaning resulting from the application of Article 31.145 
One may also look at other treaties on the same subject matter adopted either 
before or after the one in question. It would be legitimate to assume that the 
parties to a treaty did not intend that it would be incompatible with customary 
international law.146 This will be important in the subsequent discussions in this 
chapter, as many IHL rules have acquired a customary law status and the words 
“ensure respect” are used in many human rights instruments. 
On the other side of the argument we find Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, who regards 
the travaux préparatoires not as mere evidence, but as an integral part of the 
treaty, “un element fondamental, peut-être le plus important, en matière d’inter-
prétation des traités”. The text of a treaty is little more than signs on paper for 
him; those signs only acquire meaning when read in light of their drafting history, 
if only because there is really no such thing as words having an ordinary 
meaning.147 
This distinction is important, since the two opposing views on the scope of 
CA 1 give different weight to different means of interpretation. The proponents 
of the narrow scope rely heavily on the travaux, and the subjective teleological 
arguments, while the broad scope proponents base their reasoning on the sub-
sequent practice and the object and purpose side. Paradoxically, the latter could 
be used to prove the point of either side. 
In considering the subsequent practice, Zych adds that Article 31(3)(b) sets a 
very high standard since it requires that all parties to a treaty, if not actually 
engaged in the subsequent practice, must at least accept it or acquiesce to it. Any 
contrary State practice is therefore fatal to an argument based on this article. In 
the case of interpreting CA 1, such contrary State practice clearly exists.148 
 
 
                                                                                                 
145  Aust, Modern treaty law and practice, supra nota 142, p 245. 
146  Ibid, p 248. 
147  Klabbers, International legal, supra nota 137, p 277. 
148  Zych, “The Scope of the Obligation“, supra nota 116, p 256. 
48 
2.2.2. Role of the travaux préparatoires in interpreting 
the scope of Common Article 1 
Before moving forward with the interpretation of the notorious words “respect” 
and “ensure respect” an inquiry into the significance of the travaux préparatoires 
is needed. In the introduction a glimpse was given into the drafting history of the 
Conventions, now we turn to the legal significance of the travaux according to 
legal literature and the VCLT.  
The preparatory work of a treaty, in the sense of VCLT article 32, means all 
those representations produced in the preparation for the establishing of the treaty 
as definite.149 It is not clear what the preparatory work actually contains, but one 
can think of all sorts of different documents that could be useful and taken into 
account, such as meeting minutes, declarations of agreement or disagreement, 
instructions to negotiators. In our case, the final records of the 1949 Diplomatic 
Conference can be used as an evidence of the travaux.150 
When judged by the wording of Articles 31 and 32, the relationship between 
the primary and the supplementary means of interpretation is hierarchical, 
Linderfalk believes. Consequently, in any situation where a process of inter-
pretation is required to determine the correct meaning of a treaty provision, 
primary means of interpretation shall first be resorted to. Supplementary means 
shall be used at a second stage of the interpretation process, when it has become 
evident that the correct meaning cannot be clarified using the primary means 
only.151 
This traditional understanding of the relationship between primary and 
supplementary means of interpretation has not gone unchallenged. In inter-
national law literature, as well as in the practice of international courts, voices 
have occasionally been raised claiming for the preparatory work of a treaty a more 
prominent role in the interpretation process.152 In fact, even in a situation where 
using the primary means of interpretation leads to a result that is perfectly clear, 
a contrary result achieved using the travaux préparatoires may still be given 
priority according to some authors. As stated by the eminent Judge Schwebel, 
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“the hierarchical structure of Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention ... is 
unreal”.153 
Klabbers is also of the opinion that differentiating between primary and 
supplementary means of interpretation is not necessary, as “both approaches are 
based on the same assumption concerning interpretation: interpretation is not so 
much about finding the objective meaning of a text, but is about finding the 
intentions of the authors.”154 “Indeed, although the travaux préparatoires might 
merely constitute evidence, the International Law Commission was wise enough 
to underline that there was little point in excluding possibly relevant evidence”.155 
In addition, as duly noted already in 1961, it would hardly be an exaggeration 
to say that in almost every case involving the interpretation of a treaty one or both 
of the parties seeks to invoke the preparatory work.156 An argument without 
paying due regard to a treaty’s drafting history is an incomplete argument. 
The ILC’s approach to this provision proposes that if the interpreter finds that 
the preparatory work suggests a meaning which was not the one which would be 
first choice after applying the general rule, and which would not have imme-
diately struck the interpreter as within the obvious range of interpretative options, 
the interpreter will have to reconsider the position.157 In the case of CA 1 such 
“immediate struck” does not happen at all, the provision is just too vague. This is 
why one needs to turn to the preparatory work, as is done in every scholarly article 
on the topic. 
A treaty’s preparatory work and, other means of interpretation mentioned in 
Article 32, play different roles, according to various methods of interpretation. 
Thus, the subjective method regularly emphasises the travaux preparatoires of a 
treaty in order to establish the “real” intentions of the drafters. The textual and 
the contextual methods, concentrating of the written text, have traditionally 
regarded these means as supplementary. The teleological method, on the other 
hand, seeks a treaty’s object and purpose in all materials available and does not, 
therefore, distinguish between primary and secondary means of interpretation.158 
Kalshoven holds that a good example of this ambivalence towards travaux 
préparatoires (ignore them yet invoke them) is the treatment of the travaux 
préparatoires of the 1923 Convention of Lausanne by the Permanent Court of 
International Justice in the Lotus case. While concluding that “there is no 
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occasion to have regard to preparatory work if the text of a convention is suffi-
ciently clear in itself”, the Court nonetheless discussed some of the drafting history, 
before rejecting the recourse to the travaux préparatoires.159 
 
 
2.2.3. Good faith, object and purpose and 
other relevant means of interpretation 
Generally, treaties are considered living instruments capable of being applied to 
modern, changing conditions. Even where treaties use outdated concepts, they 
may be brought up to date by applying them in accordance with current trends, 
as illustrated by other treaties. Exceptionally, the subject-matter of a treaty may 
require an interpretation located in a particular historical context.160 Thus, many 
authors use other (and especially human rights) treaties to argue for or against the 
broad interpretation of CA 1. This is sometimes a slippery slope, because of the 
different basis of the two fields of law. 
On the other hand, it is not infrequently argued that all interpretation simply 
aims at arriving at what is in accordance with equity or good faith. As we have 
seen, Article 31 of the Vienna Convention, too, begins with a reference to good 
faith. However, this seems to restate the problem rather than solve it. Now it is 
“good faith” which needs to be given content – a matter of subjective preference. 
Therefore, some have held that the good faith merely refers back to subjective 
consent and the object and purpose test.161 In addition, as Article 32 states, there 
are other supplementary means of implementation that may be used to establish 
the correct meaning of a provision. 
Sub-paragraph (b) of Article 31 provides that, together with the context, any 
subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agree-
ment of the parties regarding its interpretation shall be taken into account. Aust 
thinks that this is a crucial element in the interpretation of any treaty, and reference 
to practice is well established in the jurisprudence of international tribunals. 
However precise a text appears to be, the way in which it is actually applied by 
the parties is usually a good indication of what they understand it to mean.162 
Different authors have provided different subsequent practice to prove their 
arguments on the content of CA 1 ranging from statements at human rights related 
conferences to UNSC Resolutions. We will get to these in the next subparagraphs, 
but it will be stated in passing here that there is no easy way to actually prove 
whether States (and/or courts) have acted in a certain way because they believe 
in their obligation of pacta sunt servanda or the broad interpretation of CA 1. As 
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Gardiner points out, statements and record of a position taken with regard to a 
treaty provision need to be linked to something actually done, unless they are in 
a form which itself amounts to an official act or committed policy that is being 
implemented.163 
In many instances, judicial decisions are also regarded as evidence of the law. 
A coherent body of previous jurisprudence will have important consequences in 
any given case. Their value, however, stops short of precedent as it is understood 
in the common law tradition.164 Nevertheless, the practice of courts, such as the 
ICJ itself, has been to seek jurisprudential continuity and consistency within their 
own case law, perhaps to the point of constituting precedent.165 
Fenrick holds that “judicial decisions affect the development of the law of 
armed conflict, insofar as they address legal lacunae (treaty negotiators can and 
do accept gaps in the law, judges cannot), as they add flesh to the bare bones of 
treaty provisions or to skeletal legal concepts such as military necessity of pro-
portionality, and as they identify and give legitimacy to new legal developments 
such as emergent custom.”166 
The object and purpose of the Conventions, both in 1949 and today, is the 
protection of civilians and reduction of suffering during armed conflicts. Subse-
quent practice, however, lacks clarity at first sight. Brollowski states that many 
diplomatic statements speak for an interpretation from which obligations of third 
States can be derived under CA 1 and gives the Teheran Conference as an 
example.167 Sure, these and many more documents have reiterated the need to 
respect and ensure respect for the Conventions, but this in itself says nothing 
about how this clause should be interpreted and what the scope of the obligation 
is. 
There is also an argument of in dubio mitius: “[i]f the meaning of a term is 
ambiguous, that meaning is to be preferred which is less onerous to the party 
assuming an obligation, or which interferes less with the territorial and personal 
supremacy of a party, or involves less general restrictions upon the parties.”168 
This is a good argument to avoid stretching the meaning of CA 1 to unreasonable 
limits and stick with the narrow interpretation. 
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We therefore have the good faith, the object and purpose, the subsequent prac-
tice, the in dubio mitius, and many other means of interpretation in our hands 
when analysing the scope of CA 1. All of these should be considered to arrive at 
a correct result, as much as such result is achievable. Can using the object and 
purpose method from article 31 lead to exactly the same conclusion as the travaux 
argument from article 32? If the latter would be completely opposing the former, 
it would probably have to be abandoned. However, is it the object and purpose of 
the Conventions to confer legal obligations to enforce IHL to third States?  
 
 
2.2.4. ICRC commentaries to the Conventions 
In national law, a lawyer would first turn to the official commentaries of a legal 
act for advice on correct interpretation. For example, Estonian lawyers are par-
ticularly conscious of the commentaries to the Constitution,169 which are occa-
sionally used in courts to prove a particular case. However, these commentaries 
are the views of academics and do not have any legal force on their own. They 
can only be used as supplementary means of interpretation, as “travaux supplé-
mentaires”. 
Soon after the 1949 Conference, article-by-article commentaries to the Con-
ventions were produced under the editorship of Pictet. It is interesting to note that 
in the foreword to these books the authors establish that although the Com-
mentary is published by the ICRC, it is the personal work of its authors (and thus 
does not provide an official interpretation of the text).170 The much-awaited new 
commentaries to the first Convention were published in 2016, and in 2018 to the 
second Convention.  
 
 
2.2.4.1. The 1952 Commentaries on Common Article 1 
The ICRC Commentaries to the Conventions and to the Protocols have exerted 
considerable influence on the interpretation of CA 1. Focarelli thinks that their 
analysis is thus helpful not only to grasp the meaning of these provisions, but also 
to understand subsequent misunderstandings.171 
Professor Kalshoven believes that the Commentaries have taken a much too 
eminent role. As for the clause “to respect”, the Commentary states: “By under-
taking at the very outset to respect the clauses of the Convention, the Contracting 
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Parties draw attention to the special character of that instrument”. And that “The 
motive of the Convention is such a lofty one, so universally recognized as an 
imperative call of civilization…”172 Kalshoven wittily points out that rather than 
writing a legal comment on the terms, the authors are attempting to draw a picture 
of a better world, and are themselves “lofty” about the Convention as a whole. 
He also, rightly, concludes that neither the non-reciprocal character nor the obli-
gations erga omnes can be derived in law or logic from the mere undertaking to 
“respect” the Conventions divorced from its qualifying words “in all circum-
stances”.173 
The Contracting Parties do not undertake merely to respect the Convention, 
but also to ensure respect for it. The Commentaries state that “The use of the words 
‘and to ensure respect’ was, however, deliberate: they were intended to emphasize 
and strengthen the responsibility of the Contracting Parties.” /…/ It follows, 
therefore, that in the event of a Power failing to fulfil its obligations, the other 
Contracting Parties (neutral, allied or enemy) may, and should, endeavour to 
bring it back to an attitude of respect for the Convention”.174 
Kalshoven is not satisfied with this thinking. “It follows therefore” …. from 
what he asks? “That the drafting history of Article 1 cannot have been the authors’ 
source of inspiration is obvious: more than anyone else they must have been 
aware how weak was the basis in the records for an attempt to interpret any part 
of the Article as a binding treaty provision. This makes it plausible that they did 
not bother about past history and found their inspiration in their own minds.”175 
A legally binding obligation to bring another State back to an attitude of respect 
did not exist before the Diplomatic Conference, and could not be deduced in any 
manner from the deliberations at the Conference.  
Focarelli also points out that the paragraph is highly ambiguous about the 
exact legal meaning of the term “ensure respect”. The words “may” and “should” 
allow the reader to think that CA 1 merely empowers, and indeed encourages, 
rather than obliges contracting States to take measures against transgressor States. 
This reading, however, is inconsistent with the term “undertake”. To make matters 
even more complicated, the expression “may, and should” was used on Article 1 
common to the First, the Second, and the Fourth Conventions, whereas in respect 
of the Third Convention only “should” (“doit” in the French version) was used.176 
The authors of the Commentary go on to say that the provision adopted in 
1949 has the effect of strengthening the same provision in the 1929 Convention, 
due to its prominent position and to its actual wording. “It is not an engagement 
concluded on a basis of reciprocity, binding each party to the contract only in so 
far as the other party observes its obligations. It is rather a series of unilateral 
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engagements, solemnly contracted before the world as represented by the other 
Contracting Parties.”177 
The words “in all circumstances” mean, in short, that the application of the 
Convention is not dependent on the character of the conflict. Whether a war is 
“just” or “unjust”, whether it is a war of aggression or of resistance to aggression, 
the protection and care due to the wounded and sick are in no way affected. The 
commentators finish by bluntly stating that “In view of the preceding con-
siderations and of the fact that the provisions for the repression of violations have 
been considerably strengthened, it is evident that Article 1 is no mere stylistic 
clause, but is deliberately invested with imperative force, and must be obeyed to 
the letter”.178 Kalshoven thinks that this is exaggerated, and that such force is 
inherent in its character as a binding treaty provision but applies solely to its 
meaning as such, not to interpretations placed upon it without support in history 
or logic. He thinks that “respect” should be viewed together with “respect in all 
circumstances” that is respect under each and every factual condition, whether 
favourable or adverse, i.e. respect in the face of arguments of necessity or negative 
reciprocity.179 
 
 
2.2.4.2. The 2016 Commentaries on Common Article 1 
If the late professor Kalshoven would be able to comment on the authors’ intro-
ductory remarks on the new 2016 Commentaries, it would greatly add to his 
sorrows. For Henckaerts concludes that: 
 
The main aim of the updated Commentaries is to give people an understanding 
of the law as it is interpreted today, so that it is applied effectively in today’s 
armed conflicts. /…/ The experience gained in applying and interpreting the 
Conventions over the last six decades has generated a detailed understanding 
of how they operate in armed conflicts all over the world and in contexts very 
different to those that led to their adoption. With this, the new Commentaries 
go far beyond their first editions from the 1950s, which were largely based on 
the preparatory work for the Conventions and on the experience of the Second 
World War.180 
 
The Commentaries are in fact not so different from the Pictet Commentaries. 
They are based on research that includes an analysis of State practice in the appli-
cation and interpretation of the treaties, e.g. in military manuals, national legislation 
or official statements; interpretations and clarifications provided in case law and 
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scholarly writings. “As such, it is not the final word but a solid basis for further 
discussion about the implementation, clarification and development of IHL”.181 
The commentators admit that the interpretation of CA 1, and in particular the 
expression “ensure respect”, has raised a variety of questions over the last 
decades. “In general, two approaches have been taken. One approach advocates 
that under Article 1 States have undertaken to adopt all measures necessary to 
ensure respect for the Conventions only by their organs and private individuals 
within their own jurisdictions. The other, reflecting the prevailing view today and 
supported by the ICRC, is that Article 1 requires in addition that States ensure 
respect for the Conventions by other States and non-State Parties. This view was 
already expressed in Pictet’s 1952 Commentary, and developments in customary 
international law have since confirmed this view.”182 
The difference in the 1952 Commentaries is that there is a specific section 
provided covering the obligation to ensure respect by others. By way of answer-
ing the academic debate on this issue, the commentary states that:  
 
The obligation to ensure respect also has an external dimension related to 
ensuring respect for the Conventions by others that are Party to a conflict. 
Accordingly, States, whether neutral, allied or enemy, must do everything rea-
sonably in their power to ensure respect for the Conventions by others that are 
Party to a conflict. 
This duty to ensure respect by others comprises both a negative and a positive 
obligation. Under the negative obligation, High Contracting Parties may 
neither encourage, nor aid or assist in violations of the Conventions by Parties 
to a conflict. Under the positive obligation, they must do everything reasonably 
in their power to prevent and bring such violations to an end. This external 
dimension of the obligation to ensure respect for the Conventions goes beyond 
the principle of pacta sunt servanda.183 
 
This external side, as well as the positive and negative obligations, will be dis-
cussed in the next sub-paragraphs.  
While the 1952 Pictet Commentary stated that CA 1 was not applicable in 
non-international armed conflicts the updated Commentary, based on develop-
ments over the last six decades, concludes that it is. This interpretation corre-
sponds with the fundamental nature of Common Article 3, which has been 
qualified by the ICJ as a “minimum yardstick” in the event of any armed conflict. 
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2.3. The scope of “Undertake To respect” and 
„in all circumstances“ 
2.3.1. Undertake to respect 
Any discussion on how to improve and strengthen measures promoting respect 
for IHL during armed conflicts must begin with a reflection on the obligation 
contained in CA 1.184 
“To respect” means that the State is under an obligation to do everything it 
can to ensure that the rules in question are respected by its organs, as well as by 
all others under its jurisdiction. “To ensure respect” disputably means that States, 
whether engaged in a conflict or not, must take all possible steps to ensure that 
the rules are respected by all, and in particular by parties to conflict.185 
The Commentary of 2016 states: “The duty to respect the Geneva Conventions 
reaffirms the general principle of the law of treaties ‘pacta sunt servanda’ as 
codified in Article 26 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: 
‘Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by 
them in good faith.’”186 
Kalshoven holds that this first paragraph is more or less accidental and is a 
product of a debate about a different issue. Namely, the si omnes clause was about 
to be abolished from the new texts and, therefore it was necessary to confirm that 
the contracting States were obliged to respect the provisions of the Convention in 
all circumstances, except when a belligerent Party is not a party to the Conven-
tion.187 He regrets that the optical effect of this good idea was that the sentence in 
the first paragraph came to stand out as a thing apart and, hence, could also be 
believed to have a distinct meaning of its own. 
Focarelli concludes that “the term ‘respect’ is thus deemed to refer to obli-
gations of States both to respect (themselves) and ensure respect (within their 
jurisdiction) for the Conventions, while the expression ‘ensure respect’ is reserved 
for measures taken against other contracting States failing to comply with the 
Conventions. What is striking in this reading is that the term ‘respect’ is also 
given an ‘ensure-respect’ meaning, while the term ‘ensure respect’ is given a 
radically different meaning.”188 
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Recently the ICTY has itself taken an even clearer stance on the issue, by 
rejecting what it termed the “tu quoque principle”, namely the argument based on 
the allegedly reciprocal nature of obligations created by the humanitarian law of 
armed conflict. Rebutting this argument, the Tribunal stressed that “… the bulk 
of this body of law lays down absolute obligations, namely obligations that are 
unconditional or in other words not based on reciprocity”. The Tribunal added: 
“This concept is already encapsulated in CA 1 of the 1949 Geneva Conven-
tions …”189 From the fact that such fundamental rules may not be infringed in 
any circumstances, it follows that the SC cannot request States to implement 
sanctions in violation of humanitarian law.190 
These recent developments in international practice as to the circumstances in 
which respect for IHL is required must not overshadow the general scope of the 
principle embodied in CA 1. None of the legally recognized means apt to 
“remedy” the illegality of violations of international law, for example self-defence, 
recourse to countermeasures, consent of the victim, or state of necessity can be 
claimed as circumstances precluding wrongfulness in this particular field.191 
 
 
2.3.2. In all circumstances 
The last part of the CA 1 has been largely left unattended. Only a few authors 
merit this with analysis. The term “in all circumstances” was crucial in Article 
25(1) of the 1929 Wounded and Sick Convention and in Article 82(1) of the 1929 
Prisoners of War Convention and has been understood to mean that the appli-
cation of the Convention does not depend on the character of the conflict. In other 
words, that the obligation “to ensure respect” is unconditional and not constrained 
by the requirement of reciprocity.192 
This phrase was originally linked to the abolishment of the so-called si omnes 
clause, a provision contained in the 1906 Geneva Convention and in the 1907 
Hague Conventions, to the effect that the Conventions were only applicable if all 
of the belligerents in a given conflict were party to it. In 1929, the drafters felt 
that the participation of a State not party to the Conventions in a conflict should 
no longer affect the binding nature of the Conventions on those belligerents who 
were party to the Conventions.193 The Commentary to the 1929 Wounded and 
Sick Convention, published by the ICRC in 1930, specified that the term “in all 
circumstances” in Article 25(1) was intended to mean that the Convention had a 
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“caractère d’obligation générale” and applied both in time of peace and war, in 
the case of those of its provisions which are applicable both in peace and in war. 
It was excluded that this “character as a general obligation” also covered civil 
wars, because “the obligation between the States is international”, although it 
would have been highly desirable had it been so.194 
It may therefore be said, that the words “in all circumstances” do not relate to 
civil war. However, the reason for this is no longer the one that was given by the 
commentator. The reason today is that the States have bound themselves explicitly 
in the case of non-international conflicts. Disregarding the provisions applicable 
in peacetime and Article 3, the words “in all circumstances” mean that, as soon 
as one of the conditions of application for which Article 2 provides is present, no 
Power bound by the Convention can offer any valid pretext, legal or other, for 
not respecting the Convention in all its parts.195 
The undertaking to respect and to ensure respect “in all circumstances” thus 
reaffirms the strict separation of jus ad bellum and jus in bello as one of the basic 
safeguards for compliance with the Conventions. In other words, the application 
of the Conventions does not depend on the legal justification for the conflict under 
the jus ad bellum, the protection and care due to the wounded and sick are in no 
way affected.196 
Accordingly, self-defence against an armed attack (Article 51 of the UN 
Charter) does not preclude the wrongfulness of violations of the Conventions, nor 
does the fact that the High Contracting Parties are acting on the basis of a UNSC 
mandate. The Conventions must also be observed regardless of actual capacity.197 
Focarelli is one of the few authors who has discussed the words “all circum-
stances”. He wonders if the clause could mean that the application of the 
Conventions must be ensured in six different cases: 
1) Also when the enemy is not party to the convention – as a way to overcome 
the effects of the si omnes clause. However, the Conventions already apply 
“in all circumstances” under Article 2(3), without any need for CA 1. 
2) Also in time of peace – specifically requiring contracting States to take 
implementing measures before the war breaks out. The most logical inter-
pretation according to Focarelli. 
3) Also in internal conflicts – not quite, he feels. There are indisputably 
different rules applying to the two types of conflict and Article 1 fails to 
specify which of them, as opposed to others, extend to internal conflicts. 
4) Regardless of military necessity – since the end of the Second World War, 
it has been generally accepted that military necessity has no all-embracing 
scope anymore, it being relevant only when specific provisions expressly 
provide for its “justifying” effect. 
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5) Regardless of reciprocity – the stance taken in the commentaries. Focarelli 
feels that “reciprocity cannot easily be got rid of in absolute terms since it 
remains, for fear of symmetrical breaches, the basic reason why States are 
expected to (and ultimately hopefully do) fulfil their obligations.” 
6) Regardless of being an aggressor – unclear if so or not.198 
 
In sum, the term may be understood in a variety of legal meanings and cannot be 
given an “absolute”, all-pervasive scope. His analysis is thus quite pessimistic 
and gives reason to believe that the clause “in all circumstances” might be redun-
dant in CA 1. “In all circumstances” entails many different obligations that are 
covered by other articles of the Conventions, just like “ensure respect”. On the 
other hand, the explanations given in the Commentaries to the Conventions illus-
trate that there is substance in the clause. 
 
 
2.4. The scope of “Undertake to ensure respect” 
2.4.1. Historical background 
In contrast to the obligation to respect, the obligation to ensure respect is not that 
easily defined, and has been subject to two very different interpretations. 
According to one school of thought, which takes a broad view of the obligation, 
States are required to take all appropriate measures to ensure that IHL is observed 
universally, including by other States and by non-state actors operating in other 
States.199 Within this school, some authors believe that all appropriate measures 
only mean the measures available in the Conventions themselves, and others 
believe that all measures imaginable (even the use of force) should be used. The 
competing (narrow) school holds that the obligation to ensure respect applies only 
in respect of the State’s own population and groups controlled by the State. 
According to this view, there is no legal obligation to ensure respect for IHL by 
other States, or by foreign non-state actors – only a moral obligation to do so.200 
Article 25 of the 1929 Geneva Convention on the Amelioration of the Con-
dition of the Wounded and Sick in Armies in the Field and Article 82 of the 1929 
Geneva Convention on the Treatment of Prisoners of War established that both 
texts “shall be respected by the High Contracting Parties in all circumstances”. 
These provisions have been read as imposing, for the first time, the obligation to 
abide by the rules of the Conventions regardless of the behaviour of other parties 
(the si omnes nature was abolished and replaced with the principle of non-
reciprocity). 
The phrase “to ensure respect”, however, does not emerge in any written text 
until just before the Stockholm Conference of August 1948, convened to prepare 
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the text of the Conventions. At the time, the ICRC had been involved in conflicts 
of non-international character (notably the Spanish Civil war) and was more and 
more concerned about the application of IHL to such situations. This is why 
Pilloud (the ICRC staff lawyer charged with the development of the general pro-
visions of the Conventions) tried to push for a provision that would engage not 
only the governments, but the totality of the population they represent (by 
including “in the name of the people”, “we the peoples” or something similar).201 
The clause turned up in the draft texts for revised Conventions the ICRC sub-
mitted in May 1948 to the Stockholm Conference. (The contracting Parties 
undertake, in the name of their peoples, to respect and to ensure respect for the 
Conventions in all circumstances)  
When the ICRC submitted the revised text it added a series of remarks to all 
of the articles. For CA 1 under the newly added “ensure respect” clause, it stated 
that “The ICRC believes it necessary to stress that if the system of protection of 
the Convention is to be effective, the High Contracting Parties cannot confine 
themselves to implementing the Convention. They must also do everything in 
their power to ensure that the humanitarian principles on which the Convention 
is founded shall be universally applied”.202 A formal declaration stating that the 
two undertakings are subscribed to by Governments in the name of their peoples 
did not make it to the final text of the Conventions. 
Kalshoven wonders what did the authors mean by “universally” as used in the 
comment to the second element; and how did it relate to the notion of the 
“peoples” as used in the third? He is convinced that the authors used “universally” 
in the sense of “by all concerned” or “the whole population” – a notion which 
they hoped would encompass “all parties” to such a conflict, and that the ICRC 
was determined to create a recognition that basic rules of humanitarian law must 
be respected in internal armed conflict as well as international.203 At the Stock-
holm Conference not a word was spoken about the phrase “to ensure respect” and 
the phrase “in the name of their peoples” was simply omitted. All possible past 
meanings of the term “respected … in all circumstances” were covered by other 
specific provisions.204 
Focarelli is likewise convinced that a strong trend existed to make the 
Conventions applicable also in internal conflicts, and hence in the contracting 
States’ domestic sphere. He therefore believes that “universally” meant “by all 
concerned” or “the whole population”.205 
Dörmann and Serralvo are not convinced by Kalshovens’ arguments. Firstly, 
they think that draft Article 2 presented to the Stockholm Conference already 
dealt with the issue of civil war and non-reciprocity and since CA 1 was supposed 
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to enlarge the scope compared to the 1929 text, it cannot mean anything else but 
an obligation to ensure respect universally. And, they add, “universally” cannot 
be restricted to national level already by definition.206 
The travaux préparatoires of the 1949 Diplomatic Conference show that there 
was very little discussion on the issue of CA 1. Only Italy, Norway, the United 
States, the ICRC and France took the floor during the deliberations at the Special 
Committee.207 
Pilloud, on behalf of the ICRC, pointed out that in submitting its proposals to 
the Stockholm Conference the ICRC emphasized that the Contracting Parties 
should not confine themselves to applying the Conventions themselves, but 
should do all in their power to see that the basic humanitarian principles of the 
Conventions were universally applied.208 
It is thus unlikely, Dörmann and Serralvo argue, that delegates had a narrow 
understanding of the undertaking to ensure respect. I can agree with this as far as 
the delegates actually paid attention to the clause and understood what it might 
mean for the future of the law. In the light of present discussions, it is reasonable 
to presume that they did not. What I do not agree with is the next conclusion that 
the authors arrive to. They state that the delegates “chose a broad formulation that 
accommodates an external scope, be it in terms of an entitlement or a duty”. This 
argument is completely undemonstrated in their text. Ensuring respect for the 
Conventions is certainly a noble cause and something that every State should be 
committed to, but reading a concrete obligation to do something in such a vague 
wording, is too much. As will be demonstrated below, it makes a significant dif-
ference whether the States undersigned to an entitlement or a duty. 
Things did not go much better in the conferences held in the 1970s. Kalshoven 
even states that “the Diplomatic Conference of 1974–1977 failed utterly in ful-
filling the expectation that it might shed light on the interpretation of these terms.” 
/…/ “The delegates who negotiated Protocol II shied away from incorporating 
the text of CA 1 in this first humanitarian law treaty written exclusively for 
situations of internal armed conflict.” 209 
The comment on the phrase “to ensure respect” in the Commentaries to the 
Protocols states that:  
 
Finally, and most importantly, the Diplomatic Conference fully understood and 
wished to impose this duty on each Party to the Conventions, and therefore 
reaffirmed it in the Protocol as a general principle, adding in particular to the 
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already existing implementation measures those of Article 7 (meetings) and 89 
(Co-operation).210 
 
“It may be evident from the earlier discussion of the work of the Diplomatic Con-
ference that the (incontestable) reiteration and (merely technical) reaffirmation of 
the text of CA 1 in Protocol I cannot seriously be claimed to express anything 
like a full understanding and wish of that Conference with respect to a text they 
were simply repeating verbatim. There was, moreover, no-one at the Conference 
who ever ventured to suggest that the text contained a “duty” for States to do what 
the ICRC wishes them to do.” Kalshoven points out that no one at the Con-
ferences ever discussed the text of the Article in terms even remotely resembling 
the ICRC interpretation, let alone that they qualified it as an obligation, as the 
ICRC now openly does.211 
 
 
2.4.2. Practice – when has Common Article 1 been invoked 
by States and International Tribunals? 
The first opportunity to test the new CA 1 came in 1968 in Tehran, where the UN 
International Conference on Human Rights reminded States party to the Con-
ventions of their responsibility to “take steps to ensure respect of these humani-
tarian rules in all circumstances by other States, even if they are not themselves 
directly involved in an armed conflict.” Although the Resolution XXIII was 
adopted by sixty-seven votes to none, with two abstentions, it is not absolutely 
clear whether the term “responsibility” referred to a legal obligation or something 
less.212 
It must be noted that the Teheran Conference was dealing with human rights 
in armed conflicts, and was a bold undertaking in the sense of actively entering 
in the field of IHL as Kalshoven points out.213 He further holds that this text is far 
from suggesting that States Parties to the 1949 Conventions are under a firm legal 
obligation to ensure respect for their provisions by other States. “Fail to appre-
ciate”, “responsibility” instead of duty, “take steps”: these are all very cautious 
formulations. Even so, the text does provide a useful reminder that States not 
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directly involved in an armed conflict are nonetheless entitled to “take steps to 
ensure” that their colleagues respect the rules they voluntarily accepted as law.214 
Focarelli is also not convinced: “This text is often relied upon – unconvinc-
ingly indeed, given its sheer legal weight – as proof that post-1949 practice 
supports the notion that CA 1 provides an obligation on each contracting State to 
take all measures in its power to induce each other contracting State to com-
pliance”.215 
The ICJ has taken stance on the issue in a couple of cases thereafter. In the 
Nicaragua case, the Court considered that even though the United States was not 
a party to the NIAC, it had an obligation to ensure respect for the Conventions in 
all circumstances.216 However, as Zych points out, the Court did not suggest that 
the United States should have made use of its influence in order to ensure or pro-
mote respect for IHL by the contras. The United States’ only obligation, in view 
of the Court, was not to encourage such violations.217 
In its advisory opinion on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a 
Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, the Court underscored that “every 
State party to [the Fourth Geneva Convention], whether or not it is a party to a 
specific conflict, is under an obligation to ensure that the requirements of the 
instruments in question are complied with”.218 
The Court again framed these obligations in negative terms, stating that “[a]ll 
States are under an obligation not to recognize the illegal situation resulting from 
the construction of the wall and not to render aid or assistance in maintaining the 
situation created by such construction.” In addition to these obligations, all States 
Parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention had also “the duty to ensure compliance 
by Israel with international humanitarian law as embodied in that Convention.” 
Interestingly, the Court did not specify what (if anything) this duty entailed 
beyond the negative obligations not to recognize and not to assist.219 
The often cited Genocide case also gives an idea of the Courts interpretation: 
“The ordinary meaning of the word “undertake” is to give a formal promise, to 
bind or engage oneself, to give a pledge or promise, to agree, to accept an obli-
gation. It is a word regularly used in treaties setting out the obligations of the 
Contracting Parties … It is not merely hortatory or purposive. The undertaking is 
unqualified … and it is not to be read merely as an introduction to later express 
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references to legislation, prosecution and extradition.”220 Some authors think that 
those features support the conclusion that Article 1, in particular its undertaking 
to prevent, creates obligations distinct from those which appear in the subsequent 
Articles. 
Others think that the case demonstrates that the Court can be quite liberal and 
progressive in its interpretation of treaty provisions of a humanitarian character 
and that it is not in principle opposed to recognizing an obligation to make best 
efforts (similar to the second sentence of rule 144), despite the inherent vagueness 
of such an obligation, if it considers it to have a rational basis in the text of the 
treaty.221 
Both the General Assembly (GA) and the Security Council (SC) of the UN 
have referred to the obligation under Article 1, as for example concerning the 
Arab territories occupied by Israel, and in concerning the uprising of the Pales-
tinian people.222 The SC has also called upon third States to ensure compliance in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and Rwanda.223 
In its judgment on 14 January 2000, the ICTY stressed that “[as] a conse-
quence of their absolute character, these norms of international humanitarian law 
do not pose synallagmatic obligations, i.e. obligations of a State vis-à-vis another 
State. Rather (…) they lay down obligations towards the international community 
as a whole, with the consequence that each and every member of the international 
community has a legal interest “in their observance and consequently a legal 
entitlement to demand respect for such obligation.”224 
In the case of the armed conflict in Libya in 2011, countries from all over the 
world condemned indiscriminate attacks causing death among the civilian popu-
lation, and urged the Libyan government to respect IHL. In February 2011 the 
European Union approved a package of sanctions against Libyan leaders, 
including an arms embargo and a travel ban.225 
More recently, in the conflicts of Yemen and Ukraine the parties have been 
reminded to “uphold international humanitarian law”, including taking steps to 
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protect civilians.226 Nevertheless, all of these examples emanate from inter-
national courts, the UN or the EU bodies. Finding a case where a State has for-
mally declared that it engages in some implementation or enforcement activity 
due to its obligations under CA 1, proves very difficult.  
Almost all authors finish their inquiries by pointing out that State practice is 
scarce, and that legal theory still has to develop arguments for asserting an uncon-
ditional obligation of all States not involved in an armed conflict to discourage 
belligerent parties from violating humanitarian law.227 Once articulated in State 
practice, the full potential of Article 1 will be exploited. 
 
 
2.4.3. Customary International law 
As established in the first chapter, treaty law is not the only source one needs to 
look at when examining IHL. Customary international law also deals with the 
obligation to “ensure respect”. There are two Rules in the Customary Inter-
national Humanitarian Law Study that are important for our purposes.  
The Study was commanded by Recommendation II of the Intergovernmental 
Group of Experts for the Protection of War Victims who met in Geneva in January 
1995. The group proposed that: “The ICRC be invited to prepare, with the 
assistance of experts in IHL representing various geographical regions and dif-
ferent legal systems, and in consultation with experts from governments and 
international organisations, a report on customary rules of IHL applicable in inter-
national and noninternational armed conflicts, and to circulate the report to States 
and competent international bodies.” The 26th International Conference of the 
Red Cross and Red Crescent endorsed this recommendation, and officially 
mandated the ICRC to prepare such a report, the results of which were presented 
in a 3-volume, 5066-page book published in 2005.228 
Rule 139 provides: “Each party to the conflict must respect and ensure respect 
for international humanitarian law by its armed forces and other persons or groups 
acting in fact on its instructions, or under its direction or control.” 
The rule is subject to three clarifications: 1) States are only obliged to ensure 
respect for IHL by such persons when they are in fact directing or controlling 
them; 2) the obligation of States is limited to ensuring that the instructions them-
selves are compatible with their international obligations; 3) the obligation to 
ensure respect for IHL on the part of the population must be understood as an 
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obligation to ensure respect for IHL within the State’s own jurisdiction, and not 
on the part of their nationals wherever they may be.229 
Rule 144 of the ICRC Customary Law Study provides that “States may not 
encourage violations of international humanitarian law by parties to an armed 
conflict. They must exert their influence, to the degree possible, to stop violations 
of international humanitarian law” and bases its reasoning on CA 1. “Must exert 
their influence” is an obligation that even the proponents of the narrow view of 
the meaning of CA 1 could probably accept.230 
The first good example of the use of CA 1 as customary international law is 
the aforementioned Nicaragua case. Since the US did not agree to the jurisdiction 
of the Court, the Court saw itself forced to base its argumentation solely on cus-
tomary international law and found CA 1 to be one of such norms. The Court 
found in its verdict that the United States was “in breach of its obligations under 
customary international law not to use force against another State”, “not to inter-
vene in its affairs”, and “not to violate its sovereignty”. The Courts ruling on this 
has been widely used by the proponents of the wide scope of CA 1. However, 
there is also a view that the Court did not say that States Parties to the Conven-
tions are under an obligation to ensure that other States respect their rules of 
humanitarian law, despite what many gather from this ruling. 
What the Court said was: “[T]here is an obligation on the United States 
Government, in the terms of Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions, to “respect” 
the Conventions and even “to ensure respect” for them “in all circumstances”, 
since such an obligation does not derive only from the Conventions themselves, 
but from the general principles of humanitarian law to which the Conventions 
merely give specific expression. The United States is thus under an obligation not 
to encourage persons or groups engaged in the conflict in Nicaragua to act in 
violation of the provisions of Article 3 common to the four 1949 Geneva 
Conventions.”231 
There is considerable distance between the negative duty to refrain from 
encouraging people on your side to disregard the law and a positive duty to induce 
people on the other side of the fence to respect the law, Kalshoven concludes.232 
He is straightforward in saying that “This is a typical instance of the Court wanting 
to see customary law and therefore finding it, without adducing any proof for its 
finding”.233 
Other authors take issue with the ICRC’s and the Court’s broad interpretation 
of customary law norms. For example, Zych rightly states that in view of the 
general recognition (even by the proponents of the broad interpretation) that 
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evidence of State practice is lacking, it is “surprising to find that the authors of 
the recent ICRC Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law present the 
broad interpretation as an established rule of customary IHL and claim that 
evidence in support of it is ‘overwhelming.’”234 
The commentary to the Customary Law study asserts that “State practice 
shows an overwhelming use of (i) diplomatic protest and (ii) collective measures 
through which States exert their influence, to the degree possible, to try to stop 
violations of [IHL].”235 Unfortunately, the ICRC has made it very difficult to 
verify its claim, since it does not actually provide a list of such overwhelming 
incidents. 
In fact, even ICRC officials have admitted that such evidence was insufficient, 
or at least inconclusive. Gasser, writing in his personal capacity, stated not so 
long ago that it was “difficult to draw conclusions from the practice of govern-
ments” and that no “clear” or “hard” evidence of State practice had emerged in 
this area.236 
These comments bring us to the issue of opinio juris, the second element of 
establishing customary international law, of which there is scarcely any mention 
in the commentary to rule 144. When considering this issue, it is important to 
keep in mind that rule 144 comprises two separate norms. The first sentence of 
rule 144 sets out a prohibition on encouraging violations of IHL by parties to an 
armed conflict, while the second sentence refers to a positive obligation of States 
to exert their influence to the degree possible to stop such violations. This dis-
tinction is important because, as stated in the introduction to the Study, the 
manner of assessing the existence of a customary rule “may well differ depending 
on whether the rule involved contains a prohibition, an obligation or merely a 
right to behave in a certain manner.”237 In case of a right, it may be sufficient to 
show that States do not object when others act in a certain way. Prohibitions, on 
the other hand, require positive evidence of opinio juris, particularly where the 
underlying State practice consists primarily of abstentions (i.e. compliance with 
the prohibition). Positive evidence of opinio juris is even more important in the 
context of obligations in order to distinguish the underlying State practice from 
mere courtesy or comity.238 
                                                                                                 
234  Zych, “The Scope of the Obligation“, supra nota 15, p 260. Rule 144 reads: States may 
not encourage violations of international humanitarian law by parties to an armed conflict. 
They must exert their influence, to the degree possible, to stop violations of international 
humanitarian law. 
235  Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law, supra nota 
182. 
236  Gasser, “Ensuring Respect, supra nota 33, p 31; Kalshoven points to a similar personal 
experience with Dr Yves Sandoz and Cornelio Sommarunga in Kalshoven, “Chapter 31”, 
supra nota 128, p 726. 
237  Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law, supra nota 182. 
238  Ibid. 
68 
Furthermore, as noted in the Study, “[o]pinio juris plays an [especially] 
important role … where the practice is ambiguous, in order to decide whether or 
not that practice counts towards the formation of custom.” The commentary to 
rule 144 shows no indication of these basic rules having been followed. The 
methodology actually employed with regards to rule 144 is more appropriate for 
establishing the existence of a customary right, rather than a prohibition or obli-
gation. The authors of the Study appear to have admitted any State practice 
whether or not supported by evidence of opinio juris.239 
Scobbie, for instance, has observed that there appears to be a divergence 
between the “classic” approach to assessing the existence of customary inter-
national law as described in the introduction to the Study and “the less stringent 
methodology which actually appears to have been employed” in the context of 
particular rules.240 
It remains, however, that the second sentence of rule 144 is terribly vague, 
which makes it unlikely for States to be found in violation of it, so long as they 
at least refrain from encouraging violations of IHL.241 
In fact, the only sure way to violate the second sentence of rule 144 might be 
to violate the first. As Sassòli and Bouvier have noted, “it is only certain that a 
State violates [common] Article 1 … if it encourages or assists violations by 
another State.” This view is consistent with international jurisprudence, which so 
far has not extended the duty to ensure universal respect for IHL beyond the duty 
not to encourage violations of IHL by others.242 
 
 
2.4.4. The extensive and restrictive approach 
to interpreting Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions 
In this section I set out to establish whether there is an obligation for a State Party 
to ensure respect for the Conventions by all entities falling under its jurisdiction 
(organs of the State, armed forces, etc.), or does CA 1 imply a legal obligation to 
take measures to ensure respect by other States and even non-state actors. Two 
of the major schools of thought on this question are summarised as follows: 
The first point of view is that CA 1 does not entail any obligation for States to 
ensure respect for IHL by other States. This is not what the drafters of the Con-
ventions had intended. Rather, the term “respect” was held to refer to the States 
own organs, whereas “ensure respect” was held to refer to their duty to ensure 
respect within their own field of jurisdiction (by civilians for example), through 
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measures such as legislation etc. This school also admits that there might be a 
moral obligation for States to do this and there is certainly a right to take lawful 
unilateral measures if the States wish to do so. 
Those holding the opposite view, point out that evolving practice and inter-
national opinio juris have shown that such an obligation now exists. In particular, 
they cite the 1993 Conference for the Protection of War Victims and the role of 
Customary International Law. 
These approaches have been titled restrictive and extensive respectively. The 
restrictive approach may also be termed “individual-compliance”, implying that 
under Article 1 contracting States have undertaken to adopt all measures neces-
sary to ensure respect for the Conventions within their jurisdiction by their organs 
and private individuals. The extensive approach is “state-compliance” in character, 
meaning that under Article 1 contracting States have also undertaken to adopt all 
measures necessary to ensure respect for the Conventions against other contracting 
States which fail to comply with them.243 
According to Bugnion, the travaux préparatoires to the Conventions are not 
conclusive when it comes to construing the scope of CA 1. He asserts that both 
the internal and external aspects of the duty to ensure respect were put forward 
and that the Diplomatic Conference of 1949 did not find it necessary to decide 
between them. The formulation retained would permit both interpretations. 
Kalshoven has gone one step further by stating that nothing in the travaux prépa-
ratoires justifies an interpretation of CA 1 whereby third States have an inter-
national legal obligation to ensure respect for the Conventions in conflicts to 
which they are not a party.244 
Let us now turn to the arguments of both of these groups. I argue that the 
intention of the High Contracting Parties, coupled with their subsequent practice, 
calls for a narrow interpretation of that obligation. In this sub-chapter the general 
views of the proponents of each group are analysed, whereas the next sub-chapter 
deals more specifically with possible active measures to be taken and outlines 
some concrete obligations proposed. 
  
                                                                                                 
243  See, e.g., Focarelli, “Common Article 1”, supra nota 15, p 127; Gasser, “Ensuring Respect, 
supra nota 33, p 25; Luigi Condorelli & Laurence Boisson de Chazoumes, „Quelques remarques 
à propos de I'obligation des Etats de ’respecter et faire respecter’ le droit international 
humanitaire len toutes circonstances“ – Christophe Swinarski (ed), Studies and essays on 
international humanitarian law and Red Cross principles in honour of Jean Pictet (Geneva-
The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1984) 17–36, p 24. ICRC 2016 commentary also cites that this 
is the prevailing view „Developments in customary International law have since confirmed 
this view“, but only cites its own controversial customary law study and the Nicaragua case. 
244  Dörmann, “Common Article 1”, supra nota 206, p 712, François Bugnion, Le Comité 
International de la Croix Rouge et la protection des victimes de la guerre (ICRC, Geneva, 
2000), pp 1080–1081. 
70 
2.4.4.1. The extensive approach 
According to this interpretation, States are required to take all appropriate measures 
to ensure that IHL is observed universally, including by other States and by non-
state actors operating in other States.245 Many proponents of this approach are 
closely affiliated with the ICRC and are concentrated mainly on HRL in their 
research. Their good will is of course understandable, but from a purely legal 
point of view, this issue must be analysed objectively. 
Pfanner sets out that the undertaking in Article 1 to “ensure respect for” IHL 
means that the Contracting Parties are obliged to help bring about compliance 
with the Conventions whenever they are applicable, even in conflicts in which 
those parties are not involved. “This provision thus reinforces the responsibility 
of each contracting State, which besides regulating its own conduct must act by 
all appropriate means to ensure that humanitarian law is observed by all other 
States.”246 Breslin similarly states without further ado that “the duty to ensure 
respect for the Conventions goes beyond the actions of a State’s own armed forces 
is clear from scholarly work, judicial decisions, the modus operandi of the Security 
Council in maintaining peace and security, and the policy of regional powers such 
as the EU.”247 According to Serralvo and Dörmann CA 1 goes beyond an entitle-
ment for third States to take steps to ensure respect for IHL. It establishes not 
only a right to take action, but also an international legal obligation to do so.248 
The words “ensure respect” imply an active duty and the term “undertake” suggests 
a genuine obligation.249 The latter also introduces an internal and external element 
of the duty:  
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However, CA 1 goes one step further by introducing an undertaking to ensure 
respect in all circumstances, which, in turn, consists of an internal and an 
external component. The internal component implies that each High Con-
tracting Party to the Conventions must ensure that the Conventions are 
respected at all times not only by its armed forces and its civilian and military 
authorities, but also by the population as a whole. The external component 
postulates that third States not involved in a given armed conflict – and also 
regional and international organizations – have a duty to take action in order 
to safeguard compliance with the Conventions, and arguably with the whole 
body of IHL, by the parties to the conflict.250 
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“It is reasonable to assume”, they continue, “that CA 1 goes beyond the mere 
obligation to respect the Conventions at the domestic level. What can be deduced 
from a joint analysis of the travaux préparatoires and the subsequent application 
of CA 1 for over sixty years, is that CA 1 creates and unprecedented legal obli-
gation for each State to ensure respect towards the international community as a 
whole”.251 
Chazournes goes even further in her analysis. She first states that CA 1 also 
emphasizes the non-reciprocal nature and absolute character of this fundamental 
obligation, which obliges States to react to violations of IHL regardless of the 
circumstances, so as to ensure respect for the aforementioned principles. Here she 
actually proposes means by which to enforce this obligation: meetings of the High 
Contracting Parties, Protecting Powers, grave breaches system, International 
Fact-Finding Commission, diplomatic action, public denunciation and action in 
the framework of the UN.252 Note that all of these measures are listed under other, 
substantial articles of the Conventions. She then adds that the obligation should 
be interpreted in an even broader sense, so as to include the search for a peaceful 
resolution of a conflict based on the respect for humanitarian principles as a “post-
conflict peace-building” measure to consolidate peace and prevent any recurrence 
of gross violations of humanitarian principles.253 
The authors offer different lines of argumentation for their approaches. For 
example, Tonkin agrees that one could perhaps argue that CA 1 was intended to 
be an aspirational statement rather than an independent obligation carrying real 
legal weight, but remains that the use of the word “undertake” in CA 1 goes against 
this interpretation. As the ICJ explained in the Genocide case, in relation to the 
obligation to prevent and punish genocide in Article 1 of the Genocide Con-
vention, the ordinary meaning of the word “undertake” is to give a formal promise, 
to bind or engage oneself, to give a pledge or promise, to agree, to accept an 
obligation. It is a word regularly used in treaties setting out the obligations of the 
Contracting Parties. It is not merely hortatory or purposive.254 
The Wall case is another example mentioned. Pfanner believes that “Before 
the ICJ’s Wall opinion, the legal scope of the obligation to ‘ensure respect for’ 
international humanitarian law was disputed, particularly with regard to whether 
the obligation binds only the parties to a conflict or whether it also implies a duty 
(and, if so, what duty) for third States. At the least, States should “not […] 
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encourage persons or groups engaged in [conflict] to act in violation of the pro-
visions of Article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions’.”255 
However, this reasoning has not gone entirely unchallenged. Considering 
Israel’s actions in the occupied Palestinian territory under the Fourth Geneva 
Convention, the Court noted that all States party to the Convention have an obli-
gation “to ensure compliance by Israel with international humanitarian law as 
embodied in that Convention”. In his dissenting opinion, Judge Kooijmans dis-
agreed with the majority’s conclusion that CA 1 imposes obligations on States to 
take action in relation to other States. While emphasizing that he “certainly” was 
“not in favour of a restricted interpretation of Article 1, such as may have been 
envisaged in 1949”, he argued that the drafters only intended CA 1 to impose an 
obligation on each contracting State “to ensure respect for the Conventions by its 
people” rather than by other States, and in any case he failed to see what kind of 
positive action might be expected from third States “apart from diplomatic 
démarches”.256 
Two other cases have proven helpful for the proponents of the broad inter-
pretation. In its advisory opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear 
Weapons, the ICJ noted that “a great many rules of humanitarian law applicable 
in armed conflict are so fundamental” that “these fundamental rules are to be 
observed by all States whether or not they have ratified the Conventions that con-
tain them”.257 The same Court, in its earlier decision on merits in the landmark 
Nicaragua Case, had asserted that the obligation referred to in CA 1 forms part of 
customary international law.258 This, in fact, does not say anything about the sub-
stance of the obligation in CA 1. It is clear that such fundamental norms exist that 
all States must adhere to, but this does not lead to a logical conclusion that States 
are under an obligation to force other States to respect such rules, nor that these 
obligations stem solely from CA 1. 
The proponents of the broad approach admit that there was no mention to this 
obligation in the drafting history of the Conventions, but overcome this loophole 
easily. Tonkin states for example, that “the original intent of the drafters is never 
conclusive as to the current status of a legal norm, since modern treaty inter-
pretation also relies heavily on the subsequent practice in the application of the 
treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation”.259 
She provides the Wall case as an example of “a general trend towards a broad and 
dynamic interpretation of CA 1”. 
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“The scope of the duty to ‘ensure respect’ has evolved considerably since the 
drafting of this article and has come to encompass much more than the original 
drafters explicitly included”, Breslin reaffirms Tonkin’s findings. “While third 
party responsibility may not have been originally envisaged, it has been said that 
the article nonetheless provides a ‘nucleus for a system of collective respon-
sibility’.” While the legal obligation may be clear, Breslin argues, the scope of 
the duty and the measures available to third States to ensure respect are less 
certain. “It is evident that ensuring respect entails a duty to refrain from encour-
aging or assisting others to violate the rules contained in the Conventions, it is 
less clear at what point a legal duty to undertake positive action may come into 
play”.260 
While it is usually acknowledged that consistent practice is sparse, some 
authors nevertheless hold that general acquiescence, lack of objections, and con-
fidentiality of measures are, on balance, strongly supportive of this broader inter-
pretation, and even capable of outweighing possible different interpretations 
deriving from the drafting history of the Conventions.261 
 
 
2.4.4.2. The restrictive approach 
The proponents of this approach hold that the extensive approach has become 
dominant, just by way of repetition and that some writers have sought in this 
interpretation an overarching obligation that conveniently fills any gaps in existing 
rules of IHL. It has been argued, for instance, that the obligation to respect and to 
ensure respect for IHL even requires States to regulate their arms exports so as to 
prevent violations of IHL by other actors.262 
Proponents of the broad interpretation have turned a blind eye on Kalshoven’s 
pointed critique. According to David, the obligation to ensure universal respect 
for IHL cannot be of a merely moral order, since the language of CA 1 is pre-
scriptive, not hortatory. This argument misses the point in that Kalshoven clearly 
recognises that CA 1 expresses a legal obligation; what he disputes is the claim 
that this obligation is universal in scope. In other words, the dispute is not over 
the nature (legal or moral) of the obligation to ensure respect, but rather over the 
scope of the legal obligation.263 
Other proponents of the broad interpretation dismiss Kalshoven’s critique as 
a “minor consideration” and argue that the subsequent practice of States confirms 
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their interpretation of the obligation to ensure respect.264 They do recognize that 
little State practice is available, but assume this is because States prefer to act 
discretely. 
As said in the previous subparagraphs, the VCLT (Article 31(3)(b)) provide 
that in interpreting a treaty account must be taken of “any subsequent practice in 
the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties 
regarding its interpretation.” Article 31(3)(b) sets a very high standard; it requires 
that all parties to a treaty, if not actually engaged in the subsequent practice, must 
at least accept it or acquiesce to it.265 Any contrary State practice would therefore 
be fatal to this argument as Zych concludes, pointing out examples of such contrary 
State practice. 
Zych puts forward a sound argument about States not having acquiesced to 
the broad interpretation. In Brownlie’s words, acquiescence is “the absence of 
protest when this might reasonably be expected”.266 A practice that is engaged in 
discreetly or secretly on a bilateral level, as is alleged to be the case here, would 
not be known to the generality of States and would not afford them an opportunity 
to protest.267 
The existence of State practice must always be established. Indeed, if the 
obligation to ensure respect for IHL were in fact universally accepted, each and 
every armed conflict would elicit some kind of response by each and every State. 
A much more likely explanation is that States simply do not subscribe to the broad 
interpretation.268 As illustrated in the “customary law” section of this Chapter, it 
is mostly case law that the authors cite, not specific conduct of States on the basis 
on CA 1. 
Focarelly points out that the 1949 Conventions require contracting States to 
“ensure” that a certain result be attained in numerous provisions unequivocally 
referring to an “individual-compliance” meaning. This treatment of the term 
“ensure” throughout the Conventions exclusively limited to an “individual-com-
pliance” meaning militates against a “state-compliance” meaning to be attached 
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to CA 1. The Conventions themselves provide for certain mechanisms to be acti-
vated against transgressor contracting States, but they never in this connection 
use the term “ensure”.269 
He concludes that appeals to the “state-compliance” meaning of CA 1 by 
international bodies are invariably contained in recommendations and, should 
they be contained in binding resolutions, such as those adopted by the UNSC 
under Article 41 of the UN Charter, contracting States would be bound to take 
action on the basis (and to the extent) of these resolutions rather than of CA 1.270 
Expressions similar to “ensure respect” in human rights treaties, in other 
provisions of the Conventions themselves, and in military manuals have been 
given an exclusive “individual-compliance” meaning. Measures, the adoption of 
which is expressly required or authorized by other provisions of the Conventions, 
have been redundantly linked to Article 1.271 Also, if third States really have an 
obligation to react, and yet generally they do not abide by it, it remains obscure 
how far a broad interpretation of CA 1 is sensible.272 
Focarelli points out an interesting nuance. While the Commentary to the Third 
Convention refers only to “should”, the Commentaries to the First, Second, and 
Fourth Conventions refer to „may, and should”. The text thus refers to either a 
simple recommendation (“should“) or to both a recommendation („should“) and 
a discretionary power („may“). This question is of great importance. If the term 
“ensure respect” is to be understood in terms of an obligation, it would follow 
that all contracting States are legally bound to take all measures in their power 
against transgressor States. That is, in each instance of alleged breach of the Con-
ventions each contracting State would violate the Conventions if it failed to take 
all measures in its power capable of inducing the transgressor to compliance. It 
would follow that for each single breach of the Conventions a potentially large 
number of contracting States may be held responsible for a violation of CA 1.273 
This interpretation would be in sharp contrast with the principle of effectiveness 
mentioned above. 
In conclusion Kalhsoven states: The primary legal obligation arising from CA 
1 is for States Parties to impose respect for the applicable rules of international 
humanitarian law, “in all circumstances”, on their armed forces, including armed 
groups under their control, and on their populations: for the implementation of 
this obligation they can be held legally responsible. No such legal liability 
attaches to their moral duty to endeavour to ensure respect by their peers.274 
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In sum, either measures supposedly envisaged in CA 1 against other con-
tracting States are already detailed in other provisions of the Conventions, in 
which case Article 1 is legally redundant, or they are not specifically envisaged, 
but then it seems hardly possible to determine which of them fall within the scope 
of the undertaking to “ensure respect”. It should also be considered that measures 
governed by other provisions usually relate to discretionary powers to take per se 
lawful measures, as opposed to obligations provided for in relation to measures 
to be taken to induce compliance by individuals. It is hardly plausible that CA 1 
may transform an express discretionary power into an obligation, thereby causing 
a change in meaning of other provisions of the same Conventions.275 
 
 
2.4.5. Does the obligation to ensure respect imply 
the taking of active measures? 
According to one school of thought, States do not have a legal obligation to take 
active measures to ensure respect for the Conventions, but are at the very least 
required to have “clean hands”.276 The second school of thought holds that States 
have a legal obligation not only to have clean hands, but also to take active 
measures to bring a stop to violations (recalling of an ambassador, economic 
sanctions etc.). This is also the view taken by the members of the ILC, for whom 
violations of IHL are prejudicial to the whole International Community, due to 
the fact that this body of law contains erga omnes obligations.277 
What exactly does the obligation to have clean hands entail? This principle 
prohibits States from helping a third State commit violations or inciting it to do 
so. One point of view could be that it simply requires that a State do nothing to 
help or encourage another State to commit violations (the “closed eyes” inter-
pretation). This is in contrast with the more widely held view, which is that the 
principle of clean hands entails certain specific responsibilities which go some-
what beyond this (e.g. States should abstain from supplying certain types of arms, 
especially where they are being used to commit violations).278 
There are, as in many chapters of this thesis, supporters to both of these views. 
As expected, professor Kalshoven takes issue with the broad interpretation, 
arguing that the drafters did not intend CA 1 to impose an obligation on third 
States to take action to ensure that States party to the conflict ensure respect for 
IHL. Instead, the provision was intended to oblige States party to the conflict to 
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ensure respect for the Conventions by their own populations, as well as by their 
agents and officials.279 
Basing his arguments on the work of the International Law Commission’s 
Draft articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, 
Professor Momtaz also holds that CA 1 contains the obligation for the High 
Contracting Parties to abstain from helping parties to a conflict commit violations 
of IHL.280 The ILC dedicated Article 16 of its draft statutes to that obligation. 
According to this Article, “a State which aids or assists another State in the com-
mission of an internationally wrongful act by the latter is internationally respon-
sible for doing so”. Nevertheless, State’s responsibility would be engaged if the 
latter does so “with knowledge of the circumstances of the internationally wrong-
ful act”. In other words, the State which assists another one must know for a fact 
that its action will facilitate the commission of an internationally wrongful act.281 
He admits that States probably have a right to take active measures. The dif-
ference between a legal obligation and an inherent right to act in a certain way is 
immense, though. Many authors and commentators seem to have overlooked this.  
According to the general regime of State responsibility then third States are 
under an obligation not to knowingly aid or assist in the commission of IHL vio-
lations. They also must refrain from recognizing as lawful any situation created 
by a serious breach of peremptory norms of IHL. These obligations can be con-
sidered negative duties, and even if CA 1 did not exist, they would flow from 
other norms of international law. 
Professor Momtaz points out that it is as yet unclear whether CA 1 implies 
that States have a legal obligation to take measures to ensure respect for IHL, or 
whether it simply gives them the right to take measures. “Even though the Reso-
lution XXIII adopted in the Conference of Teheran on Human Rights in 1968 and 
the Declaration of the 1993 Geneva Conference on protection of war victims refer 
to States’ “responsibility” in this field, are we allowed to talk about a State 
“obligation”? The question still remains”.282 
Focarelli sees a double regime: “while there is undisputedly an obligation to 
‘respect’ (meaning an obligation of contracting States to comply themselves and 
to do everything in their power to comply with the Protocol), the term ‘ensure 
respect’ is understood in recommendatory terms when (and only when) referring 
to action taken against transgressor States.”283 
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According to Devillard, a general obligation of prevention incumbent on third 
States can be excluded, but an obligation to prevent IHL violations would be trig-
gered in situations where the risk of such violations can be reasonably foreseen.284 
On the other hand, Dörmann conveniently concludes that taking into con-
sideration both the drafting history of CA 1 and the subsequent practice of States, 
international tribunals and intergovernmental organizations, States not party to 
an armed conflict have a legal obligation to ensure respect for the Conventions, 
and for applicable IHL more broadly, through taking positive steps.285 He holds 
that States also have an international legal obligation to actively prevent IHL 
violations. According to him, States have to take appropriate measures to put an 
end to ongoing IHL violations based on rule 144 and AP I Article 89.  
Gasser also refers to preventing further breaches from happening and acting 
when parties to an armed conflict are about to violate their humanitarian obli-
gations. However, he points out that a brief look at the behaviour of governments 
leaves no doubt that they do not feel themselves to be under a legal obligation to 
act if humanitarian law is being flouted by a party to an armed conflict. If third 
parties actually do act, they do so if and when they feel that a demarche is also in 
their own interest or if public pressure at home is such that to act seems wiser 
than to run counter to public opinion.286 
Tonkin points out that in Resolution 60/147 of 2005 the UNGA considered 
the scope of the obligation to ensure respect for IHL and concluded that it entails, 
inter alia, a duty to take positive measures to prevent violations, to investigate 
violations and punish perpetrators, and to provide victims with access to justice 
and effective remedies. The resolution emphasizes that these basic principles ‘do 
not entail new international or domestic legal obligations’, but simply ‘identify 
mechanisms, modalities, procedures and methods for the implementation of 
existing legal obligations’.287 Admittedly, this can also be understood as a con-
firmation to the point made on the obligations being written in specific Articles 
that need to be implemented at any rate. 
At the annual Brugges Colloquium of IHL in 2003, this issue was addressed. 
It was generally accepted that States have an obligation under CA 1 to abstain from 
any act that might encourage or support a party to a conflict to violate IHL.288 
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It was also generally accepted that international organizations and third States 
not involved in an armed conflict have a responsibility under CA 1 to bring their 
influence to bear on parties to an armed conflict in order to induce them to comply 
with IHL or to desist from any behaviour that violates the law. This responsibility 
was understood to be an obligation to take action, not as an obligation to reach a 
specific result. While some experts considered the duty to take appropriate action 
to be a moral responsibility, the great majority considered it a legal obligation.289 
According to the 2016 Commentary to the Conventions, the obligation to 
ensure respect also has an external dimension related to ensuring respect for the 
Conventions by others that are Party to a conflict. Accordingly, States, whether 
neutral, allied or enemy, must do everything reasonably in their power to ensure 
respect for the Conventions by others that are Party to a conflict.290 It is unclear 
if this is a legal obligation and if so, what does it entail? What happens if States 
do not comply? 
The Commentary lists both negative and positive obligations. Under negative 
obligations, in particular, they may neither encourage nor aid or assist in vio-
lations of the Conventions. CA 1 does not tolerate that a State would knowingly 
contribute to violations of the Conventions by a Party to a conflict, whatever its 
intentions may be.291 
It goes on to say that this obligation is not limited to stopping ongoing vio-
lations, but includes an obligation to prevent violations when there is a foresee-
able risk that they will be committed, and to prevent further violations in case 
they have already occurred.292 Unlike the negative obligation described above, it 
is an obligation of means, i.e. the High Contracting Parties are not responsible for 
a possible failure of their efforts as long as they have done everything reasonably 
in their power to bring the violations to an end.293 
The commentators agree that the precise content of this positive obligation is 
difficult to determine in the abstract, yet this difficulty is “not sufficient in itself 
to deny the existence of such an obligation. CA 1 is a living provision which must 
be interpreted in the overall context of the Conventions and, where applicable, 
the Protocols, and the international legal order as a whole. Its content will be 
further concretized and operationalized in the decades ahead.”294 
It is thus concluded, similar to professor Momtaz, that “the question still 
remains…”. States certainly have a right to take active measures against a trans-
gressor State, envisaged in other articles of the Conventions and Protocols. They 
also have to “bring their influence”, “take measures to prevent”, “act in coopera-
tion” and other similar formulations that seem to be used quite often in literature. 
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As for a legal obligation I still hold that all obligations envisaged by substantive 
Articles of the Conventions and Protocols, must be respected and carried out in 
good faith regardless of CA 1. 
In short, the need for greater compliance cannot automatically and logically 
generate obligations erga omnes solely because a higher degree of compliance is 
believed to follow. As mentioned, even when an obligation is proved erga omnes, 
this obligation does not necessarily entail a commitment of all States to take all 
possible and imaginable measures capable of inducing transgressor States to com-
pliance.295 
If all 196 contracting States have an obligation to take all positive measures 
in their power to respond to one State which has breached the Conventions, then 
all those which do not react turn out to be in breach of CA 1. Since contracting 
States generally do not react, one should conclude that there are 195 or so 
breaches of Article 1 for any breach of the Conventions, a very extreme construc-
tion which is far from being supported by State practice.296 
Let us consider for a moment, whether the presumable obligation in CA 1 
would be one of result or due diligence. The obligation of result is an obligation 
to ‘succeed’, while the obligation of diligent conduct is an obligation to ‘make 
every effort’297 Here, Dörmann and Serralvo take a step back and are not as rigid 
as some authors (e.g. Azzam) by stating that a State not party to a specific armed 
conflict cannot be said to be under an obligation to reach a particular outcome – 
for example, the cessation of all IHL violations by a belligerent – with regard to 
that conflict. “On the contrary, third States can only be under an obligation to 
exercise due diligence in choosing appropriate measures to induce belligerents to 
comply with the law. /…/ If they fail to do so, they might incur international 
responsibility.”298  
For Dörmann, it is clear that this obligation, being one of due diligence, only 
arises in cases which the prospective inobservance of IHL is marked by a certain 
degree of predictability. Under international law, due diligence obligations 
involving the need to prevent a particular event can only be triggered if the event 
is question is actually foreseeable.299 Failing to take measures will give rise to the 
international responsibility of the third State only when its conduct cannot be 
deemed diligent. What needs to be proved is the inconsistency between the State’s 
actual conduct and the conduct demanded by the “due diligence standard”300  
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The ICJ has assessed the due diligence rule in the context of the Genocide 
convention, stating that States are obliged to use “all means reasonably available 
to them” and that a State incurs responsibility only if it has “manifestly failed to 
take all measures to prevent genocide which were within its power”. As with any 
obligation of due diligence, it can only be assessed in concreto. Thus, only a case-
by-case analysis can reveal whether a State has actually violated CA 1.301 
It seems that ultimately States are still free to choose measures they deem 
appropriate to induce compliance; and they are responsible only when it can be 
said that they have manifestly failed to take any measures or have knowingly 
aided in the commission of violations.  
 
 
2.5. The actual scope of Common Article 1 and 
possible measures available to States 
to ensure respect for the Conventions 
What, then, is the actual scope of CA 1 and can it be used on its own, without any 
specifying articles? At the outset, it is hard to see that an unqualified obligation 
under CA 1 would take precedence over a specific and express provision found 
in the Conventions. Every right or obligation the different authors read into CA 
1 is already covered by other articles in the Conventions. As it should be. Specific 
provisions of both the Conventions and Protocol I are supposed to operate in their 
own right and not in combination with CA 1. 
Focarelli reaches a conclusion that Article 1 is not in itself a “quasi-consti-
tutional” rule; it is not even an “ordinary” rule having a meaningful autonomous 
legal content. “It is a generic reminder of an obvious obligation to abide by the 
Geneva Conventions and of the fact that all contracting States are expected to see 
to it that all others abide by the Conventions, more specifically a reminder of 
obligations already set out in other rules – included in the Conventions and/or 
customary in character – along with a recommendation to remain active in the 
effort by lawful measures to induce all contracting States to abide by the Conven-
tions.”302 If certain special consequences of the breach of humanitarian law are 
provided for by current international law, this is not because of Article 1, but 
rather because it is provided for by another source. 
Zych concludes that under CA 1, States are required to ensure respect for IHL 
only on the part of their own organs and such other persons as may be acting 
under their effective control. “With respect to persons acting on their instructions 
but outside their effective control, it could be argued that States are required to 
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ensure that such persons are willing and able to execute their instructions in com-
pliance with IHL. It is submitted that reading anything more into CA 1 is unsup-
ported by IHL and is unlikely to garner the support of States in the near future.”303 
Sandoz reaches a similar conclusion: “It seems clear [on the basis of the 
findings of the inquiry] that the most that can be done is to take diplomatic 
measures or publicly denounce violations. It would be improper, and probably 
dangerous, to impose non-military sanctions (and still more obviously, to impose 
military sanctions or any form of intervention). Therefore, one must not interpret 
this as merely an obligation in terms of means without any attendant obligation 
as regards effects. In practice, States parties to the Conventions have not really 
implemented this provision, at any rate publicly, and do not really try to monitor 
the extent to which it is observed.”304 
Gasser argues that a third party State has at least an obligation to examine a 
situation involving a breach of humanitarian law by a belligerent, and to consider 
in good faith whether action should be taken. It is, however, obvious that a State 
always remains free to choose among differing courses of action if a decision to 
act has to be taken.305 
Despite a number of avenues open for States to ensure respect for the Con-
ventions, decided action of third States has indeed been scarce.306 Although 
Article 1 throws the doors wide open to action in support of compliance with the 
law, States have rarely ventured beyond discreet representations behind the 
scenes.307 That could be seen as proof of the indeterminacy on the rule and a fact 
that States probably do not feel obligated to act as a result of CA 1. 
Some examples that do exist refer to serious violations of IHL and may there-
fore be interpreted as expressions not of a general obligation to ensure universal 
respect for IHL, but of the obligation to address serious violations of IHL, as 
codified in Article 89 of Protocol I for instance. It is also worth noting that a 
recent attempt to insert similar language into a resolution of the Human Rights 
Council was rejected.308 When human rights treaties contain similar provisions to 
“ensure respect”, they are never understood to imply that contracting States must 
(or may) take measures against other contracting States beyond what is expressly 
provided for by all other provisions of the treaty.309 
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The United States State Department Legal Adviser recently reiterated in a 
public speech that the Government does not share the expansive interpretation of 
CA 1, whereby States are required to take steps vis-à-vis not only their partners, 
but all States and non-state actors engaged in armed conflict.310 There is thus at 
least one powerful persistent objector for this emerging interpretation.  
In sum, either measures supposedly envisaged in CA 1 against other con-
tracting States are already detailed in other ad hoc provisions of the Conventions, 
in which case Article 1 is legally redundant, or they are not specifically envisaged, 
but then it seems hardly possible to determine which of them fall within the scope 
of the undertaking to “ensure respect”.311  
Measures that all contracting States are supposed to take against transgressors 
include meetings under Article 7 and co-operation under Article 89 of Protocol I, 
with the obvious limitation on the use of force. This is all that could be said about 
the “respect and ensure respect” clause that is not subject to legal uncertainty. 
When the supporters of the broad interpretation sufficiently establish that 
there is an obligation to ensure respect, and to do it through active measures, they 
usually do not provide a list of available means for such end or indicate that the 
measures themselves are self-evident and do not need further discussion. Those 
that do cite the means available under other Articles of the Conventions or list of 
couple that reappear in every text.  
Article 1 is not equipped with an Annex or other supplementary document 
detailing the accurate steps to be taken by States to fulfil their obligation to 
“respect and ensure respect”. While all 329 Articles of the four Conventions 
collectively work towards the achievement of this overall goal, each provision 
must be accorded its autonomous meaning.312 
Kessler points out that under the assumption that “ensuring respect” of a rule 
means making someone respect it, there are four means of enforcement: 
(1) repressive action against any violation of the Conventions, (2) help by one 
State to enable another State to fulfil its duties under the Conventions, (3) control, 
and (4) prevention.313 Enforcement activities will be discussed in detail in the 
next chapters of this thesis. 
Other authors write that States may, for instance, convene meetings of the 
High Contracting Parties in application of Article 7 of Protocol I; resort to the 
Protecting Powers institution and its substitutes; enforce the system of repression 
of grave breaches (in particular those calling for the greatest measure of mutual 
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assistance in criminal matters); or call upon the International Fact-Finding Com-
mission established under Article 90 of Protocol I.314 All of these measures have 
“their own” substantial article in the Conventions or Protocols. 
Pfanner states that the said undertaking encompasses a wide range of means, 
in addition to those expressly provided for by IHL. These include diplomatic, 
confidential or public approaches, and public appeals. She admits that the scope 
of this obligation can only be assessed case by case, depending on factors such as 
the appropriateness of the various means available, and the nature of the relation-
ship between third States and the warring parties.315  
Dörmann lists 1) measures aimed at exerting diplomatic pressure: protests to 
the corresponding ambassador, public denunciations, pressure through inter-
mediaries, and referral to the International Fact Finding Commission or ICC; 2) 
coercive measures taken by the State itself, such as retorsion, and 3) measures 
taken in cooperation with an international organization.316 
Focarelli also categorizes diplomatic, coercive and co-operation measures, 
and points out that the variety of measures theoretically consistent with the term 
“ensure respect” is virtually unlimited. His list of measures include steps inde-
pendent of a prior breach; loose measures against breaches such as a mere com-
mitment, to ‘consider seriously’ the adoption of measures or to ‘exert some kind 
of influence’; verbal protests; the denial of selling weapons; criminal jurisdiction 
over persons accused of breaching the Conventions; retorsions; countermeasures, 
and even to armed intervention (theoretically).317  
Professors Boisson de Chazournes and Condorelli, who are proponents of the 
broad interpretation, outline (in an article on CA 1) that under Chapter VII a wide 
array of measures may be undertaken, ranging from so-called peaceful measures, 
such as economic sanctions, to military action. “The Security Council has resorted 
to all means at its disposal to promote respect for humanitarian principles, going 
as far as euphemistically authorizing States to “use all necessary means” (up to 
and including armed force) to help implement its decisions, for instance to 
guarantee the safe conduct of humanitarian aid operations and dispatch of such 
aid”.318 Again, this blurring of jus in bello and jus ad bellum is not welcomed. 
Armed intervention may only be decided within the context of the UN, and in full 
respect of the UN Charter. The rules on the resort to armed force govern the 
legality of any use of force, even if it is meant to end serious violations of IHL. 
The content of CA 1 is not part of jus ad bellum, and thus cannot serve as a legal 
basis for the use of force.319 
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Some authors hold that a further step was taken in June 1999 when the SC 
gave its ex post facto political blessing to NATO air raids intended to put an end 
to violations of humanitarian law. The legality of such action has been, and still 
is, hotly debated, some seeing it as prohibited by international law although 
morally justified, while others consider that a legal basis already exists or is 
emerging, justifying the use of force as an ultima ratio when required to ensure 
respect for humanitarian principles in a situation of humanitarian concern.320 
Vöneky states that the obligation to ensure respect for IHL in all circumstances 
entails using all possibilities of diplomatic action, resorting to the protecting 
powers institution and its substitutes, enforcing the system of prosecution and 
extradition of war criminals, calling upon the Fact-Finding Commission or using 
the naming and shaming of parties that breach the jus in bello. It is debatable 
whether it is convincing that CA1 and Article 1, para 1, AP I additionally obliges 
all parties of the GC and the AP I to take all possible steps at all times to ensure 
that these rules applicable in armed conflicts are respected by all other States. 
This interpretation would mean that CA 1 imposes a universal obligation for 
States and international organizations that does not derive from other provisions 
of the Conventions.321 
Whereas CA 1 deals with obligations of States, it leaves States full discretion 
in deciding on what specific measures should be taken in accordance with inter-
national law. It is also important to note that CA 1 does not offer any claims. 
Under Article 42 DARS, too, only the “injured State” is entitled to claim 
reparation. Article 42 (b) (ii) DARS now provides that a State is only considered 
injured if the breach is “of such a character as radically to change the position of 
all the other States to which the obligation is owed with respect to the further 
performance of the obligation”.322 
In conclusion, it seems that standing alone CA 1 is certainly not the catch all 
clause one would hope it to be. We need to look for implementation and enforce-
ment measures in other Articles to discover the full potential of the Conventions 
and Protocols. Once again, this proves the need for deeper analysis of the “old” 
texts and see how we can adapt them to modern day circumstances.  
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3. ENSURING RESPECT THROUGH PREVENTION 
The goal of ensuring that the requirements of international law are observed when 
a conflict breaks out will be better served by prevention than cure, by measures 
designed to prevent violations from occurring than by the application of sanctions 
after violations have taken place.323 In other words, retroactive measures against 
violations of IHL “cannot replace preventive action to ensure compliance, and 
will not be convincing without due consideration of what had been done in the 
past to implement relevant rules.”324 For example, the prosecution of individuals 
guilty of wartime atrocities cannot bring the dead back to life, or restore the 
material resources destroyed by parties to an armed conflict.325 
Although the principles and basic rules of humanitarian law represent funda-
mental values that have received almost universal acceptance, peacetime efforts 
to implement them at the national level are nonetheless insufficient.326 Few States 
have placed a high priority on compliance with this obligation until they have 
become involved in a conflict. By then, time and resources are generally 
inadequate. This is a view shared by most authors writing on IHL.  
One of the most important requirements of prevention is the duty to provide 
proper instruction to members of the armed forces, and to disseminate the prin-
ciples of the law amongst the population as a whole.327 This has been outlined 
clearly in all Conventions and Protocols. It has become clear during the past 
centuries that this cannot be done through the classic one-way dissemination 
approach – but rather through understanding the complexity of factors influen-
cing behaviour.328 
This chapter is dedicated to the myriad of prevention activities that are avail-
able for States under the Conventions in particular, as well as deriving from other 
sources. I start by outlining the differences between implementation and enforce-
ment measures, and prove that this understanding helps to create respect for the 
law. Some activities, such as dissemination and instruction, will be given a 
prominent role in the discussion. The goal of this chapter is to find an aswer to 
the question whether preventive measures taken in peacetime could be the most 
effective tools to ensure compliance with the law.  
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3.1. What is implementation of international 
humanitarian law? 
In accordance with the pacta sunt servanda principle, every treaty in force is 
binding upon the parties to it, and must be performed by them in good faith. Every 
State is itself responsible for performing a treaty and ensuring any required 
domestic effects. In addition, there exists a general international obligation to 
ensure that internal law will not form obstacles to the proper observance and 
application of treaty provisions.329 By not implementing their international obli-
gations, States themselves contribute to impunity. Therefore, they should con-
sider it to be within their national interest to observe and promote the principles 
of IHL.330 
The major treaties in the field since 1949 contain an unprecedented range of 
provisions about dissemination, instruction to armed forces, humanitarian and 
monitoring tasks during armed conflicts, and repressing breaches. What, how-
ever, does this obligation to implement imply exactly, and how should it be inter-
preted in the modern environment? Roberts warns that the difficulty members of 
the international community face in attempting to ensure that rules are imple-
mented, and to restore their effectiveness after they have been violated, should 
not be underestimated. There is no strong central authority capable of enforcing 
the full range of rules that States and non-state bodies are obliged to follow.331 
Implementation is the major challenge facing IHL today. The problem of 
translating States’ legal obligations into action is common to all areas of inter-
national law. Berman regrets that there is a particularly acute contrast between 
humanitarian laws’ highly developed rules, many of which enjoy nearly universal 
acceptance, and the repeated violations of those rules in conflicts around the 
world.332 Kalshoven also states that: “it is an irony and commentary on the present 
state of international law that the Geneva Conventions of 1949 have been ratified 
by more States than any other treaty in the world including the UN Charter. Yet 
the failure of States to implement the provisions of the Geneva Conventions has 
served to render these provisions irrelevant to most victims of international and 
internal armed conflicts.”333 
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Thürer has put it similarly: “given their relative lack of effectiveness, we must 
face the fact that the implementation of all theoretically imposed obligations is 
still far from assured.”334 Implementation of IHL depends largely on the political 
willingness of States, despite the fact that the Conventions contain a monitoring 
mechanism for States parties that are not directly involved.335 
Other authors are equally pessimistic. Kadam notes: “the situation is not 
entirely satisfactory. Whatever mechanisms are at the disposal for ensuring ade-
quate implementation of international humanitarian law – unilateral, bilateral or 
international – there are many weaknesses and shortcomings in almost all of 
them.”336 Sivakumaran concludes that both implementation and enforcement 
mechanisms of IHL have proven insufficient for carrying out their task.337 
The international community has tried to counter the increased destruction and 
cruelty of warfare in the twentieth century by creating more extensive and detailed 
treaty law. However, the fact that this law is for the most part unknown, or where 
it is known not sincerely believed in, has led to serious difficulty in application.338 
The aim, then, has to be effective application, not more lawmaking; only the former 
is valuable for the victim. 
 
 
3.1.1. Definition 
The ICRC itself gives a rather short definition of what implementation of IHL 
means – turning the rules into action – and reaffirms that it is first and foremost 
the responsibility of States that are party to the Conventions and their Protocols. 
It positions that this responsibility is set forth, notably, in Article 1 common to 
the four Conventions, which requires States to respect and ensure respect for the 
Conventions in all circumstances.339 I would not risk constructing all obligations 
on a single Article as explained elsewhere in this work, but one can imagine this 
as a starting point. 
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Roberts states that the term “implementation” is used to refer to the many 
ways in which States, including belligerents in an armed conflict, generally apply, 
and sometimes fail to apply, the international rules applicable in armed conflict.340 
Goldstein writes that “implementation” generally means observance of a body 
of law or its enforcement in case of violations.341 It can be realized by drafting 
and disseminating rules of conduct, by diplomatic interventions aimed at 
affecting the governmental and belligerents’ actions, or by State and non-state 
reactions to violations of humanitarian norms and rules.342 It can be noted that 
instead of defining what implementation is, many authors outline how it can be 
carried out and how the different measures are to be categorized. This is analysed 
thoroughly in sub-chapter 3.2. 
Most importantly, Bothe notes “implementation means interpretation. The text 
of the Protocols will have to be transformed into elements, which will be used as 
guidelines for concrete decisions. This transformation thus unfolds, clarifies, 
develops the original text. Where this original text is unclear, open to differing 
interpretations, it is quite possible to ‘solve’ these uncertainties in the process of 
this transformation and give the Protocols the meaning one wants them to have.”343 
This quote perfectly illustrates why discussion on implementation is neces-
sary. It might seem evident that the Conventions and Protocols list different 
measures for implementation, and what is left for a State is simply to follow these 
rules. The purpose of this study, however, is to prove that IHL has failed on many 
levels precisely because the necessity and modalities of implementation are far 
from obvious and unambiguous.  
Why talk about implementation and enforcement separately, are they not 
synonyms under international law? According to my reading, Mendez, Pfanner, 
Lavoyer, Sassoli, Roberts and Vöneky write about implementation and enforce-
ment as the same phenomenon. In contrast, McCoubrey, Rogers, McCormack, 
Sivakumaran, Greenwood and Draper make a clear distinction between the two, 
and have separate lists of action. A good example of how diversified this topic is 
in the literature is provided in the following passages. 
Draper lists measures of implementation as protecting powers, dissemination 
and instruction, legal advisors and use of qualified persons; and enforcement 
measures as taking of hostages, reprisals, trial of war criminals, compensation, 
and the international fact-finding commission. Greenwood writes that methods 
for securing compliance are divided into implementation and dissemination on 
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the one hand, and enforcement, i.e. diplomatic recourse, reprisals, prosecution of 
war crimes, hostage taking, and claims for compensation, on the other.344 
Roberts draws an equal sign between implementation and enforcement, and 
lists criminal trials, HRL, and the right to individual redress, compensation, 
national commissions of inquiry, other acts of individual countries, regional 
organizations and alliances, and reprisals by an adversary. Quénivet speaks about 
international criminal law as a means of enforcement of IHL, but also lists tradi-
tional means to enforce IHL such as reprisals, State responsibility, protecting 
powers and individual liability; he keeps national implementation separate. Pfanner 
has all possible measures under the heading of various mechanisms and approaches 
for implementing IHL and protecting and assisting war victims.345 
Bothe speaks about application of the law, which consists of implementing the 
body of law, making it work in practice, and ensuring its respect. Sassoli puts all 
three levels of measures under the heading of implementation mechanisms, and 
lists preventive measures taken in peacetime, those ensuring respect during armed 
conflicts, and those repressing violations. Fleck has 13 enforcement measures, of 
which implementation is just one. The ICRC handbook on Customary Inter-
national Humanitarian Law only lists belligerent reprisals as a means of enforce-
ment.346 
I believe that implementation and enforcement are two separate phenomena, 
and should be given their individual meanings. Implementation mostly means 
prevention and enforcement mostly means repression. Implementation measures 
are the first steps to be taken by a State or a non-State actor after ratifying a Con-
vention or accepting to be bound by it. The next sub-chapters will clarify what 
implementation is and what measures are expected to be taken as well as assess 
which of these are considered most effective. 
 
 
3.1.2. The significance of domestic legislation 
In 1984 Bothe stated that the process of national implementation of IHL has so 
far not been given much attention by lawyers, political scientists or sociologists. 
“We thus know relatively little about it and more research is certainly needed on 
this question”.347 Since then, a number of authors have dealt with the issue, how-
ever focused mainly on criminal law, involving armed groups and recently, but 
more narrowly, the interpretation of CA 1. The real “watchdog” of national 
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implementation measures has been the ICRC, who manages an extensive data-
base on legislative and administrative measures. The promotion of national 
implementation measures has been a long-standing concern of the ICRC, and has 
frequently been included on the agendas of International Conferences of the Red 
Cross and Red Crescent.348 For example, five regional seminars were organized 
in 2003 to examine how to improve compliance with IHL by reviewing those 
means, the possibilities for making them more effective and the advisability of 
seeking new means.349 
“From the vantage point of an international lawyer, the obligation to imple-
ment rules and principles of IHL rests squarely on the State, in its quality as a 
subject of international law.”350 While a number of international mechanisms 
have been developed to promote compliance with humanitarian law, States them-
selves have the primary responsibility for implementation. Vöneky states that the 
relative weakness of international measures to secure the performance of obli-
gations under humanitarian law calls for national implementing efforts, among 
which legislative measures, education programmes, and military manuals are of 
particular importance.351 
Domestic legislation thus constitutes a crucial part of the whole set of rules 
provided for ensuring the proper implementation of humanitarian law. Therefore, 
the final goal is to achieve the entire conformity of national legislation in all coun-
tries with IHL; a conformity that, for purposes of anticipation, should be reached 
in peacetime.352 
In some of their provisions the instruments of IHL specify an explicit duty to 
adopt appropriate legislation, and in others this obligation is merely implied. 
Even in the latter case, the freedom of choice of measures to be taken does not 
release States Parties from achieving accurate adherence to its rules as a specified 
result.353 
In particular, these measures are needed to ensure that all individuals, both 
civilian and military, are familiar with the rules of IHL; that the structures, 
administrative arrangements and personnel required for the application of humani-
tarian law are in place; and that violations of humanitarian law are prevented or, 
when necessary, punished.354 It is usually through their governmental decisions, 
                                                                                                 
348  Following the adoption at a resolution on „National measures to implement international 
humanitarian law“ of the 25th International Conference (1986), the ICRC wrote to States in 
1988 and again in 1991 concerning the adoption of such measures. The responses were 
unfortunately very few. 
349  Sandoz, “International humanitarian law”, supra nota 85, p 25. 
350  Frits Kalshoven, „Instructions to Armed Forces“ – Frits Kalshoven (ed), Reflections on 
the Law of War: collected essays. 17 International humanitarian law series (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 2007) 621–629, p 621. 
351  Vöneky, “Implementation and Enforcement”, supra nota 19, p 698. 
352  Drzewicki, „National Legislation”, supra nota 14, p 109. 
353  Drzewicki, “Reporting mechanism”, supra nota 74, p 550. 
354  Ibid, p 246. 
92 
laws, courts, commissions of inquiry, military manuals, rules of engagement, the 
recruitment and/or training of personnel, the production of identity cards and 
other documents, the setting up of special structures, and training and educational 
systems, that the provisions of international law have a bearing on the conduct of 
armed forces and individuals. Interestingly, the overwhelming majority of legal 
cases in connection with the laws of war have been heard in national, not inter-
national courts.355 
Conforti speaks about the importance of domestic legal operators. “Only 
through what we could term ‘domestic legal operators’ can we describe the binding 
character of international law or, better still, its ability to be implemented in a 
concrete and stable fashion.” He believes that compliance with international law 
relies not so much on enforcement mechanisms available at the international 
level, but rather on the determination of ‘domestic legal operators’ such as public 
servants and judges to use the mechanism provided by municipal law.356 There-
fore, when national legislation is amended to reflect the requirements of IHL, it 
also serves a purpose of translating the text of the relevant international treaties into 
something understandable for the members of the administrative apparatus.357  
Some of the measures indicated require legislation, while others may, 
depending on the legal system concerned, be implemented through regulations or 
administrative provisions. A number of obligations require legislative or adminis-
trative action that can realistically be undertaken only in peacetime.358 From a 
purely legal point of view, all these national measures outlined in the Conventions 
are essential to ensure respect for humanitarian law; there should be no order of 
importance, as they are interdependent.359 In reality, States are more inclined to 
implement some rules than others. For example, protection of the emblem is 
widely regulated in internal laws, whereas regulating the creation of protected 
zones is rather an exceptional national measure taken.  
In addition, as some authors have pointed out, compliance with the entire spirit 
of the Conventions and the Protocols requires taking account in planning law of 
the duty not to site military objectives in the middle of concentrations of the 
civilian population. It is difficult to determine how many States make any real 
effort to comply with these obligations.360 
If States were generally diligent in complying with their obligations on the 
national level, the need for measures on the international level would be greatly 
reduced. Practice shows, however, that much remains to be desired in this 
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respect.361 For example, Doswald-Beck regretted in 1998 that “more than fifty 
years after the Geneva Conventions entered into force most countries have still 
not carried out their obligation to provide for compulsory universal jurisdiction 
over grave breaches.”362 Fleck also notes that “a comparison of what is required 
and what has been done reveals that although valuable work has been accom-
plished in numerous countries, many agreed measures of implementation remain 
to be taken. This is a serious problem and undoubtedly one of the main reasons 
why humanitarian law is disregarded in armed conflicts.”363 This is my point 
exactly – it is the core national implementation measures, such as teaching IHL, 
protecting the emblem, and criminalizing grave breaches, that helps ensure 
respect for the law in conflict situations. 
As said, there is no order of importance between the national implementation 
measures, they are interdependent, and should all be given due consideration. 
However, many authors emphasize some aspects that are more important than 
others. I would call them the sine qua non rules, a foundation on which to build 
the rest. Two types of national measures are particularly important, namely the 
adoption of national laws to ensure that the treaties are applied, and measures 
relating to dissemination and training.364 A key requisite for effective imple-
mentation of IHL is making sure that domestic legal systems contain norms and 
procedures for punishing those who commit grave breaches of the law: to 
prosecute alleged perpetrators, or to bring them before their courts, or to extradite 
them (aut dedere aut judicare).365 
States are under a duty to punish certain acts, but these provisions are not in 
in themselves capable of being the basis of a criminal judgment, and they need to 
be supplemented by some kind of criminal statute.366 Criminal legislation is the 
most important example of implementing non-self-executing provisions of the 
Conventions and Protocols. States must scrutinize their criminal law in order to 
ascertain that it allows criminal prosecution and punishment for any grave breach 
States are supposed to sanction. This applies to substantive law, as well as to 
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procedural law. Where there is no applicable provision of national law, new 
legislation must be enacted.367 
Another duty that must be anchored in domestic law is protecting the emblems 
of humanitarian organizations, such as the Red Cross – and for that matter the 
organizations and their workers themselves. Still, many States and non-state 
actors are not aware of the protection that must be granted to humanitarian 
workers, and the fact that the Red Cross symbol is exclusively reserved for 
humanitarian aid providers.368 
As has frequently been the case, the absence of proper legislation may essen-
tially reduce the efficiency of humanitarian law, and even make its rules a dead 
letter, particularly when preventive and repressive action against violations is 
inoperative. Such a risk was manifestly demonstrated in the Case of Public 
Prosecutor v Managing Director of N.V. Zwitsersche Waschinrichting con-
cerning the abuse of the Red Cross emblem and Swiss national flag in the absence 
of executor municipal provisions.369 
In this case a Dutch company, Swiss Laundry, decorated its cars and adver-
tising material with a white cross on a red field that looked “almost equal” to the 
Red Cross emblem – and identical to the Swiss arms. The Cantonal Court of the 
Hague held that, apart from the fact that alleged resemblance to the Red Cross 
emblem could not be admitted, the use of the Swiss national emblem could only 
be punished in virtue of a Dutch law enacted in fulfilment of Article 28 of the 
Geneva Convention. Article 28 produced no direct effect in the national sphere 
and no such law had been passed.370 
Another highly important means of inducing lasting compliance with humani-
tarian law may be to spread knowledge of the law, to encourage commitment to 
it in all sections of society, and to train the armed forces and the police.371 
The implementing measures required in peacetime to back up the obligation 
to spread knowledge of the Conventions and the Protocols thereto “as widely as 
possible” are the training of qualified staff, the deployment of legal advisers in 
armed forces, emphasis on the duty of commanders, and special instruction for 
the military and authorities who may be called upon to assume relevant respon-
sibilities.372 
The Protocols clarified some measures in connection to this. Namely, the 
greater degree of responsibility assigned to commanders. Under Article 87, com-
manders are required “to prevent and, where necessary, to suppress and report to 
competent authorities breaches of the Conventions and of this Protocol”. This is 
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a just and heavy responsibility, but one which is not sufficiently well known, and 
is therefore neither duly observed not complied with.373 
It should be emphasized that an obligation for legislative implementation is 
already violated by a simple failure to enact appropriate internal rules, but also 
when such avoidant conduct leads to a failure to observe the substantive provi-
sions of a treaty.374 In addition, all of the clauses in the Conventions and Proto-
cols, that use the term “a State must endeavor” are not self-executing and need a 
special legislation.375 Drzewicki even holds that the duty to adopt or supplement 
the relevant legislation is widely assumed to be more than an international obli-
gation of conduct, it is also an international obligation of result, i.e. an obligation 
requiring the achievement of a specified result as an outcome of a required 
conduct.376 
Translating the text of the Conventions and Protocols into domestic legislation 
is not just a matter of taste. It provides legal certainty, it helps the domestic legal 
operators easily apply the rules, and it gives a signal to other States that one is 
committed to ensuring respect for the law. States should, therefore, be proactive 
in analysing what needs to be done and keep their internal regulations up to date 
with the development of international law. 
 
 
3.1.3. Why differentiate between implementation and enforcement? 
For the sake of proving some central arguments in this thesis, it is important to 
differentiate between implementation and enforcement of IHL. I believe that 
although this difference might seem fragile or superfluous at first glance, it is 
nevertheless crucial. Lengthy reading of literature on IHL proves that not many 
authors concern themselves with this separation and start substantial discussions 
without outlining what exactly they mean by either implementation or enforce-
ment. In fact, many other words are used to denote the wide array of measures 
falling under both of these categories, as illustrated above. The Conventions 
themselves are silent on the matter.  
I will now try to explain why differentiating between these two categories is 
necessary. Merriam Webster’s Dictionary defines the verb “implement” as “to 
begin to do or use (something, such as a plan): to make (something) active or 
                                                                                                 
373  Rene Kosirnik, „The 1977 protocols: a landmark in the development of international 
humanitarian law“ – Naorem Sanajaoba (ed), Manual of International Humanitarian Laws 
(Regency: New Delhi, 2004) 68–88, p 73. 
374 Young, James and Webster v United Kingdom, Apps Nos 7601/76, 7806/77, EHRR, 
Judgment, 13.08.1981; Drzewicki, „National Legislation”, supra nota 14, p 110. 
375  Bothe, „The role of national law”, supra nota 76, p 305. Problematically there is a group 
of non-participating countries which are currently or were recently involved in an active or 
latent armed conflict; Kosirnik, “The 1977 protocols”, supra nota 373, p 77. 
376  Drzewicki, “Reporting mechanism”, supra nota 74, p 550; 2 Yearbook of the International 
Law Commission 2 (New York, 1979) para 88, at 77, 80. 
96 
effective” and more precisely as “carry out, accomplish; especially: to give prac-
tical effect to and ensure of actual fulfilment by concrete measures”. Whereas the 
verb “enforce” means: “to make (a law, rule, etc.) active or effective: to make sure 
that people do what is required by (a law, rule, etc.)” or “to urge with energy, 
constrain, compel”.377 
The verb “implement” thus feels as something preceding to other activities; 
giving an impulse to carrying out plans; taking measures to achieve something. 
The verb “enforce”, while also making something effective, seems to entail some 
element of urge or compulsion. In laymen’s terms, implementation could mean 
putting something in the plans (laws), while enforcement could be making sure 
the plans (laws) are followed. 
In all fairness, the Dictionary lists words synonymous with implement as: 
administer, apply, execute, enforce. Still, even in ordinary language these two 
words have a different connotation, as explained above. In legal language these 
words become specific terms, and should thus be even more carefully analysed. 
One of the few authors writing about the difference we are concerned about is 
McCoubrey, who in 1998 wrote that “while the implementation and enforcement 
of law are often seen as essentially coterminous processes, and the two do to a 
degree overlap, in the sense that both are ultimately concerned with the mainte-
nance of legal norms, a major distinction must be drawn between the two pro-
cesses”. Namely, enforcement is a retrospective response to the violation of 
norms, a secondary office of law, which presupposes failure in the primary 
endeavour to establish and maintain whatever normative standards may be in 
question. The processes of implementation, on the other hand, means measures to 
ensure the observance of law in prospect, rather than penalisation of violations.378 
Zyberi holds that the notion of enforcement should be distinguished from that 
of implementation, which is much broader, in that enforcement involves at least 
some degree of sanctioning for violations of IHL, which could encompass indi-
vidual criminal responsibility or State responsibility and liability for reparations.379 
Goldstein writes that “implementation” generally means observance of a body 
of law or its enforcement in case of violations. Verma believes that if the expres-
sion “implementation” is interpreted to mean observance and enforcement, then 
in case of default of observance of that body of law, such an interpretation will 
undoubtedly cause maximum strain. Strictly speaking, the term “implementation” 
includes preventive, mitigatory and compensatory measures.380 
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In a somewhat different view, Morrison defines “enforcement actions” or 
“enforcement measures” as any action, which would itself be a violation of inter-
national law, if taken without either some special “justification” or without the 
contemporaneous consent or acquiescence of the target State.381 
Draper writes that by implementation he means those devices, institutions and 
rules designed to monitor and ensure IHLs observance. By enforcement, in con-
trast the collection of mechanisms and rules available to the law of war to secure 
the restoration of observance when that law has been violated.382 Enforcement 
action is used when compliance with the obligation has been supplanted by 
violation of it, whether by acts of commission or of omission.383 
Drzewicki is under the impression that there is a gradual shift from humani-
tarian law’s traditional focus on enforcement towards implementation, and sees 
it as a commendable tendency; so do I. He describes this as a process of departing 
from measures of coercive nature taken in reciprocal interaction to restore 
observance of humanitarian law. In lieu of enforcement, measures for positive 
implementation are being developed as a set of means and mechanisms aimed at 
proper bona fidae application of humanitarian law.384 
Therefore, a retrospective and a sanctioning element are inherent to the term 
enforcement, which is of high value to our discussion. In focusing solely on 
enforcement activities, we are omitting a crucial element in the respect for law – 
prevention. Almost every article written on IHL begins or ends by emphasizing 
the importance of prevention and preparation in peacetime, because taking action 
in retrospect might be a deterrent, but does not bring back those who have 
perished in war. Other authors have outlined that there is some element of denial 
or dissent in enforcement. Judge Ranganath Misra points out that on account of 
the fact that there is a total lack of enforcement machinery in IHL, consent cannot 
be the enforcement machinery. The law takes the idea of making it obligatory and 
enforceable. Enforceability and consent do not go together.385 Indeed, if a State 
or non-state actor would voluntarily take all necessary implementation measures, 
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there would be nothing to enforce. If they do not take these measures, then 
enforcement comes into play. 
 
 
3.2. What and how needs to be implemented? 
The answer to this question seems easy and “treaty based” at first glance, but is 
actually far from it. Sure, the Conventions offer an indicative list of actions, but 
almost every author and judge offers a different categorization, some additional 
measures from other treaties or even different fields of law. Not to mention that 
they use different terms to describe the phenomenon. The object of discussion of 
this thesis has been termed: “implementation”, “enforcement” (meaning both the 
same or a different thing), “means of putting IHL into effect”, “mechanisms to 
ensure compliance”, “ensuring respect”, “ensuring proper application”, “taking 
measures of execution”, etc. It can be argued that using a different term is just a 
matter of taste, but the content of the articles and approaches the authors have 
vary greatly as well. It is not just a question of naming the issue differently; it is 
a question of diverse understanding even among legal scholars, not to mention 
military leaders and men on the battlefield. Various authors find a different 
number of implementation measures even in the plain text of the Conventions, 
categorize them differently, divide some to implementation and others to enforce-
ment measures and so on. Note that “national” implementation measures are a 
separate, narrower category within the broad concept of implementation of IHL. 
How can implementation be carried out in practice? There is no simple answer 
to this question. The ICRC has provided some concrete guidance in various 
information kits, fact sheets, model laws, and manuals on national implemen-
tation. It also has a graphic overview of every single Article in the Conventions 
that needs domestic implementation, as well as Guidelines for Assessing the 
Compatibility between National Law and Obligations under Treaties of Inter-
national Humanitarian Law.386 The table is provided in the annex to this thesis.  
Fleck rightly notes that the great complexity and technical nature of various 
IHL measures may hinder proper implementation.387 This calls for careful 
analysis and further research, rather than new lawmaking. 
Thürer explains that a lawyer trained in domestic law thinks of legal process 
as a “three-step” model: legislation, application (by administrative authorities and 
courts), and enforcement (by the police and by using military means). But the 
procedures and mechanisms best suited to implement law in the international 
sphere are generally quite different from those in the domestic sphere.388 
Although the way States and other international actors, in general, habitually 
observe the law is similar to the way citizens within a State conduct themselves – 
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there are large differences in the methods, style and culture of legal processes. In 
addition, the terminology is different: talk of “legislation”, “application” and 
“enforcement” may sound odd in connection with international law; after all, 
there is no World parliament or administrative machinery, no comprehensive and 
compulsory judiciary system, and no police force to enforce international law.389 
Professor Keyes, an expert on legislative drafting, writes that the following 
questions should be considered when determining how to implement inter-
national obligations: 
• What result does the agreement require to be implemented? 
• Does it say how the result is to be achieved? 
• Does implementation require legal action? 
• What existing powers are there to take this action? 
• Are any new laws needed and, if so, what kind (statutes or delegated legis-
lation)? 
• Are any administrative powers needed?390 
 
It is highly doubtful that all governments have taken time to analyse the Conven-
tions and Protocols in such depth. Reasons for this are known – the Conventions 
are old and might not reflect the reality of modern conflict, there are other pri-
orities during peacetime, etc. However, as the majority of authors cited in this 
work suggest, if national implementation would be perfectly or even satisfactorily 
executed, the need for international measures (or enforcement as such) would 
diminish. 
All three branches of the governments are involved in this difficult task. “Con-
vincing efforts to implement international humanitarian law and ensure com-
pliance with its rules must combine activities at various levels of decision-
making. The highest degree of influence and responsibility in this respect lies 
with the executive branch. In comparison, the influence of courts and tribunals is 
rather limited, even if the role of criminal jurisdiction with respect to war crimes 
committed in international and non-international armed conflicts is progressively 
growing”, Fleck writes. It should be borne in mind that the requirements of fair 
trial and the duration of criminal procedure will generally exclude the possibility 
of using prosecution as a tool for enforcing compliance with IHL in ongoing 
conflicts.391 
The executive branch is called to cooperate in this respect, not only with 
legislative and judicative branches, but also with civil society. Fleck also 
emphasises that those responsible for implementation should not limit their 
activities to technical aspects of treaty application, but should take a generalist 
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approach and develop convincing policies that have to go far beyond specific 
provisions of humanitarian protection.392 
As may be evident, implementation of a State’s obligations under IHL is “a 
matter of immediate concern when that State is actually involved in an armed 
conflict. This applies to its primary obligations (to keep prisoners alive, not mount 
attacks against the civilian population or civilian objects, etc)” as much as to those 
of a secondary nature where the national measures of application fall. “Yet, for 
these national measures to have their full effect in time of armed conflict, they 
must have already been prepared in time of peace.”393 
“It is painfully obvious”, the ever pessimistic (or rather realistic) professor 
Kalshoven notes, “that quite a few developed States which have no such excuse 
[of developing States], are equally inclined to regard the taking of measures for 
the implementation of the law of armed conflict as a job that can be postponed 
till such time as the need becomes really acute. In either case, it is necessary con-
stantly to remind States of their obligations in this regard.”394 This thesis can be 
considered as one example of such reminder. 
 
 
3.2.1. Treaty based national implementation measures 
The Conventions and Protocols provide for a number of national implementation 
measures, the following of which are listed as imperative (there are more than 80 
altogether): 
• To prepare translations of the Conventions and Protocols in national lan-
guages (CA 48/49/128/145 and 84 of AP I) 
• To spread knowledge of the texts of the Conventions and Protocols as widely 
as possible, both among the armed forces and more generally (CA 
47/48/127/144, and 87 AP I, 19 AP II) 
• To repress all violations of the Conventions and Protocols, and in particular 
to adopt national legislation providing for the punishment of war crimes (CA 
49-50/50-51/129-132/146-149, 85-91 of AP I) 
• To ensure that persons and places protected by the Conventions and Protocols 
are properly identified, located and protected. (GC I, 40,41; GC II, 42 and 
annex; GC III, 17, 70-71 and 120 and Annex IV; GC IV, 20, 106-107, Annex 
III; 53, 56, 58, 79 of AP I) 
• To adopt rules to prevent the misuse of the red cross or red crescent emblem 
and other signs and emblems provided for in the Conventions and Protocols 
(GC I 44 and 53-54; GC II 43-45) 
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• To ensure that fundamental and procedural guarantees are observed in times 
of armed conflict (GC III 5, 15-17, 41, 82-90, 95-108; GC IV 31-33, 35, 37, 
43, 64-78, 99-101, 117-126; 11, 44-45, 75-77 of AP I; 4-6 of AP II) 
• To provide for the appointment and training of persons qualified in IHL, 
including legal advisers within the armed forces (6 and 82 of AP I) 
• To provide for the establishment and/or regulation of National Red Cross and 
Red Crescent Societies and other voluntary aid societies, civil defence organi-
zations and national information bureaux (GC I, 26, 44; GC III, 122-124, GC 
IV, 63, 136-141; 81, 61-67 of AP I; 18 of AP II) 
• To take IHL into account in selecting the location of military sites, and in the 
development and adoption of weapons and military tactics (36, 56, 58 of AP I) 
• To provide, as necessary, for the establishment of hospital zones, neutral 
zones, security zones and demilitarized zones (GC I 23 and annex; IV 14 and 
15; 60 and annex I of AP I).395 
 
The outlined Articles are really the basic guarantees of IHL, which can be incor-
porated in domestic laws without much difficulty. The last two are generally more 
burdensome to carry out, but at the same token will yield the best protection for 
those not taking part in hostilities. When States are encouraged to take stock and 
provide an overview of their duties under IHL, it is usually these ten measures 
that should be reported on. There are many more in other IHL related treaties, 
such as the Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property, the statute 
of the ICC, and so on, but this thesis in mostly concerned with the obligations in 
the Conventions and Protocols. 
Neither Common Article 3 nor Protocol II expressly provide implementation 
mechanisms. Pfanner claims that all attempts to create such mechanisms, let 
alone a real system of legal supervision, were thwarted by the “internal affairs” 
reflex. Besides the humanitarian right of initiative enshrined in Article 3, only an 
obligation to disseminate the Protocol remains in its Article 19.396 
With regard to the existing mechanisms, there are only a few which can be 
used during a non-international armed conflict. The mechanisms contained in the 
Conventions and in the Protocols, including the enquiry procedure, the Inter-
national Fact-Finding Commission, the system of the Protecting Powers, 
meetings of the High Contracting Parties, cooperation with the UN, and even – 
with the exception of Article 18 of Protocol II – the role of the ICRC, were mainly 
or exclusively designed for international armed conflicts. “One may reason by 
analogy, but that does not solve the legal uncertainty and the problem of a lacking 
international legal basis for action.”397 In practice, however, the ICRC has been 
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able to do a lot in non-international conflicts; in fact, mostly in non-international 
conflicts.  
Many argue that, under the terms of Article 1 (“in all circumstances”, i.e. 
whenever IHL is applicable) and pursuant to Article 3 common to the Conven-
tions, the obligation to ensure respect applies to both international and non-
international conflicts.398 This is also the stance the ICJ took in the Nicaragua 
case. However, we do not know what ensuring respect actually means. 
 
 
3.2.2. Additional implementation measures 
The ICRC table is not a complete or closed list of activities to be taken on national 
level. However, with these measures, it is more or less certain who should be 
responsible for their execution and what kind of legislative and administrative 
action is expected from a State. Different authors, however, propose dozens of 
additional lists and duties to ensure respect for IHL. 
 
Mikos-Skuza finds seven formal mechanisms that are foreseen in the Conven-
tions and Protocols in order to ensure respect for IHL. They are: 
1. Meetings of States Parties; 
2. The mechanism of Protecting Powers and their Substitutes; 
3. Supervision by the ICRC; 
4. Monitoring by other impartial humanitarian organizations; 
5. Cooperation with the UN; 
6. The enquiry procedure; 
7. Recourse to the International Humanitarian Fact-Finding Commission 
(IHFFC).399 
 
Pfanner, in his work from 2009, lists various mechanisms and approaches for 
implementing IHL and protecting and assisting war victims that perfectly illus-
trate how national implementation measures are only a small part of the larger 
picture:  
1. Mechanisms originating in IHL 
• National implementation measures 
• Punishment for breaches 
• Enquiry procedure 
• The international fact-finding commission 
• Protecting powers 
• Reparations 
• The ICRC 
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o Operations during an armed conflict 
o Protection and assistance 
o Co-operation with the National Red Cross or Red Crescent Society 
• Implementation in non-international armed conflicts 
o Special agreements and unilateral declarations 
o The right of humanitarian initiative 
• The responsibility of the international community 
2. Protecting war victims through human rights treaty bodies 
3. Protecting war victims through the UN system 
• The UNSC 
o Protection of the civilian population 
• The General Assembly 
o The Human Rights Council 
o The Economic and Social Council 
• The Secretary-General and the UN agencies 
• The International Court of Justice 
4. Activities of regional organizations 
5. Activities of governmental and non-governmental organizations.400 
 
Kalshoven modestly lists (in a chapter titled Implementation and Enforcement of 
International Humanitarian Law) a few national and international measures. 
 
The national measures include: 
• Instructions for the armed forces. The Lieber Instructions of 1863 as the first 
example of such. And Article 80(2) AP I as a contemporary example;401 
• Effective system of discipline, AP I 43(1) (including failure to act and duty of 
commanders); 
• Dissemination; 
• Repression of violations. 
 
The international measures include: 
• Reprisals; 
• Fact-finding; 
• Supervision (Protecting Powers); 
• Role of the International Community of States (art 89 of AP I).402 
                                                                                                 
400  Pfanner, “Various mechanisms”, supra nota 246. 
401  Kalshoven, „Implementation and enforcement”, supra nota 87, p 600. The High Con-
tracting Parties and the Parties to the conflict shall give orders and instructions to ensure 
observance of the Conventions and this Protocol and shall supervise their execution. To be 
effective, such instructions must address each of the various branches of the armed forces 
separately, and for each branch they must deal with the diverse situation this branch is trained 
to deal with. 
402  Ibid, p 614. 
104 
There are some authors that see implementation as something that is eventually 
mostly in the hands of the individual belligerents themselves (implementation in 
the wake of violations), and therefore have a different approach to measures avail-
able. Roberts, for example, states that there is nothing new in recognizing that the 
problem of implementation of the laws of war is both important and difficult. 
“However, with rare exceptions it has not been the subject of a vigorous tradition 
of thought. Many lawyers, and others, like to think of enforcement exclusively in 
terms of criminal trial after a violation. However, implementation may take many 
other legal, administrative, or military forms”.403 For example, implementation 
can be effected through training, education and planning, drafting of codes of 
conduct, actions of third party States, non-governmental bodies, and international 
organizations.404 
Rogers has yet another different approach when he lists practice and legal 
mechanisms under implementation. By practice, he means everyday phenomena 
affecting battlefield efficacy of the law of war – command influence, reciprocity, 
prohibition of hostage taking and the Nuremberg principles. Under legal mecha-
nisms, he lists belligerent reprisals, training and dissemination, international 
assistance (protecting powers), international co-operation, fact-finding and 
inquiries, ICRC, compensation. He keeps enforcement separate and talks about 
criminal responsibility and the ICC.405 
According to Yves Sandoz the legal means of putting IHL into effect come 
under three headings: 
1) Means of prevention: to be used before the need to protect victims becomes 
a reality, and intended to ensure that these protective provisions are correctly 
applied when the time comes. 
2) Means of control: constant supervision to ensure that protective provisions 
are properly observed. 
3) Means of repression: penalties as an integral part of any legal system should 
be a valuable deterrent.406 
 
Professor Sassoli has broadly the same approach: 1) preventive measures to be 
taken in peace-time, 2) those ensuring respect during armed conflicts, and 
3) those repressing violations. In his words significant process has been made 
with respect to the first category, in particular national legislation, training and 
dissemination, during recent years, inter alia, thanks to the advisory services 
offered to States by the ICRC and to the impetus given to national legislation by 
the Statute of the ICC.407 Clear success is still lacking in the second category 
according to him, though it is the crucial test for the war victims. 
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The ICRC’s Advisory Service lists key articles requiring the adoption of 
national implementation measures and broadly divides these in three categories: 
1) to ensure that both civilians and the military personnel are familiar with the 
rules of humanitarian law; 2) to ensure that the structures, administrative arrange-
ments and personnel required for compliance with the law are in place; 3) to 
ensure that violations of humanitarian law are prevented, and punished when they 
do occur.408 
Thürer differentiates between international and national measures (of 
compliance): 
a) On the international level there are Protective Powers and fact-finding 
mechanisms, which are largely underused or obsolete.409  
b) Internally there is the duty of States to incorporate the norms of humanitarian 
law in their domestic legal systems. 
c) Compliance can also be brought about by mixed procedures, i.e. through the 
interplay of international mechanisms and domestic legal systems.410  
 
This differentiation deserves credit, but is altogether not a good basis for further 
discussion if we want to go into some level of detail.  
Lavoyer further distinguishes between mechanisms that are a) internal to the 
parties of the conflict; b) responses to the other side and, c) activities of entities 
external to the conflict. This distinction helps to illustrate the difference between 
implementation and enforcement again. Note also that Lavoyer speaks about non-
judicial enforcement measures separately.411 But a further distinction is made 
between obligations in peacetime (national legislation, dissemination, legal 
advisers in armed forces, translations) and additional obligations during armed 
conflict (duty of military commanders, responsibility of superiors, collective 
responsibility of States, repression of war crimes, protecting powers, Fact 
Finding).412 This latter distinction is again, to some extent, followed by this thesis. 
However, it would be wrong to state that implementation measures are only those 
taken during peacetime and enforcement measures those taken during armed 
conflict. 
Sandoz provides ample examples and has the most clear-cut distinction 
between prevention, control, and repression in his work from 1988: 
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Prevention activities in his view are:  
1) Respect for the law by the States concerned, reiterating the pacta sunt 
servanda in the Conventions.413 
2) General dissemination of the Conventions and Protocols.414 
3) Special instruction for the authorities directly concerned. 
4) Duties of commanders. AP I art 87.  
5) Training qualified personnel. AP I art 6. 
6) Legal advisers in the armed forces. 
7) Communication of translations of the Conventions and Protocols and laws 
of application. 
 
Control measures are: 
1) Obligation on parties to the conflict to put an end to all breaches. 
• General obligation.  
• Obligations on military commanders – are under an obligation to prevent, 
suppress and to report to competent authorities breaches of the Con-
ventions.  
• Obligation on the High Contracting Parties to ensure respect for IHL.415 
What it actually means still has to be defined.  
2) Protecting powers. 
 
And finally, repression measures: 
• General obligation – the Parties to the Conventions, although not under the 
obligation of putting an end to violations of the Conventions, are under the 
obligation of suppressing those violations known as grave breaches and con-
sidered as war crimes.416  
• Responsibility of superiors and duty of commanders – AP I, art 86, 87. 
• Mutual assistance in criminal matters – AP I, art 88. 
 
Some additional means that do not fall under these categories are international 
enquiry, co-operation with the UN, and role of the media. 
Other works use similar categorization and it seems a reasonable course. The 
chapters of this thesis roughly follow the same pattern. To put it differently, we 
talk about actions taken to prevent violations, to control and monitor the actors 
involved and to repress or put an end to violations. It is tempting to divide the 
measures to those taken before, during and after hostilities, but this does not work 
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out well. For example, teaching, training and marking medical personnel will take 
place both before and during the conflict. Criminalizing grave breaches will have 
to be done before the conflict, but the actual proceedings and convictions will 
take place after the conflict, and so on. 
 
 
3.3. Dissemination and instruction 
3.3.1. Characterisation and legal basis 
Dissemination must be seen as one of the most important part of implementing 
IHL. The importance of dissemination goes hand in hand with the argument of 
distinction between implementation and enforcement. I strongly believe, and am 
supported by many authors, that the lack of dissemination activities leads to a 
significant amount of breaches of IHL. This is why dissemination is dealt with 
separately and in somewhat larger extent than other specific implementation 
measures. Dissemination of the law of Geneva among the civilian population, the 
police, and the armed forces is of overriding importance and “might even deprive 
the defence of superior orders of much of its importance.”417 Better to disseminate 
and afford training so that violations are averted than to emphasise unduly the 
objective of punishing the perpetrators of serious breaches of the law. Effective 
implementation is thus dependent on dissemination of the law. The observance 
of IHL can only be expected if all authorities, armed forces, and peoples are made 
familiar with its contents.418 
What does dissemination mean though? The Red Cross has defined dis-
semination as spreading knowledge of IHL, of the Movement in general and the 
ICRC in particular, of the Fundamental Principles which guide the activities of 
the components of the Movement, and of those activities themselves. Its main 
objectives are to limit violations of the law and human suffering on the one hand, 
and to facilitate humanitarian action on the other.419 
Another definition reads: “activities which seek to promote rules of behaviour 
intended to mitigate certain consequences of violence and conflict which are held 
to be unacceptable by the community of States party to the humanitarian law 
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treaties”.420 Alternatively, dissemination “refers to the very large number and 
wide range of activities designed to promote the Red Cross spirit and institutions, 
together with instruction on proper behaviour in the event of conflict, which the 
Movement has been conducting since its inception.”421 
Respect for international law is, to a large extent, based on voluntary com-
pliance by the relevant actors and is not enforceable in a traditional way. This 
voluntary compliance presupposes that the relevant actor knows the law, that he 
accepts it as a standard of his action, and that compliance with the law becomes 
part of his working routine. This is called the internalization of norms. The first 
indispensable method for achieving this is dissemination.422 
The importance of dissemination has long been recognized. Although no 
reference to dissemination or education was made in the 1864 Geneva Con-
vention, in 1869, Moynier, one of the founders of the ICRC, noted to the Second 
International Conference of the Red Cross: “[i]f the Convention is to be imple-
mented, its spirit must be introduced into the customs of soldiers and of the popu-
lation as a whole. Its principles must be popularized through extensive propa-
ganda.”423 
The preface of the Oxford manual of 1880, largely also drafted by Moynier, 
reads in relevant part:  
 
… it is not sufficient for sovereigns to promulgate new laws. It is essential, too, 
that they make these laws known among all people, so that when a war is 
declared, the men called upon to take up arms to defend the causes of the 
belligerent States, may be thoroughly impregnated with the special rights and 
duties attached to the execution of such a command.424 
 
Moynier’s call seems to rest on two ideas: firstly, that the law must be known and 
understood, in order to be respected; and secondly, that there needs to be a pro-
active approach towards making the law known. This explains the quite unusual 
obligation for an international set of rules that IHL contains regarding its own 
dissemination. In legal terms, the importance of dissemination of IHL was first 
formally recognized in the 1906 Geneva Convention. The Conventions of 1949 
contain a more elaborate obligation for States (Common Article 47/48/127/144), 
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which is reiterated and developed in the Protocols. It was also found to be a 
customary rule of IHL.425 
Despite this clear obligation, war crimes trials at the conclusion of the Second 
World War disclosed that the governments of certain belligerent States had done 
little to bring the existence or the content of the law of war to the attention of their 
armed forces. Draper holds that the general ignorance on this subject, not 
excluding that of lawyers, contributed to the widespread and gross war crimi-
nality committed by members of armed, para-military and police forces. “Where 
there is a prevailing ignorance about the legal restraints operative in the conduct 
of war, the system of discipline imposed by orders from superiors to subordinates 
meets no obstacles to compliance, however criminal the nature of the order.”426 
The dissemination and instruction provision is a valuable and necessary part 
of the implementation process. If carried out in good faith by the States, it would 
limit the number of military commanders and subordinates who would be in a 
position to claim with any conviction that they did not know the order they issued 
or received was criminal.427 
Article 47 of GC I stipulates: The High Contracting Parties undertake, in time 
of peace as in time of war, to disseminate the text of the present Convention as 
widely as possible in their respective countries, and, in particular, to include the 
study thereof in their programmes of military and, if possible, civil instruction, 
so that the principles thereof may become known to the entire population, in par-
ticular to the armed fighting forces, the medical personnel and the chaplains. 
Therefore, first and foremost, dissemination is the responsibility and the task of 
governments.428 Upon the commencement of a non-international armed conflict, 
however, the obligation also vests in the armed group.429 
“The conspicuous improvements over the text of 1929 are the express 
reference to times of peace besides times of war, and the indication of the ultimate 
purpose of dissemination, which is knowledge of the principles of humanitarian 
law among the entire population.” In the earlier texts, the inclusion of the study 
of the various Conventions in programmes of civil instruction was also qualified 
by the words “if possible”. Article 83(1) of the Protocol contains the undertaking 
of the contracting States “to encourage the study thereof by the civilian 
population”. Moreover, on top of the general obligation laid down in Article 
83(1), paragraph 2 provides specifically that: Any military or civilian authorities 
who, in time of armed conflict, assume responsibilities in respect of the 
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application of the Conventions and this Protocol shall be fully acquainted with 
the text thereof.430 
Given that Common Article 3 is an integral part of the Conventions, the obli-
gation to disseminate the law extends to that Article. AP II provides that the 
Protocol “shall be disseminated as widely as possible”. The importance of 
dissemination is also evidenced by SC Resolution 1894 (2009), which calls for 
“the widest possible dissemination of information” on humanitarian norms.431 
Since the obligations mentioned above apply to the “parties to the conflict”, the 
obligation of dissemination applies to States as well as non-state armed groups. 
Peacetime teaching is clearly of particular importance. If teaching only starts 
during an armed conflict in the heat of an ongoing battle, it is often too late to 
influence the behaviour of soldiers. They must be aware of what is required from 
them before a conflict starts. In addition, States which provide troops for peace-
keeping or peace-enforcement operations conducted by the UN, regional organi-
zations or under their auspices should ensure that the military personnel 
belonging to their contingent are instructed in the provisions of the law.432 
The updated Commentary states that in order to be effective, IHL must not be 
taught as an abstract and separate set of legal norms, but must be integrated into 
all military activity, training and instruction. “Such integration should aim to 
inspire and influence the military culture and its underlying values, in order to 
ensure that legal considerations and principles of IHL are incorporated, as much 
as possible, into military doctrine and decision-making.”433 
There are thus several dimensions to this obligation to disseminate IHL. First, 
it is primarily a responsibility of States, though Red Cross and Red Crescent 
actors also have a support role to play in promoting the law and assisting States 
in their efforts to do so. In reality, it is often the ICRC that carries out many of 
the dissemination activities, both to the military and civil societies. Second, 
unlike many other rules of IHL, it is also applicable in peacetime. Indeed, dis-
semination efforts are more likely to be successful when there is sufficient time 
and calm to expose different actors in society to IHL and humanitarian principles, 
so that real norm integration can take place.434 Third, non-state actors are also the 
addressees of these rules. 
At the end of the day, systematic instruction to members of the armed forces, 
and gradually to the adult population, may do more to ensure observance of those 
instruments than the trial and punishment of those who have violated them. 
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“Instruction works at a time ahead of violation. Punishment operates when imple-
mentation has failed. In the case of death penalties, which may be imposed for all 
“grave breaches”, it is the irremovable seal upon the failure to implement”.435 
However, how does one effectively engage in the promotion, education and 
integration of IHL among the military and civilian population? While the 1949 
Conventions specify the material, temporal and personal scope of the obligation 
to disseminate, they do not elaborate on the methods that have to be used to trans-
late the legal obligation into actual respect and compliance by individuals.436 This 
will be discussed in the next paragraphs. 
 
 
3.3.2. Teaching humanitarian law to armed forces and non-state actors 
3.3.2.1. On the necessity of teaching 
The rules of war, no matter how perfect and comprehensive they may be, will 
have no practical effect if they are not known by the armed forces. Moreover, 
there is a high risk that the rules will be wrongly interpreted because of their 
complexity or inadequate training.437 Over the years, many war crimes have been 
committed that involve the ill-treatment of detainees. Often abuses have been 
carried out at a low level, by inexperienced or poorly trained soldiers who have 
not been adequately supervised by experienced officers.438 
Everyone involved in a conflict must be aware that violations carry disciplinary 
or penal consequences and realize that persistent breaches may lead to an escalation 
of the conflict. In this regard, compliance with humanitarian law is in the interest 
of every individual party to an armed conflict.439  
The armed forces, in particular those of developed, highly industrialized States, 
have become complex and sophisticated organizations with a high degree of 
specialization for their various branches. Due to this, the job of translating the 
law into meaningful instructions has become commensurately more difficult.440 
Yet, those who do not know the rules cannot respect them. This also applies to 
those who wrongly think that the rules do not apply to them; to those who think 
that the situation they are confronted with is so new that the “old” law cannot be 
applied; and to those who think that in exceptional circumstances the rules do not 
have to be complied with. None of these people will respect the rules; this is why 
relentless dissemination efforts are crucial.441 
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IHL is largely made up of obligations with which armed and fighting forces 
must comply, and therefore these obligations must form an integral part of their 
regular instruction and practical training. Yet despite their importance, the rules 
of war often feature only marginally in the military instruction programmes of 
most States.442 I know from experience that IHL is often taught for a mere 45 
minutes in the course of the 8 to 11 months basic training in the Estonian armed 
forces. The situation gets only slightly better for the officer level training, and has 
improved somewhat in the last 10 years. 
Review of literature reveals that academics are convinced that law observance 
is seriously impeded if the existence and content of the law is not brought to the 
attention of those required to observe it. Kumar thus holds that greater signifi-
cance should be attached to imparting education to members of the armed forces, 
rather than adopting coercive methods for law compliance. An educated soldier 
is less prone to commit breach of the Conventions than a soldier who is ignorant 
to them.443 
Roger, who has been teaching law of war to armed forces for decades, believes 
that once the personnel get to know the details they are universally in favour. 
They can see the sense in it and the benefits to humankind if it is properly applied. 
However, many are worried about the lack of enforcement measures if the enemy 
fail to comply and need reassurance on that score.444 
Roberts too believes that good training and the setting of high standards and 
sound examples in peacetime will be followed through into battle. There is an old 
military saying which goes “train hard, fight easy”; perhaps “train hard, fight easy 
and legally” would be more to the point.445 
Empirical studies have also shown that training increases restraint on the 
battlefield. But not just any training. Bell has found that intensity matters: data 
from Afghanistan and Iraq suggest that US military units led by officers with 
more intensive training in norms of restraint engaged in less violence against 
civilians. Research done for the Roots of Restraint study indicates that higher 
levels of IHL training result in greater adoption of norms of restraint by com-
batants in the Australian and Philippine armies.446 
However, training intensity is only part of the story: evidence from the mili-
taries shows that mixed training methods, combining IHL briefings, classroom 
discussions, case-study reviews, and practical field exercises, are the most effec-
tive in inculcating norms of restraint in combatants.447 
A survey published in 1999 of individuals in States that had experienced 
armed conflict, carried out for the ICRC, found that some 39 per cent of persons 
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had heard of the Conventions, but of these, only 60 per cent had knowledge of 
their content. This figure needs to be improved.448 
At least two sets of questions arise from these statements. First, how can this 
all-important internalization be achieved? Second, to what extent, and by whom, 
is this requirement met and what liabilities may arise where training is either 
inadequate, or even contrary to the requirements of humanitarian norms? 
 
 
3.3.2.2. How is this to be carried out? 
How does one achieve conformity with rules by armed forces and armed groups? 
First, training must be tailored to suit the level in the hierarchy, and the degree of 
responsibility, of the target groups. People who bear weapons must internalize 
not only the message about obeying the rules, but also the message about sanc-
tions that will follow for failing to do so.449 
Dissemination usually takes place through orders, courses of instructions, 
commentaries or manuals. However, dissemination should not be limited to 
handing out written copies of texts. Means of communication with which fighters 
are familiar should be utilized, e.g. norms could be presented pictorially, through 
radio, text messages etc. Furthermore, dissemination is not the same as instruc-
tion. Instruction allows individuals to ask questions, engage in dialogue, and 
resolve misunderstandings with a knowledgeable entity. Instruction may take the 
form of education and training. The breadth and depth of the instruction afforded 
will vary according to the level, mandate, and nature of the individuals being 
engaged.450 
Roberts believes that the favourable reaction of officers towards IHL has more 
to do with the straightforward nature of the law, and the realization that there is 
absolutely nothing in its provisions that any reasonable sailor, soldier or airman 
could not apply in a conflict situation.451 Hoffman has a similar line on argu-
mentation: “Anyone who has trained armed forces in the law of war knows that 
this audience is best persuaded by showing that such rules are founded in military 
pragmatism, not in legal abstractions.”452 
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Fleck writes that the emphasis must be put on practical teaching. Soldiers 
should be instructed, using examples, in how to deal with the problems of and the 
issues involved in international law. The soldier must be taught to bring his 
conduct into line with IHL in every situation.453 
O’Connell believes that soldiers can execute their job best if they have clear 
rules. Speaking about existing discussions or difficulties of IHL or human rights 
only overcomplicates the message. Similarly, if we change too frequently the 
determination of the situation on the ground and the related rules, the soldier will 
lose confidence in the rules to apply. Soldiers need firm rules. If you give them 
too much freedom of choice, the situation will turn into chaos.454 
La Rosa holds that the troops must undergo training which allows them to 
absorb fully the rules and principles of humanitarian law, as well as other obli-
gations connected with the service, so that they become a natural reaction. Bearers 
of weapons must not have to weigh up the pros and cons in the heat of the action, 
and their instinctive reactions must be in keeping with the law.455  
Similarly, Corn warns against relying exclusively on classroom education on 
IHL, which will rarely produce effective understanding and commitment to the 
law. Soldiers do not learn to perform their battle tasks by classroom instruction; 
they learn by doing. The same goes for IHL, the teaching of which must be inte-
grated into the same training and development process used to produce proficiency 
in the battle task. “The threat of a potential criminal sanction for violating IHL is 
not a substitute for training integration, and will likely provide little deterrence 
when soldiers confront in extreme situations involving pressures to act in violation 
of the law. In contrast, when IHL compliance has been integrated into all aspects 
of training battle tasks, that compliance will become increasingly instinctive and 
automatic, like the execution of the task itself.”456 
Indeed, stand-alone courses on IHL may be of marginal utility. Given a choice 
between following a direct order and following a course of action based on the 
loose recollection of an IHL course, there is no competition. “If the execution of 
a given order would blatantly violate one of the cardinal LOAC principles, the 
decision of an officer or soldier to openly question it to his or her superior is more 
likely to depend on morality learned as a child than on a mandatory legal course, 
although the latter will be given greater weight if it has been delivered by a figure 
of authority from the soldier’s own chain of command,” Carswell holds.457 
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In other words, the law should be presented and discussed “strategically,” in 
a manner that is relevant and adapted to the context, and as part of a deliberate 
plan of engagement with the parties. This is necessary if parties are to develop a 
positive attitude towards the law, the first step towards respecting it.458 
In the US, the instructors educating troops on IHL are called the JAG (judge 
advocate general) officers. Their training role is extensive. Before deployment, 
all troops receive training from JAG officers that includes sessions on the legal 
limits to the use of force. These sessions may be tailored to the specific types of 
functions the troops will be performing, and include training in the specific rules 
of engagement for the particular operation.459 
Training continues during deployment, and includes “training exercises” that 
incorporate specific, realistic scenarios designed to teach the limits on the use of 
force in the actual circumstances troops are likely to face.460 Nevertheless, espe-
cially in light of abuses at Abu Ghraib, Guantanamo, and other detention sites, 
neither the presence of JAG officers on the field nor the various organizational 
reforms have been entirely successful at stopping unlawful behaviour.461 
It has become clear that IHL training needs to take place in a context which 
facilitates the development of conscience, with input from education theory, 
social and organizational psychology, and perhaps military ethics. The ICRC’s 
first Roots of Behaviour in War Study showed that knowledge of the law and 
attitudes consistent with a risk of violations can occur together. Bates believes 
that this finding creates a conundrum, possibly even a paradox, between IHL 
training and compliance. Historical reflection and social psychology show that 
the aims of basic training (desensitization, breaking down a soldier’s inculcated 
reluctance to kill, unit cohesion and obedience to the command chain) are antago-
nistic to many of the aims of IHL training.462 
Draper holds that the 1949 Conventions are defective on the dissemination 
issue. Namely, they do not have a monitoring device in them, i.e. that the required 
instruction is being given, adequately, to those for whom it is required. The 
system of discipline and training in the armed forces of States makes the giving 
of the instruction required by the Conventions relatively simple to implement, 
and any excuse for failure to do so less easy to justify.463  
Greenwood also suggests that the UN could follow the example of the ICRC 
in reviewing the steps taken by States to comply with their dissemination obliga-
tions: the need to report to an international body on its activities may spur a State 
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into giving these activities a higher priority. He adds that the UN could offer 
sponsorship for IHL training courses run by the ICRC.464 
I believe that some oversight and obligatory reporting mechanism should be 
devised for the instruction on IHL given to armed forces. A lot of work has been 
done, and still underway, but given that there is wide agreement on training being 
the most important prerogative for adherence to IHL, it is only logical that it is 
somehow controlled and guided. 
 
 
3.3.2.3. The legal adviser 
The commanding officer must ensure that his subordinates are aware of their 
rights and duties under international law. He is obliged to prevent, and where 
necessary to suppress or to report to competent authorities, breaches of inter-
national law. He is supported in these tasks by a legal adviser.465 
In fact, the law of armed conflict requires the employment of legal advisers to 
advise military commanders on the application of the Conventions and Protocol 
I.466 It also requires the employment of legal advisers on the part of national 
liberation movements. The Customary International Humanitarian Law study 
posits that the employment of legal advisers is a norm of customary international 
law for States in respect of international and non-international armed conflicts 
alike.467 
Such advisers are employed both to ensure that IHL provisions are not over-
looked, but also to participate in general dissemination activities.468 The military 
lawyer can participate not only as a negotiator in international conferences, as a 
writer of military manuals or as an instructor on the law of war, but also as a legal 
adviser to a commander or his staff or as a prosecutor in war crimes proceedings. 
In all these areas, he can make a useful contribution to the understanding and 
implementation of the law.469 
For instance, Protocol I includes a number of wide restraints upon battle 
conduct, e.g., as to lawful targetry, means and methods of combat, and pre-
cautions in attacks. This introduces the legal adviser to an advisory role affecting 
combat operations, strategical planning and operational directives. The com-
mander is placed in an awkward position if advice is requested and ignored. To 
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meet the difficulties of certain States, the Article does not require such advisers 
to be qualified lawyers.470 
Dickinson calls these advisers the compliance unit within the military. They 
ensure that commanders and troops obey the rules of engagement, which are the 
rules that operationalize the law of armed conflict in a given war or occupation. 
The core public value undergirding this body of law is the principle that the use 
of force, even in an armed conflict, should be limited. Thus, military lawyers are 
essential to inculcating this public value into military culture.471 
For example, in the Vietnam War the existence of legal norms did not prevent 
US troops from committing widespread atrocities at My Lai and elsewhere. After 
My Lai, a high-level army investigation blamed the military for failure both to 
train troops adequately in war crimes law, and to provide procedures for reporting 
abuses. In response, the US military strengthened its internal codes of conduct by 
making military lawyers become more involved in operational decision-making. 
Such actions helped institutionalize the authority and role of these lawyers in the 
military bureaucracy and deepened the militaries commitment to the law of war.472 
The judge advocates carefully translate their legal advice into operational 
terms, making it clear to commanders that the lawyers’ job is not to say NO, but 
rather to help their commanders achieve the objectives of the mission. Their job 
is to give an alternative course of action that would accomplish the goal without 
the legal concerns.473 
The 2019 International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, is 
expected to adopt a resolution titled “Bringing IHL home”, specifically drafted 
to serve as a roadmap for better national implementation. This resolution further 
encourages States to make every effort to integrate IHL into military training and 
all levels of military planning and decision-making, thereby ensuring that IHL is 
fully integrated into the military ethos. It also recalls the importance of the avail-
ability within States’ armed forces of legal advisers to advise commanders, at the 
appropriate level, on the application of IHL, including to non-international armed 
conflicts.474 
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3.3.2.4. Military manuals 
As mentioned previously, the relative weakness of international measures to 
secure the performance of obligations under humanitarian law calls for national 
implementing efforts, among which military manuals are of particular importance. 
These manuals are important because they are translating humanitarian rules into 
the military sphere, and may support its application in daily practice.475 The 
military manuals of States have proven important in the creation and development 
of IHL. They are referred to frequently in judgments of international courts and 
tribunals, and are used as evidence of State practice and opinio juris in identifying 
customary norms.476 
Rogers marks that commanders and staff officers require manuals which are 
written in clear straightforward and non-legal language, while junior officers 
probably need a pamphlet explaining the basic principles of the laws of war. 
Soldiers and junior non-commissioned officers do not need a manual at all, a brief 
summary being all that is required. Rules of engagement cards may well suffice.477 
The translation of the provisions into more down to earth words, adapted to 
the everyday life of the members of the armed forces, might help the law of war 
expert not to sink into a legalist approach in the realization of such booklets. 
Rather, they would need to sort out some of the most important principles of the 
Conventions and Protocols and adapt them into more practical terms adjusted to 
the army’s own development and needs.478 
Non-state armed groups also draw up codes of conduct and issue internal 
regulations on issues pertaining to the law of armed conflict. Sivakumaran pro-
vides ample evidence for this ranging from the conflicts in El Salvador, to Sudan, 
Sierra Leone and Uganda.479  
In order for codes of conduct and internal regulations to constitute a useful 
means of enforcement, they need to be consistent with international standards. 
Many regulations are indeed consistent, with some reportedly being of a higher 
standard than that required by the law of armed conflict. However, consistency 
with international standards cannot be assumed, and some regulations even violate 
international standards.480 In this regard, it is advisable that such manuals be 
submitted to the ICRC for peer-review where possible. 
 
 
                                                                                                 
475  Wolfrum & Fleck, “Enforcement”, supra nota 418, pp 721–722. 
476  Sivakumaran, The law of non-international armed conflict, supra nota 337, p 438. Citing 
for example Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galić, Case No IT-98-29-A, ICTY, Judgement of the 
Appeals Chamber, 30.11.2006. 
477  Rogers, Law on the battlefield, supra nota 106, p 152. 
478  Guillemette, “Legal advisers in armed forces”, supra nota 40, p 143. 
479  Sivakumaran, The law of non-international armed conflict, supra nota 337, p 441. (The 
code of conduct of the Taliban in 2009). 
480  Ibid. 
119 
3.3.3. Teaching humanitarian law to civil societies 
Both during armed conflicts and in time of peace, dissemination of IHL is 
prompted by the hope that knowledge of the law will encourage respect for, and 
empathy with, other human beings in distress.481 As the Conventions contain pro-
visions that address people whose actions are not attributable to the State and 
everyone could become subject to prosecution for grave breaches of the Con-
ventions, it is important that the general population have knowledge of the rules 
therein.  
Educating the public has two major purposes: the medium- and long-term 
goals of promoting peace and reconciliation, and, in times of emergency, the 
immediate and short-term goals of promoting humanitarian aid and protecting the 
interests and the lives of Red Cross personnel on humanitarian missions.482 
In Article 47 of the Conventions, the obligation to include the study of the 
Conventions in programmes of civil instruction is qualified by the insertion of “if 
possible”, owing to concerns expressed during the negotiations that constitutional 
limitations in federal States could prevent a State Party from prescribing general 
public education programmes. Other concerns include overburdened curricula, 
limited financial means, and lack of interest among the target audiences or an 
apprehension of being misunderstood as preparing for armed conflict.483 
Under Article 83 of Protocol I, the possibility of the authorities maintaining 
their uninterested posture is reduced by the language adopted. The contracting 
States no longer undertake to do something “if possible”; henceforth, their under-
taking will be “to encourage the study thereof by the civilian population.” Under 
the terms of this provision, they will be required to adopt a policy of active pro-
motion – as indeed they should have done under the old provision.484 
Kalshoven takes issue with the inadequateness of the civilian instruction. In 
the Netherlands, he argues, the central authorities do not fix these programmes in 
detail, but leave it to the discretion of each educational institution. “This being 
the case the Dutch central authorities found in this situation a convenient excuse 
to spend no effort whatsoever on the dissemination of the Conventions at school 
or university level”. He goes on to say that “it seems slightly ridiculous that the 
obligation to ensure civil instruction would be permitted to yield to the sacrosanct 
autonomy of federative States or educational institutions.”485 To be honest, this 
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was the situation decades ago, and a lot has improved after that. It is true that in 
many countries, such education is left completely in the hands of individual 
schools, and no central obligation is foreseen. However, more and more countries 
are seeing the need for such education, and considerable programmes for dis-
semination among the civilian population have been developed.486 
The ICRC has a crucial role to play here. Although the promotion of IHL in 
academic circles is a relatively new activity for the ICRC, it has made rapid pro-
gress since the mid 1990s. Today, the organization is following up on university-
related activities in some 130 countries around the world. Overseen and harmo-
nized by the ICRC headquarters in Geneva but implemented primarily by opera-
tional and regional delegations in the field, the ICRC’s programmes targeting 
university professors and students are notable for their variety and diversity.487 
Whatever the causes of violent conflict, formal education has an important 
part to play in strengthening or rebuilding social cohesion in the wake of violence. 
A wide spectrum of educational initiatives, often grouped under the heading of 
“peace education”, contribute to the strengthening or rebuilding of social 
cohesion.488 The Exploring Humanitarian Law project, initiated by the ICRC, 
aims at designing learning modules focused on humanitarian law and related 
ethical issues, and introducing them into existing educational programmes for 
13–18-year-olds around the world. This is a valuable task the ICRC has taken 
upon itself. The project has been translated into a great number of languages, and 
has been implemented in all parts of the world. It could be considered one of the 
best preventative activities available – building a society that is inherently anti-
violence and educated in humanitarian issues. 
Humanitarian law education does not explore violent conflict in the same way 
as history courses. It encourages the examination of war from a humanitarian 
perspective and the exploration of the fundamental ethical issues war raises. By 
focusing on the shared experience of violence, suffering and the devastation from 
war, and the need for minimal protection of life and human dignity, education in 
humanitarian law can help rebuild or strengthen social cohesion. It can exert an 
indirect pacifying effect in situations of acute social and political tension and help 
to cultivate individual responsibility and solidarity.489 
In addition, IHL should be taught to journalists. The press can play a signifi-
cant role, for good or ill, in informing the attitudes of the general public to issues 
arising from the implementation, or failure thereof, of IHL. War correspondents 
are also to be properly marked and protected to enable them to do this difficult 
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job. Unfortunately, the atrocities committed against journalists are very well 
known.490 
Better knowledge means higher effectiveness of action and of status analysis, 
better supervision of authorities and better protection of the victims of a conflict 
by journalists, non-governmental organisations and other social institutions. 
Knowledge of IHL means a broadening of thought, shift of perspective, and new 
approaches to news reporting. IHL-aware media can function as more effective 
observers of law violations, they can inform the public respectively thus con-
tributing to the enhancement of social control over authorities and eventually 
enforcing law-abiding behaviour of States in the international arena.491 
The International Institute of Humanitarian Law at San Remo conducts inter-
national training courses for members of armed forces and academics regularly, 
and the ICRC itself holds annual Summer Schools. These courses involve instruc-
tion by international experts in the field, and are directed at persons with relevant 
qualifications of previous study, who may themselves be hoped to engage in dis-
seminatory work.492 The Henry Dunant Institute, established in 1965, is a major 
research centre, and publishes papers and other materials for the study and 
advancement of IHL. The Geneva Academy offers a one-year full-time post-
graduate degree in IHL and human rights.493 The Raoul Wallenberg Institute in 
Sweden has a two-year programme that provides students with in-depth know-
ledge in HRL and humanitarian law.494 Tens of universities in Europe offer 
comprehensive human rights and humanitarian law courses. 
 
 
3.3.4. Dissemination and promotion of IHL by the ICRC 
The ICRC has made it an institutional dogma that increased awareness of IHL 
ensures increased respect for the observance of the law. Throughout the 150-year 
history of the organization, the ICRC has relentlessly worked for more effective 
dissemination of the law – particularly to the armed forces of parties to conflicts 
around the world – because of its fundamental belief in the inextricable link 
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between understanding and implementation.495 I wholeheartedly share this line of 
thought. 
Dissemination and training activities are a large part of the ICRC’s efforts to 
make the rules of humanitarian law known and to build a foundation for dis-
cussions concerning respect for the law.496 The ICRC’s strategy is carried out on 
three levels: awareness-building, promotion of humanitarian law through teaching 
and training, and the integration of humanitarian law into official, legal, educa-
tional and operational curricula. 
Throughout the years, the ICRC has published a number of reference publi-
cations with the aim of assisting armed forces in incorporating the applicable law 
into military strategy, operations and tactics.497 It also organizes annual workshops 
for senior military officers to discuss the legal framework applicable to modern 
military operations, and is regularly invited to provide the humanitarian perspective 
in training scenarios and military exercises of armed forces around the globe. 
As mentioned in the historical part of this thesis, the dissemination obligation 
is a relatively recent one, but an awareness of its importance is older than the Red 
Cross Movement itself. The movement is “actually a product of perhaps the most 
effective instance of dissemination in the history of the humanitarian movement,” 
Dunlap states. In A Memory of Solferino, Dunant recounted the horrors he had 
seen on the battlefield and persuaded the political and military leaders of his age 
that such suffering was unnecessary and cruel and that something needed to be 
done. Four years after the battle, the Red Cross was formed, and a year later the 
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Wounded in Armies in the Field 
was adopted.498 
“The ICRC today undertakes a global, non-country-specific set of activities 
aimed at the development, interpretation, and promotion of IHL. It seeks to 
influence a variety of actors, including States, international organizations, and 
non-state actors, to take IHL more seriously and, equally important, to take the 
ICRC’s interpretations of IHL more seriously, in the belief that such awareness 
of the law will promote observance of it when conflicts arise.”499  
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The ICRC’s efforts at dissemination used to be directed at helping States pro-
mote compliance with IHL and encouraging States to meet their obligations. 
More recently, ICRC has invested heavily in the promotion of the Red Cross 
principles and the protection of ICRC delegates and operations in crisis areas. 
Dissemination has always been important in times of conflict, but it is only 
recently that the ICRC has begun structuring dissemination as an integral part of 
a humanitarian aid action from the very beginning.500 The dissemination activities 
they undertake range from diplomacy to operational dissemination. They can take 
the form of developing IHL, bringing the principles of humanitarian law to the 
military forces and general populations (lawyers, medical personnel, civil 
defence personnel, educators) or even educational efforts that are directly related 
to specific humanitarian aid operations.501 
While the fundamental objective of dissemination remains consistent – to 
limit the suffering of victims and prevent violations of the law – there is an aim 
specific to each situation as it arises. Before the conflict action needs to be taken 
to prevent the emergence of violence and a situation deteriorating to armed con-
flict. During the conflict, there is a need for action to limit the spread of violence 
and promoting acceptance of the Red Cross itself. After the conflict action needs 
to be taken to prevent any breakdown of the peace process.502 
At one of the more recent conferences of the ICRC a 4-year action plan for 
the implementation of IHL was adopted. In the recitals of this document there are 
a couple of strong-worded points. Namely the Conference “requests all members 
of the International Conference to make every possible effort to ensure that all 
actors concerned implement, as appropriate, the Action Plan” and “requests the 
members of the International Conference to report to the 32nd International Con-
ference in 2015 on the follow-up to their pledges”. The actions called for include 
improving the incorporation and repression of serious violations of IHL. At the 
Conference of 2015, it was again recommended that there is a need to continue 
an inclusive, State-driven intergovernmental process based on the principle of 
consensus and to find agreement on features and functions of a potential forum 
of States. However, the report of this conference only mentions the previous  
4-year action plan once and in connection to progress made regarding responsible 
arms transfers.503 
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In a separate development, the ICRC and the Government of Switzerland con-
ducted a major consultation process on Strengthening Compliance with Inter-
national Humanitarian Law, established inter alia “to enhance and ensure the 
effectiveness of mechanisms of compliance with international humanitarian law”. 
This process is hoped to lead to voluntary State reporting and/or thematic dis-
cussions at meetings of States.504 The next conference discussing this issue will 
convene in 2019. Unfortunately, there is a group of blocking States (including 
Russia, Cuba, Venezuela, the MENA countries), who are seriously hindering the 
creation of any new measures.505 
The 2019 Conference will work towards the adoption of five resolutions, one 
of which is of particular importance. This resolution is titled “Bringing IHL 
home: A road map for better national implementation of international law”. It 
recalls that domestic implementation of international obligations plays a central 
role in fulfilling the obligation to respect IHL and recognizes the positive impact 
that the socialization of IHL in military practice can have on battlefield behaviour, 
in particular through training tailored to the profile of the audience.506 The ICRC 
once more outlines that focusing only on violations of the law risks delegitimizing 
it over time and overlooks the many situations where the law is effectively 
respected. This is why the ICRC believes that there is a need for a more balanced 
discourse, one which gives more visibility to examples of IHL being respected. 
 
 
3.3.5. Dissemination in Estonia 
Teaching and dissemination of humanitarian law is not regulated by law in 
Estonia. Fulfilling this obligation, which at first glance seems simple, has not 
been easy in practice. Dissemination of the law is rather problematic and patchy, 
and often finds a cold reception. The Estonian Red Cross has made some efforts 
in disseminating among the civilian population and has compiled summary book-
lets on the Conventions. Teaching IHL to the armed forces in not entirely satis-
factory and lacks consistency. I conducted a study among the conscripts to Esto-
nian armed forces in the context of my bachelor’s thesis in 2006, and was able to 
interview many non-commissioned officers to find out what is being done in prac-
tice. The basic principles of IHL are usually taught to these conscripts in a 45-
minute lecture, not giving them a chance to internalize the rules.507 
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If a conscript decides to continue his military career after the mandatory 
service, he can enrol in the Estonian Military Academy to become a non-com-
missioned officer or an officer. The education starts from vocational training that 
provides the graduate with a vocational education degree in military leadership 
and a master sergeant’s rank. The Academy has issued a book called “The 
soldier’s manual”, which contains, on two pages, the basic minimum concepts of 
IHL (how to take prisoners of war and objects not to be attacked).508 On this level, 
a thorough introduction to IHL is not yet given.  
The basic officer training course is the first level of military higher education, 
and provides the knowledge and skills necessary to perform the duties of both 
wartime and peacetime platoon leaders and company commanders (depending on 
the specifics of the arms of service/weapon class).509 The second level master’s 
programme enables the continuation of speciality studies started during applied 
higher education, whereby the students acquire the knowledge and skills neces-
sary for service as staff officers of an infantry battalion or a brigade or as wartime 
battalion commanders (or equivalent posts). 
The first level training called “Military leadership for land force”, offers a 
course on “The law of armed conflict” for 2 European Credit Points (ECTS) and 
the master’s level a course on international law and IHL for 4 ECTSs but also a 
course on the use of force in international relations (3 ECTS).510 This is a welcome 
development as it is reassuring that at least on the higher levels of military edu-
cation IHL is given sufficient attention. 
IHL is also included in the pre-mission training for all those serving in the 
missions in various conflict areas around the World. Estonia has general Rules of 
Engagement and mission specific ROEs, but most of this information is classified 
and cannot be used in this thesis. There is no single handbook on IHL. Legal 
advisors on military operations are employed at the Ministry of Defence and 
Headquarters of the Estonian Defence Forces, although there is no legal basis for 
the appointment of such advisors. 
The problems in teaching IHL to armed forces are manifold. In addition to the 
inherent challenges mentioned in other parts of this thesis, there is always the lack 
of resources. The training cycles have time constraints, it is difficult to find people 
who are thoroughly familiar with and trained in IHL, and there is no common 
curriculum for teaching. 
Lack of knowledge on IHL can lead to the loss of many lives and, also, to 
unintentionally becoming a criminal for some combatants. The principles of IHL 
must already be integrated into the training of conscripts, not to mention higher 
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rank officers, especially in light of Estonia’s membership in NATO and frequent 
foreign missions. It is necessary to provide the privates with simpler reference 
booklets that would be available to them at any time, while the higher-ranking 
officers should have reference books and integrated training activities. Training 
videos, computer simulations for battle situations and other innovative teaching 
methods should be used to make the study of IHL more interesting.511 
In addition, the laws foresee rights and obligations for the police and a variety 
of actors involved in civil protection.512 These people can play an important and 
unexpected role in ensuring social order in the event of armed conflict. The 
subject of teaching and dissemination is therefore extremely important and should 
concern everyone.513 
In the field of distribution to the civilian population, most of the work is done 
by universities. All three major universities in Estonia, University of Tartu, Uni-
versity of Tallinn and TalTech have courses on IHL, at TalTech even for 6 
ECTSs.514 
On the other hand, there is the “Exploring Humanitarian Law” program, 
initiated by the ICRC and carried out by Ministry of Education and Research, 
which teaches high school students IHL. On December 11, 2007, the first teacher 
training seminar was held. The primary purpose of the curriculum is to develop a 
sense of responsibility in young people to show respect for life and human 
dignity. The teaching pack addresses historical as well as contemporary events to 
give students an idea of how humanitarian law can reduce the plagues of war and 
the suffering of non-combatants. The topic is opened to the student through 
discussions and memories of those involved in the armed conflict. It is a major 
initiative of the ICRC that I was able to help edit into the Estonian language and 
realities.515 
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3.4. The role of the ICRC 
The ICRC is a model humanitarian organization, and one of the primary mecha-
nisms assisting implementation of the laws of war. Its history of involvement in 
armed conflicts by assisting wounded soldiers soon expanded to protecting 
prisoners of war, and helping civilians or other non-combatants caught in conflict. 
Determination and devotion to the cause have earned the ICRC a unique mandate 
in the field of IHL.516 The ICRC is often said to be the only implementation 
mechanism operating in practice, especially when it concerns the war victims.517  
The organization was originally set up as a private association under Swiss 
law. The Committee proper is composed of 15 to 25 co-opted members, who must 
be Swiss nationals. The fact that international treaties confer specific tasks upon 
the ICRC has led to widespread recognition of the organization’s international 
legal personality. This trend was confirmed in 1990 when the UNGA granted the 
ICRC observer status, which allows the ICRC to participate actively in the work 
of the UN and that of other international organizations.518 
In the Simic case, the ICTY acknowledged the specific role of the ICRC in 
the implementation of IHL by upholding its immunity from the obligation to 
testify, even before international tribunals, in the interests of its ability to perform 
that role.519 
As the above international mechanisms for implementing and enforcing IHL 
are patchy, it is worth dwelling at greater length on the role assigned to the ICRC 
in the implementation of this body of law. There are a hundred or so references 
to the ICRC in the 1949 Conventions and the Protocols thereto, and most of them 
are instructions to act. 
According to its establishing statute, its principle mandate is “to undertake the 
tasks incumbent upon it under the Geneva Conventions, to work for the faithful 
application of international humanitarian law applicable in armed conflicts and 
to take cognizance of any complaints based on alleged breaches of that law” and 
“to endeavour at all times – as a neutral institution whose humanitarian work is 
carried out particularly in time of international and other armed conflicts or 
internal strife – to ensure the protection of and assistance to military and civilian 
victims of such events and of their direct results”.520 
One of the top priorities of the ICRC’s diplomacy is to ensure that newly 
independent States become bound by the 1949 Conventions and other IHL instru-
ments. For example, in September 1996, the ICRC President travelled to the 
Baltic States to discuss IHL implementation with the highest State authorities of 
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Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.521 This activity is not among the most pressing 
issues anymore, for understandable reasons. Nevertheless, the ICRC has estab-
lished an almost universal acceptance of the Conventions (for the Protocols, the 
work is still underway), and can also work with non-state actors in this regard. 
Mandated by States to prepare possible developments in the law, the ICRC 
draws its expertise from the experience acquired in the field, in the midst of armed 
conflicts. Since the ICRC is working in the very context where the Geneva law is 
applicable, it can therefore provide possible proposals which are both feasible 
and sensible.522 The ICRC Commentaries on the Conventions and Protocols have 
been cited on innumerable occasions, so frequently that they are almost treated 
as authoritative. This can prove problematic, as some of its contents are still open 
to question.523 
Apart from its role within the system of Protecting Powers and their Substitutes, 
the ICRC has a very broad mandate “to work for the faithful application of 
International Humanitarian Law applicable in armed conflicts and to take 
cognizance of any complaints based on alleged breaches of that law” (Article 5.2 
c of the Statutes of the Movement and Article 4.1 c of the Statutes of the ICRC). 
There is no doubt that the ICRC does a great deal to monitor the application of 
IHL and in practice – as mentioned above – is the only body supervising the 
respect for IHL provisions. Unfortunately, his role is potentially in contradiction 
with its modus operandi of confidentiality and neutrality and with its primary 
purpose of providing impartial assistance and protection to victims of armed 
conflicts.524 
The various aspects of its mandate are the practical expression of what is often 
referred to as the ICRC’s role as guardian of IHL. However, as Pfanner notes, it 
is not the guarantor of humanitarian law. That role must be performed by the High 
Contracting Parties, in accordance with their obligations under the Conven-
tions.525 In the next sections, some of the most important implementation 
measures associated with the role of ICRC will be analysed. 
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3.4.1. Protection of the emblem 
In connection with the ICRC’s activities, protection must be granted to the red 
cross/red crescent emblem. The red cross/red crescent emblem is the symbol of 
impartial humanitarian assistance offered to those in distress. It is often the only 
means of protection available to persons trying to attenuate the suffering of the 
victims of armed conflict and the only guarantee that help will reach those victims 
in time.526  
In 1863, the International Committee for Relief to the Wounded, which was 
the direct predecessor of ICRC, introduced the common distinctive protection 
symbol for medical personnel in the field, namely a white armlet bearing a red 
cross, honouring the history of neutrality of Switzerland and of its own Swiss 
organizers by reversing the Swiss flag’s colours. To avoid religious discomfort, 
the symbols of red crescent and red lion and sun were later adopted for use outside 
the Christian World.527 Today the red crystal is also codified by Additional Protocol 
III, and the red lion and sun symbol has fallen out of use. 
Various articles in the Conventions and Protocols foresee specific obligations 
for States. For example, all medical transport must be marked with a clearly visible 
emblem; the same goes for medical personnel, equipment, units and establish-
ments. Articles 53 and 54 of GC 1 obligate States to take measures necessary for 
the prevention and repression, at all times, of the abuses of the use of the emblems. 
Article 38 AP I prohibits the improper use of the distinctive emblem of the red 
cross, red crescent or red lion and sun or of other emblems, signs or signals 
provided for by the Conventions or by this Protocol. In addition, Article 85 
specifies that the perfidious use of the distinctive emblem is a grave breach. This 
calls for concrete action by the States on domestic level. For example, every State 
Party has to enact disciplinary and criminal sanctions to punish those in breach 
of the obligations. Clearly, some purely administrative and organizational matters, 
such as having a sufficient stock of emblems, knowing exactly which establish-
ments to mark, and the like, must already be taken in peace time. 
 
Misuse of the emblem usually takes three main forms: 
• Imitation of the emblem and its use by unauthorized organizations; 
• Misuse of the emblem by doctors, pharmacies or commercial films; 
• Perfidious use of the emblem that jeopardizes the safety of medical services.528 
 
States have a duty to adopt national legislation imposing penalties for such acts. 
In particular, it is important to draw up legal provisions defining the emblem 
itself, the persons and objects it protects, lawful and unlawful use, and the persons 
who are authorized to use the emblem. In addition, an authority responsible for 
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monitoring respect for the emblem and for reporting misuse must be designated. 
Dissemination and promoting knowledge is an inherent part of these obligations. 
In Estonia, the Red Cross Designation and Emblem Act was passed 
05.04.2006 and entered into force 01.06.2006.529 The Act provides the domestic 
procedures for the use of the designation and emblem of the Red Cross and of 
other international designations and emblems, which convey the same meaning, 
and the liability that attaches to misuse of such designations and emblems. It 
rightly differentiates between the protective and indicative uses of the emblem. 
Punishments that are more stringent are foreseen for misuses during armed conflict, 
and in connection with the protective use of the emblem. For example, Article 13 
of the Red Cross Act states that “The misuse of the designation or the emblem of 
the Red Cross or other designations and emblems specified in section 4 of this 
Act or the use of a misleadingly similar designation or emblem, where such use 
does not occur during an armed conflict or in a state of war and may be related to 
the protective use of the designation or the emblem of the Red Cross or other 
designations and emblems specified in section 4 of this Act, is punishable by a 
fine of up to 300 fine units or by detention.“ Whereas, the grave breach provision 
in AP 1 Article 83 in matched by Article 105 of the Penal Code stipulating: 
“Exploitative abuse of an emblem or name of the red cross, red crescent or red 
lion and Sun or red crystal, or of a distinctive mark of a structure containing a 
camp of prisoners of war, a cultural monument, civil defence object or dangerous 
forces, or of the flag of truce, is punishable by a pecuniary punishment or up to 
three years’ imprisonment.” This distinction is a necessary and well-balanced one 
and illustrates the importance of this implementation measure. It is one important 
thing every State can do, to lay the groundwork for adequate protection for those 
that need it. 
 
 
Protection of medical and religious personnel 
Protection of the emblem and personnel are in principle two sides of the same 
coin. However, the latter is of utmost importance in conflict situations. 
Medical personnel require special respect and protection in the event of an 
armed conflict. They should be given assistance needed to fulfil their respon-
sibilities and should not be forced to perform tasks that are incompatible with 
their humanitarian mission.530 The first condition for ensuring protection is the 
identification of such personnel.531 
Medical personnel and religious personnel accompanying the armed forces 
shall wear, on their left hand, a distinctive waterproof bandage, issued and marked 
by the military authorities. In addition, they must be issued a special identification 
card, which is made of waterproof material and fits in a pocket (examples of such 
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cards are provided in the annexes to the Conventions and Protocols). It is important 
to note that the wristband must indeed be marked by the military authorities, 
otherwise it will not have the necessary legal status.532 This means that, for 
example, civilian hospitals or the Red Cross cannot issue such badges. 
Similarly, both stationary and mobile medical units must be respected and 
protected at all times. Each Party to the conflict shall endeavour to ensure that 
they are recognizable and, with the agreement of the authority concerned, identi-
fied by a distinctive sign.  
In Estonia, identification has been enshrined in the Red Cross Designation and 
Emblem Act. Article 6 (1) provides that the designation or the emblem is used 
protectively during an armed conflict or in a state of war to mark certain persons 
or property in a way that shows them to belong to persons or property protected 
under international law. Thus, all groups protected by the Conventions are covered. 
Under Article 102 of the Penal Code, attacks against protected persons are 
prohibited; Article 106 also prohibits attacks against non-military objects, which 
could be considered to cover objects marked with the emblem although not directly 
stating that. 
In Estonia, the practical importance of this duty is revealed in the identification 
of medical and religious personnel within the framework of foreign aid and military 
missions. 
 
 
3.4.2. National committees, national societies, 
and the Advisory Service 
National committees 
A number of States have established national committees or working groups on 
IHL bringing together national authorities, experts, and in some cases organi-
zations such as the National Red Cross or Red Crescent Society. The role and 
composition of these committees vary from country to country, but their general 
objective is supporting governments on matters relating to this body of law. While 
there is no legal obligation to establish such committees, experts on IHL find that 
they are valuable means of promoting national implementation.533 
In practice, in countries where they have been established, they have proved 
to be useful and appropriate means for facilitating the process of adoption of 
national legislation.534 Such committees only have an advisory role; none of them 
possesses decision-making or judicial powers. The bodies are usually comprised 
of ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defence and Justice and serve as valuable chan-
nels for dialogue between government officials and National Red Cross or Red 
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Crescent Societies.535 In 2018, the ICRC listed a total of 112 such committees, 
unfortunately one has not been established in Estonia.536 In Finland, for example, 
the Finnish National Committee for International Humanitarian Law was estab-
lished in 1993 and, among other things, is tasked to monitor new developments 
in IHL and assess their implications for Finland. This is a sensible idea, as it helps 
the government to assess which national implementation measures have to be 
taken or strengthened as the field of humanitarian law develops. 
 
National Societies 
Establishing National Red Cross Societies is governed by Article 26 of the First 
Convention and Article 2 (2) of the Statutes of the International Red Cross and 
Red Crescent Movement.537 According to the ICRC there are currently 191 such 
societies, which help educate the population on relevant issues, aid governments 
with disaster relief and help ensure respect for the Red Cross emblem and to 
cooperate within the entire Red Cross movement. National societies are thus 
given a rather large role. In peacetime, they should be active in many areas and 
encourage citizen involvement, and in wartime, act decisively together with state 
authorities and ICRC to assist victims. 
The National Red Cross was established in Estonia as early as 1919, on the 
basis of the 1864 and 1906 Conventions.538 The current definition can be found 
in the Red Cross Act Article 5: “The Estonian Red Cross is a voluntary associa-
tion which participates in the Red Cross Movement on behalf of Estonia and 
which has been admitted to the Red Cross Movement according to the Consti-
tution of the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies.”  
The Red Cross activities are mainly focused on crisis preparedness, first aid 
and youth work. In cooperation with the societies from neighbouring countries, 
work is being carried out on rising tuberculosis awareness, preparation of crisis 
management units; as well as the organization of first aid training, donation, dis-
semination of the principles of social work and humanitarian law. Several 
campaigns and fundraising events have been organized, and camps, trainings, 
information materials have been issued and assistance has been sent abroad.539 
In 2019–2020 the Red Cross is involved in the BALTPREP project. The 
objective of the BALTPREP project is to enhance regional preparedness and 
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response capacities in the Baltic Sea region to enable more effective and timely 
response to major accidents and disasters in the region. It improves and optimizes 
the quality and interoperability of the Red Cross regional response capacity for 
major accidents, and strengthens the collaboration between Red Cross National 
Societies and civil protection authorities within the Baltic Sea Region. The project 
includes: Finland, Denmark, Germany, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland.540 
The work of the Estonian Red Cross is in line with international obligations 
and is sufficiently organized. However, the Society fulfils a role of promoting 
overall health rather than implementing humanitarian law. ICRC sees national 
societies as performing almost all of the tasks discussed in this thesis, as this is 
where experts who can advise governments should work. The Estonian Red Cross 
probably does not have such importance today. A good example for comparison 
would be the Finnish and Polish Red Cross Societies, which have a very promi-
nent role in the societies there and are able to help and educate national societies 
in neighbouring countries.541 In conclusion, the role of the Estonian National 
Society should be increased, its scope and participation in the processes of imple-
mentation of humanitarian law extended. 
 
The Advisory Service 
The 1993 Conference for the Protection of War Victims called for the convening 
of an Intergovernmental Group of Experts to study practical means of promoting 
full respect for and compliance with humanitarian law.542 The Group of Experts 
met in Geneva in January 1995 and put forward a series of recommendations aimed 
at reinforcing respect for humanitarian law. These recommendations included the 
proposal that the ICRC should increase its technical assistance to States.543 
The ICRC responded quickly to the expert’s recommendations. By the time 
of the 26th International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent in 
December 1995, it was able to report the establishment of a new unit within its 
Legal Division, the Advisory Service on IHL, aimed at providing specialist legal 
advice to governments on national implementation.544 
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The Advisory Service is intended to supplement governments’ own resources 
by raising awareness of the need for implementing measures, providing specialist 
advice, and promoting the exchange of information between governments them-
selves.545 Their work encompasses advice on all legal and administrative measures, 
which States must take in order to comply with their obligations under IHL. It 
focuses in particular on those measures which all States are obliged or advised to 
take, regardless of whether they are currently parties to a conflict.546 
The Advisory Service has a number of means of pursuing its objective. Initial 
bilateral contacts between the Service and the relevant government authorities 
may be made through the local ICRC delegation, the National Red Cross or Red 
Crescent Society or the State’s diplomatic mission in Geneva. This may lead to 
bilateral discussions aimed at explaining the need to adopt implementing measures 
or providing more detailed advice.547 
The experts also recommended that the ICRC “collect, assemble and transmit” 
information on different implementation measures. To this end, the Advisory 
Service established a Documentation Centre at ICRC headquarters in 1995.548 
They manage a large database on national implementation measures reported to 
them by the States, or collected by the Service itself. The database can be searched 
both by the State and by topic. The aim of the Service is also to provide technical 
assistance, which might entail supporting translation of the humanitarian instru-
ments into different languages, carrying out studies of compatibility of the national 
law from the standpoint of humanitarian law, and giving ad hoc legal advice on 
legislation and regulations.549 Estonia has communicated a total of six legislative 
acts to the service, such as the Penal Code, Protection of War Craves Act and the 
Red Cross Designation and Emblem Act. 
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3.4.3. Action during armed conflicts 
For international armed conflicts the legal basis for ICRC action is regulated 
(among other provisions) by Common Articles 9, 10, 126 and 143. In non-inter-
national armed conflicts by Article 81, AP I. 
Article 5, paragraph 2(c) of the Statutes of the International Red Cross and 
Red Crescent Movement prescribes three categories of duties for the ICRC in 
armed conflicts: 1) to undertake the tasks incumbent upon it under the Conven-
tions, 2) to work for the faithful application of IHL applicable in armed conflicts 
and 3) to take cognizance of any complaints based on alleged breaches of that 
law.550 
The ICRC has a right, under Article 126 of the Third convention and Article 
143 of the Forth, to visit all places where POWs and civilian detainees are held. 
For example, in the eight-year war between Iran and Iraq, the ICRC was permitted 
to visit and record the names of some prisoners and to assist in the exchange of a 
few sick and wounded prisoners.551 More recently, the ICRC helped evacuate 
over 35000 civilians and fighters from East Aleppo.552 
Such access has to be negotiated with the authorities and has to take account 
of military interests. Once the ICRC has access, its treaty-based right of initiative 
authorizes it to undertake any humanitarian activity, with the consent of the parties 
to the conflict concerned.553 The scope of action is wide – requesting a temporary 
cease-fire to allow evacuation of the wounded, repatriation of wounded prisoners 
of war, creation of hospital and safety zones, protection of hospitals, and organi-
zation of relief convoys through front lines. 
If the law is being violated, the ICRC attempts to persuade the authority con-
cerned – the government and/or armed opposition group – that it should correct 
its behaviour. As a rule, the ICRC endeavours to build a constructive relationship 
with all those involved in the conflict. The concrete findings emanating from 
visits and missions are not usually available to the general public. However, if all 
its confidential representations fail to produce the desired results, the ICRC 
reserves the right to publicly denounce violations of humanitarian law.554 
Another activity based on humanitarian law is that of its Central Tracing 
Agency (CTA), which gives moral and practical support to people of concern for 
the ICRC and to their families. It helps to trace the wounded and dead, detainees, 
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civilians isolated in enemy-controlled territory, displaced people and refugees 
and unaccompanied children, and to reunite people with their families.555 
All authors writing on IHL agree that it has done a splendid job, making it far 
more difficult for prisoners to disappear into the “night and fog” and achieving a 
great deal by its quiet diplomacy. Without its activities, the catalogue of violations 
would undoubtedly be far greater.556 When faced with the dilemma of either 
remaining silent and being able to help the victims, or speaking out and not being 
able to alleviate their sufferings, the ICRC chooses the first approach.557  
It is clear then that in international conflicts, the ICRC has traditionally drawn 
the parties’ attention in a formal manner to the essential rules of IHL. It also has 
direct access to especially vulnerable people, a sine qua non in protection work.558 
In the case of an international armed conflict, most victims have the status of 
protected persons and States are under specific obligations both towards them and 
towards the ICRC, whereas the law applicable to internal conflicts does not 
impose those same constraints on the belligerents.559 Over the years, the ICRC has 
sought to develop the IHL of non-international armed conflict on numerous 
occasions, usually being ahead of the willingness of States in this regard.560 
The Common Article 3 provision may be considered to be a fairly weak basis 
for ICRC action. However, the Pictet’s Commentary considers it to be “of great 
moral and practical value” and to reflect a reduced version of the equivalent pro-
vision in the law of international armed conflict. It should be noted in this regard 
that the 1929 Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War “did not give the Com-
mittee any more definite basis of action; it was nevertheless sufficient during [the 
Second World] war to permit eleven thousand camp visits, to relieve millions of 
prisoners, and to transport and issue supplies worth 3,400 million Swiss francs in 
the camps”.561 
Therefore, the ICRC’s work is often carried out without a firm basis in the 
rules of IHL. Even limited ad hoc agreements often make it possible to save human 
lives or alleviate suffering during a conflict.562 It could be said that the organization 
often makes its case for IHL compliance, in what is best regarded as non-legal 
terms. The ICRC’s alternatives to “law talk” include a vast array of different 
arguments. For example, it could argue that changed behaviour will reduce the 
suffering of innocent victims of the conflict; will improve the target’s domestic 
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or international reputation; will improve the efficiency, discipline, or internal func-
tioning of the target’s armed or security forces; or is demanded by the customs 
and mores of the society.563 This is a good illustration of the multifaceted and 
multidisciplinary approach that should be taken towards implementation.  
The ICRC truly is the guardian of IHL, and works relentlessly towards its 
implementation. This can also be witnessed in many other paragraphs of this 
thesis, from the commentaries to the Conventions to contributing to the enforce-
ment mechanisms. As an attestation to the main argument of this thesis, the ICRC 
now focuses heavily on prevention activities and dialogue with armed groups, as 
well as making sure that the required national implementation measures are in 
place in every State. 
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4. ENSURING RESPECT THROUGH MECHANISMS AND 
BODIES OF SUPERVISION 
As illustrated, there are many means, methods, and bodies that are designed to 
ensure compliance with IHL. In this chapter, the focus will be on supervision 
mechanisms, i.e. those that are designed to ensure that before, during and after an 
armed conflict the provisions of IHL are properly observed. While we are not 
lacking in such mechanisms, there is a huge gap between what is prescribed by 
international law and the reality of armed conflicts. In fact, for many years the 
international community has relied almost entirely on one supervision method – 
the monitoring function of ICRC. Here I test one of the hypotheses put forward 
in the introduction. I argue that there are enough treaty based measures to enable 
a proper monitoring and supervision system, but the measures are just not used 
in practice. Being codified in the Conventions, they are in principle obligatory 
and there should be no legal obstacles in using them. 
The specific reasons behind the reluctance of using other mechanisms differs 
from case to case, but there are at least two reasons of a more general nature. The 
first one is that the system as a whole has been devised for international armed 
conflicts, while most of the conflicts after the Second World War were non-
international armed conflicts in which no supervision mechanisms (except the 
right of the ICRC to offer its services) are applicable under IHL provisions. The 
second reason is that IHL belongs to traditional interstate international law; there-
fore, its implementation is left to States. This needs a great deal of international 
cooperation and coordination as well as some flexibility of sovereignity. Unfor-
tunately, this cooperation-oriented approach is still lacking.564 
 
 
4.1. Supervision mechanisms 
Most of the existing monitoring compliance mechanisms are rather weak, or have 
not been used in practice. This led the ICRC to conduct a series of regional expert 
meetings in 2003 on the subject “Improving Compliance with International 
Humanitarian Law”. Proposals for new measures or mechanisms for improving 
respect for IHL included a system of either ad hoc or periodic reporting and the 
institution of an individual complaints mechanisms; the creation of a committee 
of States or of independent IHL experts to serve as a “Diplomatic Forum” for 
addressing situations of humanitarian law violations; and the establishment of an 
Office of a High Commissioner for IHL that could be created as a “treaty body” 
to the Conventions and Protocols.565 
Participants nonetheless expressed some concern that the general international 
atmosphere was not conductive to the establishment of new mechanisms. Despite 
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the rather limited effectiveness of existing mechanisms, a majority of the par-
ticipants felt that they were not defective, but rather suffered from lack of political 
will by States to use them.566 
Sandoz believes that monitoring the compliance of States with norms of inter-
national law, as a form of preventive diplomacy, is a major way of making inter-
national law more effective. The role and significance of enforcement mecha-
nisms, such as international arbitration, will increase, but the most effective 
instruments for promoting the effectiveness of international law are the various 
implementing, monitoring, or supervisory machinery and procedures.567 
During the drafting of the 1977 Protocols, the ICRC itself put forward various 
ideas for international supervision of parties involved in a conflict. Among the 
avenues suggested were potential roles for existing international and regional 
organizations, the establishment of an international commission on humanitarian 
law or the creation of an international court on IHL.568 Certain mechanisms of the 
UN could have a specific competence to deal with IHL (e.g. a specific subsidiary 
body of the Human Rights Council), a High Commissioner of IHL could exercise 
functions similar to those of the bodies for implementation of human rights, or a 
limited inter-state body could supervise the application of IHL, whether treaty- 
or resolution-based.569 The idea of setting up a body for the purpose of monitoring 
the application of IHL in armed conflicts or of entrusting this task to an existing 
body has been mooted on various occasions, however it was rejected by the 1974–
1977 Diplomatic Conference.570 
More recently, the idea was also rejected at the 2015 Geneva International 
Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, where after four years of extensive 
consultations, States were unable to agree on a new mechanism proposed by the 
ICRC and the government of Switzerland to strengthen compliance with IHL.571 
The new mechanism would have involved setting up an annual meeting of states 
party to the Geneva Conventions, which would serve as a non-politicized forum 
for them to share best practices and technical expertise.572 Even if consensus has 
not yet been found, all States reaffirmed that IHL remains the appropriate 
international legal framework for regulating the conduct of parties to armed 
conflict, and reiterated their willingness to work towards improving its imple-
mentation. Other mechanisms, such as the Universal Periodic Review (UPR), 
have proved to be feasible for sensitive matters on respect for human rights 
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norms. Recognizing the benefits of peer-pressure is an important way forward to 
ensure respect for IHL.573 
The current consultation process has no decision-making power, but a meeting 
of States has been supported as a “central pillar” of compliance initiatives, and 
“most States” agree that voluntary reporting on national practice in IHL, and a 
separate process for thematic discussion, “should be established”. A fact-finding 
function might be “added over time if there is State agreement”.574 
 
 
4.1.1. Reporting and monitoring 
Executive provisions of the Conventions create both individual and collective 
responsibility of all parties, thereto for ensuring their implementation. Thus, once 
implementation is found unsatisfactory, the responsibility of States parties extend 
to examining its improvements.575 To find implementation unsatisfactory a 
reporting and/or monitoring mechanism has to be in place. 
However, proposals to introduce an obligation for States to report to an inter-
national commission on the way national measures are applied have been rejected 
on many occasions.576 Drzewicki, nevertheless, holds that there is a prevailing 
view that potentials of extra-conventional instruments should be used, and that 
an essential aspect of a proposed arrangement would be that it has an exclusively 
voluntary character.577 
Sound arguments in favour of the reporting system stem from failures in 
implementing the law. With regard specifically to international law and its 
implementation within domestic legal systems, a failure in question seems to 
result from a set of complex and wide-ranging issues, which have accumulated 
in the course of decades.578 This was discussed in depth in the first chapter of this 
thesis. 
IHL has traditionally been a noticeably inter-state body of law, where checks 
and balances have been provided by common interests of belligerent States, rather 
than by international community considerations and international mechanisms of 
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monitoring and supervision. With the formation of the ICRC in 1863, the foun-
dation of a semi-official and semi-international monitoring mechanism was 
created.579 The 1949 Conventions and their AP I refer to the ICRC and give it the 
status of a protecting and partly monitoring body with respect to international 
(normally inter-state) armed conflicts. In particular, the delegates of the ICRC, 
under Article 126, paragraph 4, of Convention III of 1949, have the same right as 
representatives of Protecting Powers “to go to all places where prisoners of war 
may be”, and to be able to “interview prisoners of war without witnesses”.580 
 
 
4.1.1.1. Legal basis and historical background of the reporting mechanism 
As said, preference for a kind of reporting obligation by States Parties has been 
proposed and discussed on several occasions. Surprisingly, strong opposition on 
the part of some governments has ensured that such a solution, though worded as 
a modest obligation, had to be abandoned. However, instruments of IHL contain 
provisions revealing certain elements of a reporting-like duty. For example, 
States Parties have to communicate to one another, through the depositary, their 
official translation of the Conventions and Protocols as well as the laws and 
regulations adopted to ensure their application. In practice, States largely ignored 
their duty to transmit the texts of required instruments, and the depositary has 
been unable to undertake any corrective measures against conduct of States 
failing to fulfil the obligations in question.581 
Drzewicki believes that there is ample practical evidence that in a majority of 
States the degree of conformity of the existing national legislation implementing 
IHL is highly unsatisfactory. To alleviate this, IHL needs to be effectively inte-
grated into domestic legal systems, and such integration must be monitored on an 
international level.582 A first basis for such an arrangement exists in the Reso-
lution V of the 25th International Conference of the Red Cross (31.10.1986), 
which states in the preambular part that the “…very applicability of international 
humanitarian law depends largely upon the adoption of appropriate national 
legislation”.583 
Resolution V, paragraph 1 urges the Governments to fulfil their obligation to 
adopt or supplement the relevant national legislation, as well as to inform one 
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another of the measures taken or under consideration for this purpose. It is 
specified in paragraph 3 that both Governments and National Societies are to 
assume the position of report-senders on domestic legislation. It is important to 
note that implementation was not intended to mean the application process of 
IHL. Otherwise, Resolution V would have intruded in the sensitive issue of 
violations, and thus have most likely been met with a strong opposition.584 
With the adoption of this Resolution, a fundamental breakthrough was 
achieved for the potential strengthening of the national legislative dimension of 
implementation of IHL. The Resolution gave ICRC a wide mandate for arrange-
ment of national reporting with an international procedure for regular assessment 
of legislative information, although its potential remains “dormant” and has 
brought modest results.585 Even if States submit reports on domestic imple-
mentation voluntarily, such data is not really comparable as there is a lack of 
consistency and big differences in scope. Also, there is no review mechanism for 
the assessment of data submitted. Any further attempt to develop such mechanism 
should thus establish a concrete scope and review (possibly even infringement) 
procedures. 
In 1995, the meeting of Intergovernmental Group of Experts for the Protection 
of War Victims also discussed the issue and tried to take it further with a Dutch 
proposal. The proposal to establish a reporting system and an appropriate inter-
national review body was unacceptable for some governments. The experts 
finally adopted Recommendation VI, which provides for some elements of 
reporting. According to this, States “make every effort to participate in the fullest 
possible exchange of information on the measures that they have taken to imple-
ment their obligations under IHL instruments”.586 
Spieker holds that since there is an alarming degree of failure in enacting 
national legislation, an urgent need to remedy this has become self-evident. How-
ever, Resolution V and Recommendation VI constitute merely dormant oppor-
tunities according to her. “One may assume that there is a wide consensus about 
an imperative necessity to ensure compatibility of national legislation with IHL. 
If so, there should also be a conductive climate for making the reporting mecha-
nism a viable arrangement through a constructive dialogue”.587 
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A further attempt to establish a reporting system on a specific field – dis-
semination – was made during the 1974–1977 diplomatic conference. Drafting 
Article 83 of AP I on reporting was difficult. Following a proposal of the Con-
ference of Government Experts, the ICRC added a provision on regular reporting 
about dissemination not only to the depositary, but also to the ICRC. This provi-
sion, which “imposed only a very modest obligation” was met with surprisingly 
strong opposition. As far as paragraph 3 was concerned, some delegations found 
that “the compulsory submission of reports conflicted with the sovereignty of the 
High Contracting Parties”; others emphasized that it “placed excessive unilateral 
obligations on the High Contracting Parties” and even “constitutes some sort of 
unacceptable control over States”.588 Ultimately, paragraph 3 of Article 83 was 
deleted because of its mandatory formulation. 
Again, at the expert meeting on occupied territories (1998) two noteworthy 
suggestions emerged. First, the call for regular meetings of the Contracting 
Parties, which may make it possible to take up the idea of a reporting mechanism 
once again. Second, the invitation to quickly ratify the Statute of the ICC, the entry 
into force and implementation of which will substantially improve the effective-
ness of IHL.589 
The 2015 conference discussed this issue further. A resolution on strengthening 
compliance with IHL was adopted after a heated debate. The idea behind this 
resolution is the creation of a Forum of States to exchange information on imple-
mentation of IHL. The EU countries are strong supporters of this Forum, but, 
under the leadership of Russia, the result achieved at this conference was mediocre. 
The only thing that was agreed upon was to continue biannual consultations for 
the possible Forum and refer the issue to the 2019 ICRC conference.590 The latter 
conference will take place in December and is discussing, among others, a draft 
resolution titled “Bringing IHL home”, which once again addresses the issue of 
reporting, but in a wording that is sadly watered down even more than the previous 
one.591 
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4.1.1.2. Scope of the mechanism. What needs to be reported? 
One of the most crucial elements of the reporting system is the identification of 
substantive scope of reporting. In the absence of explicitly formulated treaty-duty 
to adopt national legislative instruments, it is very hard to point out which provi-
sions actually need such action. A possible selection criterion would be the non-
self-executing provisions of the Conventions. Thus, the substantive content of 
reports would be those provisions of humanitarian law, which require legislative 
action, because they are not formulated in a sufficiently precise and complete way 
to be directly applicable by domestic bodies. However, such a statement defines 
only a point of departure for a precise identification of provisions, calling for 
domestic legislative implementation.592 
In particular, focus should be centred on legislation to implement provisions 
regarding repression of violations of humanitarian law; provisions concerning 
protection of personnel and emblems of Red Cross and similar; provisions related 
to dissemination; provisions concerning states of emergency and other executive 
provisions. An extensive list of topics in this regard was drafted by the ICRC in 
1988 titled “Measures of Implementation (Indicative List)”.593 
Another question is whether States will exclusively or primarily report on the 
adoption of national implementation measures, or if they will additionally or 
primarily report on their compliance with substantive obligations under IHL. In 
addition, should a reporting system be regarded as efficient when reports by 
States are written and submitted to the respective organ, or should these reports 
be evaluated? What, then, could the reaction be to an established non-compliance 
by a State of its implementation and/or substantive duties?594 
Within the concept of IHL, the applicability of implementation and enforce-
ment obligations as primary peacetime activities is the general rule, and the 
applicability and application of substantive duties is the exception. Substantive 
rules are those that protect certain groups of persons. It follows that reports on 
implementation and enforcement measures are considerably less sensitive than 
reports on compliance with substantive obligations. On the other hand, the latter 
would be much more helpful for peer scrutiny and avoiding violations of the law. 
A reporting system on peace-time obligations under IHL would, however, 
help to create a consciousness and culture of implementation of obligations. 
States simply do not have a sufficient knowledge of the degree, extent or possible 
ways of national implementation. Spieker believes that this is the reason for a 
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considerably high rate of non-implementation, not the lack of political will to 
implement.595 
One option would be to focus on a specific topic in each reporting-cycle. This 
is done in many EU working group formats (i.e. reporting on the progress made 
on bringing national laws in conformity with EU standards). Examples could 
include prosecution of war crimes, protection of the emblem, legal advisers in 
armed forces, qualified personnel in IHL, dissemination, location and identification 
of protected objects, and national bodies dealing with implementation of IHL.596 
Such international dialogue would most likely result in a higher level of national 
implementation, as a peer-review process is designed ultimately to improve the 
situation not pass judgment. 
As said, it is the purpose of any reporting system not only to furnish some sort 
of information to an international control body, but also to lead to an internal and 
integrated discussion process. This process is to enable respective national 
authorities to assess States’ compliance with international law obligations.597 
 
 
4.1.1.3. Possible shape of reporting mechanism. 
How the reporting should be done? 
The peace-time obligations of national implementation and enforcement are 
permanent duties, and could therefore be reported regularly in a set time-frame, 
and a non-permanent evaluating body would likely be sufficient for their review.598 
In consequence, States would submit their reports to a non-permanent evaluating 
body, which would, after its initial evaluation (and maybe a follow-up) provide 
transparency and publicity in a plenary organ, serving the further purpose of 
improving the implementation of IHL at the national level.599 
On the other hand, there is the theoretical possibility of national reports on a 
State’s actual behaviour in international and non-international armed conflicts, 
i.e. on the compliance with substantive duties of the Conventions and Protocols. 
In this case, ad hoc reporting would be needed. The main purpose of reports on 
such an ad hoc basis would be to assure compliance with the substantive humani-
tarian law obligations by the State in question. For this, a formal type of moni-
toring mechanism and evaluating body would be needed, one which would be in 
the position to draw conclusions from established non-compliances.600 It would 
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then be for next cycles to request further legislative information to fulfil gaps and 
omissions of earlier reports.601 
Experience of HRL treaty-based bodies has demonstrated that an effective 
impact on domestic legislation may best be exerted through a regular reporting, 
expertise in assessment of conformity of national legislation with international 
treaty obligations, and an interaction between a report-sender and report-recipient. 
For IHL, a specialized body (Commission of Experts) should be established to 
deal with substantive assessment of submitted reports. This could also offer 
advisory legal services and draft model legislative acts. Within the context of 
IHL, the ICRC has effectively assumed such role and tried to help States and non-
state actors in their efforts. 
Spieker holds that the reporting system should comprise a plenary organ (the 
International Red Cross Conference) and a separate evaluating body. The 
evaluation of State reports should possibly include an encouragement of the 
reporting State to improve any possible deficits in implementation, enforcement 
and criminal prosecution measures. The body of initial evaluation could consist 
of independent experts, governmental experts, ICRC staff and national societies 
as observers.602 
If the ICRC Conference were the final recipient of these reports, it would be 
logical to have a reporting period of 4–5 years. It is conceivable that the Con-
ference would decide upon the basic principles of the reporting system as a 
demonstration of consensus, whereas the Assembly of the ICRC would be 
responsible for the enactment of more detailed guidelines for the procedures.  
After reporting, a systematization of information collection and the evaluation 
dialogue could be foreseen by an expert group. As a result, conclusions and 
recommendations could be adopted by the Committee, which are then first sent 
to the State for comments, and then rendered public. A public document on the 
caps in implementation could be a powerful tool to foster compliance.603 As said, 
a similar process is used in many other fields of law and has proven very useful. 
For example, there are the Universal Periodic Reviews by the UN on the situation 
of human rights issues described in the next sub-chapter. 
Luigi Condorelli and Laurence Boisson de Chazournes have suggested solu-
tions that are more comprehensive. Having accepted that implementation of the 
obligation to “nationalize”, IHL deserves the greatest attention – they attribute 
particular significance to an opportunity for the ICRC to conceive and programme 
a constant and generalized verification of States’ performance of their duty to 
take internal legislative actions. They further suggest that as a follow-up to such 
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verification procedures the ICRC might exert appropriate pressures on each State 
to remedy the possible defects of its own legal order.604 
 
 
4.1.1.4. Examples 
It took some time for the ICRC to reflect upon a more concrete modus operandi 
to be adopted for following up Resolution V. After a year and a half, the ICRC 
contacted, by letters of 28 April 1988, the States Parties to the Conventions and 
the National Societies. The letters contained a request to submit the relevant 
information on national legislative measures to implement IHL and replies were 
requested within six months. The ICRC reported that by 30 June 1989 only 
twenty-six replies from States Parties and fifteen from the National Societies 
were received. The preliminary examination of the replies by the ICRC indicated 
quite poor quality compared with what had been requested.605 
A couple of examples on reporting can be given here. The 1963 to 1969 
procedure of repression of violations of the Conventions and the 1977 to 1981 
reporting on the use of the emblem. The legal basis of the former was Resolution 
VI stemmed from the ICRC Council of Delegates. Only 49 reports were sub-
mitted, and no particular follow-up actions were taken. In the latter case, the 
ICRC initiated consultations of all National Societies, received 55 answers, and 
extended its activities to a follow-up action offering both comments on the 
existing legislation and a series of detailed guidelines on regulations that should 
be adopted by States.606 
States can choose to voluntarily send the ICRC a periodic overview of their 
implementing actions. In 1998, Estonia submitted a report on all implementation 
measures foreseen in the Conventions (from the legal point of view). This gave 
the country a good overview of where the caps are and what needs to be 
improved.607 A public seminar was organized at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
to introduce the report and draw attention on the importance of IHL. The report 
served as a basis for an academic follow up study that I conducted 10 years later 
and published as a master’s thesis. However, the 1998 report remains the first, 
and only one, on implementing IHL in Estonia to this day, and is very hard to 
retrieve from any public source. It seems, therefore, that submitting these reports 
depends largely on the enthusiasm of some government officials. 
A more recent and agreeable example is the voluntary report by the UK from 
2019, led by the UK National Committee on International Humanitarian Law. It 
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comes in the form of a colourful booklet – which looks more like a commercial 
material than an official report – but is a very welcome contribution nevertheless. 
“The report is in the form of a short questionnaire, divided into five sections: 
(i) general 3 domestic implementation, (ii) dissemination and training, and access 
to legal advice, (iii) violations of IHL under national criminal law, (iv) protections, 
and (v) means and methods of warfare. The question and answer format seeks to 
provide a record of the UK’s implementation in an accessible way to anyone with 
an interest in IHL matters.”608 By submitting this report, the UK has illustrated 
its commitment to ensuring respect for IHL, and hopefully will encourage other 
States to follow its lead. 
As an interesting analogue, the UN Human Rights Council has introduced a 
Universal Periodic Review (UPR) system. This mechanism provides for a review 
of the human rights situation in each of the 192 UN Member States. However, 
with the GA Resolution 60/251, IHL was also clearly incorporated into the UPR 
machinery. Depending on the expertise of States, and the efforts and attention 
paid to IHL, the review of compliance with IHL under the UPR mechanism will 
become more comprehensive, adding another opportunity to address shortcomings 
concerning IHL enforcement on the part of States.609 
IHL has been touched upon on several occasions in the review process in cases 
where the country in question was involved in an armed conflict.610 At the 74th 
session of the Human Rights Council the following countries were reviewed: 
Angola, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Egypt, El Salvador, Fiji, Iraq, 
Kazakhstan, Madagascar and the Gambia.611 This system could also be explored 
further to further monitoring and reporting of IHL. 
 
 
4.1.1.5. Possible improvements 
Although the proposed mechanism is to be of a legally non-binding character, it 
should nevertheless be clear that it can be placed in close proximity to the already 
established obligation of States. On the one hand, States are under the obligation 
to enact necessary legislation and, on the other, to communicate to one another 
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the texts of relevant legal instruments. Neither obligation has been supplemented 
by any special rule enabling the supervision of their effective realization.612 
Dutli stated in 1999 that there are many States which have no legislation or 
inadequate legislation in this regard. At that time, she held (supported by the 
ICRC) that it is premature to establish a reporting system, even if it is on a 
voluntary basis. Many States would have no concrete information to submit to 
such a system, and there is a risk that only those States which already have a high 
level of implementation would submit reports.613 While this might have been the 
case 20 years ago, it should not hinder the aspirations to establish a reporting 
system today. The major consultation processes of the last decade prove that the 
idea of a reporting system is not premature anymore, and definitely not because 
of the lack of information, which by now is abundant. Most States agree to some 
type of reporting system, but there are unfortunately a few big powers against it. 
Writing in 1999, Bothe proposed the creation of an International Humanitarian 
Law Implementation Information Exchange System (IIES) that would still be 
non-confrontational. The purpose must be to ensure a smooth functioning of IHL 
in the difficult moment of application, i.e. in times of armed conflict, by preparing 
a normative, political and even cultural support system for that application already 
in peacetime. The creation of a reporting or similar system would be part of 
modernizing the relatively old treaty regime of the Conventions, bringing that 
regime in line with the current constitution of the international system.614 
According to Caflisch, a treaty system could be set up under which each con-
tracting State would be required to report in regular intervals on implementation 
on the domestic level, so as to make it possible to detect, abate and, possibly, 
sanction non-compliance. Under the system, contracting States might also present 
alleged cases of non-compliance before a treaty organ to obtain a condemnation 
and, possibly, some form of redress. Treaty bodies could further be entrusted with 
the competence to proceed to announced or even unannounced inspections.615 
This kind of system would truly contribute to better implementation of IHL, but 
is still quite hard to achieve. 
However, success is not absolutely beyond reach as is illustrated by similar 
cases in other fields of international law. For example, the creation of ICC that 
was unsuccessfully promoted by the International Law Commission for years or 
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the Ottawa Process that managed to ban anti-personnel mines despite it looking 
impossible and undesirable at first.616 With sufficient perseverance and fortunate 
timing, the proponents of the reporting system could well succeed. This will be 
seen very shortly at the next ICRC Conferences.  
 
 
4.1.2. Protecting Powers 
Upon the outbreak of an international armed conflict, it is not uncommon for the 
warring States to suspend or terminate diplomatic contact. In such situations, 
“Protecting Powers” may be appointed to safeguard the interests of one State in 
the other, and to serve as an intermediary between the two States.617 
A Protecting Power is traditionally a neutral State mandated by a belligerent 
State to protect its interests and those of its nationals’, vis-à-vis an enemy State. 
Its role is twofold: it can conduct relief and protection operations in aid of victims, 
and can at the same time supervise the belligerents’ compliance with their legal 
undertakings.618 According to Article 5, paragraph 1, of AP I it is the duty of the 
parties to a conflict “to secure the supervision and implementation of the Con-
ventions and of this Protocol by the application of the system of Protecting 
Powers”. The Conventions also provide for the possibility of a conciliation pro-
cedure also involving the Protecting Powers, if there is disagreement between the 
belligerent States as to the application of interpretation of the Conventions.619 
 
 
4.1.2.1. Historical background 
Analogues of this institute date back to the 16th century, when only the great Powers 
had the financial means to maintain embassies and in order to make sure that their 
nationals were given protection, smaller States agreed to entrust this task to other 
States.620 
Protecting Powers played an important part in applying these Conventions 
during the First World War, by virtue of an international custom recognized to 
varying extents. Their task was by no means always easy, and States wanted to 
see the institution mentioned in a Convention. Therefore, a new framework for 
the implementation of humanitarian norms, called “control” (changed to “scrutiny” 
in 1949) emerged in the context of prisoners of war. According to Abi-Saab, “It 
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was a preventive/corrective technique aiming at establishing an early warning 
system of potential violations. The third party, through periodic verifications, 
could draw the attention of the detaining power to situations where the treatment 
of the prisoners of war fell below the prescribed standards. /…/ The encouraging 
results of this new technique led to its codification in the 1929 Geneva Prisoners 
of War Convention, where both the role of the Protecting Powers and the ICRC 
were recognized”.621 
However, the article only recognized “a possibility of collaboration” between 
Protecting Parties, and thus did not go very far. The choice of delegates of the 
Protecting Power was subject to the consent of the Detaining Power. Although 
the article was widely applied during the Second World War, it proved imperfect 
on several respects. There were no treaty-based provisions authorizing the 
Protecting Powers to act on behalf of enemy civilians or take action in occupied 
territory.622 When the conflict spread, the few States remaining neutral had to 
agree to act as Protecting Powers for more than one country, including adverse 
Parties. They thus tended to become a kind of arbitrator, a role that was not origi-
nally envisaged. In such conflicts the lack of Protecting Powers was cruelly felt 
by civilians in enemy hands.623 
The above mentioned difficulties prompted the ICRC, when it initiated pre-
parations for the adoption of new Conventions in the aftermath of the Second 
World War, to direct its focus to three points: the extension to all the Conventions 
of the principle of supervision by the Protecting Power; arrangements for the 
replacement of Protecting Powers no longer able to act; and making supervision 
obligatory.624 Achieving all of these objectives proved a difficult task. 
 
 
4.1.2.2. Legal basis 
Originally, the duties of the Protecting Power were to act as agent for the appointing 
power and to deal with complaints. Nowadays the duties are laid down in the GCs 
and AP I, including general supervisory duties. Only the Wounded Convention 
allows the activities of the protecting power to be restricted. This is because that 
convention is primarily concerned with battlefield activities, where there may be 
valid security reasons for restricting the activities of agents of the protecting 
power.625 
The legal basis of today’s Protecting Powers system derives from Article 8 of 
Convention I and Article 5 of Protocol I. 
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Article 8 GC I provides in relevant part: 
 
The present Convention shall be applied with the cooperation and under the 
scrutiny of the Protecting Powers whose duty it is to safeguard the interests of 
the Parties to the conflict. For this purpose, the Protecting Powers may appoint, 
apart from their diplomatic or consular staff, delegates from amongst their own 
nationals or the nationals of other neutral Powers. The said delegates shall be 
subject to the approval of the Power with which they are to carry out their 
duties.626 
 
An alternative for such Powers is provided in Common Article 10/10/10/11: 
 
If protection cannot be arranged accordingly, the Detaining Power shall request 
or shall accept, subject to the provisions of this Article, the offer of the services 
of a humanitarian organization, such as the ICRC, to assume the humanitarian 
functions performed by Protecting Powers under the present Convention. 
 
At the 1974–1977 Conference, an attempt was made to make the Protecting 
Power system both mandatory and default proof. As it stands now, Article 5 
requires that the parties to an armed conflict have the duty, from the very beginning 
of the conflict, to ensure the supervision and implementation of the Conventions 
and Protocol I by applying the system of Protecting Powers. In addition, the 
Protocol lays down detailed procedures to facilitate the designation and acceptance 
of Protecting Powers. If all these fail, the ICRC or any other organization may 
offer to act as a substitute, which the belligerent parties “shall accept without 
delay.”627 Improvement was envisaged by a considerably longer Article 5 of 
Protocol I, however. 
Nevertheless, the new article has been called both “the triumph of sovereignty” 
and a “story of initial success and ultimate failure”.628 The opening words of 
paragraph I display the former: 
 
It is the duty of the Parties to a conflict from the beginning of that conflict to 
secure the supervision and implementation of the Conventions and of this 
Protocol by the application of the system of Protecting Powers, including ‘inter 
alia’ the designation and acceptance of those Powers, in accordance with the 
following paragraphs. Protecting Powers shall have the duty of safeguarding 
the interests of the Parties to the conflict. 
 
The crucial words “in accordance with the following paragraphs” display the 
latter. In the other paragraphs of the Article, we find the need for the consent of 
both of the belligerents and, in paragraph 3, of the proposed Protecting Power. In 
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a case where the ICRC may make an offer to act, as a substitute, in the absence 
of a Protecting Power, it must be accepted without delay by the Parties to the 
conflict. Moreover, the ICRC made it clear during the conference that it could not 
promise that it would always be in position to make such an offer. The UN for its 
part made it clear that it would not be willing to act as an international standing 
Protecting Power.629 
Sandoz notes that the rather complicated series or provisions contained in this 
article has never been used; in practice this role has been taken over by the ICRC. 
Exactly on what grounds has not been clearly established.630 The question 
remains as to the effect of Article 5 of the Protocol upon the existing provisions 
of the Protecting Powers in the Conventions. For States Parties to the Protocol 
and the Conventions, the former “supplements” the latter. Only States Parties to 
the Conventions may become Parties to the Protocol. The effect may be that in 
relation to the role of the ICRC as a substitute for a Protecting Power, any advance 
made by the Conventions in Common Articles 10/10/10/11, paragraph 3, is 
negatived by Article 5 (4) of the Protocol, controlling the role of the ICRC as a 
substitute.631 
Therefore, in theory the system as it stands now is obligatory. However, the 
delegates of the Protecting Powers “shall be subject to the approval of the Power 
with which they are to carry out their duties” and the impossibility of agreement 
on this point cannot be ruled out. 
 
 
4.1.2.3. The main elements and purpose of the system 
Arguably, the most effective deterrent to the commission of war crimes in inter-
national armed conflicts is the presence of observers who can scrutinize the per-
formance of the parties to the conflict, complain to a party about perceived 
violations of legal norms, and report such violations to the aggrieved party.632 
As established, the parties to the conflict have the duty to appoint Protecting 
Powers, which safeguard their interests and has to implement humanitarian law 
by supervision, inspection, assistance, and transmissions. It has the right to 
inspect prisoner-of-war camps, to assist in judicial proceedings, to deliver notes 
to the belligerents, and to render good offices. Through a Protecting Power, a 
kind of neutral supervision is created, even though the Protecting Power is 
obliged to advocate the interests of the party to the conflict that it represents.633 
Kalshoven believes that “A close scrutiny of the provisions of the Geneva 
Conventions shows that the supervised implementation of a large part of their 
humanitarian provisions devolves upon the Protecting Power. Without it, the 
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The “co-operation and scrutiny” of the Protecting Powers has in practice 
assumed the character of management of interests and mediation. For example, 
when their delegates become aware that prisoners of war are suffering from bad 
housing conditions or lack of food, it is their job to seek an improvement of the 
situation. On the other hand, it is not the task of Protecting Powers to act as a 
public prosecutor, investigating and exposing violations of the Conventions. 
Kalshoven wittily points out that if they would embark on such a course of action, 
they would soon find themselves discharged of their functions.635 
The Protecting Power is also given significant oversight functions with respect 
to relief shipments for prisoners of war, the conduct of judicial proceedings 
involving prisoners of war, and the resolution of any disputes between the Parties 
to the conflict. Cassesse holds that although the Protecting Power aims to protect 
the interests of the parties, it is also a mechanism that may be activated in order 
to contribute to the enforcement of IHL.636 As such, the system has elements of 
both implementation and enforcement. 
In reality, the ICRC has carried out this role in most conflicts. Its representa-
tives have carried out various humanitarian and monitoring tasks provided for in 
the Conventions; even in cases where protecting powers have been appointed to 
look after certain interests of the belligerents.637 In fact, some authors find that 
the option of employing Protecting Powers cannot realistically be considered 
functional today (if ever), and notwithstanding the potential role of other humani-
tarian organizations, the reference to the ICRC is crucial.638 
One difference between the mode of acting of a Protecting Power and a sub-
stitute such as the ICRC is that, while the former is obliged to safeguard in par-
ticular the interests of the Party to the conflict it represents, the emphasis in 
respect of the substitute is on its impartiality. For an organization like the ICRC, 
it is evident that it will focus first and foremost on the interests of the victims of 
the conflict.639 
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monitoring system for implementation is largely threadbare and implementation 
is left to the good faith of the belligerent and the force of reciprocity.”  
However, there are at least two factors that have weakened the system. First, 
neutrality is neither widespread nor appreciated anymore. The number of neutral 
States willing to act as Protecting Powers and are acceptable to one or other bel-
ligerent is limited. Second, the functioning of the system requires a threefold con-
sensus by the three States concerned, each of which can bring its sovereignty to 
prevent the system from being effective.634 
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4.1.2.4. Examples 
As said, although the 1929 provision did not place any obligations on the High 
Contracting Parties, it proved extremely useful during the Second World War, 
when most of the belligerents called upon the services of a Protecting Power. 
Switzerland, for instance, performed this function simultaneously for up to 35 
States.640 Earlier, in the Winter War between Finland and the USSR, a Finnish 
request for such appointment was refused by its opponent.641 
Shortly after the end of the Second World War, Switzerland unilaterally 
renounced its safeguarding of German interests in view of the disappearance of 
the Reich Government. Similarly, Switzerland refused to safeguard certain 
Japanese interests because it no longer enjoyed free communication with the 
Japanese Government, which was controlled by the Allied Powers at the time. 
These two examples show that, at least in Swiss practice, a Protecting Power’s 
purpose depends on having a mandate from a government.642 
Protocol I was negotiated soon after the end of the war in Vietnam, and its 
provisions were certainly influenced by experiences of that war. The US tried its 
best during the Vietnam War to convince North Vietnam to accept a Protecting 
Power. At the beginning of 1966, the US even obtained the consent of Egypt to 
serve in that capacity, although Vietnam would not agree.643 
In practice, the various formal provisions for the role of Protecting Powers 
have been of little use after the Second World War, because States in conflict 
with each other have almost always been unwilling or unable to agree on the 
appointment of such powers. This might also result from a fear that the desig-
nation of a Protecting Power will be seen as recognition of the other Party or 
unwillingness to admit that an armed conflict exists. Yet, there have been some 
cases in practice where they were used, for example, in the 1971 Indian-Pakistan 
War and in the 1982 Falklands War.644 However, their neutrality has been said to 
be “at best questionable”, as they were generally picked by only one party and 
focused on securing political interests rather than on the protection of individuals. 
The Protecting Power system does not apply to non-international armed con-
flicts in the strict sense. Conceivably it could apply, as a neutral State may be able 
to carry out the role on behalf of the armed group. The parties could also be 
persuaded to accept some form of international intervention. There is one ancient 
instance of this in practice. During the Boer war (1899–1902), at the request of 
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the British Government, the US Consul in Pretoria took charge of Britain’s 
interests in the Transvaal Republic and Orange Free State.645  
In addition, Common Article 3(2) expressly refers to the right of “an impartial 
humanitarian body, such as the ICRC to offer its services to the Parties to the 
conflict”. AP II Article 18 also refers to relief actions for the civilian population 
but, while referring to national relief societies and national Red Cross and Red 
Crescent organizations, avoids mentioning the ICRC.646 Despite these short-
comings in treaty law, the ICRC has been able to carry out humanitarian activities, 
including certain monitoring functions, in a number of non-international armed 
conflicts as well as situations of internal disturbances and tensions.647 
 
 
4.1.2.5. Potential improvements 
A Protecting Power has no formal sanctions with which to require compliance, 
but its supervision can help to prevent violations and the threat of publicity, which 
its presence creates, can be a powerful informal weapon.648 
Increased use of the Protecting Power system would undoubtedly lead to a 
greater degree of compliance with the law, if only because many violations seem 
to be the product of neglect rather than deliberate State policy and are thus less 
likely to occur if there is some form of outside scrutiny.649 Just like the reporting 
mechanism mentioned in the previous sub-chapter. 
However, the institution has, at best, played a marginal role as a monitoring 
and supervisory mechanism. In practice, the Protecting Powers system has not 
been used in recent years. Instead, the ICRC has come to be recognized as a 
substitute for the Protecting Power.650 
Indeed, the contrast between the law and practice is striking. The Protecting 
Powers system was designed to be a ‘crucial part of the law’, and ‘[t]he corner-
stone of the system of implementation’.651 Since the Second World War, this 
system has very rarely been set in motion, leading Pfanner to believe that the 
chances of its being used successfully in future are slim, given the politically 
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delicate role a State would have to play to discharge its responsibilities as a Pro-
tecting Power.652 Seemingly, practice since 1949 has evolved to the point of con-
sidering the appointment of Protecting Powers as optional in nature. This does 
not preclude, however, that Protecting Powers may still be appointed in future 
international armed conflicts on the basis of Article 8.653 
Whenever an international armed conflict occurs, the parties involved should 
be pressed to designate protecting powers, as required by the Conventions and 
Protocol I. Refusal to agree to a protecting power should be treated as a serious 
violation of the Conventions.654 This should be done hand in hand with the 
reporting and monitoring obligation of States. 
 
  
4.1.3. Fact-Finding and enquiry 
As a conflict gets under way, the opposing propaganda machines start working at 
full capacity and allegations of misconduct will emerge. It is a well-known adage 
that the first victim of war is the truth.655 To remedy this, the Conventions also 
provide for the possibility of an enquiry procedure concerning alleged violations 
of the Conventions.656 However, the manner of the enquiry, including the possible 
choice of an umpire, must be agreed between the interested parties. This pro-
cedure has apparently never been used. The ICRC has in some instances been asked 
by one of the parties to a conflict to investigate allegations of breaches but consent 
from the other party has been lacking.657 
Bothe holds that certainty about actual facts is a first step in ensuring com-
pliance with an obligation and describes the course of fact-finding procedure by 
a common scheme: initiation (suspicion/unilateral claim, routine); determination 
of a mandate; taking evidence (problem of access and reliability); evaluating 
evidence; statements of facts (report, judgment); reaction.658 
Fact-finding in a narrow sense, also called “inquiry”, may constitute a specific 
separate or self-contained procedure. However, it serves a purpose to settle dis-
putes and create trust in another actor’s behaviour as well. Where fact-finding is 
used within the context of measures taken to monitor and ensure compliance with 
                                                                                                 
652  Pfanner, “Various mechanisms”, supra nota 246, p 287. 
653  Cameron, et al, “The updated”, supra nota 61, p 1223. 
654  Aldrich, “Compliance with the law”, supra nota 7, pp 8–9. 
655  Rogers, Law on the battlefield, supra nota 106, p 354. 
656  Articles 52/53/132/149. The provision draws upon Art 30 of the Convention for the 
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armies in the Field 1929. 
657  Rosas, “International Monitoring Mechanisms”, supra nota 579, pp 227–228; Pictet, Hu-
manitarian law, supra nota 80.  
658  Michael Bothe, „Fact-finding as a means of ensuring respect for international humani-
tarian law“ – Wolff Heintsechel von Heinegg & Volker Epping (eds), International 
humanitarian law facing new challenges: Symposium in honor of Knut Ipsen (Berlin, Springer 
2007) 249–267, p 249. 
158 
a treaty regime (so-called “verification”) its purpose is to detect violations, deter 
violations and to create confidence.659 
Fact-finding as a self-contained procedure has to be distinguished from pro-
cedures for ascertaining facts that are part of other dispute settlement procedures, 
in particular international conciliation or judicial proceedings.660 Greenwood 
rightly points out that fact-finding should not be seen as a form of international 
adjudication or arbitration, in which a tribunal investigates, hears arguments, and 
then gives a judgment that binds the parties. In addition, he suggests that it would 
be more accurate to see fact-finding missions as part of the diplomatic process, 
rather than adjudicatory.661 
Nevertheless, States may also create permanent bodies to ascertain relevant 
facts. A body of this type is the International Humanitarian Fact-Finding Com-
mission (IHFFC) established pursuant to Article 90 of AP I. 
 
 
4.1.3.1. Legal basis 
Article 52, Convention I provides: 
At the request of a Party to the conflict, an enquiry shall be instituted in a 
manner to be decided between the interested Parties, concerning any alleged 
violation of the Convention. 
If agreement has not been reached concerning the procedure for the enquiry, 
the Parties should agree on the choice of an umpire who will decide upon the 
procedure to be followed. 
Once the violation has been established, the Parties to the conflict shall put an 
end to it, and shall repress it with the least possible delay.662 
 
The special rules in Articles 52/53/132 and 149 therefore provide for the creation 
of an enquiry procedure upon the request of one party to a conflict. Although the 
ICRC Commentary has always seen this provision as binding, the enquiry proce-
dure provided in the Conventions has never been used successfully, principally 
due to the lack of automaticity in bringing the fact-finding procedure into force.663 
The general provision of IHL in article 52 GC I is not a very strongly phased 
provision, nor one that is likely to overcome the very considerable obstacles in 
the way of such procedures in the heated exigencies of actual armed conflict. A 
provision that is much more detailed is now found in article 90 of 1977 AP I.664  
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At the 1974–1977 Geneva Diplomatic Conference a permanent International 
Enquiry Commission was proposed to investigate alleged violations of the Con-
ventions. After lengthy discussions it proved possible to form such a commission, 
designated the International Fact-Finding Commission. The price that had to be 
paid for this novelty, which many States viewed with suspicion, was that the 
applicability of Art 90, as a “miniature convention”, was made dependent on 
separate acts of State consent.665 The aim of the article was to systematize the 
enquiry process and to help prevent polemics and violence from escalating during 
a conflict. 
 
 
4.1.3.2. Historical background 
The concept of an enquiry procedure as a means to resolve diverging views 
among States was not new in 1949. It was introduced into a multilateral treaty for 
the first time with the adoption of the 1899 Hague Convention (I). The procedure 
was later considerably developed when the Convention was amended in 1907. In 
this latter version, the Hague Convention recommends the establishment of an 
“International Commission of Enquiry” to facilitate the solution of disputes of an 
international nature that may arise from “a difference of opinion on points of 
facts”. Such Commission must be instituted by special agreement between the 
States concerned, and its conclusions must be limited to a statement of facts, 
leaving to these States “entire freedom as to the effect to be given to the state-
ment”.666 This body is created ad hoc, and both parties have to agree beforehand. 
When the Protocols were negotiated in 1974–1977, apart from dissemination, 
the attention of the negotiators of the Protocols concentrated on two traditional 
instruments already found in the Conventions: The Protecting Powers and 
inquiry. The negotiators wanted to improve the situation by eliminating the need 
to establish the inquiry body ad hoc by a special compromise, a need which might 
account for the non-use of the inquiry procedure found in the Conventions since 
1929.667 
Thus, it was proposed to create a standing commission. The proposals which 
were made, however, went far beyond what is now in Article 90. It was proposed 
to create a body with obligatory monitoring functions which it could even trigger 
on its own initiative.668 This was bitterly opposed by a number of delegations. 
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Even a general obligation to accept an inquiry initiated at the request of a State 
party was not acceptable. The compromise was to adopt a copy of the optional 
clause of Article 36 of the Statute of ICC.669 
 
 
4.1.3.3. Role of different bodies 
There are four different types of institutions or bodies engaged in ascertaining 
facts: States; organs established in common by two or more States; inter-govern-
mental organizations and non-governmental organizations. 
A State where relevant facts have taken place can start a unilateral fact-
finding, often in a post conflict situation, as part of a process of re-establishing 
normalcy. Whether this clarification process leads to any criminal prosecution is 
a question which varies from case to case (examples include the commissions of 
truth in Sierra Leone, Guatemala and El Salvador).670 
Secondly, fact-finding can be used as a means of dispute settlement between 
States. A procedure for ascertaining facts is created on the basis of an agreement 
between the parties to a dispute. If there is a preceding agreement providing for 
such a procedure, it is possible for one party to unilaterally trigger the process. If 
not, there must be an ad hoc agreement between the parties. The result of such 
“inquiry” procedures is usually a statement of the facts.671 
The ICRC can perform certain fact-finding role within the context of its pro-
tection activities. And GCs III and IV provide for specific enquiries to be carried 
out by the Detaining Powers in cases of prisoners of war or civilian detainees 
killed or injured in special circumstances.672 
Fact-finding by the ICRC serves two purposes – firstly, it is needed to assess 
the needs of different kinds of victims. In this respect, it is an important prelimi-
nary measure for relief operations. Secondly, it is part of the activities of the 
ICRC to ensure compliance with IHL. It is only where access is consistently 
denied or where violations observed by the ICRC are not stopped that the ICRC 
goes public and uses the general transparency as a means to induce compliance.673 
The ICRC has been hesitant to become actively involved in enquiry procedures, 
fearing that its impartiality may be jeopardized. 
The role of different bodies varies greatly. The ICJ states in a legally binding 
way violations of international law and awards damages for these violations (e.g. 
in the Nicaragua and Congo cases after an extensive fact-finding). The ICC has 
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its own procedure of investigation which is in the hands of the Office of the Prose-
cutor. The SC can trigger an array of measures after fact-finding relating to vio-
lations of IHL. Fact finding is indeed a major tool for a better implementation and 
enforcement of IHL, yet it has become multifaceted and complex.  
 
 
4.1.3.4. The permanent Fact-Finding Commission 
According to the Conventions the International Fact-Finding Commission shall 
be established when not less than 20 High Contracting Parties have agreed to 
accept the competence of the Commission by issuing a special declaration in 
accordance with paragraph 2 of article 90. The twentieth declaration was made in 
1990 and the fifteen members of the Commission were elected in 1992.674 The 
Commission met subsequently to adopt its Rules of Procedure. As of 2019, 76 
States had accepted the competences of the Commission. No formal request for 
an enquiry was made for decades. Instead, the UNSC has established ad hoc 
mechanisms for investigating and taking action regarding violations. Some 
authors have thus argued that the SC has seemingly become the master of collec-
tive security, and apparently is about to take over, step by step, the responsibility 
for the administration of humanitarian law.675 
The creation of the Fact-Finding Commission has been applauded, and a lot 
was hoped from to come from it. Aldrich writes: “I cannot stress too strongly the 
potential importance of this development for the improvement of compliance 
with international humanitarian law.”676 Roger too holds that “One might have 
thought that the commission would be welcomed by the parties to a conflict 
anxious to establish their innocence in respect of the accusations levelled against 
them” but, so far as the author is aware, “its services have never been called upon 
despite its having taken a pro-active role in recent years in offering its good 
offices to parties where it seemed to the president of the commission that it could 
provide a useful service.”677 
The major innovation made by the procedure to be followed by that Commis-
sion is that it has to enquire into any allegation of a grave breach or other serious 
violation of the Conventions or of Protocol I, with or without the agreement of 
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the accused Party.678 The Commission will be automatically competent to con-
duct enquiries only when both the requesting State and the State against which 
the allegation has been made have issued declarations recognizing, ipso facto and 
without special agreement, the competence of the Commission. On the other 
hand, the requesting State does not have to be a party to an armed conflict, but 
can be any High Contracting Party which has recognized the Commission’s com-
petence.679 Article 90 does not recognize a right for the Commission to undertake 
an enquiry on its own initiative.  
A further condition for the competence of the Commission is that it is asked 
to enquire into “any facts alleged to be a grave breach as defined in the Conven-
tions and this Protocol or other serious violation of the Conventions or of this 
Protocol”. There must, therefore, be a prima facie case for at least a “serious 
violation”, which is not required under the enquiry procedures provided for by 
the Conventions. The requirement of previous declarations of acceptance does 
not apply if the parties to an international armed conflict agree otherwise.680  
The Commission’s mandate is thus two-fold. First, it has the competence to 
enquire into alleged grave breaches or other serious violations of the Conventions 
or Protocol I. The Commission will have to determine the meaning of the term 
for itself, since neither of the instruments mention a category of “serious vio-
lations”. It may be able to draw on the term in the context of international criminal 
law, for example the idea in the Tadić Decision “that a serious violation of IHL 
constitutes ‘a breach of a rule protecting important values, and the breach must 
involve grave consequences for the victim’. However, a certain care needs to be 
taken, for what is a serious violation for the purposes of an international criminal 
tribunal may be too high a threshold for a serious violation for the purposes of 
the Commission.”681 
“The second aspect of the Commission’s mandate is to use its good offices to 
facilitate the restoration of respect for the Conventions and Protocol I. In this 
context, good offices refers to ‘the communication of conclusions on the points 
of fact, comments on the possibilities of a friendly settlement, written and oral 
observations by States concerned’, and the like. This aspect of the Commission’s 
work is equally important as its undertaking of enquiries.”682 
What kind of conclusions would the Commission be able to make? It is a fact-
finding body, not a conciliation commission, let alone an arbitration tribunal or 
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international court. However, the right to “include such recommendations as it 
may deem appropriate” in the report as well as its competence to “facilitate, 
through its good offices, the restoration of an attitude of respect”, may give the 
Commission a mediatory role.683 
The result of the Commission’s work is a statement of facts. However, the 
Conventions also clarify that there is a further purpose for the fact-finding proce-
dure – to ensure respect for IHL (when such violation has been established the 
belligerents shall put an end to and repress it as promptly as possible).684 Article 
90 is less explicit but also seems to lead towards a result beyond the actual state-
ment of the facts. Paragraph 5(a) reads: “The Commission shall submit to the 
Parties a report of the findings of fact of the Chamber, with such recommen-
dations as it may deem appropriate”. 
The result thus stops short of a statement of the law. Once the facts are stated, 
the parties can agree on what follows. If the ICJ has jurisdiction in the case, one 
party can still go to the ICJ for a declaration of the law and an award of damages. 
But this is highly improbable. The facts being ascertained will as a rule facilitate 
an agreement among the parties on the question of just compensation.685 
The report of the Commission shall not be made public, unless all the parties 
to the conflict have requested the Commission to publish the report. This can be 
seen as a serious shortcoming, since publicity could be one of the few tools avail-
able to give effect to the findings and recommendations of the Commission.686 
While potentially quite important, the fact that since its establishment in 1991 
this mechanism has only been used once shows that States are reluctant to accept 
the IFFC’s authority or consent to its investigation of serious violations of IHL. 
However, the first use of this mechanism to investigate an explosion involving 
personnel and a vehicle of the OSCE’s Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) in 
Eastern Ukraine shows that the Commission can be used effectively to enquire 
into situations potentially involving IHL violations.687 
Could the Commission instigate enquiries also in non-international armed 
conflicts, given the consent of all the parties to the conflict? As the Commission 
is established under Article 90 of AP I and no mention is made to it in AP II, 
enquiries or other activities possibly undertaken by the Commission would, strictly 
speaking, constitute extra-conventional activities. However, the possibility of ad 
hoc agreements under paragraph 2(d) seems to apply to entities other than States 
as well (since it does not speak of High Contracting Parties but of “Parties 
concerned”).688 
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As to whether or not a complaint could be initiated by a non-state armed group, 
the ICRC Commentary takes the view that ‘[t]here is no doubt that only States 
are competent to submit a request for an enquiry to the Commission’.689 
“This would be quite unfortunate both as a matter of law and as a matter of 
practice. As a matter of law, it is one-sided, disadvantageous to the armed group, 
and goes against ideas of equality of obligation, albeit obligations in relation to 
enforcement of the law. It also goes against the language of the provision itself. 
Whereas Article 90(2)(a) refers solely to High Contracting Parties in recognizing 
the competence of the Commission in advance, thereby limiting such recognition 
to States alone, Article 90(2)(c) refers to ad hoc requests and ad hoc consent on 
the part of parties to the conflict, thus including non-states parties. In practice, the 
Commission has been approached by a number of non-state armed groups.”690 
Accordingly, any party to a non-international armed conflict should be able to 
initiate an enquiry, States and non-state armed groups alike; however, both parties 
will have to consent to the process. 
 
 
4.1.3.5. Possible improvements 
There remains a considerable potential for the IHFFC, in particular in cases where 
the States concerned want to retain a control of the procedure which either the SC 
or the ICC Prosecutor might take away. 
On one hand, the Commission has no right to initiate a fact-finding mission 
motu proprio. On the other hand, it may “facilitate, through its good offices, the 
restoration of an attitude of respect for the Conventions and this Protocol” (Art 
90 (2)(b)(ii)). “Article 90 does not say that it can do so only within the framework 
of an ongoing procedure initiated by a State against another State. The Commission 
is able to offer its good offices without being asked to do so, while the State to 
whom they are offered is of course free to refuse them. The good offices clause, 
thus, is the key which opens the door for a proactive role of the Commission”.691 
Rosas, an original member of the Commission, takes its role a step further. He 
suggests that “reference to the UN in Article 89 AP I might inspire the organi-
zation to call upon parties to armed conflicts to make use of the International 
Humanitarian Fact-Finding Commission. And refusal to comply with such a 
request might be considered by the UN in considering the need for further action, 
including, at least in theory, determination that a situation constitutes a “threat to 
the peace” within the meaning of article 39 of the Charter.”692 
“In principle, the /.../ Commission can undertake an enquiry only if all the 
parties concerned have given their consent, but there is nothing to prevent a third 
State from requesting an enquiry by the Commission into a grave breach or 
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serious violation of humanitarian law committed by a party to a conflict, provided 
that the party concerned has also recognized the Commission’s competence.” 
Pfanner believes that this possibility arises out of the obligation to “ensure respect 
for” the law of armed conflict.693 
Sivakumaran holds that the Commission could and should be utilized.694 As 
said, the Commission has now been used for the first time. In May 2017, it was 
announced on the Commission’s website that it would lead an independent forensic 
investigation in Ukraine, following the explosion of an Organization for Security 
and Cooperation in Europe’s (OSCE) vehicle. The Executive Summary of the 
report of the investigation was published in September 2018.695  
The investigation team concluded that the anti-tank mine was not specifically 
aimed at that particular vehicle. This was determined because the road was not 
on the SMM’s usual route and the patrol was unplanned. Moreover, there was 
little opportunity to lay mines immediately before the patrol, given that the road 
was used frequently by other vehicles as well. Nonetheless, the report considered 
any laying of anti-vehicle mines on that road as a violation of IHL because of the 
potentially indiscriminate damage caused by these weapons.696 
Competence-wise, Article 90 AP I does not prohibit the Commission to make 
suggestions to international bodies to use its competences in specific situations. 
Even if the Commission does not have the right of initiative, its Rules of Proce-
dure explicitly state in the preamble that it can “take all appropriate initiatives as 
necessary in cooperation with other international bodies, in particular the UN, 
with the purpose of carrying out its functions in the interest of the victims of 
armed conflict”. Moreover, nothing in the text of Article 90 AP I prevents the 
Commission from gathering and analysing information and allegations on spe-
cific incidents that could lead to IHL violations, with the possibility of approaching 
the relevant States and calling upon their consent to start an enquiry.697 
 
 
4.2. Implementation of IHL in the EU 
This sub-chapter is dedicated to the specifics of implementing IHL in the EU. 
Measures taken at the EU level could be separated by topic and included under 
other chapters of this thesis, but keeping them in one chapter gives a more coherent 
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overview. In addition, EU action in this field does resemble reporting and 
monitoring the most. Many fields in the EU require periodic overviews, peer-
reviews, standardizing and infringement procedures, this transferred to how the 
IHL related activities are seen as well. The EU is also very active in sanctioning 
people and regimes that violate (mostly) HRL and IHL. 
 
 
4.2.1. IHL in the EU legislation 
IHL is not mentioned as such in any of the EU’s constitutive texts. In EU practice, 
it is generally subsumed under the HRL. The Union’s international action in the 
field of human rights is based on a mix of instruments, both in its Common Foreign 
and Security Policy (CSFP) and its external relations covered by the EC Treaty. 
The Lisbon treaty, which amends the two treaties that form the constitutional 
basis of the EU, contains quite a few articles on humanitarian aid, human rights 
and fundamental freedoms, but no mention is made to IHL. The treaty elaborates 
a great deal more on the common security and defence policy but IHL is certainly 
not an issue of discussion.698 
A few decades ago, when the EU was not yet a major actor in ensuring com-
pliance with IHL, its actions were described as being “more political than legal”. 
It was criticized for treating IHL as a subset of HRL and not giving it the promi-
nent place it deserves, for being more consistent in terms of urging respect for 
IHL in relation to international rather than non-international armed conflicts, and 
for scant reference in EU practice to humanitarian law as a separate field of 
international law.699 
Back in 2001, Desgagne pessimistically noted that humanitarian law has not 
been consistently invoked, or its violations condemned by the EU, since the 
European political co-operation has been formally established after the Single 
European Act of 1986. “EU practice in the field of humanitarian law is mostly 
‘declaratory practice’. The EU has no military forces of its own and is only 
beginning to formulate a defense policy, hence its own conduct with regard to 
humanitarian law rules is rarely directly challenged. In most cases, the EU insti-
tutions are examining, noting, commenting on or condemning the behaviour of 
parties involved in armed conflicts.” He admitted, however, that humanitarian law 
has some bearing on the conduct of EU institutions. Measures of enforcement, 
such as embargoes, bans and sanctions, either at the request of the SC or on its own 
initiative, require actions by the EU or the EC. The EU also provides financial 
support for several institutions and initiatives in the field of humanitarian law or 
closely related to it.700 
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He also rightly noted that the EU plays a more active role in humanitarian 
assistance, individual accountability, the ban on anti-personnel landmines and the 
arms trade. Generally speaking, it appears that the EU’s practice considers IHL 
as a subset of HRL and does not give it the prominent place which it deserves.701 
In 2003, the European Commission published a Communication on the rela-
tionship between the EU and the UN, which explored possibilities for more con-
certed action between the EU and the various organs and bodies of the UN, such 
as the SC, the GA, and so forth. Wouters noted that this is a welcomed step, and 
added that, in light of the development and implementation of the EU Security 
Doctrine, there is a lot of important work to do on exploring ways to more effec-
tively encourage and ensure respect for IHL.702 
The EU made a joint pledge at the 30th Conference of the Red Cross and Red 
Crescent in 2007, which indicated that public dissemination and training, sup-
ported by effective enforcement, were crucial for improved compliance with IHL, 
and in particular pledged to pursue efforts to train military and civilian personnel 
involved in EU crisis management operations.703  
In 2010 Breslin argued that in the past decade, the EU had adopted and revised 
policy specifically relating to IHL, no longer treating it as a subset of human rights 
but rather as a separate set of norms, and increasingly issued statements con-
cerning humanitarian norms in relation to non-international armed conflicts.704 
“The EU is no longer limited to “declaratory practice” in relation to the field of 
IHL but also engages in civilian and military operations during armed conflicts, 
has become involved with training third party armed forces, and in one instance 
has set up an international fact-finding mission to investigate violations of IHL. 
The practice of the EU in relation to IHL has become more engaged and applied 
and this appears likely to increase, although certain inconsistencies remain”.705 I 
do not fully share this enthusiasm having worked on a daily basis at the EU 
Council working parties. IHL is rarely a topic of discussion, even in connection 
with sanctions. Today the sanctions regime is mostly used in connection with the 
use of force and/or an illegal annexation followed thereafter and very rarely have 
sanctions been imposed specifically citing IHL as a basis for the decision. 
This shows that the development of IHL on EU level has not been quick nor 
easy. It clearly lags behind the highly developed human rights system, but is 
showing some positive trends in recent years. For example, a Council working 
party on public international law (COJUR) now publishes annual reports on the 
EU guidelines on promoting compliance with IHL (two so far). The reports cover 
statements and demarches made by the EU, cooperation with international organi-
zations, restrictive measures, arms exports, crisis management and international 
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criminal mechanisms and as such has to be applauded as a welcome develop-
ment.706 
The EU can represent and fulfil some of the duties of the Member States where 
appropriate, and take initiatives to ensure respect for IHL in its own capacity in 
addition, in accordance with its policy and values.707 For example in the field of 
civil protection, the EU is moving towards a common scheme that could better 
utilize the resources of individual countries. This EU Civil Protection Mechanism 
aims at strengthening cooperation between the EU Member States in the field of 
civil protection, with a view to improving prevention, preparedness and response 
to disasters.708 Although agreement on this mechanism was quite difficult to 
achieve, such initiatives could be envisioned on other fields of IHL. The EU should 
act in a coordinated way and try to influence the development of IHL globally.  
 
 
4.2.2. The EU Guidelines on Promoting Compliance 
with International Humanitarian Law 
The report of COJUR working party states that as a major global actor, the EU is 
strongly committed to promoting respect for IHL as part of its wider commitment, 
laid down in its founding Treaties, to advancing respect for human dignity and 
for the principles of international law.709 
The Guidelines on Promoting Compliance with International Humanitarian 
Law were first adopted in 2005 to provide a visible and practical sign of the EU’s 
commitment to IHL and were widely welcomed. An updated version of the Guide-
lines was adopted by the 2958th Foreign Affairs Council on 8th December 2009. 
The Council reaffirmed its support for the promotion and protection of IHL and 
to this end adopted an updated version of the Guidelines. Breslin regrets that 
although the publication of the Council Conclusions coincided with the 60th 
Anniversary of the Conventions, they contain no substantive improvements or 
additions.710 
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Since their adoption, the EU has continued actively to promote respect for IHL 
through the various means at its disposal. Many of these activities are already 
regularly reported in the various publications and communications issued by the 
responsible institutions. However, there has remained scope for presenting a more 
systematic and transparent overview of the implementation of the Guidelines as 
a whole including to facilitate the Council’s assessment of the work carried out 
by the Union in this field. To achieve these objectives, and as described above, 
the COJUR prepared a first annual report on the action taken by the EU to imple-
ment the Guidelines on the period 2016–2017, published in 2018.711 
The purpose of the Guidelines is to set out operational tools for the EU and its 
institutions and bodies to promote compliance with IHL. They are addressed to 
all those taking action within the framework of the EU to the extent that the 
matters raised fall within their areas of responsibility and competence. They are 
complementary to other Common Positions already adopted within the EU in 
relation to matters such as human rights, torture and the protection of civilians.712 
The Guidelines are in line with the commitment of the EU and its Member 
States to IHL, and aim to address compliance with IHL by third States, and, as 
appropriate, non-state actors operating in third States. Whilst the same commitment 
extends to measures taken by the EU and its Member States to ensure compliance 
with IHL in their own conduct, including by their own forces, such measures are 
not covered by these Guidelines.713 The latter issues are dealt with in other fora, 
including the Military Committee as far as EU missions are concerned.714 
In 2009 Wrange wrote that while Article 15 (b) of the Guidelines stipulates 
that “whenever relevant, EU Heads of Mission, and appropriate EU representa-
tives, including Heads of EU Civilian Operations, Commanders of EU Military 
Operations and EU Special Representatives, should include an assessment of the 
IHL situation in their reports about a given State or conflict” there is yet no 
dedicated reporting system for monitoring the promotion of IHL or implemen-
tation of the EU Guidelines.”715 The COJUR annual reports now serve as a 
reporting system on the implementation of the EU guidelines, but the guidelines 
do not include all the implementation and enforcement measures described in this 
thesis. In this regard, individual Member States are still responsible for reporting. 
Some information about compliance with IHL is subsumed into the annual human 
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rights reports, although to merge assessment of the two in this way could some-
what limit the impact of the IHL-specific critique contained in the report, and also 
limit the visibility and exposure on issues pertaining only to IHL.716 This should 
be of interest not only because of the content of the Guidelines – which are more 
political than legal – but also because they supply an example of the importance of 
expertise and bureaucratic factors in the implementation of international law.717 
Two important observations have to me made here. Firstly, the Guidelines 
supply tools that the EU can use if it so wishes, EU action to enhance compliance 
can never be expected or even less mandatory, it is a political organization.718 
Secondly, the Guidelines do not state that it is the duty of each State to ensure 
compliance by or in third States, as would a broad interpretation of CA 1 of the 
Conventions. It is acknowledged in the Guidelines that, as all EU Member States 
are Parties to the Conventions and Protocols, they are already obliged to ensure 
compliance with IHL in their own conduct. As such, the focus is on external pro-
motion in the sphere of the foreign policy and external action of the EU, although 
some means of action provided for, such as dissemination and training, may have 
an internal element.719 
 
 
4.2.3. Means of action at the disposal of 
the EU to foster compliance with IHL 
It is clear that the EU, as a powerful economic actor, has developed many instru-
ments “between words and wars” to ensure respect for international law, but the 
implementation of these instruments in a productive and just manner is a complex 
process.720 In 2009, the ICRC conducted an overview of the implementation of 
the IHL Guidelines based on public documents, available at the public register of 
the Council, the Commission and the European Parliament’s respective websites. 
The mapping exercise had shown that there were more than 300 references to 
IHL in EU documents since the adoption of the Guidelines in December 2005 to 
January 2009, and out of these 200 references were found in Council docu-
ments.721 IHL was referred to most commonly in the context of the fight against 
terrorism (49), followed by respect of IHL and repression of violations in Sudan/ 
Darfur (26), the Israeli-Lebanon conflict and the Gaza Strip (24), ICC and the 
international tribunals (22) as well as respect for IHL in the Democratic Republic 
of Congo (13). For the European Commission, 70 documents were found and 
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demarches/public statements about specific conflicts (34), followed by coopera-
tion with other international bodies (28) and political dialogue (21) are by far the 
most commonly referred to.722 
Many of these documents are issued at the level of the Head of State and 
Government, where the European Council often refers to compliance with IHL 
in the public Conclusions that it issues at the end of its meetings. Similarly, the 
Foreign Affairs Council regularly deliberates on situations of conflict around the 
world and underlines the need to respect IHL in the Conclusions issued at the end 
of its meeting.723 
EU practice has been relatively consistent in urging respect for humanitarian 
law in conflicts that have obviously been international conflicts. It has maintained 
the applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention to the territories occupied by 
Israel. It called on parties to respect IHL in the context of the first Gulf War 
between Iraq and Iran; it condemned alleged violations by Iraq in the second Gulf 
War.724 More recently, it has condemned the wide scale violations of human 
rights in the conflict in Ukraine. The EU Delegation raised IHL-related issues in 
various formats and fora in Kyiv, most notably in the context of the annual 
Human Rights Dialogue, in which IHL is one topic of discussion. The EU is also 
the biggest contributor to the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine.725 
In non-international conflicts, the trend has rather been to urge respect for 
human rights (not respect for IHL), even though humanitarian law vocabulary is 
sometimes used. However, in some instances humanitarian law has also been 
cited. For example, the indiscriminate use of landmines in Afghanistan – among 
other motives – prompted the EU to call for the respect of humanitarian law.726 
The EU also issued a declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the EU on the 
bombings of civilian targets by the Sudanese air force,727 and a Presidency state-
ment on behalf of the EU on the bombing of the Temple of Tooth and Kandy.728 
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Dialogue, statements, initiatives and demarches are only a few ways for the 
EU to contribute. It has a complex political and diplomatic machinery at its dis-
posal. This includes the whole tool kit of positive incentives it can offer, such as 
development aid, humanitarian funding to ensure humanitarian access and wider 
dissemination, access to the internal market and technical and economic assis-
tance. Additionally, the EU could apply economic sanctions against political 
regimes or non-state actors, and leaders of armed groups in internal conflicts. 
Nevertheless, it can also contribute via crisis-management operations and even 
control of exports of military technology and equipment.729 The full potential of 
these bilateral and multilateral instruments has not been sufficiently explored. 
The EU also has an important role to play in supporting and upholding the 
ICC. It has provided over 40 M EUR to the ICC since its creation and organized 
seminars to foster closer cooperation between States and the Court. The Union is 
also active as a member or observer in a range of international organizations and 
bodies and in this capacity frequently intervenes on matters of IHL. At the annual 
humanitarian debate in UNGA in December, the EU Delegation delivers a state-
ment on behalf of the EU and its Member States which always includes strong 
language on IHL. 
The European Commission’s Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection depart-
ment (ECHO) also promotes the global respect of IHL and humanitarian prin-
ciples. ECHO supports five types of concrete activities for the dissemination and 
implementation of IHL ranging from IHL advocacy to increasing the capacities 
of humanitarian workers in advocating for IHL.730 
Direct funding is probably the most visible way in which the EU contributes 
as it provides billions of euros to conflict zones. A most recent example is a 
pledge to allocate 6 billion euros to help the people in need in Syria in 2017.731 
The EU also funds training in IHL of both military personnel and humanitarian 
actors and finances large-scale information campaigns to raise awareness of IHL 
in the wider public.732 Violations of IHL heavily impact and hamper the EU’s 
humanitarian investments in meeting the needs of the affected populations and 
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imperil the security of the EU’s humanitarian partners. Strengthening compliance 
with IHL is thus a key concern for the EU as a reference humanitarian donor. 
The ICRC is a key partner to the EU in delivering humanitarian response and 
in upholding respect for IHL and the humanitarian principles. The ICRC is regu-
larly invited to speak in informal sessions of Council working groups and at the 
PSC. The EU funding to the ICRC includes dedicated funding for IHL dissemi-
nation in Afghanistan and Ukraine.733 
The implementation of the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) 
involves the deployment of military or civilian missions for peace-keeping, con-
flict prevention and strengthening international security in accordance with the 
principles of the UN Charter. EU-led military operations and missions are con-
ducted in accordance with the basic legal framework as laid down in the Council 
Decision and relevant international law (in particular IHL and IHRL).734 
The EU, as such, is not a party to humanitarian law treaties – but the question 
arises as to whether it is bound by them. Does customary law bind it? These are 
fundamental questions for the implementation of humanitarian law. The ICRC 
has in fact attempted to persuade EU to include references to IHL in the sections 
of the treaty dealing with foreign and security policy. These efforts were unfor-
tunately unsuccessful.735 
The EU and its Member States accept that if EU-led forces become a party to 
an armed conflict, IHL will fully apply to them. In that case, the EU is arguably 
bound by customary IHL, while its Member States’ forces also remain bound by 
their IHL treaty obligations. However, this has not been the case so far, and will 
probably remain the exception. EU policy is that IHL does not necessarily apply 
in all EU military operations (because the Union did not become a party to an 
armed conflict), nor is it necessarily considered the most appropriate standard as 
a matter of policy in all EU military operations (when not applicable as a matter 
of law). Rather, in most operations the EU looks to HRL as a more appropriate 
standard.736 
During 2016–2017, the EU conducted 15 civilian and military crisis manage-
ment operations within the framework of the CSDP. By promoting security and 
deterring conflict, they contribute by their nature to preventing situations in which 
violations of IHL can occur. 
Some authors believe that the EU could consider adopting an EU Common 
Position, in which the Member States agree to collectively accept the competence 
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of the International Fact-Finding Commission. Similarly, the EU could affirm its 
intention to use its bilateral and multilateral contacts to encourage third States to 
do the same, by means of certain incentives. The EU could also ask the Inter-
national Fact-Finding Commission to carry out certain studies. For instance, it 
could be asked to carry out the task of doing studies and preparing recommen-
dations with regard to earlier armed conflicts, or, to the extent that information is 
available, with regard to ongoing armed conflicts.737 I believe this could prove 
extremely useful if used correctly, and systematically. The EU is used to applying 
different monitoring and control mechanisms that could be expanded to IHL 
mechanisms. 
The European Court of Human Rights plays a significant role in the enforce-
ment of IHL, despite the fact that IHL violations as such do not fall into the scope 
of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The enforcement of IHL 
through the case law of the ECtHR involves both individual applications, as well 
as inter-state cases. Some of the inter-state cases relating to armed conflict are 
Cyprus v. Turkey, Georgia v. Russian Federation, and Ukraine v. Russian Fede-
ration. There have been also a number of cases relating to the activity of European 
States’ military forces abroad, including cases concerning the ISAF operation in 
Afghanistan and the international military operations in Iraq.738 
 
 
4.2.4. EU sanctions 
The EU is also able to apply sanctions against those who violate the rules of IHL. 
Sanctions, or restrictive measures (the two terms are used interchangeably), have 
been frequently imposed by the EU in recent years, either on an autonomous EU 
basis or implementing binding Resolutions of the UNSC. Restrictive measures 
imposed by the EU may target governments of third countries, or non-state entities 
and individuals. They may comprise arms embargoes, other specific or general 
trade restrictions (import and export bans), financial restrictions, restrictions on 
admission (visa or travel bans), or other measures.739 When deciding on restrictive 
measures, it is important to consider which measure or package of measures is 
most appropriate in order to promote the desired outcome.740 
The EU applies sanctions or restrictive measures in pursuit of the specific 
objectives of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), namely to 
strengthen the security of the Union in all ways, to promote international coopera-
tion – to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law and respect for 
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human rights and fundamental freedoms.741 When the EU implements UNSC 
Resolutions it adheres to the terms of those Resolutions, but it may also decide to 
apply further restrictive measures. The EU will implement UN restrictive 
measures as quickly as possible.742 
It is important to note that the legal basis of such sanctions is however not the 
IHL, but the EU community laws. It could be argued, therefore, that it is not 
implementation of IHL in the strict sense. The legal basis for sanctions will 
depend on the exact nature of the restrictive measures, and the areas or targets 
covered by them. Where Community action is required, a Common Position must 
be adopted under Article 15 of the Treaty establishing the EU by unanimity.743 
If the Common Position provides for the reduction or interruption of economic 
relations with a third country, implementation at Community level is governed 
by Article 301, and, where financial restrictions are concerned, Article 60 of the 
Treaty establishing the European Community. Where restrictive measures target 
persons, groups, and entities, which are not directly linked to the regime of a third 
country, Articles 60, 301 and 308 of the Treaty establishing the European Com-
munity have been relied upon. In such cases, adoption of the Regulation by the 
Council requires unanimity and prior consultation of the European Parliament. 
The EU maintained 25 sanctions regimes during 2016–2017. A number of these 
were specifically aimed at preventing or repressing violations of IHL, including 
by targeting individuals engaged in such violations. By taking measures dealing 
with situations of armed conflict, including through arms embargoes, many 
sanctions measures seek to prevent the situations in which violation of IHL can 
occur.744 This can thus be a powerful tool to implement IHL, and should be further 
developed. 
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5. ENSURING RESPECT THROUGH 
ENFORCEMENT MEASURES 
It is now time to flip the coin, from implementation to enforcement. This chapter 
focuses on the enforcement measures that armed groups, States, or the internatio-
nal community can take to condemn and stop violations of IHL. As described 
earlier, enforcement in the context of this thesis is generally understood as 
something repressive, a measure that has an element of compulsion in it. 
The primary function of the law is not to punish war criminals, but to protect 
victims of armed conflicts by preventing war crimes from being committed. 
Before any question about war crimes trials or other enforcement action can arise, 
failure in that primary endeavour must be presupposed. In this sense, “enforce-
ment” is a secondary office of the laws of armed conflict.745 
One of the major points of difference between international law and domestic 
law is the absence of a systematic regime for the enforcement of international law. 
Nowhere has this absence been more pronounced than in IHL. “In no case”, Skillen 
argues, “has the absence of a systematic enforcement regime contributed more to a 
lack of respect for the legitimacy of the law than has been the case with IHL”.746 
What are the repressive measures that are available to States and how effective 
have they been? Are new measures necessary due to the changing nature of con-
flicts? This chapter will focus on repression of violations and armed groups’ com-
pliance with the law as well as the role of UN in ensuring compliance with the law. 
Practice confirms that serious violations of humanitarian law are not con-
sidered an internal affair of a State, and the community of States can intervene 
through its co-operative organs if need be. Apart from this, however, enforcement 
of IHL often lies with individual members of the international community, which 
have recourse to different interstate and domestic enforcement methods. Retalia-
tion, reprisals, and self-defence are regarded as classic forms of enforcement of 
international law obligations.747 One could also name demands to ensure State 
responsibility, compensation, punishment of individuals, or sanctions directed 
against the property or assets of individuals.748 
Furthermore, Humanitarian law cannot be considered a “self-contained system” 
which, in the words of the ICJ, enumerates a limited number of possible reactions 
to violations in the context of the law of diplomatic relations.749 Therefore, 
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measures from other fields of law can also be used to bring an illegal action to a 
halt or to punish the perpetrators.  
 
 
5.1. What is enforcement of international 
humanitarian law? 
As said, enforcement measures differ from implementation measures in their 
content and prospective aims. This chapter will first provide an overview of what 
enforcement means in the context of IHL, and then analyse some specific measures 
in more detail. As mentioned previously, drawing the line between monitoring 
and enforcement measures is not always easy. Supervision and enforcement are 
analysed in separate chapters of this thesis, but I admit that the distinction is not 
clear. For example, Zyberi holds that “Enforcement involves a variety of measures 
aimed at ensuring observance of IHL through international monitoring, assigning 
responsibility for serious violations through courts or other mechanisms and 
providing reparations for serious IHL violations to affected individuals or States. 
When considering the enforcement process, it is possible to categorize that in terms 
of judicial and non-judicial enforcement; in terms of the law of international 
responsibility, as responsibility of States, international organizations, individuals, 
or non-state actors; and, in terms of the levels or layers of enforcement, the 
domestic, the regional, and the international ones.”750 
The 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions on Land War, and the Regulations 
annexed to them, are imprecise on the matter of ensuring compliance. Article 1 
of the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions requires the powers to issue instructions 
to their land forces in conformity with the Regulations. Article 3 of the 1907 
Convention says that a belligerent party violating the Regulations “shall, if the 
case demands, be liable to pay compensation.” Additionally, Article 56 of the 
1899 and 1907 Hague Regulations makes a vague reference to legal proceedings 
in the event of violation of its rules about certain types of public property. Nothing 
more is said about how these, or other provisions, are to be enforced. Roberts 
holds that the many striking omissions regarding enforcement exposed the Hague 
system to the accusation that it was based on unduly optimistic assumptions.751 
With the Conventions and other instruments emerging after the Second World 
War, many efforts have been made to draw up formal provisions regarding imple-
mentation and enforcement. However, many of those that have been adopted in 
treaty form have, in practice, been ignored or sidestepped – and States have ob-
served unevenly their duty to ensure that all those suspected of grave breaches 
are tried.752 This is why so many authors are sceptical on the issue of enforcement, 
and hold that the proliferation of international legal norms has not led either to 
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corresponding developments in international judicial decision-making, or to 
corresponding procedures for the coercive enforcement of international rules. If 
anything, there has been a regression in this respect.753 
Conforti and Dunworth take this scepticism the furthest, by indicating that 
even the few institutional enforcement mechanisms created following the Second 
World War, including the UN collective system, have not lived up to the high 
expectations they generated at the outset. These actions have been so fragmentary, 
decentralized and sporadic that it remains impossible, rebus sic stantibus, to speak 
of an effective system of coercive enforcement of international rules.754  
Several authors hold that IHL shares a critical weakness with international law 
in general, which makes it fundamentally different from domestic law: the lack 
of a central enforcement body and the resulting lack of effective implementation.755 
This weakness is even said to detract from the legitimacy of international law as 
a legal regime. To a large degree, States have reserved the function of ascertainment 
and enforcement of international law to themselves, a fact that blurs the distinction 
between legislation and adjudication.756 
Indeed, who should bear the role of an international police force or a prose-
cutor that has powers to instruct individual States on how they should act in times 
of war, and how they should punish the wrongdoers? If a State, or even more 
difficult a non-state actor, simply does not abide by the rules under IHL or cus-
tomary law, which course of action are other States allowed to take? This is the 
central and defining question connected to enforcement that also differentiates it 
from implementation. What can be done to bring a wrongdoer back to a lawful 
conduct, to restore respect for IHL? 
Again, there are almost as many interpretations and catalogues on the concept 
of enforcement as there are authors writing on the subject of IHL. Traditional 
textbooks on the law of armed conflict generally list the following methods of 
enforcement: diplomatic recourse (including complaints, mediation, and com-
missions of inquiry); reprisals; the prosecution of war crimes; hostage-taking and 
claims for compensation.757 
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Kalshoven notes that IHL has never been totally devoid of means for the pro-
motion of compliance and gives the examples of State responsibility and indi-
vidual liability for war crimes; supervision by outside powers; and dissemination 
of knowledge of the law.758 
For Cassese, various means are available for enforcing IHL. Firstly, there is 
the traditional, but controversial, method of reprisals, whereby a belligerent 
employs illegal means of warfare in response to violations of the laws of war by 
its adversary.759 Secondly, he lists specific mechanisms agreed upon by the 
parties to a conflict, such as the designation of a Protecting Power; the utilization 
of fact-finding mechanisms, such as the “Fact Finding Commission”, and 
criminal jurisdiction – prosecution and punishment by national or international 
tribunals of individuals accused of being responsible for violations of IHL. 
Hoffmann finds that the modalities for enforcing the rules of IHL have 
expanded over the generations. Even before the modern treaty based IHL system, 
States were responsible for assuring that their armed forces implemented rules 
for behaviour in combat, and punished infractions. He believes that self-
regulation continues to be the most fundamental form of State compliance with 
IHL, with training and military discipline at the core of these efforts.760 
Today, other enforcement mechanisms are developing, e.g. humanitarian 
intervention that has been employed with mixed results in Bosnia, Kosovo and 
East Timor. Such intervention remains under discussion as a possible tool to 
prevent other war crimes in the future. On occasion, governments are also willing 
to impose economic boycotts on States that are in flagrant violation of their obli-
gations under IHL.761 
Palwankar classifies legally permissible measures available to third parties 
into four broad categories: measures to exert diplomatic pressure; coercive 
measures that States may take themselves; measures which States may take in co-
operation with international organizations and assistance action undertaken in 
conformity with IHL.762 Note that these are enforcement measures available for 
third States, and do not include punishing of grave breaches for example. One 
could think of external and internal enforcement measures in this sense. 
Zyberi holds that IHL treaties have established four mechanisms for the 
enforcement of IHL, namely the Protecting Powers; the ICRC; the ad hoc fact-
finding commissions under the GCs, and a standing International Fact-finding 
Commission. He does admit however, that the Protecting Powers system has been 
used only five times, the ad hoc fact finding commissions have never been used, 
and the standing International Fact-Finding Commission has only been used once 
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so far. “This situation provides a very bleak picture of the effectiveness of three 
IHL treaty-based mechanisms.”763 
Appropriate measures to ensure compliance with IHL are not confined to 
those specifically provided for in this particular branch of law itself. State respon-
sibility, and also the individual responsibility of fighters in armed conflicts, are 
based on a much broader concept of responsibility. In fact, all available means 
and mechanisms to ensure compliance with the law may be used, including action 
by the SC under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, human rights mechanisms, inter-
national criminal tribunals, and public opinion.764 
Non-governmental organizations are also engaged in this work. Human rights 
organizations investigate war crimes aggressively, and pressure wrongdoers by 
making their findings known to the public. Some journalists have acquired sub-
stantial insight into the nature of war crimes. Academics are also beginning to 
turn their awareness toward the humanitarian challenge of war crimes. If States 
are resolute in drawing on all of these efforts, legal tools, and institutional 
resources, then much can be done to curb war crimes and advance the develop-
ment of IHL in some circumstances. And sometimes, says Hoffmann, State 
depredations can be brought to an end by decisive targeting of military and eco-
nomic pressure points – in other words, by waging war against wrongdoers.765 
There are some common elements that can be derived from the aforemen-
tioned. It seems to me that punishment of grave breaches, reprisals, and measures 
under the UN framework are mentioned more often than others. These three ele-
ments will be given some more thought in the current chapter, after briefly stop-
ping on one important aspect in the general concept of enforcement. Namely, 
there is an alarming new development emerging whereby some authors have 
started to hint that the general obligation to “ensure respect” for the Conventions 
could in principle also extend to the use of force. It is usually specifically pointed 
out that respect must be ensured by all lawful means, but there is an evident 
tendency to stretch this obligation even further. It is worthwhile to repeat that the 
only instrument of international law authorizing the use of force is the UN 
Charter. Armed intervention undertaken unilaterally, i.e. without any reference to 
a treaty or custom, by a State or a group of States, is not permitted under public 
international law. “It would indeed be unthinkable”, as Sandoz puts it, “to see 
international humanitarian law, whose philosophy it is not to link its application 
to jus ad bellum, itself become a pretext for armed intervention”.766 
IHL applies equally to all parties in an armed conflict situation, and inde-
pendently of considerations relating to the legality of the use of force. In fact, if 
it were to be conceded that IHL does permit the use of armed force in order to put 
an end to violations of this law, then it could also be argued that any use of armed 
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force which abides by IHL to the letter is thereby “legal” under that law, inde-
pendently of the provisions of the Charter. This would be absurd, which is precisely 
one of the reasons why IHL cannot – and must not – in any way be connected 
with the legality of the use of force.767 
The use of force cannot be justified without Security Council’s approval. The 
Charter of the UN is “the bedrock of International Law and Order, and the 
bending of its rules will quickly result in chaos.”768 Even more so, the use of force 
can never be justified on the basis of CA 1 on its own, this being a question for 
jus ad bellum. No recent international practice or evolving customary law proves 
that there has been a re-interpreting of the UN Charter. The only case in which 
State practice has been in contradiction with the UN Charter is the “humanitarian 
Intervention” by NATO in Kosovo, which was clearly an exception. Another con-
sideration that has to be taken into account is that the UN Charter cannot be com-
pared to other treaties: it is what Kelsen termed a “Grundnorm” or the Consti-
tution of the International Community. Therefore, one should not remove or 
attack this foundation without having an alternative system to replace it with.769 
 
 
5.2. Repression of violations 
“The many failures to find effective means of implementation in respect of 
violations of the laws of war, coupled with a high level of rhetoric on the subject, 
have had deeply damaging effects. They have contributed to a widespread view 
that the laws of war are virtually a dead letter, and can be ignored with impunity”.770 
Rosas rightfully holds that we have not reached the stage where principles of 
decency will be respected simply because it is the decent thing to do. An effective 
legal system cannot do away with the notions of sanctions and punishment.771 
This brings us to the next level of enforcement of IHL – criminal jurisdiction, i.e. 
enforcement through the prosecution and punishment by national or international 
tribunals of individuals accused of being responsible for violations of IHL.772 
The ICC now has jurisdiction over war crimes listed in the Conventions. For 
this reason, many authors write about the need to incorporate the Rome statute 
into national law, instead of incorporating the Conventions. The ICRC has 
compiled a useful comparative table on War Crimes under the Rome Statute of 
the ICC and their sources in IHL. The table aims, on the one hand, to identify the 
origin of the terms used in the Statute’s definitions of war crimes and, on the 
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other, to highlight the differences in wording and content between those defi-
nitions and obligations arising under IHL instruments.773 
The approach which a State takes to implementation of the Rome Statute will 
depend on the nature of that State’s legal system. Once ratified, in some monist 
States, treaties occupy a position in the hierarchy of national law on par with 
constitutions. For other States, however, constitutions are supreme, and imple-
mentation of conflicting treaty obligations may require constitutional amend-
ments or, at the least, reinterpretation of key provisions.774 
In common law States, treaties do not, as a general rule, become part of the 
domestic or national law until implementing or enabling legislation is enacted. 
This means that a State cannot prosecute an individual alleged to have committed 
violations of treaty rules of IHL unless it has adopted enabling legislation estab-
lishing these offences under domestic law.775 
In many civil law States, the treaties to which the State is a party form an 
integral part of the State’s national law. While this may provide the theoretical 
framework for direct enforcement, in practice, prosecutions of violations of IHL 
treaties are likely to be brought only where the State’s criminal and/or military 
law specifically includes these offences. Ordinarily, this will be required in order 
to satisfy requirements for clarity and certainty in the law, and to ensure that the 
penalties for any such offences may be known to the public.776 
In States which have not adopted any of the preceding approaches, conduct 
constituting a grave breach will have to be charged as an ordinary criminal offence. 
Such an approach will not permit prosecution of all grave breaches. For example, 
a grave breach such as unjustifiable delay in the repatriation of prisoners of war 
or civilians could not be prosecuted unless there are specific humanitarian law 
type offences in the military or ordinary criminal code.777 In many cases the 
prosecution of sexual violence in armed conflicts was regulated on national level 
only in early 2000s.778 The issue of human shields also used to be improperly 
legislated in domestic law, leaving only the possibility of prosecuting this as an 
“ordinary crime”. 
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Paradoxically, the Rome Statute does not explicitly require States Parties to 
prosecute and punish crimes under the Court’s jurisdiction, as the Conventions 
do. However, this is assumed, as the complementarity mechanism provided for 
in the Statute depends on the ability of a State to try such crimes domestically. It 
is therefore essential for States Parties to the Rome Statute to adapt their criminal 
legislation to the Statute so that they are able to try crimes under the Court’s 
jurisdiction domestically when necessary.779 
I believe that “writing” the relevant offences into national legislation is a crucial 
measure for inducing compliance with IHL. It goes hand in hand with the obli-
gation to teach and disseminate. The latter obligation is much easier to be fulfilled 
if the crimes and sanctions for them are clearly listed in a national legislative act 
and everyone can be certain which acts are punishable. 
 
 
5.2.1. Definition of grave breaches and war crimes 
It is important to note that there are different categories of violations of IHL. Not 
every infringement entails a possibility for international adjudication. The most 
serious breaches of the Conventions and Protocols are the “grave breaches” 
expressly listed in the Conventions and Protocol I. These include wilful killing; 
torture or inhumane treatment; wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury 
to body or health; attacks on the civilian population and indiscriminate attacks; 
attacks on works and installations containing dangerous forces and non-defended 
localities; perfidious use of the protected emblems; unlawful population transfers; 
unjustified delay in repatriation of prisoners of war or protected civilians; attacks 
on historic monuments or places of worship; and denial of judicial guarantees.780 
Each of the four Conventions has an Article describing grave breaches appro-
priate to the category of protected individual in that particular convention. The 
grave breaches for the four Conventions overlap to a large extent. In addition, 
grave breaches are a closed category. If the offence is not specified in the Con-
ventions, it is not a grave breach. Grave breach offences that are specified in all 
four Conventions are wilful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, and wilfully 
using great suffering or serious injury. Similar obligations were later imposed by 
the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event 
of Armed Conflict.781 
While Protocol I of 1977 was promulgated, it improved the system of third-
party supervision by creating new items of “grave breaches”, including, inter alia: 
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(a)  wilfully launching indiscriminate attacks with the knowledge that such 
attacks will cause excessive loss of life, injury to civilians or damage to 
civilian objects; 
(b)  unjustifiably delaying in the expatriation of prisoners of war or civilians; 
(c)  practicing apartheid and other inhumane and degrading practices involving 
outrages upon personal dignity based on racial discrimination, when com-
mitted willfully and in violation of the Conventions and Protocol I; 
(d)  making grave breaches of the said Conventions and Protocol “war crimes.” 
 
A more noteworthy improvement made by Protocol I was the establishment of 
the principle of respondent superior (Articles 51(4), 57(2), 85(4) and (5)). In this 
connection, the Protocol requires State Parties and Parties to armed conflict to 
impose a duty on military commanders to prevent and, where necessary, to 
repress and report to competent authorities breaches of the Conventions and of 
Protocol I. To facilitate the implementation of this complicated responsibility, the 
Protocol requires the said States Parties to make legal advisors available to the 
commanders at the appropriate level.782 
Superiors shall only issue orders which are in conformity with international 
law. A superior officer who issues an order contrary to international law exposes 
not only himself but also the subordinate obeying to the risk of being prosecuted 
(Article 86 AP I). Military commanders are the enforcers of the internal discipli-
nary system of their army and have the duty to prevent breaches of the law of war 
and to ensure that members of the armed forces under their command are aware 
of their obligations under the Conventions and Protocol I.783 
Grave breaches are regarded as war crimes. However, the notion of war crimes 
is somewhat broader than that of grave breaches because it also covers other 
serious violations of the rules of IHL, either customary or treaty-based, regardless 
of whether such violations are committed in situations of international or of non-
international armed conflict.784 
The war crimes provisions of the Rome Statute clarify this issue and are 
divided into four “segments”. The first division or distinction is between war 
crimes committed in international armed conflict and those committed in non-
international armed conflict. In international armed conflict, there are two sepa-
rate provisions: 
• Article 8(2)(a) refers to “grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 12 
August 1949” (and lists eight specific acts which constitute war crimes). 
• Article 8(2)(b) refers to “other serious violations of the laws and customs 
applicable in international armed conflict” (and lists 26 specific acts which 
constitute war crimes). 
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War crimes in non-international armed conflict are similarly divided into two: 
• Article 8(2)(c) covers “serious violations of Article 3 common to the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949” and lists four acts which, if committed 
against persons taking no active part in hostilities, constitute war crimes. 
• Article 8(2)(e) refers to “other serious violations of the laws and customs 
applicable in armed conflicts not of an international character” (and lists 12 
acts which constitute war crimes). 
 
It is important to remember that the term “war crime”, as defined in the Rome 
Statute, does not cover all violations of IHL, which give rise to individual crimi-
nal responsibility.785 
The advantage of this approach is its clarity and transparency, which is of the 
utmost importance for criminal law. The disadvantage is the creation of the cate-
gory of “other” breaches, which involves the violation of all the remaining pro-
visions of the Conventions, which then seem to be less serious. In this case, 
judicial recourse may exist at national levels, but these are not specified in the 
Conventions, and the recourse will therefore depend on each different national 
system of justice.786 
 
 
5.2.2. Repressive measures at national level 
States Parties to the Conventions and Protocol I must enact laws to repress the 
most serious violations of these instruments, those which are defined as grave 
breaches. In addition, States Parties to the Conventions and Protocol I must sup-
press all violations. The obligation to suppress violations does not require crimi-
nal legislation to be adopted, but leaves it to States to adopt such legislative, 
administrative or disciplinary measures as may be necessary.787 As said in many 
parts of this work, action on national level is often the most effective in preventing 
further violations of IHL. 
It is well known that the International Military Tribunals at Nuremberg and 
Tokyo raised a new standard that imposed personal criminal responsibility upon 
individuals found guilty of serious violations of the law of war. This lead the 
drafters of the 1949 Conventions to realize that to effectively enforce the require-
ments and prohibitions of the Conventions, there had to be a means of imposing 
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criminal penalties on individuals. The solution was Common Article 
49/50/129/146.788 
The Conventions introduced a State’s twofold obligation to establish penal 
sanctions and prosecute offenders. Each contracting Party is obliged not only to 
ensure that its legislation stipulates “effective penal sanctions for persons com-
mitting or ordering to be committed any of the grave breaches”, but also to 
“search for such persons and to bring them, regardless of their nationality, before 
its own courts”, unless it prefers to hand them over for trial to another contracting 
Party (aut dedere aut judicare).789 
Therefore, the jurisdiction provided by the Conventions is universal, in that 
those suspected of being responsible for grave breaches come under the criminal 
jurisdiction of all States parties. In addition, Article 88 of Protocol I requires that 
States parties provide mutual assistance with regard to criminal proceedings 
brought in respect of grave breaches to the Conventions or to Protocol I, including 
cooperation in the matter of extradition.790 For States that are party to Protocol I, 
the obligation to repress grave breaches extends to those grave breaches, which 
result from a failure to act when under a duty to do so.791 
The extent to which such extradition is possible is regulated by the domestic 
law of the home State. Normally, the State interested in prosecution will most 
likely be either the injured state, or the home state of the accused.792 The State 
where the offender belongs to has the main opportunity and, therefore, the first 
duty to punish. The aim of the punishment is twofold: to secure the effectiveness 
of international law of war, and to maintain the discipline of the troops.793 
Punishment of violations at national level immediately upon outbreak of a con-
flict is particularly important if a negative spiral of violations of the law is to be 
avoided. 
In Estonia, extradition and mutual assistance in criminal matters as well as 
cooperation with the ICC is comprehensively regulated by the Code of Criminal 
Procedure. For example paragraph 433 provides that “International cooperation 
in criminal proceedings comprises extradition of persons to foreign states, mutual 
assistance between states in criminal matters, execution of the judgments of 
foreign courts, taking over and transfer of criminal proceedings commenced, 
cooperation with the International Criminal Court and Eurojust and extradition to 
Member States of the European Union.”794 
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Individual criminal responsibility is also in the heart of the Rome Statute and 
differentiates the ICC from other existing courts, such as the ICJ, which addresses 
State violations of law. State responsibility has been reaffirmed, and further 
developed by the International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on the Respon-
sibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, without affecting the lex 
specialis character of relevant provisions of humanitarian law.795 
There are those that do not see individual criminal responsibility as a golden 
ticket. Fleck states that “it is not only the lex specialis character of international 
humanitarian law, but even more so the particular deficiencies of law application 
in international armed conflicts, non-international armed conflicts and internal 
disturbances which makes the exercise of individual and international respon-
sibility a complex, difficult and often hopeless task.” The provisions are still not 
systematic, and there are many competing interests at play.796 
Cassese and Kleffner believe respectively that “the principal problem with the 
enforcement of IHL through the prosecution and punishment of individuals is that 
the implementation of this method ultimately hinges on, and depends upon, the 
goodwill of States”.797 And that “although criminal prosecutions of individual 
perpetrators have gathered much attention over the last decades, the framework 
of individual responsibility remains limited.” While it addresses the respon-
sibility of the individual, the violations are still based on the collective entities of 
States and armed groups.798 
It was the establishment of the ICC that prompted numerous States into 
adopting national pieces of legislation implementing IHL provisions relating to 
war crimes; before that the initial enthusiasm was not followed by massive legis-
lation as hoped.799 
Until very recently, the accepted wisdom was that neither Common Article 3 
(which is not among the grave breaches provisions of the Conventions) nor 
Protocol II (which contains no provisions on grave breaches) provided a basis for 
universal jurisdiction, and that they constituted, at least on the international plane, 
an uncertain basis for individual criminal responsibility.800 
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Protocol II is silent on sanctions, responsibility or third-party supervision, but 
it may rely for its implementation upon application of the Article 3 language 
common to the Conventions of 1949, i.e., an impartial humanitarian body, such 
as the ICRC, may offer its services to the parties to the conflict. In so doing, 
however, the non-intervention injunction of Article 3 of the Protocol should be 
taken into account.801 
“Those who reject Common Article 3 and AP II as basis for individual crimi-
nal responsibility tend to confuse criminality with jurisdiction and penalties. The 
question of what actions constitute crimes must be distinguished from the ques-
tion of jurisdiction to try those crimes. Failure to distinguish between substantive 
criminality and jurisdiction has weakened the penal aspects of the law of war”, 
holds Meron.802 Regarding the Conventions there is no doubt that certain acts 
constitute crimes, even if the scale of penalties or jurisdiction is not established. 
Individual criminal responsibility is thus a tricky method of enforcement. On 
one hand, it holds great potential for immediate punishment, deterrence and State 
involvement. On the other, it is too dependent on State’s will and the standard of 
its judicial system.  
In order to respect their obligations under IHL, States must incorporate punish-
ment for international crimes into their domestic criminal law. From a legislative 
perspective, incorporating punishments into domestic law for violations of IHL 
raises two problems: the definition of the criminal offence (the method of crimi-
nalization), and the form and the place in which it is to be introduced into the 
legal system.803 This was touched upon briefly in the first chapter of this thesis. 
In accordance with Article 49, para 4, GC 1, States are not entirely free in 
organizing this legal procedure. Minimum standards of international law, as 
stated in Articles 99–108 GC III and Article 75 AP I, must be respected. 
The ICRC Advisory Service has developed an information kit for National 
Enforcement of International Humanitarian Law. The kit deals with obligations 
in terms of penal repression; methods of incorporating punishment into criminal 
law; Universal Jurisdiction over war crimes; Command responsibility and failure 
to act; Criminal procedure; Judicial guarantees and safeguards; and Cooperation 
in extradition and judicial assistance in criminal matters.804 All this must be taken 
into account when adopting domestic legislation and other administrative acts. 
As ICRC’s database for national implementation demonstrates that this has been 
done with varying degrees of success.  
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States party to the Rome Statute have additional obligations. They must amend 
their national laws and adapt procedures to enable them to co-operate with the 
Court (for example, arrest and surrender of suspects, collecting and preserving 
evidence, enforcing fines, forfeitures and penalties). Privileges and immunities 
also have to be granted to the Court and its officers.805 These vital contributions 
of States to the respect of IHL should be peer-reviewed by other states, and the 
ICRC to gradually develop common standards for all.  
 
 
5.2.3. Repressive measures on the international level 
The primary duty for the maintenance of norms of IHL and its enforcement 
against personnel who violate it therefore rests upon States through their systems 
of criminal law and military discipline. The question of international jurisdiction 
arises only at the point where a State cannot, or will not, undertake municipal 
enforcement, or where the circumstances otherwise dictate that this is the only 
viable way of proceeding.806 
The reality of warfare has proven that the described obligatory national 
measures have failed on numerous occasions. The reasons for this might be various. 
Sometimes the home States of the perpetrators have simply ceased to exist, or 
changed so dramatically that prosecution is impossible. At other times States are 
unwilling to prosecute, or there is a dispute that calls for international fact finding 
and prosecution. Be that as it may, any discussion of international enforcement 
action should be predicated upon an assumption of the prior failure of municipal 
measures of enforcement.807 This is only logical and similar to a point previously 
mentioned – as it would not make sense to start enforcing before implementing, 
it would not be wise to turn to international measures before exhausting the 
national ones. Humanitarian law and most domestic systems give us a vast array 
of measures to take before resorting to international criminal adjudication. 
Today, when faced with allegations of violations of IHL, the international 
community has a few options if criminal prosecutions are desired. Where national 
infrastructure has collapsed, international resources could be made available to 
assist with the prosecution of the alleged offenders in domestic courts. Additional 
ad hoc international tribunals or mixed international criminal tribunals, similar to 
those established for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, could be established. 
In cases where this is possible, the case could be referred to the ICC. International 
law norms for the punishment of war crimes have evolved along with the devel-
opment of IHL. They are understood primarily as a means of enforcement of the 
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latter. Unfortunately, this development has limped along behind the develop-
mental pace of rules on warfare.808 
Some proposals were made for punishment of war crimes already in the 1929 
Conventions, and by the Commission established at the Paris Peace Conferences 
for investigating responsibility for the war’s outbreak and mandated to establish 
a criminal court. Unfortunately, the Second World War started before a system 
of prosecution was put in place.809 
After the war, as is well known, the International Military Tribunals of Nurem-
berg and Tokyo were established, and successfully conducted trials and imposed 
penalties against a number of German and Japanese actors having committed 
crimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. They saw a com-
prehensive application of the law of war’s criminal enforcement.810 These 
tribunals, and the circumstances leading to their creation, must be seen as some-
thing exceptional, and the whole system of IHL enforcement should not be based 
on this precedent. 
Since 1993, the World has witnessed the establishment of the International 
Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda, of the Special 
Court for Sierra Leone, of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cam-
bodia, and other hybrid mechanisms in East Timor, Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
Kosovo, and more recently Lebanon and Guatemala. Mendez thus concludes that 
there is a clear historical trend in breaking impunity and fostering account-
ability.811 Other authors hold, on the contrary, that national interests have out-
weighed the willingness to comply with IHL, and that War Crimes trials have 
only been convened when national political will has so dictated. Trials have only 
taken place where defeat and criminality coincided.812 
The most promising step in building long-term respect for the rule of law has 
arguably been the establishment of the permanent International Criminal Court. 
Moynier, one of Dunant’s co-founders of the ICRC, published the first known 
draft statute for an international criminal court and became a leading advocate of 
the need to supplement a purely national approach to the enforcement of the law 
of war.813 Nevertheless, the international community took 130 years to respond 
to his call with the entry into force of the Rome Statute for the ICC on 1st July 
2002.814 
                                                                                                 
808  Vöneky, “Implementation and Enforcement”, supra nota 19, p 662. Wolfrum & Fleck, 
“Enforcement”, supra nota 418, p 678. 
809  Ibid, p 680. 
810  Yves Beigbeder, “The Pioneers: The Nuremberg and Tokyo Military Trials” – Yves 
Beigbeder (ed) International Criminal Tribunals (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011) 20–48. 
811  Juan E. Mendez, „Preventing, implementing and enforcing IHL“, 39 Studies in Trans-
national Legal Policy (2008) 89–99, p 92. 
812  Skillen, “Enforcement”, supra nota 746, p 208. 
813  McCormack, „The importance“, supra nota 495, p 322. 
814  Ibid, p 321. 
191 
The jurisdiction of the ICC, which is complementary to national criminal 
jurisdictions, is limited to the most serious crimes of concern to the international 
community as a whole (Article 5 ICC Statute). But, the fact that a number of 
States have not ratified the Rome Statute indicates a double standard in the 
implementation of international criminal law. There is another issue that lessens 
the initial euphoria on the potential benefits of the ICC. The court has only tried 
a handful of cases, and the proceedings before it are enormously time-consuming 
and elaborate.815 Therefore, it is not the magical solve-all-solution that it was 
perhaps hoped to be. As indicated in many other subparagraphs, I believe that 
States should do everything in their power to avoid the escalation of an issue to 
the ICC in the first place. If a case is brought before the ICC, the State has already 
failed in its obligation to respect and ensure respect for IHL. 
The ICJ has also played a role in helping to enforce IHL. Claims based on 
violations of rules or principles of international law of human rights and/or IHL 
brought before the ICJ from 1991 were present in over 20 contentious cases. A 
recent finding of the Court has been that violations of human rights and humani-
tarian law norms create an individual right to reparation on the part of the affected 
individual, vis-a-vis the State.816 This seems to be a new development, as 
generally the right to reparation had been only acknowledged in respect of States, 
given the nature of the jurisdiction of the ICJ. 
All that said, it is probably true that we cannot (yet) speak about a compre-
hensive international judiciary, at least if understood as a complete and hierar-
chical judicial system covering the globe. Nonetheless, over the past decades, in 
large part because of the proliferation of criminal institutions supported by the 
international community, the general public has to a certain extent come to expect 
enforcement of the laws of war at the international level.817 International criminal 
institutions are, therefore, increasingly assessed, in practice, against this 
expectation. 
 
 
5.2.4. Sanctions and reparations  
Another enforcement mechanism to explore is that of sanctions and reparations. 
Sanctions express the sentiment that certain actions will not be tolerated. They 
punish wrongful conduct, serve as a warning to those considering similar action, 
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and send a message to victims.818 To be clear, sanctions in the context of this 
subparagraph mean mostly punitive actions that are taken against bearers of 
weapons, especially members of non-state armed groups. My argument here is 
that scorn and sanctions by a group that a fighter belongs to are powerful 
measures to improve compliance (especially if coupled with thorough dissemi-
nation). In fact, the dissemination obligation is essential for the effectiveness of 
sanctions, because it is the means of informing and educating people about what 
a serious violation is, and the consequences which it entails.819 When disciplinary 
sanction is taken right after a violation has occurred, it underlines the prohibition 
and has great effect on both the perpetrator and the bystanders. Criminal sanc-
tions, naturally taken with a delay, might have somewhat smaller effect, but still 
reaffirm that the conflict is not an excuse for violations.  
Sanctioning wrongful conduct also allows the armed group to distinguish 
itself from groups that intend to terrorize, engage in ethnic cleansing, and the like. 
If it is important for the group to be recognized by the international community 
and improve their image, they are much more likely to adhere to norms. Further-
more, sanctioning wrongful conduct on the part of members of the armed group 
allows superiors to demonstrate that they condemned violations of the law, thus 
satisfying their obligations under the principle of command responsibility.820 
Sanctions used by armed groups can take different forms, for example: disci-
plinary sanctions, including reprimands, warnings, confiscation of weapons, 
demotion, and dismissal from the group; financial sanctions; imprisonment and 
house arrest; corporal punishment, such as drill exercises or beatings; and criminal 
sanctions, including capital punishment.821 Some of these measures risk violating 
IHL themselves, and must be carefully tailored for each case. 
Whether or not such sanctions are effective in preventing violations has been 
a question of debate. La Rosa has drawn up a comprehensive list of elements 
which determine the effectiveness of sanctions. Of that list, a few merit particular 
attention. First of all, any message about the imposition of sanctions must be 
accompanied by measures intended to improve adherence to the rules and respect 
for them, as well as dissemination about such rules and sanctions. Secondly, the 
very idea of sanctions must incorporate prevention of a repetition of the crime 
and be based on a pragmatic and realistic approach. Thirdly, sanctions must lead 
the perpetrators to recognize their responsibility in the violation of humanitarian 
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law and thus help to enable the society to be aware of the impact of certain events, 
which have affected it.822 
On the other hand, it has been rightly assessed that “adopting an exclusively 
penal approach to unlawful behavior and sanctions makes it fairly illusory to 
expect sanctions to have a dissuasive impact”. The idea, which must be borne in 
mind, is a system of constraints at each stage of the process prior to the com-
mission of the crime.823 The preventive capacity of purely penal sanctions has 
been seen to be more “random”, as compared to an approach that takes into 
account all the factors that can result in the sanctions producing the anticipated 
effects to the full.824 
Another form of sanctions are those rising on the international level against a 
State or an armed group by another State or the international community. Article 
41 of the UN Charter authorizes the SC to decide on “measures not involving the 
use of armed force… to give effect to its decisions… These may include complete 
or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, tele-
graphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplo-
matic relations.” International embargoes against Rhodesia, Libya, Haiti, Iraq, 
and Yugoslavia were enacted under this provision. Alternatively, sanctions can 
be ordered by a regional organization, as the EU did in the Yugoslav case and 
more recently on a continuous basis against Russia. They can also be imposed 
unilaterally by one country against another, for example the US trade embargo 
against Cuba.825 
On the occasion of the armed conflict in Libya in 2011, countries from all over 
the world condemned indiscriminate attacks causing death among the civilian 
population and urged the Libyan government to respect IHL; in February 2011 
the EU approved a package of sanctions against Libyan leaders, including an arms 
embargo and a travel ban.826 International sanctions were imposed during the 
Ukrainian crisis by a large number of countries against Russia and Crimea, fol-
lowing the Russian military intervention in Ukraine. The sanctions were imposed 
by the United States, the European Union and other countries and international 
organisations against individuals, businesses and officials from Russia and 
Ukraine.827 
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Reparations 
What happens when perpetrators are brought to justice and “guilt” is established 
under national or international law? A party to a conflict, which does not comply 
with the provisions of IHL, shall be liable to make reparations, and shall be 
responsible for all acts committed by persons forming part of its armed forces. 
The forms of reparation include restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, 
satisfaction, and guarantees of non-repetition. The obligation to compensate can 
be traced to Article 91 AP I.828 Sanctions can also include an order for reparations. 
The principle of reparations effectively requires the State concerned to take 
financial responsibility for damages caused by its wrongful conduct. In practice, 
the losing party may be obliged under peace treaty to pay the victor a lump sum, 
by way of reparation for financial losses suffered by the victorious side because 
of the war.829 This has been the case in “traditional” inter-state wars, but will be 
different and not as clear-cut when it comes to armed conflicts that involve other 
actors than States.  
This obligation applies equally to each party to the conflict, whether aggressor 
or defender. Compensation must be paid only if violation of IHL causes com-
pensable damages (personal injuries, material and property damage, etc). A 
general obligation to compensate for violation of law has not yet been accepted 
under international law.830 
In 1929 the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) stated that, “It is 
a principle of international law that the reparation of a wrong may consist in an 
indemnity corresponding to the damage which the nationals of the injured State 
have suffered as a result of the act which is contrary to international law.”831 
Regrettably, for a long time victims of violations of IHL themselves could hardly 
claim compensation on the basis of provisions of IHL instruments, due to lack of 
specific enforcement mechanisms. As Zegveld notes, although at the inter-
national level more channels are available to victims to claim compensation, a 
general remedy does not exist.832 Fleck also noted that “still today, the right to 
individual reparation mainly rests within municipal legal orders and there are no 
other remedies for individual victims, except under national law. An international 
legal regime of individual reparations could strengthen democratic developments 
and have deterrent effects for some perpetrators.”833 
Such a remedy was finally made available under Articles 75 and 79 of the 
Statute of the ICC, which provide for reparations and the establishment of a Trust 
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Fund for victims of violations. In addition, the ICJ’s findings in the advisory 
opinion on the Wall case paved the way towards a better protection for individuals 
under the framework of international law in general, and to the possibility of 
awarding reparations directly to the affected natural and legal persons in 
particular.834 
The UN Commission on Human Rights has thereafter prepared “Basic prin-
ciples and guidelines on the right to a remedy and reparation for victims of gross 
violations of international HRL and serious violations of international humani-
tarian law”, adopted by the General Assembly in December 2005.835 According 
to these guidelines, States shall, if they have not already done so, make available 
adequate, effective, prompt and appropriate remedies, including reparation, and 
ensure that their domestic law provides at least the same level of protection for 
victims as that required by their international obligations. It is hard to tell if, and 
how, these guidelines have been implemented in practice.  
Kleffner provides another interesting measure for improving compliance with 
IHL – the establishment of an Individual Complaints Procedure.836 He holds that 
providing individuals with the possibility to submit complaints to an international 
judicial or quasi-judicial mechanism, which could determine their claims to be 
victims of violations of IHL committed by parties to an armed conflict, would be 
one additional means for improving compliance with IHL.837 The individual com-
plaints procedure has not been significantly discussed within the context of IHL, 
and the Hague Appeal that advocated for such procedure has unfortunately not 
had a lasting impact. 
 
 
5.2.5. Belligerent reprisals 
In his chapter on implementation and non-judicial enforcement of IHL Siva-
kumaran differentiates between internal mechanisms (e.g. dissemination, instruc-
tion, sanctions) and a second category of enforcement measures that are carried 
out by one party as a response to violations committed by the other side. 
According to him, such enforcement measures primarily take the form of 
belligerent reprisals. A belligerent reprisal is “an act in breach of a rule of the law 
of armed conflict, directed by one belligerent party against the other with a view 
to inducing the latter party to stop violating that or another rule of this branch of 
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international law”. He warns that if the act were not undertaken with such a view 
in mind it would be unlawful.838 
Roberts defines a reprisal as “a retaliatory measure, normally contrary to 
international law, taken by one party to a conflict with the specific purpose of 
making an opponent desist from particular actions violating international law. It 
might be intended, for example, to make the adversary abandon an unlawful 
practice of warfare”.839 
Fleck holds that reprisals are, “quite controversially, a means of enforcement 
of IHL that constitute violations or grave breaches of that same law, and may 
result in disciplinary or criminal proceedings. The use of reprisals should cause 
an adversary who is contravening international law to cease that violation. They 
are permissible only in exceptional cases and for the purpose of enforcing 
compliance with international law.”840 More importantly, the decision to take 
retaliatory measures lies at the political level, i.e. a military leader does not have 
the right to decide on the use of them. 
Reprisals are thus exceptionally justified in the light of a prior unlawful act 
committed by the State at which they are directed. Thus the International Law 
Commission, which uses the term “countermeasures” to designate such acts, 
considers the initial illegality to constitute a circumstance which precludes the 
illegality of the response.841 
The lawfulness of the measures themselves, notably with regard to their content 
and implementation, is determined not only in terms of the limits dictated by the 
demands of civilization and humanity, but also in terms of their aim. Palwankar 
also warns that the aim is neither to punish (we are concerned with counter-
measures, not sanctions) nor to seek compensation, but solely to oblige the State 
which is responsible for violating the law to stop doing so, by inflicting damage 
upon it, and to deter it from repeating the same offence in the future.842 
 
 
5.2.5.1. Under which circumstances is the use of reprisals allowed? 
As said, reprisals are permissible only in exceptional cases and for the purpose of 
enforcing compliance with international law. They are countermeasures that 
justify the infringement of the rights of a subject of international law, which itself 
is violating the law. This justification is given if, and only if, certain conditions 
are met: reprisals are aimed to stop the ongoing unlawful conduct; they are neces-
sary and proportional in regard to the ongoing unlawful conduct and the caused 
damage and they must end if the unlawful conduct of the adversary ends.843 
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According to the Kupreškić Trial Chamber, the use of reprisals has the fol-
lowing restrictions: 
(a) they must be a last resort in attempts to impose compliance and may be 
exercised only after a prior warning has been given; 
(b) there is an obligation to take special precautions before implementing them; 
(c) the principle of proportionality must be adhered to and; 
(d) the “elementary considerations of humanity” must be taken into account.844 
 
In establishing the lawfulness of a reprisal, two norms have usually been applied 
by the courts: subsidiarity, and proportionality. Subsidiarity means that recourse 
to belligerent reprisals is an exceptional measure which must be regarded as an 
ultimate remedy, after other available means of a less exceptional character have 
failed. And proportionality generally means proportionality to the preceding 
illegality, not to such future illegal acts as the reprisal may prevent. It also means 
the absence of obvious disproportionality.845 
As the purpose of a belligerent reprisal is to compel the other party to the 
conflict to observe the law, it is evident that a prior violation of the law of armed 
conflict must have occurred. The enforcement function of the doctrine also means 
that, “if one party to an armed conflict breaches the law but then expresses regret, 
declares that it will not be repeated, and takes measures to punish those immedi-
ately responsible, then any action taken by another party in response to the 
original unlawful act cannot be justified as a reprisal”.846 The Martić Trial 
Chamber has suggested that “[r]eprisals are … drastic and exceptional measures 
employed by one belligerent for the sole purpose of seeking compliance with the 
law of armed conflict by the opposite party”.847 
Sivakumaran submits that the latter overstates the point. “While reprisals must 
be undertaken to enforce compliance with the law on the part of the opposing 
party”, he says, “they may be taken also for other reasons, for example to satisfy 
public pressure, or a particular domestic constituency. /…/ These other reasons 
do not render unlawful the use of belligerent reprisals. The relevant test should 
be whether the employment of belligerent reprisals was for the primary purpose 
of seeking compliance with the law by the opposing party.”848 In my view, this is 
a risky statement and contradicts the definition of reprisals. Reprisals are not 
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sanctions, nor criminal jurisdiction measures. They may, additionally, satisfy 
public pressure, but their primary aim is to put an end to violations, nothing more. 
 
 
5.2.5.2. Prohibited belligerent reprisals 
The Conventions prohibit reprisals against protected persons. This was discussed 
at the conference of 1974–1977 and, as a result, reprisals were banned by Protocol 
I in relation to the wounded, sick and shipwrecked. Even before that, in 1970, the 
UN General Assembly had re-affirmed that civilian population, or individual 
members thereof, should not be the objects of reprisals.849 
The Hague Convention on Cultural Property protects cultural property from 
belligerent reprisals. The Amended Mines Protocol prohibits the use of certain 
mines as a belligerent reprisal against civilians and civilian objects. The result of 
the various restrictions is that, unless a reservation has been made, States parties 
to Protocol I are limited in their use of belligerent reprisals essentially to 
combatants only.850 
Kalshoven points out that reprisals against civilians in a situation of internal 
armed conflict was left unregulated in 1977, and warns that the state of customary 
international law with regard to reprisals against the civilian population and 
civilian objects continues to be a matter of considerable controversy.851 Other 
authors note that the extent to which the law of non-international armed conflict 
prohibits the use of belligerent reprisals is not clear. It is even difficult to conclude 
that Common Article 3 prohibits belligerent reprisals against civilians in the con-
duct of hostilities. As no general prohibition of belligerent reprisals has so far 
been achieved, it remains to be seen whether any norms regulate the recourse to 
such belligerent reprisals which have not been prohibited.852 
An example of belligerent reprisals being used is the armed conflict between 
Iran and Iraq, where both sides openly and frequently resorted to reprisal bom-
bardments directed against the enemy civilian population. However, their 
activities clearly failed to bring about a change in the other party’s behaviour.853 
Roger calls belligerent reprisals a relic from the past, a rather blunt enforce-
ment weapon. While customary law permitted the taking of reprisals to redress 
illegitimate acts by the enemy, the concept has been narrowed down to com-
batants and military objectives, which are lawful targets.854 Consequently, 
reprisals as a method of enforcement have lost a lot of significance. 
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McCoubrey shares this pessimism, and holds that resorting to belligerent 
reprisals remains an unfortunate means by which to enforce the law. Such 
responses to gross illegality may be inevitable, but are nevertheless not to be 
encouraged. “They are increasingly restricted, especially so far as key humani-
tarian norms are concerned, and it is to be hoped that in time, modes of response 
which do not involve the perpetration of proportionate illegalities will entirely 
supplant them.”855 
There are few authors that still believe that in the absence of impartial moni-
toring mechanisms, the sole device to put pressure on an enemy to comply with 
the law is the institution of belligerent reprisals.856 In practice, the institution is 
outdated and cannot be realistically said to contribute to enforcing IHL. This 
inevitably leads to the conclusion that other existing rules, especially the preven-
tion measures, must be made more effective. 
 
 
5.2.6. Deterrence 
It is important in this context to briefly stop on the issue of deterrence, a crucial 
element in the success of international judgements. Roberts has noted that “a 
critical weakness that has seriously affected understanding and implementation 
of the laws of war is the almost complete divorce between two important schools 
of thought about security matters in the post–1945 period.” On the one hand, 
theorists of deterrence have shown little interest in the laws of war; on the other, 
proponents of IHL have had little to say about deterrence of any kind. “For 
proponents of the laws of war to neglect the question of deterrence is to risk con-
signing themselves to a position of doctrinal purity and practical irrelevance.”857 
Deterrence, as an aim of criminal law, means discouraging future crime by 
effectively punishing crimes already committed. Since at least Beccaria, criminal 
policy generally has assumed that punishment – if certain and prompt – can deter 
the general public from committing crimes.858 General deterrence, more specifi-
cally, is understood as the theory that criminally punishing an offender for 
violating the law dissuades others from similar violations. Seeing other criminals 
being punished for not respecting IHL should therefore deter members of armed 
groups from committing violations. However, some authors have suggested that 
international criminal justice provides minimal general deterrence of future 
violations of IHL.859 
The first international courts were primarily punitive in their nature, and 
general deterrence was not a primary goal of the architects of the ad hoc tribunals. 
Not until the 1998 Rome Statute did the international community formally 
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embrace the idea that international criminal justice provided general deterrence. 
Indeed, general deterrence is even said to be “the most important goal of the ICC”. 
The former president of the ICC claimed that “[b]y putting potential perpetrators 
on notice that they may be tried before the Court, the ICC is intended to contribute 
to the deterrence of these crimes”.860 
While providing general deterrence is a challenge for any criminal justice 
system, the challenge is much greater in the international context, given the limited 
jurisdiction of the ICC and the ad hoc tribunals. They have limited mandates and 
resources, which understandably results in prosecuting only the most serious 
offenders. By definition, international criminal justice cannot offer anything close 
to certainty of punishment.861  
It has even been argued that claims on international courts and tribunals 
deterring future violations assume an inconsistent burden that the processes can-
not bear, in essence setting international criminal justice up for failure. The limited 
number of proceedings, the length of time required, the dense opinions generated, 
and the relatively light sentences all wear down whatever limited general 
deterrence international criminal justice might otherwise provide.862 Bluntly 
stated, thousands of pages of multiple Tadić decisions have not factored into any 
armed-groups’ members’ decision-making on whether to comply with IHL.863 
For international criminal justice to generally deter IHL violations there would 
need to be exponentially more cases and easily understandable judgments issued 
closer in time to the original IHL violations. 
Of course, it should not be decisive whether the influence stems directly from 
a judicial decision, or, for instance, from a military manual that was amended 
following such a decision. Effectiveness can be defined as the ability to induce a 
change away from the status quo in a desired direction, even if the result is less 
than full compliance. “The effectiveness of international criminal courts and 
tribunals in regard to general deterrence should therefore be assessed in a more 
holistic way”, Acquaviva believes: as the ability to foster behavioral changes and 
reinforce the legal ban on prohibited conduct, even when it is “mediated” by other 
legal and social instruments and does not directly flow from the text of an ICTY 
or ICC judgment.”864 
Ultimately, the interests of justice and the interests of peace cannot and should 
not be divorced. Justice is an important component of the prevention of future 
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crimes. It is only through justice and through enforcement of the law that long-
term respect for the rule of law can be built.865 
In conclusion, many authors still believe that the most effective means of 
enforcing IHL remains the prosecution and punishment of offenders within 
national or international criminal jurisdictions.866 Or to put it differently – that a 
truly effective enforcement regime must involve domestic trials,867 and that a 
clear preference has become apparent for, whenever possible, a national rather 
than an international system.868  
One of the fundamental problems of international justice might be that it is 
not yet systematic, and there are still too many ways to escape it. This in turn 
shows the importance of the complementarity approach: the need to foster 
accountability at both the domestic and the international levels, so that they ulti-
mately reinforce each other.869 Whichever system is chosen, accountability for 
such crimes must be comprehensive, balanced and holistic, meaning that policies 
and practices must address the need to discover and disclose the truth, to bring 
perpetrators to justice, to offer reparations to the victims, and to promote deep 
reform in the institutions through which State power is exercised.870 
 
 
5.2.7. National measures taken in Estonia 
Introducing national rules on criminal liability for violations of IHL helps to 
ensure respect for this body of law, but is also part of the concept of legal 
certainty. Everyone must be able to foresee with sufficient certainty what legal 
consequences one or another act will bring.871 The Estonian Penal Code is suffi-
ciently clear on criminalizing the majority of international crimes. War crimes 
are dealt with separately in Division IV of Chapter Eight titled „Offences against 
humanity and international security“. It contains 21 Articles that should cover all 
war crimes under the Conventions. Some very detailed or repeating descriptions 
in the Protocols find their place within other provisions of the Code. There is also 
a special „rescue clause“ in case a specific crime should not be covered in the 
division. Article 94 (1) states that „offences committed in war time which are not 
provided for in this Division are punishable on the basis of other provisions of 
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the Special Part of this Code“.872 States should always make sure that war crimes 
under international are also regarded as such under domestic law, as they are 
punishable by more severe penalties and may, in certain cases, be subject to 
retroactivity. 
Article 13 of the Constitution and Article 2 of the Penal Code provide that no 
one shall be convicted or punished for an act which was not an offence pursuant 
to the law applicable at the time of the commission of the act. However, non-
retroactivity in international criminal law is not as absolute as in domestic law. 
War crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide are also punishable if the acts 
were criminalized under international law at the time when they were committed, 
but not under national criminal law.873 In a 2003 judgment, the Supreme Court of 
Estonia found in a case against Vladimir Penart that the nullum crimen sine lege 
principle is not violated if the offense was prohibited by international law at the 
time when the offense was committed, but the domestic provision was adopted 
after the offense.874 This perfectly illustrates the need for many of the domestic 
implementation measures. A State should notify its citizens as soon as possible 
in a language they understand which offences constitute war crimes, and that the 
principle of non-retroactivity of criminal law may not apply.875 
Common Articles 49, 50, 129 and 146 of the Conventions provide for uni-
versal jurisdiction for serious infringements. On this basis each High Contracting 
Party shall be under the obligation to search for persons alleged to have com-
mitted, or to have ordered to be committed, such grave breaches, and shall bring 
such persons, regardless of their nationality, before its own courts.876 It may also, 
if it prefers, and in accordance with the provisions of its own legislation, hand 
such persons over for trial to another High Contracting Party concerned. The prin-
ciple of universality is laid down in Article 8 of the Penal Code in Estonia. It 
states that regardless of the law of the place of commission of an act, the penal 
law of Estonia shall apply to any acts committed outside the territory of Estonia 
if punishability of the act arises from an international obligation binding on 
Estonia. 
The Code of Criminal Procedure further specifies the conditions of extradition 
and cooperation with the ICC.877  
A person committing a war crime will not be released from liability solely 
because he was executing superior orders, as was said before. This principle 
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became particularly important during the Nuremberg Process after World War II, 
as it proved to be one of the most common excuses for committing appalling war 
crimes.878 If the perpetrator knew, or should have known, that the command given 
to him was unlawful, he and the commanding officer shall both be liable for the 
offense committed. Failure to comply with an unlawful order is regulated in 
Estonia by Articles 27–29 of the Internal Regulations of the Defence Forces and, 
indirectly, by § 433 of the Penal Code, which stipulates the punishment for failure 
to comply with a lawful order of a commander.879 The Penal Code could, how-
ever, spell out the content of the obligation more accurately, as it does not make 
it clear that the execution of the order may be a war crime. The Articles in the 
Internal Regulations are interesting to analyse. Article 27 states that: “An order 
is ‘void’ if it calls for committing an offence. A void order cannot be given, and 
may not be executed”. Article 28 states that: “An order is ‘prohibited’ if it is 
against the law. A prohibited order must be executed” (sic!).880 I think this overly 
complicates matters, and leaves the soldier utterly confused as what he has to do 
when receiving an order that is vague. He cannot realistically be expected to know 
the difference between an order that is simply against the law or constituting an 
offence. The concept of superior orders should, therefore, be significantly clari-
fied in Estonian domestic law. 
Failure to act is a close concept to superior orders and means that a superior 
is not absolved from penal or disciplinary responsibility for a breach committed 
by his subordinate, if they knew, or had information which should have enabled 
them to conclude in the circumstances at the time, that he was committing or was 
going to commit such a breach and if they did not take all feasible measures 
within their power to prevent or repress the breach.881 This is not directly regu-
lated domestically in Estonia. 
In addition, there are a few more points to keep in mind. First, war crimes and 
crimes against humanity have no statute of limitations under international law 
and, naturally, States must bring their laws in line with this principle.882 Article 
81 (2) of the Penal Code states that “Crimes of aggression, crimes of genocide, 
crimes against humanity, war crimes and criminal offences for which life 
imprisonment is prescribed do not expire”. There is no contradiction between 
national and international law here. Second, States must provide each other with 
every assistance in connection with criminal cases brought against serious vio-
lations and, third, provide for a procedure under which victims of violations of 
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humanitarian law may seek compensation for the damage caused.883 Once again, 
all these obligations can only work through national mechanisms. Assistance in 
criminal cases is provided for in the Code of Criminal Procedure, but the com-
pensation mechanism has not been regulated. It has been an object of major 
national debate for some years now, in light of the Country’s soviet past. 
 
 
5.3. Armed groups compliance with IHL 
It has been long recognized that engaging armed non-state actors on compliance 
with international norms is a critical element in any effort to strengthen the pro-
tection of civilians. According to a recent study, at least five different UN organs 
and agencies have drafted policies or guidelines on engagement with armed non-
state actors (UNOCHA, DPKO the UNSG, UNICEF and UNHCR). However, 
how armed non-state actors understand international humanitarian norms, how 
they value them, or to what extent they have the necessary capacity to actually 
implement these norms are issues which are yet to be understood. Academic 
research has shown that if one strives for better implementation of IHL, humani-
tarian norms must be reflected in the local norms and values of armed groups, i.e. 
increase their ownership of international law.884 
Today’s armed conflicts no longer fit the traditional model of one State 
fighting against another. More often than not they are armed groups’ struggles 
against each other, or a particular host State. Concerns on the applicability and 
accuracy of the Conventions in regulating these “new” types of conflicts are thus 
well founded. It is extremely difficult to influence armed groups to abide by the 
rules drawn up in Geneva decades ago. It was established earlier that the Con-
ventions must be universally respected, but why should armed groups bother? 
Why should they take this body of law as a starting point, and how can they be 
held responsible for violations of IHL? It is important to link the rather theoretical 
discussions in previous chapters to this very practical issue. What needs to be 
asked is whether there are measures of implementation and enforcement that 
actually help foster compliance amongst armed groups. Academic discussion has 
increasingly focused on this topic in recent years. Especially on the individual’s 
role in making a decision to either comply or not. After all, States do not make 
decisions, people do.  
At the outset, it is submitted that, contrary to general belief, fear of criminal 
repression is not the most effective means to induce compliance by armed groups. 
Enforcement in its stricter punitive sense is not the key. It is not legalization, i.e. 
creating more stringent rules or regulating more aspects of humanitarian law 
either. It is rather a set of perplexing multidisciplinary preventive measures that 
should be carefully analysed to reach better results in the future.  
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Stephens suggests that identification of the underlying values implicit in the 
corpus of IHL can have a more sustained impact on behaviour than merely relying 
upon “the law” and potential prosecutions for its violation.885 Many other authors 
reach the same conclusion, sometimes even asking whether increased formali-
zation actually inversely correlates with observance of the normative principles 
underlying regimes.886 This subchapter asks what the other factors influencing 
compliance besides law and prosecution are and how the existing measures can 
be better used. 
 
 
5.3.1. Characteristics and organizational culture of armed groups 
For the purposes of this discussion, it is important to define what a combatant is. 
Simply put, “combatant” is the legal status of an individual who has the right to 
engage in hostilities during an international armed conflict. The definition is 
found in article 43 of AP 1. It states that “Members of the armed forces of a Party 
to a conflict (other than medical personnel and chaplains covered by Article 33 
of the Third Convention) are combatants, that is to say, they have the right to 
participate directly in hostilities.” However, in recent literature that definition is 
not fully adhered to. When talking about members of armed groups, authors mean 
both members of regular State armies and other fighting groups that pass the 
threshold of being under relevant control and are sufficiently organized. 
There are specific characteristics that both combatants and members of armed 
groups have that influence their decision to either respect the law or not. 
Normally, combatants are under strict hierarchical and structured State control, 
whereas armed groups range from very loosely connected fighters to groups that 
resemble State armies by any measurement. Naturally, differences in their 
reasoning and organisational culture occur and everything said in this subchapter 
should be read with this caveat in mind.  
Various constraints are involved in identifying armed groups that can be 
influenced by the discourse of compliance with the law. For instance, for IHL to 
be applicable the armed groups must at the very least be operating in a context of 
non-international armed conflict. To qualify as an armed group a minimum 
degree of organization, such as a command structure and the capacity to sustain 
military operations is necessary.887 This level of organization is particularly 
relevant for our purposes, for a group that is very loosely organized may well be 
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unable to familiarize its members with IHL and establish mechanisms to ensure 
compliance.888 
Understanding this structure is important for humanitarian organizations in 
two ways. First, it helps to identify key decision-makers within a group. Second, 
organizational structure can indicate the levels of influence that leaders have at 
their disposal. Centralized armed groups rely on clearly established rules and 
values, which are likely to be communicated to the members through indoctri-
nation and training. Decentralized and community-embedded armed groups do 
not always have written codes of conduct, drawing instead on shared values and 
traditions.889 
Centralized non-state armed groups share many of the structural charac-
teristics of State armies, including a prominent hierarchy, elaborate doctrine and 
strict discipline. However, they do not benefit from State resources and infra-
structure, creating greater challenges for leaders to communicate with, and 
monitor the behaviour of, field commanders and their units.890 All armed groups 
capable of launching operations have structures of one kind or other – one or 
more leaders and degrees of organization which need to be identified. They have 
their own objectives, strategies, diasporas, links with crime, sources of finance, 
codes of conduct and the like.891 
Dickinson has done extensive research on organizational theory linked to 
armed groups, and concludes that the literature holds tremendous promise and 
could meaningfully reshape compliance debates. She regrets that a sustained 
commitment to qualitative analysis of the actual mechanisms by which compliance 
occurs is still missing and scholars have spent too little time trying to tease out 
these factors. “After all”, she says, “few would dispute that compliance occurs not 
so much because of fears of enforcement but because of combined psychological, 
sociological, and institutional factors that make obeying the law habitual, 
legitimate, socially acceptable, convenient, normal, and so on”.892 
One interesting takeaway from Dickinson’s work is the suggestion that 
organizational culture can actually be affected by external forces, including laws, 
norms, values, and aspirational targets. It follows that defining international law 
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norms may have a real impact on institutions even absent mechanisms of enforce-
ment. Furthermore, training regimens can have lasting effects on institutional 
culture by changing the normative space within the institution.893 
The ICRC’s recent studies on the roots of behaviour and roots of restraint in 
war also emphasise that a detailed understanding of the inner workings of armed 
groups is a prerequisite for identifying the sources of authority, the beliefs, the 
traditions and the people steering their behaviour towards violence or restraint.894 
Some rather universal characteristics can be used to describe members of 
armed forces. First, they are subject to group conformity phenomena such as 
depersonalization, loss of independence and a high degree of conformity. They 
are also subject to a process of shifting individual responsibility from themselves 
to their superiors in the chain of command. When they take part in hostilities and 
go through traumatizing experiences they might be caught in a spiral of violence 
and perpetrate violations of IHL themselves.895 
Hoffmann sees armed groups in the darkest of shades stating that though 
studies of these groups are limited, it is clear that they are capable of extreme 
brutality. They tend to be composed of uneducated individuals with few prospects 
in a stable environment. Many of them may prefer a life lived in the midst of 
lawlessness and chaos. It is improbable that they would pay much attention to 
criminal law in a country at peace, let alone IHL in a country at war.896 
He admits that we need to find ways to persuade them to comply with humani-
tarian norms, although some of them live in isolation from the world and have no 
reference group beyond their own armed band.897 Others are motivated by ideo-
logical hostility to the western world, and probably view the modern international 
legal system as a western construct that has no legitimacy. 
It seems therefore, that if the structure and motives of armed groups would be 
better understood, much could be accomplished in improving compliance with 
IHL. 
 
 
5.3.2. Why armed groups decide to respect the law, or not? 
International law scholarship “remains locked in a raging debate about the extent 
to which States do or do not comply with international legal norms. For years, 
this debate lacked empirical data altogether. After all, even when we speak of 
domestic law, few would dispute that compliance occurs not so much because of 
fears of enforcement, but because of combined psychological, sociological, and 
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institutional factors that make obeying the law habitual, legitimate, socially accept-
able, convenient, normal, and so on.”898 It is therefore surprising that scholars have 
spent so little time trying to figure out what these factors are as they debate the 
compliance question in the international arena. 
Do armed groups choose to comply with IHL because they are aware of the 
age old norms it contains and are afraid of sanctions that follow, or is it something 
else? Bangerter holds that the decision to respect the law or not is far from auto-
matic, regardless of whether it is taken by an armed group or a State. It follows 
that respect for IHL can only be encouraged if the reasons used by armed groups 
to justify respect or lack of it are understood and if the arguments in favour of 
respect take those reasons into account.899 
There are a few authors that have recently drawn attention to these reasons. In 
addition, the ICRC commissioned a study and a follow-up to get to the roots of 
this phenomenon. The results of the original study were published in 2004 titled 
The Roots of Behaviour in War (RBW). The aim of the study was to identify 
factors, which were crucial in affecting the behaviour of bearers of weapons in 
armed conflicts.900 It indicated three parameters that determine the behaviour of 
fighters:  
1) their position within a group, which leads them to behave in conformity with 
what the group expects of them;  
2) their position in a hierarchical structure which leads them to obey authority 
(because they perceive it as legitimate or as a coercive force, or a mixture of 
the two);  
3) the process of moral disengagement favoured by the war situation, which 
authorises recourse to violence against those defined as being the enemy.901 
 
It also attempted to divide the causes of IHL violations into five broad categories: 
(1) the encouragement to crime that is part of the nature of war, (2) the definition 
of war aims, (3) reasons of opportunity, (4) psycho-sociological reasons and, 
finally, (5) reasons connected with the individual.902 Bangerter outlines three 
reasons for non-compliance: the group’s objective; the military advantage, and 
what it is that IHL represents according to the group. Among the reasons for 
respecting the law, two considerations weigh particularly heavily: their self-
image and the military advantage.903 It is thus vital to understand the rationale 
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leading to respect or non-respect in order to persuade armed groups to comply 
with the rules. 
Bangenter holds that “the mere existence of a body of law is not enough to 
ensure that it is applied; it would be naive to hope that armed groups could be 
won over by the mere existence of international law.”904 In fact, the RBW study 
outlines: “Knowledge does not suffice to induce a favourable attitude towards a 
norm or to the institution responsible for its promotion. Moreover, a favourable 
attitude – or indeed sincere adherence – to a norm does not mean that combatants 
will conform to it in a real-life situation.”905 
Besides (or rather instead of) relevant legal considerations, other factors seem 
to carry greater weight. For example, the personal conviction and sense of moral 
responsibility of the individuals involved, expressed in the form of the principle 
of chivalry, are quite important for ensuring compliance with IHL. As Gill has 
noted, chivalry and martial honour have always been part of the “code of the 
warrior” and have played a significant role in the development of the law of 
war.906 
Most armed groups see their aim as beneficial for their country or their ethnic 
group, and attach some importance to being recognized by the international com-
munity. It therefore seems logical for the protection of that same population to be 
included in their objectives.907 Similarly, avoiding violations of IHL may help to 
convey a positive image of the group, which might be very important to them. 
A notion connected to the previous one is the support the population provides 
for the survival of the group. The groups we are talking about are usually not self-
sufficient and financially secured groups. They often depend on what the local 
people can supply and this is a very effective argument in favour of showing 
respect for people in general.908 
Another reason for compliance with IHL is paradoxically the military advantage 
it actually gives to the group. The morale of their fighters, support of the people, 
effective use of military resources, weakening of the enemy, and impact on long-
term victory are factors where genuine respect for IHL will give a decisive 
advantage.909 It is clear that the lack of discipline could lead to violations that are 
detrimental to the group’s military performance. 
The importance of group compliance and organizational structure has been 
briefly mentioned already. I am convinced that compliance is best achieved 
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through influencing cultural norms and organizational structures, rather than new 
rules and enforcement by international courts. Indeed, reforms aimed at structure 
and culture may well run deeper and last longer than other possible efforts to 
induce greater compliance.910 Social psychology studies also show that the mutual 
reinforcement of two phenomena (obedience to authority and conformity to the 
group) ensures an extremely high degree of submission to orders (explicit or 
implicit).911 
The abovementioned were some of the reasons why armed groups have 
decided to abide by the customary and treaty based rules. On the other hand, there 
are many reasons why they choose not to respect the law. Some of these reasons 
are not as straightforward as one might expect. One unpredicted cause of vio-
lations stemmes from interpreting the terms of IHL. Many armed groups that 
attack civilians (as defined by IHL) do so not because they want to attack civilians 
but because their definition of protected persons is different.912 In this context the 
need for proper dissemination and instruction become even more evident. 
Furthermore, while the findings of the RBW study indicate that there is an 
understanding of scope of the general norms (such as the fact that certain kinds 
of behavior are prohibited in time of war or that civilians must not be attacked), 
it is not the same with regard to their application. When the combatants inter-
viewed are asked to refer to more specific situations which confront them with a 
dilemma (e.g. can we attack civilians who are helping the enemy?) serious cracks 
begin to appear.913 
In addition, it is fully conceivable for the belligerents to know that an act is 
illegal but to consider it legitimate. If the enemy is guilty of violations of IHL, 
combatants will argue that they are justified in not respecting it either. This is 
why legitimacy was touched upon in the previous chapters of this work. It is an 
important link and maybe even the key to foster greater compliance. The “secret” 
formula for adhering to IHL during armed conflicts might therefore lie in a deli-
cate balance between group compliance, the perceived legitimacy of the group’s 
aims and the perceived legitimacy of the humanitarian norms.  
Having analysed all these possible issues, the study somewhat surprisingly 
concludes that there is a need to treat IHL as a legal and political matter rather 
than as a moral one, and focus communication activities more on the norms than 
on their underlying values because the idea that the bearer of weapons is morally 
autonomous is inappropriate.914 
One of the main conclusions of the study is that the rigorous training of com-
batants, strict orders concerning proper conduct, and effective sanctions in the 
event of failure to obey those orders are prerequisites for obtaining greater respect 
                                                                                                 
910  Dickinson, “Military lawyers”, supra nota 459, p 28. 
911  Muńoz-Rojas & Frésard, „The roots”, supra nota 891, p 195. 
912  Bangerter, „Reasons why”, supra nota 899, p 382. There are older examples, especially 
the Viet Cong in South Vietnam (1965) and to a more limited extent the FMLN in El Salvador. 
913  Muńoz-Rojas & Frésard, „The roots”, supra nota 891, pp 199–197. 
914  Ibid, p 203. 
211 
for humanitarian law from weapon bearers. Without a normative frame of 
reference, “those who have been victims of war are drawn into a cycle of vengeance 
which leads them to pay less and less heed to the application of IHL. On the other 
hand, if the acknowledgement of such principles is firmly rooted, attitudes 
encouraging people to seek the protection offered by the norms tend to become 
predominant.”915 
This approach has been widely criticized by other authors. Stephens, for 
example, says that despite the richness of its interdisciplinary methodology, the 
study was surprisingly formal and narrow in its conclusions. “The central message 
from this study is that strict compliance with the law, backed up by a regime of 
effective disciplinary action, is the critical focus necessary to ensure that soldiers 
and other “bearers of arms” act correctly. The implication from these conclusions 
is that soldiers cannot be trusted to exercise any kind of applied judgment 
regarding underlying values and that only a strong reliance on “the law”, and a 
strict regime of enforcement, will ensure that behaviour is effectively 
conditioned.”916 
Given the time that has passed since the publication of this important work, 
some have wondered whether it was opportune to ask if the conclusions made by 
the authors are “durable”, in the sense that they should remain the exclusive focus 
of compliance strategies relating to IHL instruction and practice. An update of 
the project titled The Roots of Restraint in War was published in 2018. This report 
explores restraint, defined as behaviour that indicates deliberate actions to limit 
the use of violence. The most common violations witnessed today include attacks 
on non-combatants, disproportionate attacks, the use of indiscriminate weaponry, 
forced displacement, sexual violence, and attacks on health-care infrastructure 
and personnel.917 
This study and the ICRC’s experience suggest that across all types of armed 
groups, an exclusive focus on the law is not as effective at influencing behaviour 
as a combination of the law and the values underpinning it. Linking the law to 
local norms and values gives it greater traction.918 
Thus, it is here that this study differs with the Roots of Behaviour in War 
conclusions, which opposed invoking moral values, arguing them to be relativist 
and unreliable, and instead advocated for a formalistic adherence to orders, dis-
cipline and hierarchy. This research demonstrates that the “integration approach” 
has considerable ongoing validity in seeking to shape the behaviour of com-
batants towards civilians, but it needs to be fully tailored to the audience, taught 
with intensity and tested under duress.919 
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The research found that there is a need for both the law and the values under-
pinning it, with the emphasis of each influence dependent on the target audience. 
The role of law is vital in setting the standards, but ensuring that the values it 
represents are internalized seems to be a more durable way of promoting restraint. 
The internalization of norms beyond IHL-based punishments is all the more 
necessary in decentralized counter-insurgency warfare, where units operate far 
from commander oversight and the legal enforcement mechanisms of higher 
command. There is no substitute for honour.920 
 
 
5.3.3. Ways to foster compliance and monitor compliance 
What are the options for a State or the international community if, after all the 
above, armed groups still violate IHL? This body of law, unlike HRL, applies to 
non-state actors and armed groups, but there are much fewer enforcement mecha-
nisms devised for them. Sassoli proposes four ways in which we may hold armed 
groups responsible for violating international law: 1) through State responsibility 
i.e. one tries to attribute them to a State (The ICTY has used this approach in the 
Tadic case); 2) through individual criminal responsibility, which has also been 
successfully employed by international tribunals; 3) to hold the armed group or 
non-state actor directly responsible itself;921 4) to impute individual criminal 
responsibility to the members of an armed group for any IHL violations it 
commits, on the sole basis of membership.922 
It has been held that attempts to influence the behaviour of parties to a non-
international armed conflict will be most effective in the context of a process of 
engagement and relationship with each party to the conflict. A long-term process 
of engagement will provide opportunities for negotiating access, for developing 
good contacts with appropriately placed persons, and for gaining reliable infor-
mation about the circumstances surrounding the conflict.923 
When an armed conflict breaks out, it is important to formally inform all 
parties of the legal characterization of the situation and to remind them of the 
applicable rules, that is, of their obligations under humanitarian law. The ICRC 
most often makes this communication by way of a letter or memorandum sub-
mitted directly to the parties to a conflict, in a bilateral and confidential manner.924 
First of all, one might wonder, what are the problems with regards to com-
pliance in internal conflicts? What armed groups are doing that we want them to 
stop? In majority of times the problem lies in the distinction that has to be made 
between military objects and the civilian population, since the methods of non-
state actors often include the targeting of civilians and indiscriminate attacks. The 
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treatment of detainees is also a problem, since basic humanitarian guarantees are 
not always available.925 These issues, however, are deeply rooted in customary 
law and ignorance of the law can therefore not be an excuse for non-compliance. 
There are a large variety of measures that can be used in non-international 
armed conflict to induce compliance by the actors. In part, they have also been 
discussed in previous sections of this work, but some are inherent specifically to 
NIACs. Some of them include: The role of the ICRC (Common Article 3), 
supported by the international community and action through the UN system; 
direct diplomatic pressure and special agreements; IHL education and dissemi-
nation; individual criminal responsibility; regional and international conventions 
and Contributions by NGOs.926 
 
 
5.3.3.1. Teaching and training 
In order for the law of non-international armed conflict to be applied, it must first 
be understood. Accordingly, one of the most important aspects of the imple-
mentation of the law is dissemination of, education about, and training on, the 
law. This is as true for members of the armed forces as it is members of armed 
groups and civilians.927  
Article 19, Protocol II briefly notes that the Protocol shall be disseminated as 
widely as possible. The choice of means is left to the Contracting Party or to the 
parties to the conflict. This obligation thus extends to armed groups with a mini-
mum degree of organization as described above. There is no mechanism in 
Protocol II designed to guarantee its application such as that of Protecting Powers 
or their substitute. Therefore, dissemination is a fortiori an essential measure of 
application.928 
However, IHL training of armed groups is rendered more difficult by the fact 
that most armed groups are considered as terrorist groups by the governments 
against which they fight. As a consequence, supporting “terrorists”, including by 
training them, is criminalized in some jurisdictions.929 
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Bangerter wonders to what extent the content of the law really is known, 
despite the prevalence of an IHL-related discourse among armed groups. He 
admits that some of the violations are the result of a lack of in-depth knowledge, 
concealed beneath a surface of basic notions.930 Obviously, few groups have 
access to lawyers who are well versed in IHL; in most cases, their knowledge 
derives from hearsay and reading matter of varying quality. “Ignorance of the 
workings of international justice is equally prevalent, which casts some doubt on 
the dissuasive impact often attributed to international tribunals such as the 
ICC.”931 
There has been a lot of discussion on how the obligation in Article 19 AP II 
can be executed in practice. Teaching armed groups is obviously not the same as 
teaching regular armed forces. However, we should not underestimate the 
importance of dissemination and education with respect to non-state actors and 
armed groups in non-international armed conflict. Sure, the distinction between 
combatants and civilians as well as humane treatment of detainees are part of 
customary law, but how would non-state actors know anything more detailed 
about IHL given the chaotic circumstances on the ground that force them to take 
up arms? In some way the ICRC or another trusted person or entity must get to 
the groups and spread knowledge on IHL. This, as has been said, is only possible 
if the group has a minimum degree of control and organization.  
The ICRC’s first study holds that if combatants are to respect IHL, the rules 
must be translated into specific mechanisms and care must be taken to ensure that 
practical means are set in place to make this respect effective. In other words, it 
is necessary to opt for an integrative approach.932 The study shows that 
combatants who affirm that they have developed a relationship of trust with the 
ICRC on an individual basis are more favourable to the application of the norms 
of IHL.933 
La Rosa gathers, in her article about sanctions, that the dissemination of the 
rules is a key element not only of the fighters’ sensitization to sanctions, but also 
of their compliance with the process. The message about sanctions must be 
clearly spread: everyone who takes part in a conflict, irrespective of allegiance, 
will be held to account for any criminal acts they have committed. Here too, the 
ICRC inevitably plays the role of the messenger.934 Second, the content of 
humanitarian law must be made accessible; it should be summarized in simple 
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rules, which could be included in codes of conduct. Some armed groups have in 
fact stated that they follow this practice.935 
By adopting and distributing a code of conduct that is consistent with IHL, the 
hierarchy of an armed group sets up a mechanism that enables its members to 
respect this law. Such indication of commitment can also have a direct impact on 
its members’ training in IHL and on the dissemination of the law. Where contact 
and dialogue with the ICRC have been possible, codes of conduct have provided 
a basis for discussing the law. In some cases (e.g. in Colombia, El Salvador and 
Nicaragua), the ICRC or other actors have offered to review and comment on 
existing codes of conduct.936 
Rogers, on the other hand (being a long-time military lawyer) holds that the 
most important factor in ensuring compliance is the beneficial controlling 
influence of commanders. It is hard to imagine that this could differ for non-state 
armed groups. “Military leaders have long recognized that it is necessary to issue 
orders to those under their command, not only for the effective conduct of mili-
tary operations, but also to ensure certain standards of behavior and conduct in 
action. These orders can do much to ensure that the law of war is complied with. 
Effective enforcement is also achieved because breaches of these orders can be 
dealt with under national disciplinary regulations.”937  
Corn provides another interesting and even beneficial aspect for the members 
of armed groups. Namely, command responsibility contributes to the effec-
tiveness of the unit. Although it is not without exception, in general history 
demonstrates that IHL compliance almost inevitably produces strategic benefit, 
while widespread (and even isolated) non-compliance produces strategic dis-
advantage. Indeed, were this not the case, it is unlikely that so many States would 
agree to bind themselves to the constraints inherent in IHL treaty obligations.938 
All of this applies to armed groups as well, taking their specificities into account. 
 
 
5.3.3.2. Special agreements and unilateral declarations 
After making the rules known, the next level of fostering greater compliance for 
IHL is creating a sense of ownership of the rules among armed groups. One way 
of achieving this is by involving them in the development of the law, Sassoli 
holds. It should be possible to do a preliminary research on what is realistic for 
non-state actors in order to secure better compliance later. “One could also 
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include these actors in the preparatory meetings or even the diplomatic con-
ferences that are organised for the negotiation of new treaties.”939 
As far as customary law is concerned, armed groups have already been 
involved in the development and reaffirmation of the law, because customary law 
is based on the behaviour of the subjects of a rule and IHL implicitly confers a 
limited international legal personality to armed groups involved in armed 
conflicts.940 
Armed groups cannot formally adhere to Article 3 common to the Conven-
tions. Two alternative possibilities can therefore be envisaged for these groups to 
be involved. First, special agreements may be concluded on the basis of Common 
Article 3 bringing into force other provisions of the Conventions. In practice, 
special agreements are successfully concluded when the conflict is both seemingly 
intractable and more “equal” in terms of the fighting between the State and armed 
groups.941 
The second way of giving armed groups an opportunity to express their com-
mitment to comply with IHL is that of unilateral declarations. These are a power-
ful means of conveying information to combatants, despite the risk that they 
could be misused by criminal organizations for political purposes.942 
Common Article 3 of the Conventions foresees that the “Parties to the conflict 
should further endeavour to bring into force, by means of special agreements, all 
or part of the other provisions of the present Convention.” This means that both 
States and armed groups – or exclusively armed groups if no State is involved in 
the conflict – should endeavour to bring into force other provisions of the GCs. 
In this process it is possible for the parties to the conflict to agree upon specific 
rules that might not otherwise apply. This is a unique opportunity for armed 
groups to have some input on what their concrete rights and obligations will be 
(and express their views as to what commitments they are factually prepared to 
undertake), thus applying the principle of equality of belligerents. Moreover, in 
some cases the parties will be able to agree upon enforcement mechanisms, a 
possibility that they do not usually have.943 
As said, because they are based on the mutual consent of the parties – and 
make clear that the parties have the same IHL obligations – special agreements 
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might also provide added incentive to comply. A special agreement provides an 
important basis for follow-up interventions to address violations of the law. The 
fact that an identifiable leader for each party has signed a special agreement, 
thereby taking on responsibility to ensure that the agreement is adhered to, will 
on one hand provide a contact person and reference point for future represen-
tations, and on the other send a clear signal to his forces. This person might even 
become an interlocutor, an advocate of IHL within the group, if only to guarantee 
the group a minimum level of credibility vis-à-vis the outside world.944 Further-
more, given that a special agreement is likely to be made public, a range of actors 
in the international community will be aware of it and may be able to help in 
holding the parties to their commitments. 
In sum, one of the main advantages of special agreements, understood as tools 
for enhancing compliance with IHL, stems from the fact that they serve the 
purpose of clarifying the obligations that the parties to the conflict undertake.945 
 
 
5.3.3.3. Unilateral declarations 
On the other hand, armed groups can also come forward with unilateral decla-
rations, also called formal acceptance. For example, Protocol I provides that 
national liberation movements can formally accept its provisions. Surprisingly, 
there is a long history of general or partial declarations of intent. The primary 
function of a unilateral declaration is to provide armed groups with an opportunity 
to express their consent to be bound by the rules of humanitarian law. This 
provides the hierarchy with an opportunity to take ownership of ensuring respect 
for the law by their troops or fighters. This too can lead to better accountability 
and compliance by the armed group, through providing a clear basis for follow-
up, as well as dissemination to its members.946 
These declarations provide the answer to a paradox of humanitarian law. For 
although armed groups cannot be party to treaties of humanitarian law, it is 
nevertheless their responsibility to respect and to ensure respect for that body of 
law in all circumstances. The declarations are a way for these groups to demon-
strate and confirm that they are prepared to be bound by IHL. This was in fact 
noted at the 27th International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent 
convened in 1999, and it was on this basis that the Geneva Call organization 
invited armed groups to sign a declaration of adherence to the rules enshrined in 
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the Ottawa Convention on anti-personnel mines. To date, over fifty armed groups 
have reportedly agreed to ban anti-personnel mines through this mechanism, and 
the results in the field have been conclusive.947 
Moreover, commitments have been made that bring into force the Conven-
tions as a whole, and which have included a commitment to treat captured fighters 
as prisoners of war. Such a commitment may also be included in a ceasefire agree-
ment. The conduct of the party can then be judged against their commitments, by 
various actors such as UN human rights mechanisms or non-governmental 
organizations.948 Bilateral agreements between the State and the non-state armed 
group are also concluded. Prisoners of war and the wounded and sick can be 
exchanged pursuant to such agreements.949 
Allowing armed groups that are party to non-international armed conflict the 
opportunity to make a unilateral declaration stating their commitment to comply 
with IHL can be a useful tool for ensuring compliance in actual practice. It should 
be borne in mind, however, that such statements could be issued for purely 
political purposes.950 
It should be emphasized that armed groups remain bound by the provisions 
and rules of IHL applicable in a specific conflict – including Common Article 3, 
customary IHL and, where applicable, Protocol II – regardless of whether they 
make a unilateral declaration.951 
Members of armed groups party to non-international armed conflicts have 
little legal incentive to adhere to IHL, given the fact that they are likely, eventu-
ally, to face domestic criminal prosecution and serious penalties for having taken 
part in the conflict, even if they comply with IHL. Therefore, AP II, Article 6 
foresees the possibility of granting an amnesty to persons who have merely par-
ticipated in the armed conflict. This might help to provide armed group members 
with a legal incentive to comply with IHL. Amnesties may also help to facilitate 
peace negotiations or enable a process of post conflict national reconciliation. It 
must be remembered that amnesties may not be granted for war crimes or other 
crimes under international law. 
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5.3.3.4. Monitoring respect for International Humanitarian 
Law by armed groups 
Is it possible to charge non-state actors with violations of the GC and AP I? Yes, 
although not directly. Under international criminal law, both organizations are 
criminal groups, and their members are criminals. Like any other criminals, they 
may be prosecuted under the criminal law of the States in which they commit 
terrorist acts, or by a military tribunal. While in military custody, they remain 
protected by Common Article 3. They also remain criminals.952 
“Although disciplinary measures are not sufficient to remedy serious vio-
lations of IHL, they are necessary and useful inasmuch as they enable the leaders 
of a group to react in a timely way to violations. These measures can take various 
forms, such as a note to file, a warning, demotion or dismissal. They can also 
involve the assignment of extra duty or the withdrawal of the soldier’s weapons 
or uniform. In practice, they sometimes also include imprisonment and corporal 
punishment, including capital punishment”, La Rosa & Wuerzner note.953 
In the case of imposing sanctions by the State it must first be capable of duly 
conducting proceedings and willing to do so. Second, the State must establish 
procedures in which all of the parties can have confidence, i.e. guarantee equal 
and individualized treatment for all, irrespective of what group they belong to. 
Only then can armed groups overcome natural reluctance to hand over their 
members to the government.954 
The Roots of Restraint study showed that the threat of punishment under 
domestic and military law exerts a much greater influence than that of punishment 
under IHL per se. This finding confirms the importance of integrating IHL norms 
into domestic law, standard operating procedures and rules of engagement. How-
ever, although the threat of punishment under internal military law had a strong 
influence on soldiers, particularly officers, this influence was surpassed by the 
socializing effect of informal norms and of “army values”.955 
Once the armed groups have attained a sense of ownership of the rules, 
monitoring becomes a necessary aspect of ensuring compliance. One idea on this 
matter is to let the groups report on their own respect for the rules, and have an 
expert body examine them. Such internal “bureaucratic” incentives have shown 
some results with Hamas (in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict).956 
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Another possibility is for armed groups to create their own verification 
mechanism in the same way as some multinational companies have done con-
cerning their compliance with Human Rights.957 The likelihood of this happening 
is low. 
 
 
5.4. The role of UN and counterterrorism measures 
in implementing and enforcing IHL 
In recent decades many implementation measures have increasingly been carried 
out by the ICRC, the UN, and other international and non-governmental organi-
zations. The organizations have taken a leading role even concerning the tasks 
that are in principle left for the States, offering assistance and guidance or 
influencing public opinion and pressing for diplomatic measures to be taken. 
Human rights, environment, economic development and humanitarian relief 
are examples of a few areas where national or international NGOs have gained 
significant authority. Amnesty International, Doctors without Borders, and Green-
peace, for instance, are frequently a source of official information or are partners 
to governmental actors in setting new international standards.958 They utilize a 
variety of methods to bring about normative change, e.g. intensive advocacy and 
dissemination of information to mobilize public opinion; mobilizing support for 
a legislative venture and lobbying relevant governmental representatives. 
Two fascinating examples include the International Campaign to Ban 
Landmines (ICBL) and the NGO Coalition for an ICC. The former was launched 
in 1992 by 16 NGOs, but grew to bring together 1300 advocate groups and resulted 
in the International Treaty Banning Antipersonnel Landmines in 1997. Con-
cerning the ICC, somewhat surprisingly in 1989 Trinidad and Tobago proposed 
to the UNGA the idea of finally codifying the Nuremberg principles, and 
establishing a permanent international criminal tribunal. This expanded to some 
800 NGOs coming together from all over the world. The adoption of the ICC 
statute in 1998 will remain a milestone of NGOs’ increasing influence on inter-
national treaty making.959 
In addition, regional organizations may carry out monitoring and fact-finding 
missions not only in peacetime, but also to further the respect for human rights 
and humanitarian principles in situations of armed conflict.960 
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Also, some of the major human rights conventions contain clauses for public 
emergency regimes that enable monitoring and “conclusion drawing”. The Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966, European Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR), Euro-
pean Social Charter of 1961 and the American Convention on Human Rights are 
good examples. The courts and commissions acting under such conventions are 
competent to perform their functions in relation to situations of public emer-
gencies. The body of law the observance of which they are monitoring may, in 
theory at least, include IHL applicable in armed conflicts. However, with the 
exception of the European Court of Human Rights and the UN Security Council, 
no legally binding decisions can emanate from these bodies. 
The Inter-American Court and Commission on Human Rights has also 
become a forum for the enforcement of IHL due to the number of cases presented 
and reports prepared that concern States in which internal armed conflicts  
exist.961 The same goes for other regional human rights bodies of which there is 
an impressive amount. 
If regional organizations monitor compliance with IHL, there is bound to be a 
positive impact on its implementation, but the essentially political nature of these 
organizations may be reflected in their operations and may sometimes jeopardize 
the work of humanitarian agencies that must be conducted with impartiality and 
remain untainted by political considerations.962 
These examples prove that a vast array of different stakeholders are involved 
in the implementation and enforcement actions of IHL. Without a doubt the two 
major actors remain the UN and the ICRC.  
 
 
5.4.1. The role of the UN 
The United Nations system was designed carefully to make war illegal and 
unnecessary, so the Charter itself does not even mention the concept of war. If 
force is used or threatened against the territorial integrity or political inde-
pendence of any State contrary to the Charter, there are two possible military 
options permitted in response, i.e., self-defence and police or enforcement 
action.963 As such, it could be said that the UN is more concerned with enforce-
ment compared to the ICRC that covers mostly implementation action. However, 
the UN has also taken a more preemptive and educational role recently. 
Dörmann noted in 2007 that during the last 15 years or so the UN has become 
a very important actor in the field of international humanitarian law. He mentions 
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just a few examples that include appeals by the SC to respect IHL; establishment 
of ad hoc criminal tribunals; sending of fact-finding missions; the attention given 
to the protection of the civilian population in situations of armed conflict; and 
action by the GA.964 
Palwankar even goes on to say that “any effective attempt by a State to ensure 
respect for international humanitarian law, especially in the event of massive 
violations, would be difficult, if not impossible, without the political support of 
the community of States, and the UN is one of the most widely used vehicles for 
such support in the contemporary world.”965 IHL gives a legal basis for this in 
Article 89 of Protocol I: “In situations of serious violations of the Conventions or 
of this Protocol, the High Contracting Parties undertake to act, jointly or indi-
vidually, in co-operation with the United Nations and in conformity with the 
United Nations Charter”. This is a significant change compared to the text of the 
Conventions. Formally, this provision does not allow them to act in situations 
other than international armed conflicts, but as will be seen from proceeding dis-
cussions, this has not prevented action in any way. 
It is not entirely clear what “in situations of serious violations” means, as it 
was not elaborated at the Conferences preparing the 1977 Protocols. The Com-
mentary to the Protocols gives three categories that could qualify (note that grave 
breaches is not the same as serious violations):  
• isolated instances of conduct, not included amongst the grave breaches, but 
nevertheless of a serious nature; 
• conduct which is not included amongst the grave breaches, but which takes on 
a serious nature because of the frequency of the individual acts committed or 
because of the systematic repetition thereof or because of circumstances; 
• “global” violations, for example, acts whereby a particular situation, a 
territory or a whole category of persons or objects is withdrawn from the 
application of the Conventions or the Protocol. 
 
And one category that does certainly not qualify: [the Article] “is not concerned 
with situations where the wrongful conduct remains rare and isolated, so that 
other mechanisms expressly established for prevention, supervision and repression 
are to be adequate.”966 
The Commentary goes on to say that the UN actions may therefore consist of 
issuing an appeal to respect humanitarian law, setting up enquiries on compliance 
with the Conventions and the Protocol and “even, where appropriate, of coercive 
actions which may include the use of armed force.” United Nations actions may 
also take the form of assistance in terms of material or personnel given to 
Protecting Powers, their substitutes, or to humanitarian organizations.967 
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It is therefore clear that IHL enforcement action by or with the UN should 
only legally be used when a violation has taken place, as it is serious and cannot 
be remedied by other mechanisms. A central argument of this thesis is that usually 
other remedies do exist, and turning to the UN coercive system should be seen as 
a last resort. 
There are some issues in the Commentary that call for scrutiny. The commen-
taries to the Protocols date back to 1977 and could not, at this time, take into 
account the practice that actually followed. In practice, the UN has not cited the 
Protocols as a legal basis for action; if anything, they cite CA 1. Usually the 
Resolutions just mention breaches of human rights and humanitarian law and 
prescribe measures under Articles 41 and 42 of the Charter. The UN does not 
differentiate between grave breaches and serious violations as neatly separated 
by the Commentary. 
The kind of violations that bring about measures under the Charter are 
“violations on such a scale that a continuation of them would constitute a threat 
to international peace and security”. If the violations of IHL are on such a scale 
(within the meaning of Article 39 of the UN Charter), it is up to the UNSC to take 
note of the fact, to make recommendations and, if it deems necessary, to decide 
on measures to be taken under Articles 41 and 42 of the Charter. The use of force 
can then be envisaged. The purpose of such measures is not essentially to enforce 
humanitarian law, but to terminate a situation that is a threat to international peace 
and security. In this case, the legal basis is not to be found in humanitarian law.968  
In other words, the use of force can be resorted to with the primary goal of 
restoring or maintaining international peace and security. And, secondly, it can 
be done only on the basis of the UN Charter and not of IHL. The lawfulness of 
the use of force in such circumstances is strictly limited to this goal, and cannot 
be derived from any rule or provision of IHL, not even Article 89 of Protocol I. 
“For international humanitarian law starts off from the premise that any armed 
conflict results in human suffering, and proceeds to elaborate a body of rules 
meant precisely to alleviate this very suffering. It would indeed be logically and 
legally indefensible to deduce that that same law itself allows, even in extreme 
cases, for the use of armed force.”969 
 
Fact-finding 
The Security Council can, and has, mandated fact-finding – but unfortunately not 
by the International Fact-Finding Commission itself.970 Fact-finding missions 
have been sent by the UN to a number of trouble-spots over the past 50 years, on 
a pragmatic, occasional, case-by-case basis in the field of human rights and 
humanitarian law. The institutions of Working Groups, Special Rapporteurs, 
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Special Representatives and Independent Experts established by the UN Com-
mission on Human Rights have become an increasingly important tool, but are 
mostly concerned with HRL.971 
As said, the legal basis for such missions has not been IHL and the Inter-
national Fact-Finding Commission provided therein. On 9 December 1988, the 
GA requested the Special Committee on the Charter of the UN and on the 
Strengthening of the Role of the Organization to consider proposals concerning 
fact-finding activities by the UN. As a result, the Committee submitted a draft 
Declaration to the GA that adopted it on 9 December 1991.972 
The declaration that defines and institutionalizes the use of such missions 
states that it is not only a tool to gather information, but also to signal concern 
over a potentially explosive situation. It states that fact-finding should be “com-
prehensive, objective and impartial”. It should be used at the earliest possible 
stage to prevent disputes. Fact-finding missions may be undertaken with the con-
sent of the “receiving State”. Nations, however, are asked to receive and 
cooperate with these missions. Refusals to do so should be explained.973 
These international investigative bodies have been tasked with inspecting 
allegations of violations of international human rights, IHL or international 
criminal law and making recommendations for corrective action based on their 
factual and legal findings.974 They assist in ensuring accountability for serious 
violations, which is fundamental in order to deter future violations, promote 
compliance with the law and provide avenues of justice and redress for victims. 
These activities, of course, may also lead the SC or the GA to denounce 
breaches and, as far as the SC is concerned, even to resort to bringing enforcement 
measures. 
 
Peace-keeping 
Peace-keeping is a further way for the UN to maintain peace and security and 
help countries to transition from conflict to peaceful settlement. Peace keeping 
also facilitates political process, protects civilians, and assists in the disarmament 
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and restoring the rule of law.975 I will not elaborate on this complex issue but will 
note briefly the significance and main problems connected to it. 
None of the existing Conventions or Protocols addresses the specific issues of 
UN forces, or forces acting on their authority, in situations of armed conflict. It 
could be said that this situation leaves military forces acting under the control of 
the UN somewhat in limbo. However, the Institut de Droit International has 
confirmed that the rules of the “law of armed conflict” apply as of right and they 
must be complied with in every circumstance by UN forces engaged in 
hostilities.976 Therefore, although originally there was some doubt about the 
applicability of humanitarian law to UN forces, it is now generally accepted that 
UN forces are bound by humanitarian law, whether performing duties of a peace-
keeping or enforcement nature.977 Unfortunately, these forces have been known 
to engage in conduct that is contrary to humanitarian law.978 
Secondly, the fact that military and humanitarian operations coexist within 
peacekeeping forces is not unproblematic. Military operations go beyond purely 
humanitarian objectives and encompass political aims, whereas humanitarian 
action, by its very nature, can never be coercive. The use of force inevitably trans-
forms a humanitarian action into a military one, and a threat of force to facilitate 
a humanitarian operation may be enough to jeopardize that very operation.979 
Since 1948, when the UN established its first peacekeeping operation in the 
Middle East (the UN Truce Supervision Organization), there have been over 
70 UN peacekeeping operations around the world. Most are deployed in Africa, 
but they are also used in the Middle East, Europe, Asia and the Americas. Since 
the 1990s, the number of missions and of deployed personnel has increased, while 
mission mandates have become more robust and multifaceted. According to the 
UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations there were over 110000 peace-
keepers deployed in 2018.980 Recent studies have concluded that peacekeeping 
does fulfil its purpose. The missions reduce both the amount of violence during a 
conflict and the duration of the conflict; they help contain the conflict from 
spreading to neighbours, and reduce the risk of it recurring.981 
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Enforcement through the Security Council 
The UNSC has acquired a major role in the implementation of the laws of war.982 
As every armed conflict, which is covered by IHL, is prima facie a situation 
falling under Article 39 of UN Charter, the Security Council Competence on 
Chapter VII can and has to be an enforcement mechanism in regard to the rules 
of humanitarian law. Since 1989, this coercive competence of the SC has come 
to practical existence,983 or as Rosas puts it, “has surfaced after a rather long 
beauty sleep”.984 It has authority under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, to respond 
to threats to or breaches of the peace or against an act of aggression. Under Article 
41, the UNSC can undertake different measures not involving the use of force, 
whereas under Article 42 it can authorize military action.985 
Whereas the system established under IHL rests essentially on the consent of 
the parties to a conflict, particularly in internal conflicts, the measures authorized 
by Chapter VII of the Charter require no consent and can be imposed. The SC 
does not remain within the framework of IHL, and often combines aspects of jus 
ad bellum (direct or indirect interventions in current military operations) and of 
jus in bello (initiatives to protect war victims). Again, in doing so, especially 
where force is used to impose these measures, the SC is implementing the UN 
Charter and not humanitarian law, which does not admit of any interference in a 
conflict.986  
The Council helps to implement and enforce IHL inter alia by stressing the 
responsibility of all parties of a conflict to obey these rules, and by reiterating that 
both HRL and IHL has to be obeyed. Among the most common measures not 
involving the use of armed force are those measures that are known as sanctions, 
discussed in a previous sub-chapter. “Sanctions can be imposed on any combi-
nation of States, groups or individuals. The range of sanctions has included 
comprehensive economic and trade sanctions and more targeted measures such 
as arms embargoes, no-fly zones, travel bans, financial or diplomatic restric-
tions”.987 Article 41 also includes measures such as the creation of post-conflict 
international tribunals or the creation of a fund to pay compensation for damage 
resulting from a breach.988 
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The UNSC has powers that allow it to pursue a degree of individual account-
ability for serious violations of IHL. Thus, in 1993 and 1994 respectively, the 
UNSC established the ad hoc tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and for 
Rwanda, in order to investigate and prosecute serious violations of IHL (now 
subsumed under the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribu-
nals).989 It also has the authority to refer to the ICC situations where serious vio-
lations of IHL are being committed. So far, there have been two SC referrals, 
namely Sudan (Darfur) in 2005, and Libya in 2011.990 
The list of actions in Article 41 of the Charter is indicative, and does not limit 
the SCs’ choice of means for achieving the desired objective or restoring and 
keeping the peace. In its practice, the SC has been primarily concerned with the 
effects of international conflicts and frequently calls upon the belligerents to 
respect humanitarian law (examples include the Iran/Iraq conflict, the territories 
occupied by Israel, the invasion of Kuwait, Ethiopia/Eritrea, Iraq, Georgia, etc). 
It has, however, increasingly addressed non-international armed conflicts (such 
as Somalia, Rwanda, Liberia, Afghanistan).991 
The SC has, furthermore, called for recognition of the applicability of the 
Fourth Geneva Convention; for prisoners of war to be released and repatriated; 
for unrestricted access and safe passage to be given to aid deliveries; for travel 
bans and asset freezes for those responsible for violations; for a commission of 
enquiry to be set up;992 or for a situation to be referred to the ICC, even if the 
State concerned is not a party to the Rome Statute.993 
However, it can also set up UN Protection Forces, protected towns and 
humanitarian corridors, a compensation system for the victims of armed attacks 
or even a reporting system related to IHL.994 More recently, it has adopted reso-
lutions on particular thematic issues, notably child soldiers, the protection of 
civilians in armed conflict, and sexual violence against civilians in armed con-
flict. Sanctions have also been imposed on high-level officials for violations of 
IHL.995 
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Therefore, as long as the SC remains within the broad framework of the UN 
Charter, it is not limited to the instruments made available to it by IHL and can 
innovate. It can take wide-ranging decisions and even create new mechanisms, as 
long as it acts in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter and 
does not violate the norms of jus cogens. The main check on the SC’s decisions 
is, however, the possibility that States may disregard its decisions: without the 
Member States’ support, the resolutions are mere wishful thinking.996 
As Roscini has noted, the privileged position of the SC, which has exclusive 
competence to take coercive measures involving the use of armed force and 
whose decisions are binding on all UN Member States, makes it potentially “a 
formidable instrument against serious violations of IHL, which can at least partly 
remedy the lack of enforcing mechanisms in the treaties on the laws of war, where 
compliance is mainly based on the goodwill of the States parties”.997 
 
Enforcement through the General Assembly 
The GA has also utilized IHL in different ways, for example calling on parties to 
non-international armed conflicts to respect the law, and condemning violations 
of the law. It has called on States not parties to IHL instruments to consider 
becoming parties to them, and called on States parties to instruments to dis-
seminate them.998 
The UN Charter gives the GA the power to initiate studies and make recom-
mendations to promote the development and codification of international law. 
Since the end of the 1970s, the General Assembly began to cite, although incon-
sistently, the Conventions and the Protocols in numerous resolutions and other 
decisions it adopted. 
Starting with the 1968 Proclamation of Teheran, the UNGA has reminded 
parties to an armed conflict of their IHL obligations, issuing several resolutions 
on “Respect for Human Rights in Armed Conflict”. In these resolutions the GA 
did not confine itself to listing the principles to be observed in such situations. It 
also paved the way for resolutions calling for compliance with IHL in general, as 
well as in specific situations. The broad functions and powers of the GA allow it 
to discuss and make recommendations on all matters that fall within the purview 
of the UN, subject to the prerogatives of the SC.999 
More recently, in 2005, the UNGA has adopted the responsibility to protect 
doctrine (R2P), which requires States to protect their populations from mass 
atrocity crimes, including war crimes.1000 This doctrine is based on the primary 
responsibility of States to protect their populations from mass atrocity crimes, 
including war crimes, and a subsidiary responsibility on the part of the organized 
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international community to assist States in this duty.1001 At this stage the 
situations in Myanmar, Burundi and Mali are under scrutiny. As the year 2020 
marks the 15 year anniversary of the doctrine, efforts are being made to include 
the R2P on the agenda of the GA as a permanent item, and furthermore to 
mandate the Permanent Secretary to compile an annual report on R2P.1002 
The normative contribution of the GA comes also through the work of its sub-
sidiary body, the International Law Commission, on the codification and progres-
sive development of international law, which has been mentioned in several parts 
of this thesis. The ILC has worked on the “Formulation of the Nürnberg Prin-
ciples”, “Draft code of offences against the peace and security of mankind”, and 
many other aspects of international law more recently.1003 
The operational aspect of the mandate of the UNGA is carried out mainly 
through its subsidiary organ, the Human Rights Council, an inter-governmental 
body within the United Nations system responsible for strengthening the pro-
motion and protection of human rights and for addressing situations of human 
rights violations and making recommendations on them.1004 
The UN Secretary-General obviously plays a key role in the implementation 
of humanitarian law, as he takes care of the practical arrangements for and the 
follow-up to the actions of the other non-judicial UN bodies, and may bring 
matters to the attention of the SC on his own initiative. Acting under his authority, 
the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights is responsible for the UN’s 
activities in the human rights sphere.1005 
 
Enforcement through the International Court of Justice  
The ICJ’s position as one of the main organs of the UN and its principal judicial 
organ makes its role quite important.1006 This institutional role is also reflected in 
requests for advisory opinions on IHL-related issues by the GA. Some of the 
aspects of the work of the Court which are relevant to the enforcement of IHL are 
State responsibility for violations of IHL; reparations due to States, legal entities, 
and individuals; and indication of provisional measures of protection in armed 
conflict situations.1007 This is elaborated further under the chapter of grave 
breaches. 
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The courts contribution through its jurisprudence and its advisory opinions is 
something very important for our purposes. Namely, it may be called upon to 
settle a dispute between States concerning the application of IHL if both States 
have accepted the Court’s jurisdiction.1008 
States may also, through the SC and/or the GA, request the ICJ to give an 
advisory opinion on whether an established fact – namely an alleged violation of 
IHL by a State or States party involved in a conflict – actually constitutes a breach 
of an international commitment undertaken by that State or those States.1009 In 
principle, therefore, the ICJ could be asked if a State is in violation of its obliga-
tions under CA 1 and define exactly what that obligation entails. 
 
 
5.4.2. Counterterrorism responses 
In the beginning of this thesis we briefly talked about the relationship of IHL with 
HRL. There is another field of law that is very frequently mentioned in con-
nection with IHL, namely the laws on counter terrorism. Counterterrorism 
responses, combined with a robust counterterrorism discourse, have significantly 
contributed to a blurring of the lines between armed conflict and terrorism, with 
potentially adverse effects on IHL. There appears to be a growing tendency 
among States to consider any act of violence carried out by a non-State armed 
group as being “terrorist” by definition, even when such acts are in fact lawful 
under IHL.1010 In part, this might be a result of the longstanding concern of States 
that recognizing the existence of an armed conflict in their territory would 
“legitimize” the non-State armed groups involved. In part, it can be because these 
is considerable confusion between the law-enforcement and military approaches 
to terrorism itself.1011 
While the legal frameworks governing terrorism and IHL may have some 
common ground, these two regimes remain fundamentally different (like IHL and 
HRL). They have distinct rationales, objectives and structures. For example, in 
legal terms, armed conflict is a situation in which certain acts of violence are 
considered lawful and others are unlawful, while any act of violence designated 
as “terrorist” is always unlawful.1012 
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In principle, terrorists are subject to national criminal law. Before September 
11 this was also true for terrorist groups which used significant and sustained 
armed violence. However, even before that, it became clear that global non-state 
terrorist organizations existed. For example, the Security Council decided in 
1999, by way of Resolution 1267, to establish a Committee supervising the 
implementation by States of the sanctions imposed by the SC on individuals and 
entities belonging or related to the Taliban, Bin Laden and the Al-Qaida organi-
zation.1013  
The question, then, has become if these global non-state terrorist organizations 
are and can be regulated under the IHL regime. There appears to be at least two 
options. First, some authors believe that if we accept that transnational terrorism 
remains outside the classical typology of international armed conflicts, but cannot 
be adequately dealt with if qualified as a non-international armed conflict, since 
it is not confined to the territory of one State, then we have to admit that IHL 
provisions need to be altered and cannot be applied to the fight against terrorism.1014 
Second, if we accept that terrorism is not a “new phenomenon”, but it has 
always existed and was in the minds of the legislators when drafting the Conven-
tions, then: a) if acts of terror are committed during an armed conflict, relevant 
IHL provisions will apply, or b) if they are committed during peace, HRL and all 
relevant anti-terrorism provisions will apply. 
Marouda proposes an intermediate position. Namely, “the armed conflicts 
representing all these challenges, are not a new phenomenon in IHL but the insti-
tutional framework of IHL needs reinforcement so as to incorporate new actors, 
‘the rise of the rest’ but also armed conflicts crossing borders.”1015 
Sassoli rightfully holds that international law does not prohibit non-inter-
national armed conflicts; internal law does. Ius ad bellum for non-international 
armed conflicts does exist in national legislation. As the monopoly on the use of 
force for State organs is inherent in the very concept of the Westphalian State, we 
may assume that the national legislation of all States prohibits anyone under their 
jurisdiction to wage an armed conflict against governmental forces or, except 
State organs acting in said capacity, anyone else.1016  
Sandoz further holds that we must “dig in our heels” – IHL must defend its 
most fundamental provisions, just as a healthy body defends itself against a virus. 
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It is a mistake to impose the burden of the debate on terrorism on this branch of 
law, especially when this debate should centre on cooperation between law 
enforcement agencies and on addressing the problems that provide the fertile soil 
in which terrorism can grow.1017 
I agree that terrorist acts are crimes under domestic law and under the existing 
international and regional conventions on terrorism, and they may, provided the 
requisite criteria are met, qualify as war crimes or as crimes against humanity. 
Thus, as opposed to some other areas of international law, “terrorism” – although 
not universally defined as such – is abundantly regulated.1018 
The legal framework of the fight against terrorism has been developed step by 
step by the UN, since the 1990’s with sanctions against some States (Libya, 
Sudan), and later against groups such as the Taliban or Al-Qaida. In the aftermath 
of the attacks of 11 September, the SC adopted resolution 1368 recognizing the 
existence of “threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts”, 
and resolution 1373 of 28 September 2001 that created a “counter-terrorism com-
mittee” within the SC, to be assisted by an executive directorate of the counter-
terrorism committee in charge of monitoring the measures adopted by the SC.1019 
The “United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy” was adopted on 
8 September 2006, and a special Office of counter-terrorism was created in 2017. 
The international counter-terrorism framework also includes a vast network of 
approximately twenty multilateral instruments, conventions and protocols, with 
a universal dimension, which incriminate “acts of terrorism”. This framework is 
completed at regional level. Thus, on 4 July 2018, the Council of Europe adopted 
a 2018–2022 strategy relating to counter-terrorism centred on three lines of 
action: prevention, prosecution and protection. The European Union has ratified 
the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism (CETS 
No.196) and its Additional Protocol (CETS No.217) that entered in force for the 
EU on 1st of October 2018.1020 
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CONCLUSIONS 
What can be concluded from this study is the fact that there are sufficient imple-
mentation and enforcement measures foreseen in the Treaties, and the texts pro-
vide sufficient flexibility to take the new realities of warfare into account. The 
texts are the result of long and arduous diplomatic debates and can be imple-
mented at any moment with sufficient political will.  
Constant violations of IHL can lead to a perception that the principles are 
never respected or that they are not relevant anymore, an opinion that is heard 
incessantly from sceptics. In the past century, the laws of war have been substan-
tially revised every 25–30 years by major new treaties. By that standard, we 
should be due for another international conference leading to the promulgation of 
new rules and the revision of existing ones.1021 This in itself is not sufficient to 
justify the automatic initiation of new developments in this area of law. Anyone 
conscious of World’s politics in 2019 knows that the climate is not favourable for 
a treaty drafting exercise. Because conferences often make decisions by con-
sensus and try to fashion generally acceptable texts, even a few stubborn govern-
ments may prevent the adoption of more enlightened provisions.1022 
On the other hand, it would be wrong – and indeed dangerous – to believe that 
IHL is always and only violated and is therefore useless. The focus on violations 
risks to de-legitimize the law over time and to miss those thousands of situations 
where the law is effectively respected: the civilians spared, the detained treated 
humanely.1023 The latest session of the UNGA had a high-level side event to 
celebrate 70 years of the Geneva Conventions. The president of the ICRC out-
lined some positive examples of implementation that prove the endurance of the 
Conventions to this day.1024 For example, tens of thousands of detainees have 
remained connected with their families; armed forces are investing in reducing 
civilian death and injury; the death toll from anti-personnel landmines has dras-
tically declined, and non-State armed groups have made commitments against the 
recruitment of children in hostilities and against sexual violence.1025 
As noted, most authors share the view that no formal process for revising the 
laws of war is currently appropriate, despite flaws, gaps, and ambiguities in 
existing law. What needs to be changed is our attitude towards implementation 
of the law, not the law itself. Even those authors who emphasize specific prob-
lems with contemporary applications of the laws of war argue principally in 
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favour of particular interpretations of existing law, rather than for codified 
changes to it.1026 Sassoli holds that he is not aware of many concrete proposals by 
those labelling the Conventions ‘outdated’ as to which provisions of IHL treaties 
should be amended with what new wording. “If scholars and politicians say that 
IHL is not adequate without immediately adding which rules are adequate in what 
situation, this has catastrophic results in the field”.1027 
Sandoz holds that there is a powerful temptation to explain violations of the 
law in terms of its inadequacies. However, this explanation is illusory, and the 
basic rules of IHL remain perfectly relevant. He agrees that certain provisions 
could be improved somewhat, but the effort that this would require would be 
completely disproportionate to the results for which one might hope.1028  
Dörmann writes that despite the emergence of new actors of violence, and new 
means and methods of warfare, IHL continues to “provide an adequate frame-
work to attenuate the effects of armed conflict and to establish a judicious balance 
between the principles of humanity and military necessity”.1029 Solis adds that 
“the 1949 Conventions have shown themselves to be remarkably resilient and 
adaptable to emerging warfare modalities; hardly perfect, but equal to previously 
unforeseeable circumstances.”1030 Fitzgerald even states that IHL has never been 
stronger. It may be true that IHL develops slowly, but progress is inexorable.1031 
The ICRC too is convinced that the existing provisions of IHL form an 
adequate basis to meet the challenges raised by modern conflicts,1032 and the 
Geneva Academy of IHL and human rights that there is no need to reinvent the 
wheel. Creating new ways to implement IHL using existing mechanisms is pos-
sible.1033 
Finally, Gasser holds that recent conflicts have “not revealed major lacunae 
or loopholes in the jus in bello. It appears that all types of behaviour by 
belligerents, which public opinion rightly condemns as unacceptable by any 
standard of human decency, are in fact already prohibited by international 
humanitarian law.”1034 
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Implementation is a major challenge for IHL. There is an enormous contrast 
between the very carefully crafted and widely accepted rules of humanitarian law 
and the continuous daily violation of these rules. Undeniably, after more than a 
hundred years of lawmaking, the goal should not be new law, but the effective 
implementation of existing norms. 
The purpose of this study was to establish how to ensure better respect for IHL 
and to demonstrate that IHL has failed on many levels, because the necessity and 
modalities of implementation are not obvious nor unambiguous. Take for 
example the interpretation of CA 1, the meaning of which is far from clear. It 
may eventually depend on which interpretative method is applied and whether a 
State (or any other actor) can be accused of an internationally wrongful act, or 
whether it will be regarded as having stayed faithful to its commitments. 
Of the three categories of measures analysed, enforcement measures have 
received most criticism. Several traditional measures are now banned, inter-
national criminal law functions very slowly, the collective security system yields 
results, but at a very high price, both in human life and financially. As it is estab-
lished that enforcement measures are lacking or ineffective, there might not be 
much choice other than to focus on preventive action. By teaching and dis-
seminating humanitarian law, one can contribute to the growth of a society where 
violations are less common. 
The discourse of prevention and national implementation needs more atten-
tion. There should be no doubt that the very applicability of humanitarian law 
largely depends on the effective integration of its rules into domestic law. The 
States should ask what they themselves can do to reduce the number of violations. 
For example, it would be appropriate to review national training programs, mili-
tary rules and manuals, consider humanitarian law when urban planning, and 
approach prevention in an interdisciplinary way. Dialogue with non-state actors 
is inevitable, and must be at the heart of preventive action. The Protocols that 
recently celebrated their 40th anniversary provide for this possibility. 
Thus, there are problems that arise out of the environment where IHL has to 
be applied; out of the perception of the general public and out of the content of 
the law itself. And, these are indeed inherent to the very idea of IHL. We defi-
nitely cannot change the environment where IHL is applied, an armed conflict is 
and armed conflict and looks more or less the same throughout the centuries. But 
there is something we could do about the perception of the public. This is some-
thing the ICRC is working on a daily basis. The inter arma silent leges adage has 
to be eradicated if IHL is to be respected better in the future. And with the com-
plexity and incompleteness of the law, one could also envisage measures to over-
come these issues. Think about the numerous educational programs mentioned 
throughout this work. The ICRC’s database of national implementation measures, 
the vast commentaries to the Conventions, the military manuals of States and 
non-state groups, the statute of the ICC etc. 
To answer the research questions set out for this thesis we start with outlining 
the actual scope of CA 1 to the Conventions. It is concluded that the Article serves 
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as a generic reminder of an obvious obligation to abide by the Conventions, more 
specifically a reminder of obligations already set out in other rules. 
States are required to ensure respect for IHL only on the part of their own 
organs and such other persons as may be acting under their effective control. With 
respect to persons acting on their instructions but outside their effective control, 
it could be argued that States are required to ensure that such persons are willing 
and able to execute their instructions in compliance with IHL. It seems clear on 
the basis of the findings of the analysis that the most that can be done is to take 
diplomatic measures or publicly denounce violations. It would be improper, and 
probably dangerous, to impose military sanctions or any form of intervention.1035 
The few examples that exist on States using the CA 1, refer to serious viola-
tions of IHL, and may therefore be interpreted as expressions not of a general 
obligation to ensure universal respect for IHL but of the obligation to address 
serious violations of IHL, as codified in Article 89 of Protocol I for instance. It is 
also worth noting that a recent attempt to insert similar language into a resolution 
of the Human Rights Council was rejected.1036 When human rights treaties con-
tain similar provisions to “ensure respect”, they are never understood to imply 
that contracting States must (or may) take measures against other contracting 
States beyond what is expressly provided for by all other provisions of the 
treaty.1037 
What a State can and should do to ensure respect for IHL by another State or 
non-State actors remains debatable. Besides calling on other States to stay within 
the limits of IHL, publicly condemning violations, and recalling diplomatic staff 
or severing diplomatic relations, States must ensure they do not become complicit 
in committing war crimes by knowingly and actively supporting a party to the 
conflict.1038 
Moving forward to the reporting and monitoring measures available in the 
Conventions, it has to be admitted that Protecting Powers system has been used 
only five times, the ad hoc fact finding commissions have never been used, and 
the standing International Fact-Finding Commission has only been used once so 
far. This situation provides a very bleak picture of the effectiveness of those three 
treaty-based mechanisms.1039 
To overcome the lack of respect for IHL, many have thought about new, 
additional mechanisms of implementation. One of the proposals made is to set up 
a monitoring system along the lines of systems that exist in other branches of 
international law, such as environmental protection, labour law and disarmament. 
A periodic reporting system might involve some bureaucratic work and have little 
impact on the situation in the field, unless the reports were verified by a body of 
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experts authorized to carry out on-the-spot inspections. Nevertheless, the useful-
ness of such system is often reiterated. States have previously bound themselves 
to much stringent provisions than periodic reporting of IHL related activities. 
A mandatory reporting system could be introduced in the future in order to get 
an overview of the state of implementation of humanitarian law, and to assess the 
situation in the countries. In a globalized world, no conflict could be considered 
interstate anymore. If the internal rules and violations of States were exposed to 
the scrutiny of international community, it would surely contribute to compliance. 
There is nothing inconceivable in creating a similar system to European Union’s 
infringement procedure. The inquiry system could also be set in motion as often 
as needed. The first inquiry by the International Humanitarian Fact Finding Com-
mission has just been published and will certainly prove useful in the future. As 
a logical extension, the use of the institution of the protecting powers or the 
assignment of the ICRC for these purposes would be recommended.  
There is also the idea of appointing a High Commissioner for International 
Humanitarian Law on the model of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Human Rights, or setting up some form of intergovernmental committee, bringing 
together a small group of States particularly concerned about IHL and ready to 
accept special responsibility for its implementation. A similar kind of cooperation 
already took place in the form of the ICRC-Swiss initiative on strengthening 
compliance with IHL.1040  
States should be prepared to submit major differences of opinion on the inter-
pretation or application of IHL to the ICJ, using either contentious proceedings 
or the advisory procedure. On the other hand, the real challenge relating to the 
implementation of IHL on the ground in today’s conflicts is not how a certain 
provision is interpreted, but whether it is applied at all. It is facts, not legal theo-
ries, are often the object of dispute, and thus need to be established.1041 This is 
why the fact-finding system should be quickly beefed up and put to maximum 
use. 
There are many useful measures developed on the EU level, which could be 
broadened to cover IHL violations. For example, recently focus has been on 
tracking the financing of terrorism, i.e. obstructing the cash flow to such organi-
zations to hinder their ability to commit atrocities. In the field of IHL it could be 
investigated how non-governmental armed groups acquire weapons and other 
equipment.  
If sanctions are used within an armed group there are a few elements to be 
taken into account to guarantee their effectiveness. Any message about the 
imposition of sanctions must be accompanied by measures intended to improve 
adherence to the rules and respect for them, as well as dissemination about such 
rules and sanctions. They must incorporate prevention of a repetition of the crime, 
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and must lead the perpetrators to recognize their responsibility in the violation of 
humanitarian law.1042 
The liability of parties to the conflict to pay compensation for violations of 
IHL committed by persons forming part of their armed forces could provide for 
an obligation to compensate not only for States but also individuals. Obligations 
of parties to the conflict could thus be construed as being mirrored by rights of 
individuals for which IHL envisages a cause of action in case they are violated. 
This could prove a very powerful deterrent, if properly disseminated among the 
possible perpetrators. 
At the 70th anniversary of the Geneva Conventions States were called upon to 
do more. That included ratifying all IHL-related treaties; strengthening military 
doctrine, rules of engagement and practice; ensuring military training socializes 
the rules and principles of IHL; developing national legislation which is com-
patible with international obligations; and more.1043 In addition, there is now a 
UN Peacebuilding Fund available for countries emerging from a conflict or in a 
significant risk of lapsing into a conflict. As a way to implement IHL, one could 
imagine some kind of conditionality between the behaviour of the parties to the 
conflict and the financial aid they may receive through the fund, of course without 
prejudicing the civilian population.1044 
Next, when it comes to the question of why some rules elicit more compliance 
than others, it is concluded that, contrary to general belief, fear of criminal 
repression is not the most effective means to induce compliance by armed groups. 
Enforcement in its stricter punitive sense is not the key, it is still too slow, too far 
from the battlefield and too sporadic to offer real deterrence. It is not legalization, 
i.e. creating more stringent rules or regulating more aspects of humanitarian law 
either. It is rather a set of perplexing multidisciplinary preventive measures that 
should be carefully analysed to reach better results in the future. More emphasis 
should be put on the idea that the law is intensely practical and represents a set of 
deals between professional soldiers and bargains among States.1045 
“The greatest impediment to more effective legal regulation of war is not a 
demonstrable pattern of noncompliance, but rather the ongoing incapacity to 
explain and predict this pattern and offer policy-relevant guidance to the legal 
architects charged with making those modifications necessary to enhance 
compliance”, Bradford believes.1046 Crafting the most effective IHL regime is not 
merely a matter of codification of proper rules and institutions, although these are 
vital steps: it is to the selection and training of the right people to administer, 
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interpret, and implement the normative content of the rules and institutions. After 
all, only individuals can exercise choice to comply with the rules. 
To reiterate once more – if we are asking whether the Conventions need to be 
updated – the answer is negative. In substance, IHL has grown stronger, not 
weaker, over the past decades. A range of new international treaties have been 
ratified by States, international courts and tribunals produce judgments on the 
basis of IHL, States and non-state armed actors have been trained in this body of 
law, and IHL is integrated into States’ domestic legal orders more than ever 
before. 
It is true that the legal mechanisms of application have been met with varying 
degrees of success. Even where one or other of those mechanisms has not worked, 
we have to acknowledge that their role would have been even more limited if 
other – non-legal – factors had not made the warring parties aware of the need to 
comply with certain humanitarian limitations. It is not the text of the Conventions, 
but the whole spirit of this branch of law, that guarantees the effectiveness.1047 
Therefore, what needs to be advanced, is identifying and strengthening the values 
inherent to IHL rather than relying on the enforcement measures sensu stricto. 70 
years after the adoption of the Geneva Conventions, these values have not 
changed. 
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
CFSP  Common Foreign and Security Policy 
CSDP  Common Security and Defence Policy  
COJUR  Council Working Group on Public International Law 
ECHO  European Commission’s Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection 
department 
ECHR  European Convention on Human Rights 
HRL  Human Rights Law 
ICC  International Criminal Court 
ICJ International Court of Justice 
ICTR  International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
ICTY  International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
IHFFC  International Humanitarian Fact-Finding Commission 
IHL  International Humanitarian Law 
ILC International Law Commission 
JAG  Judge Advocate General 
LOAC  Law of Armed Conflict 
NGO  Non-Governmental Organization 
NIAC  Non-International Armed Conflict 
OSCE  Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
POW  Prisoner of War 
PSC  Political and Security Committee 
UNGA  United Nations General Assembly 
UNSC United Nations Security Council 
UNTS  United Nations Treaty Series 
VCLT  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
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ANNEX 1 
Key articles requiring the adoption of IHL national implementation measures 
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Conv. 
1999 
Protocol 
 First Second Third Fourth I II   
Translation 48 49 41, 128 99, 145 84  26 37 
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& training 
47 48 41, 127 99, 144 80, 82–83, 
87
19 7, 25 30 
Violations         
General 
provisions 
49–54 50–53 129–132 146–149 85–91  28 15–21 
War crimes 49–50 50–51 129–130 146–147 11, 85–90    
Compensation     91    
Protection         
Fundamental 
guarantees 
 3, 12 3, 13–17 3, 27–34 11, 75–77 4–5,7   
Judicial and 
disciplinary 
guarantees; 
rights of 
prisoners and 
detainees 
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3 
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82–90, 
95–108, 
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3, 5, 31–
35, 43, 
64–78, 
99–100, 
117–126 
 
44–45, 75 
 
6 
  
Medicinal and 
religious 
personnel 
40, 41 42  20 15–16, 18 10, 12   
Medicinal 
transports and 
facilities 
19, 36, 
39, 42–
43 
22, 24–
27, 38–
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43 
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Cultural 
property 
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Dangerous 
forces 
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Identity cards 27, 40, 
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Annex II 
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Annex 
 
17, Annex 
IV 
 
20 
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Annexes 
I&II
   
Capture and 
internment cards 
  70,  
Annex IV
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Annex III
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emblems and 
symbols 
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 1949 Geneva Conventions 1977 Protocols 1954 Hague 
Conv. 
1999 
Protocol 
 First Second Third Fourth I II   
Experts and 
advisers 
        
Qualified 
persons 
    6  7, 25  
Legal advisers   82   
Organizations     
National 
Societies 
26   63 81 18   
Civil defence   63 61–67   
Information 
bureaux 
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Mixed medical 
commissions 
  112, 
Annex II
     
Military 
planning 
        
Weapons/tactics   36   
Military sites   57–58  8 
Protected zones 
and localities 
23, 
Annex I 
  14, 15 59–60, 
Annex I
   
Source: ICRC, Advisory Service, “Implementing International Humanitarian Law: from Law to Action” 
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RESÜMEE  
Rahvusvahelise humanitaarõiguse riigisisene rakendamine 
Aktuaalseid probleeme 
Rahvusvaheline humanitaarõigus on õigusharu, mille eesmärk on leevendada 
sõja põhjustatud kannatusi, piirata relvakonflikti poolte julmust ja halastamatust 
ning tagada esmane kaitse neile, keda konflikt kõige otsesemalt mõjutab. 
Sõjapidamine eksisteerib paraku aegade hämarusest saadik. Võib öelda, et see 
on üks vanimaid kollektiivse tegevuse vorme. Seega on üsna loomulik, et sajan-
dite jooksul on tekkinud muljet avaldav kogus seadusi, mis sellist tegevust regu-
leerivad.1048 Ainuüksi aastatel 1815–1910 toimus sõjaseaduste ja -tavade kodifit-
seerimiseks 148 rahvusvahelist ametlikku koosolekut.1049 Genfi 1949. aasta 
konventsioonid, 1977. aasta protokollid1050 ja lugematud muud sõjapidamise 
vahendeid ja viise reguleerivad õigusaktid lisavad kindlasti veel paarsada kodi-
fitseerimisteemalist koosviibimist. 
Traditsiooniliselt oli sõjapidamine vaid poliitika jätkamine teiste vahenditega 
suveräänsete riikide vahel. Kuivõrd sõda oli rahvusvaheline ettevõtmine, nähti 
sõjaseadusi, mis hiljem nimetati humanitaarõiguseks, rahvusvahelise õiguse 
haruna. Sellele vaatamata on humanitaarõigus unikaalne režiim seetõttu, et olles 
küll adresseeritud riikidele, on selle eesmärgiks vähendada inimeste kannatusi ja 
kaitsta seega indiviidi.1051 Sõja eesmärk peab olema vaenlase relvajõududest 
jagusaamine, mitte rahva hävitamine.1052 
Ühest küljest on rahvusvahelise humanitaarõiguse areng olnud vaieldamatu 
edulugu. Selle normid on rahvusvahelise õiguse ühed detailseimad ning selle 
peamiseid lepingulisi aluseid aktsepteerib pea iga olemasolev riik. Teisest küljest 
                                                                                                 
1048 G. I. A. D. Draper. Humanitarianism in the Modern Law of Armed Conflicts. – Armed 
Conflict and the New Law: Aspects of the 1977 Geneva Protocols and the 1981 Weapons 
convention. M. A. Meyer (Ed.). London: BICCL 1989, lk 3. 
1049  I. P. Trainin. Questions of Guerrilla Warfare in the Law of War. – American Journal of 
International Law 1946 (40) 3, lk 534, 536. 
1050  12. augusti 1949. a Genfi (I) konventsioon haavatud ja haigete sõjaväelaste olukorra 
parandamise kohta maismaal. – RT 1999, 17, 107; 12. augusti 1949. a Genfi (II) konventsioon 
haavatud, haigete ja merehädas sõjaväelaste olukorra parandamise kohta merel. – RT 1999, 
18, 116; sõjavangide kohtlemise 12. augusti 1949. a Genfi (III) konventsioon. – RT 1999, 19, 
117; tsiviilisikute sõjaaegse kaitse 12. augusti 1949 Genfi (IV) konventsioon. – RT 1999, 20, 
120; 12. augusti 1949. a Genfi konventsioonide 8. juuni 1977. a (I) lisaprotokoll rahvus-
vaheliste relvakonfliktide ohvrite kaitse kohta. – RT II 1999, 21, 121; 12. augusti 1949. a Genfi 
konventsioonide 8. juuni 1977. a (II) lisaprotokoll siseriiklike relvakonfliktide ohvrite kaitse 
kohta. – RT 1999, 21, 122. 
1051  N. Quenivet, S. Shan-Davis. Confronting the Challenges of International Law and Armed 
Conflict in the 21st Century. – International Law and Armed Conflict: Challenges in the 21st 
Century. N. Quenivet, S. Shan-Davis (Eds.). The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press 2010, lk 3. 
1052 H.-P. Gasser. International Humanitarian Law. – Manual of International Humanitarian 
Laws. N. Sanajaoba (Ed.). New Delhi: Regency 2004, lk 204. 
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aga tasub vaid meenutada hiljutisi relvakonflikte, kui selgub, et humanitaarõiguse 
rikkumised on igapäevased kõikjal maailmas. Paljud autorid peavad humanitaar-
õigust üheks rahvusvahelise õiguse nõrgaks haruks.1053 Sellel on hästi arenenud 
ja selgesti sõnastatud normid relvastatud konfliktide reguleerimiseks, kuid kokku-
lepitu rakendamise ja jõustamise puhul ei ole areng kaugeltki samal tasemel. 
Sellest võib järeldada, et reeglitest kinnipidamine ja nende rakendamine, mitte 
adekvaatsete reeglite puudumine, on tänase humanitaarõiguse suurim probleem.1054 
Genfi konventsioonides on üle 600 artikli. Millised neist nõuavad riikidelt 
edasist tööd, millised on meetmed, mida tuleb rakendama asuda? Küsimus tundub 
esmapilgul lihtne ja vastus lepingupõhine, kuid akadeemilises kirjanduses esineb 
siiski pea sama palju tõlgendusi kui autoreid. Nimelt valib iga autor konvent-
sioonidest välja oma kataloogi kõige olulisemaid meetmeid, kategoriseerib need 
erinevalt ning kombineerib vajadusel ka teiste õigusharude meetmetega. Teoorias 
on seega võimalik, et uus riik või rahvusvaheline rühmitus, kes on otsustanud 
Genfi konventsioone heas usus täita, on üsna raskes olukorras, otsustamaks, 
mida, millal ja kuidas täita. Käesolevas artiklis on eristatud kolme kategooriat: 
ennetavad, järelevalve- ja jõustamismeetmed. Tuleb aga tähele panna, et see 
jaotus on mõnevõrra tinglik, sest mõned meetmed ei allu ühesele kategori-
seerimisele ja võivad kuuluda kahe eri kategooria alla. 
Kuigi Genfi konventsioonid on, nagu öeldud, pea universaalselt aktsep-
teeritud, oleks väär oletada, et kui leping on riigi jaoks rahvusvahelisel tasandil 
jõustunud, on ta sellega jõustunud ka riigi sees, s.t saanud selle riigi õiguse osaks. 
Rahvusvaheliste lepingute riigisisese kehtivuse all peetakse silmas lepingu 
normide vahetut toimimist siseõiguse sfääris. See on võimalik, kui lepingu 
normid ühel või teisel moel kanduvad siseõigusesse ehk muutuvad riigi õigus-
süsteemi osaks. Kuidas seda tehakse, sõltub konkreetsest riigist ja üldistest 
teooriatest siseriikliku ja rahvusvahelise õiguse vahekorra kohta (monistlik ja 
dualistlik lähenemine).1055 Olenemata rahvusvahelise õiguse riigisisesest staa-
tusest, on riik rahvusvahelise õiguse normi rikkumise eest – mis avaldub muu-
hulgas rahvusvahelise normi riigisiseses kohaldamata jätmises – rahvusvahelise 
                                                                                                 
1053  U. Kadam. Implementation of International Humanitarian Law: Problems and prospects. – 
Manual of International Humanitarian Laws. N. Sanajaoba (Ed.). New Delhi: Regency 2004, 
lk 379. 
1054  M. T. Dutli. National Implementation Measures of International Humanitarian Law: 
Some practical aspects. – Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 1998 (1), lk 245; 
P. Berman. The ICRC’s Advisory Service on International Humanitarian Law: The challenge 
of national implementation. – International Review of the Red Cross 1996 (78). Arvutivõrgus: 
www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/article/other/57jn57.htm (14.09.2017). 
1055  A. Aust. Modern Treaty Law and Practice. Cambridge University Press 2000, lk 143. 
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õiguse alusel igal juhul vastutav.1056 Ükski riik ei saa vabandada oma rahvus-
vahelisest õigusest tuleneva kohustuse rikkumist riigisisese õiguse puudu-
jääkidega.1057 
Tuleks rõhutada, et rahvusvahelise õiguse siseriikliku rakendamise kohustust 
rikutakse juba lihtsalt asjakohaste riigisiseste eeskirjade kehtestamata jätmisega, 
kuid veelgi enam juhul, kui selline tegevusetus toob kaasa lepingu sisuliste sätete 
rikkumise.1058 
Käesoleva artikli eesmärk on näidata, et just riigisisene rakendamine võib olla 
rahvusvahelise humanitaarõiguse reeglitest kinnipidamise garantiiks rahvus-
vahelisel tasandil. Pärast Genfi konventsioonide 1977. aasta lisaprotokollide 
vastuvõtmist oli riigisisene rakendamine akadeemilises diskussioonis olulisel 
kohal, kuid asendus sajandivahetusel pea täielikult rahvusvahelise kriminaal-
õiguse, terrorismi, humanitaarabi ja teiste spetsiifiliste meetmete diskursusega. 
Fookus kandus ennetavalt tegevuselt karistamisele. Tegelikkuses pakuvad olemas-
olevad õigusaktid piisavalt ennetavaid vahendeid, selleks et nende heas usus (või 
heas poliitilises tahtes) rakendamisega paljusid humanitaarõiguse rikkumisi ära 
hoida saaks. Seetõttu on aeg-ajalt paslik vaadata tagasi sellele, millised võima-
lused humanitaarõiguse tõhusamaks järgimiseks on ette nähtud Genfi konvent-
sioonides ja nende lisaprotokollides endis ning mida riigid saaksid iga päev teha, 
et rikkumisi vähendada. 
Mõned küsimused, millele autor vastust otsib, on näiteks, kuidas tegelikult 
riikide kohustus humanitaarõigust austada riigisisesesse õigusesse üle võtta ning 
milliseid olemasolevaid mehhanisme saaks paremini kasutada. Millised võima-
lused on riikidel väljaspool oma jurisdiktsiooni jõustamismeetmete võtmiseks ja 
kas need sisalduvad Genfi konventsioonides või ka teiste õigusharude tekstides? 
Kas Genfi konventsioonid vajavad uuendamist või saab neid tõlgendamise teel 
kohandada ka tänapäevastele konfliktidele? 
On lootust, et debatt rakendusprobleemide üle saab lähiaastatel sisse uue hoo. 
2016. aasta märtsis avaldas ICRC 60-aastase vahe järel Genfi konventsioonide 
uued kommentaarid, mis kinnitavad vana, kuid sisaldavad ka mõndagi uut riigi- 
ja kohtupraktikast.1059 
 
 
                                                                                                 
1056  H. Vallikivi. Välislepingud Eesti õigussüsteemis: 1992. a. põhiseaduse alusel jõustatud 
välislepingute siseriiklik kehtivus ja kohaldatavus. Tallinn: Õiguskirjastus 2001, lk 20. 
1057  Rahvusvaheliste lepingute õiguse Viini konventsioon, art 26, 27. – RT II 1993, 13, 16; 
A. Cassese. International Law. 2. ed. Oxford University Press 2005, lk 217. 
1058  K. Drzewicki. National Legislation as a Measure for Implementation of International 
Humanitarian Law. –Implementation of International Humanitarian Law. Research Papers by 
participants in the 1986 Session of the Centre for Studies and Research in International Law 
and International Relations of the Hague Academy of International Law. F. Kalshoven, 
Y. Sandoz (Eds.). Dordrecht 1989, lk 110. 
1059  Updated Commentary on the Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the 
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field. Geneva, 12 August 1949. Arvutivõrgus: 
https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/ihl/full/GCi-commentary (17.09.2017). 
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1. Ennetavad meetmed 
Eesmärki tagada rahvusvahelise õiguse normide järgimine tulevastes konfliktides 
saab kindlasti paremini saavutada ennetades kui tagajärgedega tegeledes.1060 
Olemasoleva õigusraamistiku asjakohasuse hindamiseks tuleks seega kõigepealt 
vaadelda nõudeid, mis on kehtestatud seoses riikide kohustusega rikkumisi 
ennetada, ehk teha teatavaid ettevalmistusi enne konflikti puhkemist. Käesoleva 
artikli eesmärgiks ongi illustreerida asjaolu, et ennetusmeetmed peaksid olema 
tähelepanu keskpunktis. Humanitaarõiguse kontekstis võiks väita, et just enne-
tavad meetmed moodustavad õiguse rakendamise (ingl implementation), karis-
tuslikud ja muud meetmed, mis tulevad kasutusele konflikti ajal või selle järel, 
aga õiguse jõustamise (ingl enforcement). Artikli autor on veendunud, et humani-
taarõiguse rakendamise ja jõustamise mõisteid tuleb teineteisest eristada, olgugi 
et erinevus võib esmapilgul tunduda habras või üleliigne. 
Pikaajaline humanitaarõiguse allikatega töötamine annab alust väita, et autorid 
kasutavad rakendamise ja jõustamise, aga ka paljusid muid lähedasi mõisteid 
kattuvate või vastupidistena ega selgita erinevusi enne sisuliste teemade juurde 
asumist.1061 Üks autoritest, kes eristamise vajadusele viitab, on professor 
McCoubrey, kes tunnistab, et kuigi mõisted kattuvad eesmärgi osas – tagada 
õiguslike normide kehtivus –, on kahe protsessi vahel siiski oluline erinevus. 
Nimelt on jõustamine tagasiulatuvaks vastuseks normide rikkumisele, mis eeldab 
seega seaduse esmaste püüdluste ebaõnnestumist (kehtestada ja säilitada mis-
tahes normatiivseid standardeid) ning näib sisaldavat ka mingit jõu või sunni 
elementi. Rakendusprotsess on teisest küljest meetmed, mis tagavad seaduste 
järgimise n-ö ettevaatavalt. Ta viitab õigustatult sellele, et konfliktiohvrite jaoks 
on palju kasulikum ettevaatavate/ärahoidvate meetmete võtmine kui kurjategijate 
karistamine pärast tarbetuid kannatusi.1062 Seega viitab McCoubrey jõustamise 
retrospektiivsele elemendile, mis on käesolevas arutelus väga tähtis. Kesken-
dudes ainult jõustamistoimingutele, jätame me tähelepanuta ennetuse olulise 
rolli. Püüdes järgimist saavutada karistamise kaudu, oleme lahingu tegelikult juba 
kaotanud. 
                                                                                                 
1060  C. Greenwood. Ensuring Compliance with the Law of Armed Conflict. – Control over 
Compliance with International Law. W. E. Butler (Ed.). Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1990, 
lk 202; L. Doswald-Beck. Implementation of International Humanitarian Law in Future Wars. – 
The Law of Armed Conflict into the New Millennium. M. N. Schmitt, L. C. Green (Eds.). 
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www.merriam-webster.com (14.09.2017). 
1062  H. McCoubrey. International Humanitarian Law: Modern Developments in the limitation 
of Warfare. Dartmouth: Ashgate 1998, lk 57–58. 
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Õiguslikult ei ole rakendamismeetmete vahel hierarhiat, need on üksteisest 
sõltumatud ja peaksid kõik olema sama tähtsad. Sellele vaatamata on kirjanduses 
esile tõstetud mõned reeglid, mis moodustavad rakendamise sine qua non 
kogumi. 
Esimene selline nõue on, et riigisiseses õiguses oleks tehtud vajalikud muuda-
tused, mis võimaldavad humanitaarõiguse normide tundmist ja rikkumiste eest 
karistamist; et normid oleksid riigisiseselt inkorporeeritud. Riigid on kohustatud 
teatavaid tegusid karistama, kuid asjakohased rahvusvahelise õiguse sätted ise ei 
saa olla aluseks süüdimõistva otsuse tegemisel, neid tuleb täiendada karistus-
õiguslike normidega. Seega sõltub humanitaarõiguse toimimine suures osas riigi-
sisestest sammudest.1063 Eestis on karistusseadustiku 8. peatükis sätestatud inim-
suse ja rahvusvahelise julgeoleku vastased süüteod, sh sõjasüüteod on eraldi jaos 
välja toodud. Vajaliku riigisisese õigusliku baasi olemasolu on ennetav meede, 
sätete alusel karistamine aga juba jõustamismeede, millest tuleb juttu käesoleva 
artikli kolmandas alapeatükis. 
Teine kohustus, mis peab olema riigisisesesse õiguses juurutatud, on huma-
nitaarorganisatsioonide embleemide ning nende töötajate ja transpordivahendite 
kaitse, neile erilise staatuse tagamine, nende märgistamine, finantseerimine jne. 
Seda üsna loogilist kohustust on praktikas kahjuks laialdaselt rikutud. Iga riik 
peab tagama, et tema alamad teaksid ja austaksid igas olukorras Punase Risti, 
tsiviilkaitse, kultuuriväärtuse, ohtliku rajatise või muu asjakohaselt tähistatu 
erilist staatust. Mitteriiklike rühmituste puhul on nimetatud kohustuste järgimine 
osutunud äärmiselt muret tekitavaks ning paljud autorid murravad pead selle üle, 
kuidas selliste rühmitustega läbirääkimised tulemuslikumad oleksid.1064 
Riigid peavad samuti korraldama ja koordineerima oma sisemisi poliitilisi ja 
haldusstruktuure selliselt, et saavutada humanitaarõiguse nõuete maksimaalne 
mõju.1065 Lõppeesmärk peaks olema kõikides riikides kogu riigisisese õiguse 
vastavus rahvusvahelisele humanitaarõigusele, mis on saavutatud juba rahu-
ajal.1066 Koordineerimise all on muu hulgas mõeldud seda, et oleks vajadusel 
tagatud võimalikult kiire erikaitse tsoonide loomine, et humanitaarõiguse nõudeid 
võetaks arvesse sõjaliste objektide linnaruumi paigutamisel ning sõjalise taktika 
valikul.1067 
                                                                                                 
1063  M. Bothe. The Role of National Law in the Implementation of International Humanitarian 
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1064  D. Thürer. International Humanitarian Law: Theory, Practice, Context. Brill, Nijhoff 
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Õiguskuulekuse üheks eelduseks on siduvate õigusnormide tundmine. Kõikide 
sõjaõiguse normide detailset tundmist saab ilmselt eeldada üksnes relvajõudude 
õigusnõuandjatelt, kuid selleks, et tagada kasvõi minimaalne austus selliste 
igaühte puudutavate reeglite vastu, on mõistlik teha maksimaalseid pingutusi.1068 
Genfi konventsioonide ühised artiklid 48/49/128/145 kohustavad riike edas-
tama üksteisele konventsioonide ja nende rakendamise seaduste ja määruste 
ametlikud tõlked. Tõlkimisnõue on üks selgemaid nõudeid, mis eeldab aktiivset 
riigisisest tegevust. Teine samalaadne kohustus on toodud Genfi konventsioonide 
ühisartiklites 47/48/127/144, mille kohaselt riikidel on kohustus nii rahu- kui ka 
sõjaajal levitada konventsioonide teksti oma territooriumil, esmajoones näha ette 
humanitaarõiguse põhimõtete õpetamine sõjaväelistes ja võimaluse korral ka 
tsiviilõppeprogrammides. Eesmärgiks oleks see, et sõjaõiguse põhimõtteid teab 
kogu elanikkond, eriti relvajõud, meditsiinipersonal ja vaimulikud.1069 
Artikli autor on veendunud, et õpetamine ja levitamine on kaks kõige olu-
lisemat elementi Genfi konventsioonide järgimise tagamisel. Kui relvajõud ja 
mitteriiklikud rühmitused seadusi ei tea ega internaliseeri, ei ole riikide edasisel 
tegevusel rikkumist vähendamisel tulemusi. Viimaste aastate uuringud näitavad, 
et rahvusvahelisel kriminaalõigusel ei ole olnud sellist hoiatavat mõju, mida 
loodeti, seega ei saa lootma jääda ainult võimaliku karistuse karmusele. 
Austus humanitaarõiguse vastu põhineb suures osas vabatahtlikkusel. Nii 
relvajõudude kui ka mitteriiklike rühmituste liikmed teevad iga päev otsuseid, 
kas norme täita või mitte. Selline vabatahtlikkus eeldab, et isik teab õiguse sisu, 
aktsepteerib seda oma tegevuse alusena ning õiguskuulekus saab tema rutiinse 
töö osaks. Seda nimetatakse normide internaliseerimiseks, mille saavutamise esi-
mene vahend ongi humanitaarõiguse levitamine.1070 Riikide ametlikes relva-
jõududes on sellise eesmärgi saavutamine üldiselt lihtsam ning reguleeritud kind-
lates käsiraamatutes, sisereeglites ja ka käsuliini abil. Tänapäeval on konfliktide 
puhul aga valdavalt tegemist mitteriiklike rühmitustega. Just sellistele rühmitustele 
humanitaarõiguse õpetamine ning normide internaliseerimine peaks olema aka-
deemilise diskussiooni fookuses. Mitmed autorid küsivadki selle järele, miks 
teevad selliste rühmituste liikmed üldse otsuse õigust järgida ning mida saaks 
teha, et õiguskuulekus oleks laiemalt levinud. Lähenedes probleemile inter-
distsiplinaarselt, mitme eri õigusharu, psühholoogia, organisatsioonikultuuri ja 
muude teaduste kaudu, on jõutud järeldusele, et olukord ei ole lootusetu ning 
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eksisteerib mitu viisi selliste rühmituste käitumise mõjutamiseks. Tuhandete 
inimelude päästmise kontekstis väärib probleem kindlasti sügavamat uurimist.1071 
Õpetamiskohustusega kaasnevad meetmed on ka kvalifitseeritud töötajate 
väljaõpe, õigusnõustajate lähetamine relvajõududesse, rõhu asetamine ülemate 
vastutusele ning sõjaväe ja selliste muude ametiisikute eriväljaõpe, kes võivad 
humanitaarõiguse tagajateks osutuda.1072 Kuigi paljud riigid ja riiklikud Punase 
Risti seltsid on õpetamisega seoses teinud väga head tööd, on selge, et eel-
nimetatud kohustuste täitmine ei ole riikide jaoks prioriteetne enne konflikti 
sattumist. Konflikti ajal aga ei ole enam üldjuhul piisavalt aega ja ressursse.1073 
 
2. Järelevalvemeetmed 
Järelevalvemeetmed on artikli käsituses sellised meetmed, mille eesmärk on 
tagada, et relvastatud konflikti ajal järgitakse humanitaarõiguse sätteid nõuete-
kohaselt. Kuigi sellised meetmed on konventsioonides selgelt sätestatud, eksis-
teerib õiguse ja relvakonflikti reaalsuse vahel suur lõhe. Tegelikult on rahvus-
vaheline üldsus juba aastaid tuginenud peaaegu täielikult ühele, Rahvusvahelise 
Punase Risti Komitee (ICRC) järelevalvefunktsioonile. Rahvusvahelise Punase 
Risti Komitee moodustamisega 1863. aastal loodi poolametlik ja poolrahvus-
vaheline järelevalvemehhanism.1074 Konventsioonid ja lisaprotokollid viitavad 
Rahvusvahelisele Punase Risti Komiteele ja annavad sellele rahvusvahelistes 
(tavaliselt riikidevahelistes) relvastatud konfliktides kaitse- ja osaliselt järele-
valveorgani staatuse. 
Vastumeelsus teiste mehhanismide kasutamise suhtes on igal konkreetsel 
juhul erinev, kuid on vähemalt kaks üldisemat laadi põhjust. Esiteks on järele-
valvesüsteem tervikuna välja töötatud rahvusvaheliste relvastatud konfliktide 
jaoks, kuid enamik pärast Teist maailmasõda tekkinud konflikte on olnud riigi-
sisesed konfliktid. Teiseks on humanitaarõiguse rakendamine üksikute riikide 
pädevuses ja vajab seega pidevat rahvusvahelisel tasandil koostööd ja koos-
kõlastamist, milleks poliitiline kliima pole alati soodne.1075 
Esimene võimalik järelevalvemeetod on juurdlus (ingl fact-finding). Esimese 
Genfi konventsiooni artikkel 52 sätestab, et konfliktiosalise nõudmise korral 
tuleb konventsiooni iga oletatava rikkumise kohta korraldada juurdlus, mille 
korra määravad asjaomased pooled. Konventsiooniga oli varem ette nähtud, et 
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juurdluse algatamist palutakse kaitsva riigi kaudu.1076 Esimese lisaprotokolliga 
juurdluste korraldamine institutsionaliseeriti ja loodi rahvusvaheline uurimis-
komisjon, mis koosneb 15 liikmest ja mille ülesanne on humanitaarõiguse 
rakendamisele kaasaaitamine ning selle vastu austuse suurendamine. Tõele au 
andes tuleb öelda, et uurimiskomisjoni ei ole kuigi palju kasutatud, kuid see on 
endiselt toimiv üksus ja paljud autorid ei ole loobunud ideest, et see on kasulik.1077 
Faktide tuvastamine mängib humanitaarõiguse rakendamisel olulist rolli ning 
võib aidata ka individuaalse kriminaalvastutuse kindakstegemisel ja isikute 
süüdimõistmisel. On hea meel tõdeda, et rahvusvaheline uurimiskomisjon on 
viimaks ometi alustanud tööd ja teinud OSCE tellimuse alusel 2017. aasta mais 
kohtuekspertiisi Ida-Ukrainas. See annab alust loota, et riigid kasutavad komis-
joni teenuseid ka edaspidi ning komisjon ei ole vaid teoreetiline jäänuk 
1970. aastatest.1078 
Teiseks järelevalvemeetmeks on võetud rakendusmeetmetest ning konflikti 
ajal humanitaarõiguse järgimisest ettekandmine. ICRC on aastaid pidanud andme-
baasi, kuhu riigid saavad sisestada kommentaare ja õigusaktide tõlkeid, mis on 
riigis konventsioonide rakendamiseks loodud.1079 See on siiski pigem vabatahtlik 
süsteem ja riigid täidavad andmebaasi väga erineva intensiivsusega, mistõttu ei 
ole andmed ka omavahel võrreldavad. Lisaks sellele ei sisalda ICRC andmebaas 
tegelikult mingit analüüsi või tagasisidesüsteemi, s.t et kui riigid ei anna aru piisa-
valt või ilmneb aruannete sisust, et võetud rakendusmeetmed on ebakorrektsed, 
ei ole nähtud ette võimalusi olukorra parandamiseks. 
Idee luua püsiv organ, mille eesmärk on jälgida rahvusvahelise humanitaar-
õiguse rakendamist relvastatud konfliktides, on olnud mitu korda diplomaatilistel 
konverentsidel arutlusel, kuid on alati tagasi lükatud.1080 Hiljuti, aastal 2014, tehti 
veel üks katse regulaarset aruandlussüsteemi luua. Genfi konventsioonid on selles 
mõttes erilised, et ei näe ette liikmesriikide regulaarseid kohtumisi ega foorumit 
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probleemide arutamiseks. Šveitsi riigi abiga korraldas ICRC ulatusliku konsul-
teerimise ja pakkus 2014. aastal välja iga-aastase riikide kohtumise ja ka pool-
kohustusliku aruandlussüsteemi. Paraku ei jõudnud ICRC 31. konverentsil osa-
lenud riigid kokkuleppele ja aruandlus jäi endiselt lõppresolutsioonist välja. 
Siiski tundub, et oleme jõudnud väga lähedale sellele, et mõnel järgneval ICRC 
konverentsil aruandlussüsteemi loomises kokkuleppele jõutakse. Sellise organi ja 
pigem kohustusliku aruandluse poole peaks autori hinnangul kindlasti püüdlema. 
Perioodiline aruandlus on oluline tööriist riigisisesel tasandil vastavuse 
suurendamiseks. See looks võimaluse hinnata iseenda arengut, saada häid näiteid 
teistelt riikidelt ja tuvastada valdkondi, kus võimekust on võimalik tõsta.1081 
Sealjuures peaks aruandlus olema nii vormiline kui ka sisuline. See tähendab, et 
esiteks tuleks ette kanda kõikidest sätetest, mis on riigisiseselt kehtestatud nende 
regulatsioonide ülevõtmiseks, mis ei ole vahetult kohaldatavad ja iserakenduvad 
ning vajavad riikidelt seadusandlikku sekkumist.1082 Näiteks saab riik ICRC abiga 
kõiki huvitatud osapooli teavitada sellest, et on karistusseadustikku sisse viinud 
karistuse Punase Risti sümboli väärkohaldamise kohta ning edastada ka selle-
kohase tõlke või lühikokkuvõtte. Teiseks peaks ette kandma ka tegelikust käitu-
misest konfliktiolukorras, see tähendab konventsioonide ja protokollide sisuliste 
kohustustega kooskõlast ehk sätete rakendamisest.1083 Mõlemal juhul oleks vaja 
ka formaalselt hindamise ja tagasiside andmise mehhanismi (võib-olla ka järel-
kontrolli) ja selleks määratud hindavat asutust. Aruandluskohustust ei saa pidada 
täidetuks lihtsalt aruande esitamise faktiga. 
Professor Sassoli teoretiseerib ka võimaluse üle, kus mitteriiklikud rühmi-
tused annavad aru reeglitest kinnipidamisest. Kui rühmitus on reeglid omaks 
võtnud ja seda ka näiteks deklaratsiooniga väljendanud, ei ole selline asi võimatu 
(näitena võib tuua Hamasi Iisraeli-Palestiina konflikti puhul).1084 
Inimõigusaktide puhul on monitoorimine ja raporteerimine täiesti tavapärased. 
ÜRO kontekstis näiteks monitooritakse riikide käitumise vastavust kuuele  
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põhilisele inimõiguslepingule.1085 Euroopa Liidu kontekstis on vastavuse kont-
rollimine veelgi levinum. Kui riigid on milleski ametlikult kokku leppinud, siis 
seda tuleb ka täita ja kontrollida. Näiteid võiks tuua keskkonnaõigusest ekspordi-
kontrollini. Vastavuse tagamine kindlustatakse rikkumismenetlusega. Tõsi, 
Euroopa Liit on kahtlemata hoopis teistsugune struktuur, kuid hea tahtmise korral 
ei ole võimatu ette kujutada, et ka rahvusvaheline üldsus oleks teatud laadi 
rikkumismenetlusega nõus. Riik ei annaks oma suveräänsusest sellega otseselt 
midagi ära, vaid allutaks ennast vastastikusele kontrollile, mis aitab kindlustada 
humanitaarõiguse rikkumiste selge vähendamise. 
Kolmanda meetmena võib välja tuua kaitsva riigi institutsiooni. Rahvusvahe-
lise relvastatud konflikti puhkemise korral ei ole sõdivate riikide puhul haruldane 
diplomaatiliste suhete peatamine või lõpetamine. Sellisteks puhkudeks loob 
Genfi konventsioonide esimene protokoll kaitsva riigi institutsiooni. Konflikti-
osalised on kohustatud tagama järelevalve konventsioonide üle ning nende 
täitmise, kasutades selleks kaitsvate riikide süsteemi, mis hõlmab muu hulgas 
kaitsvate riikide määramise ja heakskiitmise.1086 
Kaitsev riik on konfliktiosalise riigi poolt volitatud neutraalne riik, selleks et 
kaitsta riigi enda ja selle kodanike huve vaenlase riigi ees. Kaitsva riigi roll on 
kahetine: ta võib ohvrite abistamiseks korraldada abistamis- ja kaitseoperatsioone 
ning samal ajal jälgida, kas sõdivad pooled täidavad oma õiguslikke kohustusi.1087 
Konventsioonid näevad ette võimaluse lepitusmenetluseks, milleks saab samuti 
kaitsvat riiki kasutada, kui sõdivate riikide vahel on arusaamatus konventsioonide 
tõlgendamise või kohaldamise küsimuses.1088 
Teise maailmasõja ajal osutus nimetatud süsteem väga kasulikuks, kui enamik 
sõdivatest riikidest palus kaitsva riigi teenust. Näiteks täitis Šveits seda funkt-
siooni korraga kuni 35 riigi jaoks.1089 Talvesõja ajal aga keeldus NSVL Soome 
palvest kaitsva riigi määramiseks.1090 
Kaitsva riigi kasutuses ei ole ametlikke sanktsioone, millega humanitaar-
õigusest kinnipidamist nõuda, kuid kaitsva riigi järelevalve võib aidata rikkumisi 
ära hoida ja leitud rikkumiste avalikustamisega ähvardamine võib olla oluline 
                                                                                                 
1085  Monitoring and Reporting on Violations of International Law. Harvard Humanitarian 
Initiative. Arvutivõrgus: http://atha.se/content/monitoring-and-reporting-violations-inter 
national-law (17.09.2017); Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism on Children Affected by 
Armed Conflict, set up under Security Council Resolution 1612 (2005). S/Res/1612 (2005) 
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1612%20%282005%29&Lang=
E&Area=UNDOC. 
1086  12. augusti 1949. a Genfi konventsioonide 8. juuni 1977 (I) lisaprotokoll rahvusvaheliste 
relvakonfliktide ohvrite kaitse kohta, art 5; S. Sivakumaran. The law of Non-international 
Armed Conflict. Oxford University Press 2012, lk 457. 
1087  T. Pfanner (viide 18), lk 287. 
1088  Genfi I–III konventsiooni art 11 ja IV konventsiooni art 12. 
1089  H. Brollowski. The responsibility to Protect and Common Article 1 of the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions and Obligations of Third States – Responsibility to Protect: from principle to 
practice. J. Hoffmann, A. Nollkaemper (eds), Amsterdam University Press 2012, lk 98. 
1090  I. D. De Lupis. The Law of War. London: Cambridge University Press 1987, lk 323. 
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mitteametlik relv.1091 Kaitsva riigi institutsiooni kasutamine tooks kaasa kahtle-
mata suurema õiguskuulekuse kasvõi sellepärast, et paljud rikkumised sünnivad 
pigem hooletusest kui tahtlikest poliitilistest otsustest.1092 
ICRC veebileht kirjeldab paraku viimase aja pessimistlikke suundumusi, tõde-
des, et „[p]raktikas ei ole kaitsva riigi institutsiooni viimastel aastatel kasutatud. 
Selle asemel on ICRC-d tunnistatud kui kaitsva riigi asendajat“1093. ICRC töötab 
siiski edasi kui ICRC ja seda ei saa konventsioonide mõttes pidada kaitsvaks 
riigiks, kes peab definitsiooni järgi olema riik. Siinkohal nendivad paljud autorid, 
et seaduse ja praktika vahel on väga suured käärid. Pidi ju kaitsvate riikide süsteem 
olema õiguse „kriitilise tähtsusega“ osa ning lausa „rakendussüsteemi nurga-
kivi“.1094 Pfanner nendib, et alates Teisest maailmasõjast on süsteemi väga harva 
kasutatud ning selle tulevikuväljavaated ei ole head, arvestades poliitiliselt deli-
kaatset rolli, mida riik peab täitma oma kohustuste täitmiseks.1095 Autori arvates 
peaks rahvusvahelise relvakonflikti puhkemisel konflikti pooltele avaldama 
survet kaitsvate riikide määramiseks vastavalt konventsioonidele. Keeldumist 
tuleks aga pidada konventsioonide raskeks rikkumiseks.1096 
Lisaks nimetatud kolmele järelevalvemeetmele on pakutud veel mitut või-
malust, mis kahtlemata vääriksid kaalumist. Näiteks rahvusvahelise humanitaar-
õiguse komisjoni loomine või rahvusvahelise humanitaarõiguse kohtu loomine.1097 
Mõnel ÜRO organil võiks olla spetsiifiline pädevus tegeleda rahvusvahelise 
humanitaarõigusega (nt Inimõiguste Nõukogu abiorgan), humanitaarõiguse kõrge 
esindaja võiks täita samalaadseid funktsioone nagu inimõiguste vastavad organid, 
samuti võiks piiratud riikidevaheline organ jälgida rahvusvahelise humanitaar-
õiguse kohaldamist, olenemata sellest, kas organ on loodud lepingu või resolut-
siooni alusel.1098 
Enamik olemasolevatest järelevalvemehhanismidest on üsna nõrgad või neid 
pole praktikas kasutatud. See viis Rahvusvahelise Punase Risti Komitee mõtteni 
korraldada aastal 2003 mitu piirkondlikku ekspertide kohtumist rahvusvahelise 
humanitaarõiguse järgimise parandamise teemal. Kogutud ideed uute meetmete 
või mehhanismide jaoks hõlmasid kas ad hoc ehk teatud konkreetse konflikti 
korral loodud või perioodilise aruandluse süsteemi ning individuaalsete kaebuste 
esitamise mehhanismide loomist; riikidest või sõltumatutest rahvusvahelise 
humanitaarõiguse ekspertidest koosneva diplomaatilise foorumi loomist; rahvus-
vahelise humanitaarõiguse voliniku ametikoha loomist Genfi konventsioonide ja 
                                                                                                 
1091  C. Greenwood (viide 13), lk 197. 
1092  Samas, lk 203. 
1093  Arvutivõrgus: https://casebook.icrc.org/glossary/protecting-powers (22.10.2017). 
1094  S. Sivakumaran (viide 39), lk 457. 
1095  T. Pfanner (viide 18), lk 287. 
1096  G. H. Aldrich. Improving Compliance with the Laws Applicable in Armed Conflict: A 
work in progress. – Man’s Inhumanity to Man. Essays on International Law in Honour of 
Antonio Casses. L. C. Vohrah et al. (Eds.). Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2003, lk 8–9. 
1097  T. Pfanner (viide 18), lk 306. 
1098  Samas. 
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nende lisaprotokollide lepingulise organina.1099 Humanitaarõigus areneb ja 
täieneb pidevalt ning uute meetmete väljakujunemine on kahtlemata protsessi 
loomulik osa. 
 
3. Jõustamismeetmed 
Nüüd pöördume mündi teise poole juurde, milleks on riikidele ja rahvusvahe-
lisele üldsusele kättesaadavad jõustamismeetmed. Nagu öeldud, erinevad 
jõustamismeetmed (mis hõlmavad karistusmeetmeid) rakendusmeetmetest sisu ja 
eesmärkide poolest. Siinkohal tuleb veel eristada kahte kategooriat meetmeid – 
neid, mida riigid ise saavad rakendada oma kodanike rikkumiste karistamiseks, 
ja neid, mille kaudu riigid saavad survestada teisi riike humanitaarõiguse rikku-
misi lõpetama. 
Esiteks on riigid Genfi konventsioonide ja nende esimese lisaprotokolli järgi 
kohustatud kehtestama humanitaarõiguse raskete rikkumiste karistamiseks riigi-
sisesed normid. Rahvusvahelise Kriminaalkohtu Rooma statuut toob küllaltki 
pika nimekirja tegudest, mis on sõjakuriteod. See laiendab sisuliselt juba Nürn-
bergi tribunali ajal väljakujunenud sõjakuritegude mõistet veel kõikide kon-
ventsioonide raskete rikkumistega.1100 Sõjakuritegu on laiem mõiste kui raske 
rikkumine, sest sõjakuritegu võib olla ka tegu, mis konventsioonide järgi ei ole 
raske rikkumine või ei sisaldu üldse Genfi konventsioonides, vaid tavaõiguses 
või muudes õigusaktides. Humanitaarõiguse rikkumise eest kriminaalvastutust 
ette nägevate normide riigisisene kehtestamine aitab kindlustada austust rahvus-
vahelise humanitaarõiguse vastu, samas moodustab see osa õiguskindluse põhi-
mõttest. Riigisisese kriminaliseerimise kohustust on riigid paraku järginud pehmelt 
öeldes ebaühtlaselt.1101 
Lisaks sellele on üksikisikute ja gruppide vastutusele võtmiseks olemas rahvus-
vaheline kriminaalõiguse süsteem, mis koosneb tribunalidest, erikohtutest ja 
Rahvusvahelisest Kriminaalkohtust. Rahvusvahelise õigusega kursis olijad aga 
teavad, kui pikaajalised sealsed protsessid on. Selliste kohtute töö on kindlasti 
aidanud õigust tõlgendada ja edasi arendada, kuid ei avalda kurjategijatele 
heidutavat mõju piisavalt kiiresti. Kohtuprotsessid toimuvad aastaid pärast kuri-
tegude toimepanemist ning tavaliselt mõistetakse süüdi vaid üksikud kõrgemad 
isikud. 
                                                                                                 
1099  K. Dörman. Dissemination and Monitoring Compliance of International Humanitarian 
Law. – International Humanitarian Law Facing New Challenges: Symposium in honor of Knut 
Ipsen. W. Heintsechel, V. Epping (Eds.). Berlin: Springer 2007, lk 242. 
1100  L. C. Green. The Contemporary Law of Armed Conflict. 3. ed. Manchester University 
Press 2008, lk 295. Rasked rikkumised on toodud konventsioonide ühistes art-tes 50, 51, 130 
ja 147 ning esimese lisaprotokolli art-tes 11, 85 ja 86 – neid peetakse sõjakuritegudeks. 
1101  A. Roberts. Implementation of the Laws of War in Late-Twentieth-Century Conflicts. – 
The Law of Armed Conflict into the Next Millennium. M. N. Scmitt, L. C. Green (Eds.). 
Newport: Naval War College 1998, lk 364. 
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Teise kategooria meetmeid ei ole aga üheselt lihtne välja tuua. Traditsiooni-
lised relvakonfliktiõiguse õpikud loetlevad järgmised meetmed: diplomaatilised 
püüdlused (sh ametlikud kaebused, vahendus, uurimiskomisjonid), repressaalid, 
retorsioonid, sõjakuritegude eest vastutusele võtmine, isegi pantvangide võtmine 
ja hüvitisnõuded.1102 
Kohtunik Cassese loetleb humanitaarõiguse jõustamise meetoditena esiteks 
vastuolulised repressaalid (mis on tänaseks suuresti keelatud), teiseks spetsiifi-
lised mehhanismid, mis on konfliktipoolte vahel kokku lepitud. Need on näiteks 
kaitsva riigi määramine, uurimiskomisjon ja kriminaaljurisdiktsioon: riigisiseste 
või rahvusvaheliste kohtute poolt humanitaarõiguse rikkumises süüdi mõistetud 
üksikisikute karistamine.1103 See on hea näide, kuidas järelevalve- ja karistuslikke 
meetmeid ei ole alati kerge teineteisest eraldada. 
Eristatud on ka järgmist nelja meetodit: diplomaatiline surve (protestid, avalik 
hukkamõist, rahvusvaheline uurimiskomisjon); sunnimeetmed (retorsioonid: nt 
diplomaatide väljasaatmine, lepingute sõlmimisest keeldumine, kaubanduslike 
eeliste peatamine; repressaalid: impordikontrollid, investeeringute keelud, varade 
külmutamine, lennuliikluse peatamine); meetmed, mis võetakse koostöös ÜRO 
ja teiste rahvusvaheliste organisatsioonidega ning kaitsva riigi institutsiooni 
rakendamine.1104 
Mõnevõrra erinevalt määratleb Morrison jõustamismeetmed mistahes meet-
mena, mis iseenesest oleks rahvusvahelise õiguse rikkumine, kui seda võetakse 
ilma mingi erilise põhjenduseta või ilma sihtriigi nõusolekuta. Seega ei tohiks 
ÜRO põhikirja VI peatüki alusel võetud meetmed tavaliselt olla jõustamis-
meetmed, sest nende kasutamine võib olla ebasõbralik, kuid ei ole iseenesest 
õigusvastane. Seevastu VII peatüki alusel tehtavad otsused sisaldavad sageli 
meetmeid, mis nõuavad sellist põhjendust, et vältida ebaseaduslikkust.1105 
Mõne autori hinnangul ei ole aga humanitaarõiguse jõustamise mehhanisme 
tarvis otsida üksnes humanitaarõiguse enda aktidest, vaid kasutada võib kõiki 
olemasolevaid meetmeid, sh ÜRO põhikirja VII peatükki, inimõigusalaseid 
                                                                                                 
1102  C. Greenwood (viide 13), lk 196; F. Kalshoven (viide 33), lk 759; D. Fleck. The Hand-
book of International Humanitarian Law. 3. ed. Oxford University Press 2013, lk 685; 
U. Palwankar. Measures Available to States for Fulfilling Their Obligation to Ensure Respect 
for International Humanitarian Law. Arvutivõrgus:  
www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/article/other/57jmaw.htm (24.09.2017). 
1103  A. Cassese. On the Current Trends towards Criminal Prosecution and Punishment of 
Breaches of International Humanitarian Law. – European Journal of International Law 1998 
(9) 1, lk 3. 
1104  U. Palwankar (viide 55). 
1105  F. L. Morrison. The Role of Regional Organizations in the Enforcement of International 
Law, in Allocation of Law Enforcement Authority in the International System. – Proceedings 
of an international symposium of the Kiel institute of international law. J. Delbrück (Ed.). 
Berlin: Duncker and Humblot 1995, lk 44. Ühinenud Rahvaste Organisatsiooni põhikiri ning 
Rahvusvahelise Kohtu statuut. – RT 1996, 24, 95. 
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meetmeid, rahvusvahelisi tribunale või avaliku arvamuse survet.1106 Humanitaar-
õigust ei saa vaadelda kui iseseisvat ja eraldiasuvat süsteemi. 
Jõustamise kontekstis on tekkinud muret tekitav uus suundumus. Mõned 
autorid on hakanud vihjama, et üldine kohustus tagada Genfi konventsioonide 
järgimine (ingl ensure respect) võib põhimõtteliselt hõlmata ka jõu kasutamist. 
Tavaliselt on küll märgitud, et austus konventsioonide vastu peab olema tagatud 
kõikvõimalike seaduslike vahenditega, kuid on selge tendents laiendada seda 
kohustust veelgi. Konventsioonide esimese ühisartikli laiema tõlgenduse eest-
kõnelejad on viidanud kõigile olemasolevatele meetmetele, mida riikidel oleks 
õigus võtta kolmanda osalise õiguskuulekusele sundimiseks.1107 Siinkohal on 
vaja korrata, et ainus rahvusvahelise õiguse dokument, mis lubab jõu kasutamist, 
on ÜRO põhikiri. Oleks tõepoolest mõeldamatu, et humanitaarõigus, mis tugineb 
eeldusele, et selle rakendamine ei ole sõltuvuses ius ad bellum’ist, saab ise relvas-
tatud sekkumise ettekäändeks.1108 
Ühepoolselt, s.t ilma igasuguse viiteta lepingule või tavaõigusele, riigi või 
riikide grupi poolt algatatav relvastatud sekkumine ei ole rahvusvahelise õiguse 
järgi lubatud ning mitte ükski relvastatud sekkumine ei saa tugineda humanitaar-
õigusele, eriti veel Genfi konventsioonide esimesele ühisartiklile.1109 Jõu kasu-
tamist ei saa õigustada ilma ÜRO Julgeolekunõukogu nõusolekuta. Ükski hilju-
tine rahvusvaheline praktika ega arenev tavaõiguse norm ei tõenda, et ÜRO harta 
tõlgendust oleks muudetud. Ainus juhtum, kus praktika on olnud vastuolus ÜRO 
hartaga, on NATO nn humanitaarne interventsioon Kosovos, mis on selge 
erand.1110 
Rahvusvaheline humanitaarõigus kehtib võrdselt kõigi relvastatud konflikti 
osaliste suhtes ja sõltumatult jõu kasutamise seaduslikkuse kaalutlustest. Kui 
tunnistada, et rahvusvaheline humanitaarõigus lubab relvajõu kasutamist, et 
lõpetada õigusrikkumine, siis võiks ka väita, et igasugune relvajõu kasutamine, 
mis järgib humanitaarõiguse sätteid täht-tähelt, on õiguspärane. See oleks mõistagi 
absurdne, mis on just üks põhjustest, miks rahvusvahelist humanitaarõigust ei 
tohi mingil juhul seostada jõu kasutamise õiguspärasusega.1111 
Veel üks vastuoluline arenev kontseptsioon on 2005. aastal ÜRO Peaassamblee 
resolutsioonis kokku lepitud kohustus kaitsta (ingl responsibility to protect). 
                                                                                                 
1106  D. Fleck. International Humanitarian Law after September 11: Challenges and the need 
to respond. – Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 2003 (6), lk 63. Peatükiga VII on 
rahvusvahelise rahu ja julgeoleku säilitamiseks või taastamiseks ÜRO Julgeolekunõukogule 
antud kompetents kasutada sunnimeetmeid. 
1107  T. Pfanner (viide 18), lk 305. 
1108  U. Palwankar (viide 55). 
1109  The states’ obligation to “respect and ensure respect” for International Humanitarian Law: 
from law to practice. Working Group chaired by G.-J. van Hegelsom. Improving Compliance 
with International Humanitarian Law. Proceedings of the Bruges Colloquium, September 11–
12, 2003. Brugges, Brussels: College of Europe, ICRC, 2004, lk 72. 
1110  Samas, lk 74. 
1111  U. Palwankar (viide 55). 
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Selle järgi võtsid riigid endale kohustuse kaitsta elanikkonda nelja kuriteo eest: 
genotsiid, etniline puhastus, inimsusvastased kuriteod ja sõjakuriteod. Lisaks 
nõustuti, et kui riik ei suuda või ei soovi seda kohustust täita, on rahvusvahelisel 
kogukonnal rikkumiste peatamiseks ja ennetamiseks abistamiskohustus. Kui ka 
seeläbi ei õnnestu nimetatud nelja kuriteo toimepanemist vältida, lasub ülejäänud 
maailma riikidel kohustus reageerida, sh vajadusel jõudu kasutades. Jõudu võib 
kasutada vaid ÜRO Julgeolekunõukogu loal.1112 
Ükskõik, kuidas jõustamismeetmeid klassifitseerida, on paljud autorid jõusta-
mise küsimuses skeptilised ja leiavad, et rahvusvaheliste õigusnormide arvu 
suurenemine viimase 80 aasta jooksul ei ole toonud kaasa samasugust arengut 
rahvusvaheliste kohtuotsuste puhul, samuti pole loodud protseduure rahvus-
vaheliste õigusnormide sunniviisiliseks jõustamiseks.1113 
Conforti ja Dunworth on järeldustes kõige skeptilisemad, viidates, et isegi need 
vähesed institutsioonilised jõustamismehhanismid, mis on pärast Teist maailma-
sõda loodud (sh ÜRO kollektiivne süsteem), ei ole täitnud neile pandud ootusi. 
Meetmed on olnud nii killustatud, detsentraliseeritud ja juhuslikud, et rebus sic 
stantibus ei ole võimalik rääkida rahvusvaheliste reeglite jõustamise tõhusast 
süsteemist.1114 
Iseseisvate jõustamismehhanismide puudumine viib rahvusvahelise õiguse 
valikulise jõustamiseni.1115 Selline jõustamine ja piiratud jõustamismehhanismid 
on olnud aluseks isegi rahvusvahelise õiguse legitiimsuse kahtluse alla sead-
misele. Riigid on rahvusvahelise õiguse kindlakstegemise ja täitmise ülesande 
suures osas reserveerinud endale. Nagu märkis Martti Koskenniemi, „see seab 
ohtu seadusandliku ja täitevvõimu eristamise, mis on nii raskelt saavutatud ja 
õiguse identiteedi jaoks nii oluline“1116. 
Seega on leitud, et rahvusvaheline humanitaarõigus jagab rahvusvahelise 
õiguse üldist kriitilist nõrkust, milleks on keskse jõustamisorgani puudumine ja 
sellest tulenev tõhusa rakendamise puudumine.1117 Tõepoolest, kui riik või veelgi 
enam mitteriiklik rühmitus keeldub rahvusvahelise humanitaarõiguse või tava-
õiguse reegleid täitmast, siis kes saab teda seaduskuulekusele sundida? See on 
jõustamisega seotud keskne ja määrav küsimus, mis eristab seda ka rakendamisest. 
                                                                                                 
1112  L. Lipre-Järma. Sõjaline sekkumine Liibüasse võib mõjutada riigisisestesse konflikti-
desse sekkumise põhimõtteid. – Diplomaatia, nr 110, oktoober 2012. Arvutivõrgus:  
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Publishers 1993, lk 5. 
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and National Legal Systems. H. Charlesworth (Ed.). Sydney: The Federation Press 2005, 
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4. Kokkuvõte 
Artikli piiratud mahu tõttu on väga raske analüüsida humanitaarõiguse päeva-
kajalisi probleeme kogu nende ulatuses. Siinkohal on sobiv viidata artikli autori 
samateemalisele doktoritöö käsikirjale1118, kus on kõigi kolme kategooria 
meetmed – ennetavad, järelevalve ja jõustamismeetmed – ning Genfi konvent-
sioonide esimese ühisartikli ulatus põhjalikult lahti kirjutatud. 
Mida võib aga ka põgusast ülevaatest järeldada, on asjaolu, et humanitaar-
õiguse rakendamiseks ja jõustamiseks on küllaldaselt meetmeid aluslepingutes 
endis. Nendeni on jõutud pikkade diplomaatiliste vaidluste järel ning neid on 
võimalik igal hetkel piisava poliitilise tahte korral rakendada. 
Rakendamine on rahvusvahelise humanitaarõiguse peamine proovikivi. Paul 
Berman ICRC-st avaldab kahetsust, et humanitaarõiguse väga peenelt välja-
töötatud ning pea universaalselt aktsepteeritud reeglite ja nende igapäevase 
rikkumise vahel on väga suur kontrast.1119 Tõepoolest, pärast rohkem kui sadat 
aastat humanitaarõiguse loomet ei tohiks eesmärgiks olla uus seadus, vaid olemas-
olevate normide tõhus rakendamine. 
Kui riigid kasutaksid kõiki neid jõupingutusi, õiguslikke vahendeid ja institut-
sionaalseid ressursse, millele on artiklis viidatud, saaks sõjakuritegude takista-
miseks ja rahvusvahelise humanitaarõiguse edasiarendamiseks palju ära teha.1120 
Kolmest väljatoodud kategooriast on just jõustamismeetmetesse suhtutud 
kõige skeptilisemalt. Mitu traditsiooniliselt lubatud meedet on tänaseks keelatud, 
rahvusvaheline kriminaalõigus toimib aeglaselt, kollektiivne julgeolekusüsteem 
annab küll tulemusi, kuid selle eest tuleb maksta väga kõrget hinda nii inimeludes 
kui ka rahaliselt. Kui jõustamismeetmed puuduvad või on ebaefektiivsed, ei jäägi 
ehk palju muud üle kui keskenduda ennetustegevusele. Humanitaarõiguse õpeta-
mise ja levitamise teel saab aidata kaasa sellise ühiskonna kasvamisele, kus 
rikkumised on juba iseenesest harvemad. 
Ennetamise ja riigisisese rakendamise diskursus vajab laiemat tähelepanu. 
Riigid peaksid küsima, mida nad ise saaksid selleks teha, et rikkumisi vähendada. 
Näiteks saaks üle vaadata riiklikud õppeprogrammid, sõjapidamise reeglid ja 
käsiraamatud, arvestada humanitaarõiguse vajadustega linnaplaneerimisel, lähe-
neda rikkumiste ennetamisele interdistsiplinaarselt. Ka dialoog mitteriiklike 
rühmitustega on vältimatu ja peab olema ennetustegevuse keskmes. Selleks 
annavad muuhulgas võimaluse konventsioonide lisaprotokollid, mille jõustu-
misest möödub käesoleval aastal 40 aastat.1121 
                                                                                                 
1118  Autori valduses. 
1119  P. Berman (viide 7). 
1120  J. Hoffmann (viide 42), lk 104. 
1121 Brugge rahvusvahelise humanitaarõiguse tunnustatud kollokvium keskendus sel aastal just 
dialoogile humanitaarabi organisatsioonide ja mitteriiklike rühmituste vahel ning võima-
lustele, mida protokollid ennetamiseks ja rakendamiseks pakuvad. Arvutivõrgus:  
http://www.coe-icrc.eu/en (25.10.2017). 
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Humanitaarõiguse rakendamise meetmetest ülevaate saamiseks ja riikide olu-
korra hindamiseks võiks tulevikus kehtestada kohustusliku aruandlussüsteemi. 
Globaliseerunud maailmas ei ole sisuliselt ükski konflikt enam riigi siseasi, vaid 
mõjutab kõike ümbritsevat. Mustvalgelt kirja pandud ja teiste riikide ette toodud 
sisereeglid ja rikkumised aitaksid ehk õiguskuulekusele kaasa. Mõeldamatu ei ole 
ka miski Euroopa Liidu rikkumismenetluse sarnane. Aruandlusega käsikäes 
saaks tõhustada ka rahvusvahelise uurimiskomisjoni tööd ning kasutada seda 
tänapäeva konfliktides nii tihti kui vaja. Loogilise jätkuna kuulub siia ka kaitsva 
riigi institutsiooni kasutamine või kaitsva riigi volituse andmine ICRC-le. 
 
Resümee on muutmata kujul artiklina avaldatud ajakirjas Juridica. Annika 
Talmar, “Rahvusvahelise humanitaarõiguse riigisisene rakendamine. Aktuaalseid 
probleeme”, 25 Juridica (2017) 479–489. 
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